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Abstract
This thesis seeks to trace the evolution of Korean social policy within the 
framework of T.H.MarshalTs citizenship theory. The following questions are raised:
1) does Korea have the historical and cultural foundations to secure citizenship rights?
2) has Korea followed Marshall’s developmental path of citizenship rights? 3) how far 
did Marshall’s sequence of emerging rights hold in Korea? 4) what obstacles have 
there been that have hindered the full development of citizenship rights in Korea, and 
what kind of impacts have they had on social policy in Korea? 5) how far do the 
conditions necessary for full citizenship rights and responsibilities exist today in 
Korea? To answer the questions, the thesis discusses first the foundations for 
citizenship in the pre-modem period and the consequence of Japanese colonisation. It 
then discusses the post-war period in more detail.
The findings suggest the following: 1) Korean society had some foundations on 
which citizenship could have been built, but began to take a divergent path, following 
colonisation and subsequent American occupation. 2) Since the 1960s the society has 
achieved rapid industrialisation but at the expense of citizens’ civil and political rights.
3) The development of social policy in Korea from the 1960s has reflected an 
authoritarian tradition, and hence failed to enshrine the basic principles o f social 
citizenship. Finally, 4) the thesis challenges the existing approaches to comparative 
study of social policy, in particular their reference to Korean welfare programmes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Over the years, many scholars of comparative social policy have argued that welfare 
states have largely developed in accordance with the nation’s socio-political traditions, and 
hence they are not the same. However, some scholars have also attempted to develop a 
universal framework that categorises different welfare states into several types by which a 
general developmental pattern emerges. Esping-Andersen’s welfare regime approach is one 
such example of the latter (Esping-Andersen 1990). This scholarly endeavour appears to 
have been successful in identifying why welfare states are different.
It seems, however, that the studies are weak in addressing how welfare states are 
different. They fell short in identifying the significant differences of each welfare state. 
This shortfall is particularly salient in the case of developing welfare states. Critics argue 
that comparative works have mainly focussed on the advanced welfare states. This one­
sided focus may more clearly define and distinguish the differences between the advanced 
welfare states, but not between the developed and the developing welfare states, let alone 
amongst the developing ones. For example, while discussing the Japanese welfare state, 
Esping-Andersen (1997; 1999: 92) labels it ‘a hybrid’ which offers little new to his 
Western-based ‘regimes’. Other scholars have described the welfare states in East Asia as 
being “oikonomic” (Jones 1990: 446), “Confiician” (Jones 1993: 198) welfare state, or 
“welfare Orientalism” (Goodman et al. 1998b: 10), which emphasises education and family 
as key components of welfare protection, with a well-developed firm-based welfare system. 
Such scholars tend to minimise the difference between these welfare systems and, at the 
same time, emphasise their differences from western models.
Discussions of the welfare state in the Republic of Korea (hereafter referred to as
Korea) have consistently followed this approach. For instance, many scholars consider the
Korean welfare state to be a product of the ‘Japanese welfare model’ in which occupational
welfare and familial protection systems were primary considerations (Goodman and Peng
14
1996). Whilst many Japanese welfare programmes became the model for Korean 
programmes, I shall argue that the underlying traditional basis of indigenous welfare 
programmes differed from the colonially imposed or derived programmes in several key 
respects. Moreover, this thesis will attempt to show that the Korean welfare state appears to 
belong neither to one of Esping-Andersen’s three welfare regimes nor to the Japanese 
welfare model. The Korean welfare state has been misunderstood. Thus, I will seek to 
explain how some unique features of the Korean welfare state emerged prior to 1997.
Why Citizenship?
This thesis attempts to reassess the Korean welfare state using Marshall’s concept of 
citizenship as a basic reference point. Originally expounded in Marshall’s Cambridge 
lectures in 1948, it set out an ‘ideal type’ model for a modem democratic welfare society 
which Marshall claimed had emerged in Western Europe and notably in the United 
Kingdom after the Second World War. It provided a middle way, he claimed, between the 
communist model that was then dominating Eastern Europe and the pure capitalist model 
represented by the United States. His theory is discussed and criticised later in chapter 2. 
This thesis does not assume that Marshall’s historical account is necessarily correct, nor 
that the European institutions he describes necessarily fully embody the pattern of rights 
and duties he ascribes to them (Parker 1975; Glennerster 2000). However, the threefold 
categorisation of legal, political and social rights does form a well understood framework 
that is embodied in international declarations of human rights to which nations at least give 
nominal adherence. They form a useful coherent template against which to test a nation’s 
social institutions. Marshall’s central contention that welfare institutions must be built on 
legal and political rights and freedoms and that these are interdependent with welfare rights 
is of particular importance in the Korean case. At the same time, a discussion of welfare 
states should deal not just with the outcomes of their programmes but also their sources that 
reflect the idiosyncratic socio-politico-economic traditions of each welfare state and have 
thus resulted in the current differences. I will attempt to identify these traditions by
15
discussing the civil and political components of citizenship as a foundation for social rights. 
Failure to acknowledge these traditions leads to problems of over-generalisation and the 
lack of due acknowledgement of the particular features of welfare states.
This tendency occurs throughout much of the research conducted on the characteristics 
of East Asian welfare states. This research is mostly about Japanese and Chinese welfare 
systems, and additionally other newly industrialised countries including Korea (Anderson 
1993; Goodman and Peng 1996; Jacobs 1998). However, the focus is usually on the 
analysis of the contemporary welfare states, and does not take a more comprehensive 
viewpoint that deals with their origins. They do not avoid the mistake that Esping-Andersen 
(2002: 6) calls “snapshot diagnoses” of different welfare states. There are also some works 
dealing with Asian citizenship, mainly from a sociological perspective, and these focus on 
both Japanese and Chinese society, but in turn with little discussion in relation to welfare 
(for example, Ikegami 1996; Wong 1999; Keane 2001). One reason for this is that the 
comparative study of the region is in a nascent stage. Another reason may be that many 
analysts have construed citizenship to be a synonym for the welfare state. Even if social 
policy discourse focuses significantly on citizenship, it does not represent the entity of 
citizenship because the debate of citizenship involves not just the welfare state but also the 
dynamics between the state and society that requires the inclusion of civil and political 
rights in any discussion. That is, although there have been studies dealing with either the 
Asian welfare systems or citizenship, these do not usually contain an in-depth study of its 
socio-politico-economic roots. Hence, they miss their distinct contributions to the modem 
features of welfare (Goodman and Peng 1996; Kwon 1997a; Goodman et al. 1998a; 
Goodman, White, and Kwon 1998b; Joo 1999; 1999). I would argue that this lack of 
awareness of such foundations could hinder the understanding of how social protection 
systems have emerged with distinctive features and operate in this region.
This thesis aims to identify the driving force(s) of Korean social policy, as one case of 
welfare states, within the framework of T.H.Marshall’s citizenship theory. The following 
questions arise from this examination: 1) Does Korea have the historical and cultural 
foundations to secure citizenship rights? 2) Has Korea followed Marshall’s developmental
16
path of citizenship rights? 3) How far did Marshall’s sequence of emerging rights hold in 
Korea? 4) What obstacles have there been that have hindered the full development of 
citizenship rights in Korea, and what kind of impacts have they had on social policy in 
Korea? And 5) How far do the conditions necessary for full citizenship rights and 
responsibilities exist today in Korea? By answering these questions, the thesis attempts to 
achieve a comprehensive evaluation of Korean social policy, as well as suggesting a new 
framework to comparative study of social policy
Organisation of the Thesis
The thesis consists of nine chapters. The introductory chapter outlines the research 
questions posed. Chapter 2 elaborates Marshall’s principles of citizenship and discusses 
critiques that have been made of it. Chapter 3 looks into the traditions of citizenship in 
Korea in order to determine whether there are any similarities with the foundations for 
citizenship development in western societies. Chapter 4 discusses how and to what extent 
the citizenship foundations were dismantled while Korea underwent colonial rule. The 
following four chapters examine the modem period of Korean society starting from the 
inception of nation-hood to 1997. As generally understood, the society of this era was one 
where authoritarian politics became the norm. I have distinguished three periods according 
to changes to the traits of this authoritarianism. First, the period from liberation to 1960 was 
one in which the modem authoritarian pattern was set. The second period to be considered 
is that of the 1960s to the 1980s during which military rule was consolidated with a strong 
presidency. The third period is from 1987 to 1997 during which the society experienced 
democratic transition but also the advent of a conservative political regime. Chapter 5 and 6 
are divided into three sections, with the first section discussing the background and 
characteristics of authoritarian rule, the second its effects on civil and political rights, and 
the third their effects on social rights.
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Given that the recent stage of citizenship development in Korea has the greatest bearing 
on the current state of Korean citizenship and thus needs to be discussed in more detail, the 
third period is divided into Chapters 7 and 8. Chapter 7 discusses the democratic transition 
and how it affected civil and political rights. Chapter 8 focuses on social rights. While each 
chapter of the thesis discusses social rights implemented in a specific period from the 
viewpoint of citizenship principles, Chapter 8 exclusively focuses on the recent state of 
social rights. This is done by focusing on social security programmes. The last chapter 
returns to the research questions and summarises the findings. It ends by briefly discussing 
the impact of Korea’s characteristic historical path on its social policy after 1997.
Names and terms have been romanised in accordance with accepted norms in the 
English-speaking world. For translating Korean, the McCune-Reischauer system was used, 
and for Chinese and Japanese the Wade-Giles and Hepburn system respectively.
Definitions of Terms
Capitalism. In general, this term refers to the economic system that is characterised by 
“wage-labour and commodity production for sale, exchange, and profit rather than the 
immediate need of the producers” (Marshall 1998: 53). This system began to develop in the 
UK and France from the eighteenth century in line with the progress of the Industrial 
Revolution and extended to other parts of the world, such as Germany and America in the 
nineteenth century. There are two representative scholars who analysed the characteristics 
of capitalism: Karl Marx and Max Weber. Marx viewed capitalism’s most essential feature 
as residing in the production relations which can be epitomised by class conflicts based on 
the exploitative relations between capital and labour, which eventually led to its transition 
to socialism and communism (Giddens 1971: 35-45). However, Weber saw capitalism as 
rational conduct on the basis of the idea of the calling. In his view, capitalism is defined as 
“one which rests on the expectation of profit by the utilization of opportunities for 
exchange, that is on (formally) peaceful chances of profit”(Weber 1920-lb: 17). Thus, in
18
Weber’s understanding, exchange and peaceful chances are the key components of 
capitalism.
Despite these different understandings of the essential traits of capitalism, there appears 
to be common agreement among scholars that capitalism originated from the break-up of 
feudalistic relations of production, which led to the development of new institutional 
features such as private property, free labour, labour produce and an extensive monetary 
system. This is in alignment with what Marshall called “individual economic freedom” 
sustained by such basic civil rights as “the right to own property and to conclude valid 
contracts”, and “the right to work” (Marshall 1963b: 74, 78-9). In this vain, the 
establishment of civil rights are, as Marshall claimed, regarded as the basic precondition for 
the development of capitalism. Simultaneously, as social historians (for example, Moore 
1967; Thompson 1968) claim, the development of capitalism can be the basis of the 
extension of civil rights as it also facilitated the growth of groups of bourgeois and labour, 
which were the sources of civil society. Thus, when referring to capitalism, this thesis 
mainly focuses on its origins, rather than the disputed arena of its traits, as a condition for 
the development of civil rights.
Democracy. Although there are a number of variants across the world in theory and 
practice, the term democracy is generally considered to include such common principles as 
“real representation of different interest; free and fair elections; a genuine choice between 
candidates and polities; real parliamentary power; the separation of power; civil rights for 
all citizens; and the rule of law” (Marshall 1998: 147). In the realm of citizenship, 
democracy can be defined as a political system which fulfils citizens’ political rights. In 
addition, as will be seen in Ch.2, one of the principles stipulated by Marshall’s citizenship 
is of participation which enables citizens to take part in the process of policy making, as 
well as in the promotion of welfare. Therefore, in this thesis, democracy is taken to mean a 
political system which embraces not only those common principles but also participatory 
democracy.
19
Imperial presidency. This term was originally coined by Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. to 
refer to the Nixon government in which the president held supreme power in the process of 
political decision making, while Congress was in a weak position (Schlesinger Jr. 1974). In 
Korean politics, the exercise of this presidential power goes beyond the American case, and 
is much closer to autocratic rule. Whereas the American political system contains a 
mechanism of checks-and-balances which does not permit such a strong exercise of power, 
the Korean political system did not develop such a mechanism, at least during the period 
that this thesis deals with. Even though the principle of division of powers was stipulated 
by the constitution, it was not put into practice. This was particularly the case after the 
effectuation of the autocratic Yushin constitution in 1972. Korean presidents were able to 
dominate not just the National Assembly (NA) but also other governmental institutions 
such as the Judiciary. In this context, the term, imperial presidency, is more applicable to 
Korea than America.
The basic features of the imperial presidency can be summarised as follows. First, the 
president dominates the entire political process both as the head of the government and as 
the leader of the ruling party. Thus, while the president can preside patemalistically over 
the political stage, leading to the centralisation of policy decisions, other political apparatus 
such as the NA and political parties play only a minor role, or even come under the 
president control, especially when they voice any opposition to his policies. Second, the 
centralisation of political power leads to the over-expansion of the presidential bureaucracy, 
so that the balance of power among the governmental ministries breaks down, with 
preferential privileges given to those ministries which carry out the policies prioritised by 
the president. Third, the resultant process of centralisation develops an exclusive structure 
of decision-making in which only a few ministers, bureaucrats and his secretaries can 
influence presidential policy making. Thus, rather than by an open and ‘bottom-up’ way, 
the major decisions are made in a clandestine and ‘top-down* fashion. Consequently, 
policies are more likely to be developed in a conspiracy-based fashion, not in an open and 
democratic way (Paik 1990: 52-53; Chung 1993: 91-96).
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Nationalism. Basically, this term has two principal concepts: 1) the attitude that the 
members of a nation have when they care about their identity as members of that nation and 
(2) the actions that the members of a nation take in seeking to achieve or sustain some form 
of political sovereignty (Miscevic Winter 2001). But, the term has developed into a variety 
of meanings, reflecting the different cultural and political settings to which the term applies. 
According to Kohn (1946), Western Europe, especially England and France where civil 
revolution took place, developed a form of nationalism called ‘civic nationalism’ which 
was inspired by the people’s search for the rights vis-a-vis the rights of the king and the 
feudal caste system. However, Eastern Europe developed a type of nationalism which can 
be used to justify the creation of nation-states and political processes in conformity with 
ethnographic demands. Thus, the latter can also be called ‘ethnic nationalism’ (Greenfeld 
1992). In addition to these two, there has been suggested other variants of nationalism. One 
distinctive example is what is called ‘religious nationalism’ which is strongly associated 
with Islam and Judaism, and also with the experience of Poland and Ireland in which 
Roman Catholicism has had a great influence on forming the national identity (Marshall 
1998: 440). In this regard, the variant of nationalism which is closest to Marshall’s 
definition of citizenship is that of civic nationalism, as it can be understood as the people’s 
quest for civil rights.
In the Korean context, the term nationalism has generally referred to ‘national 
resistance,’ mainly in opposition to the intervention of foreign powers and in the protection 
of sovereign rights (Lee 1979a: 18-9). Due to its geographical position as a peninsula, 
traditional Korea was subject to invasion and intervention by neighbouring countries such 
as China and Japan. When the former developed their strategic interests toward the Pacific 
Ocean, more specifically Japan, and when the latter sought to expand the Asian Continent, 
these nations wanted to use Korea as a bridge. This led to many invasions of Korea, and 
resulted in the development of a mind-set which was resistant to foreign influences. This 
was particularly so by the end of the Choson dynasty (1392-1910) when not just the 
neighbouring countries, including Russia, but also other western ones such as America, 
Britain, and France attempted to expand their influence on the country, and culminated in
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colonisation by Japan (Lee 1979b: 56-60). These traits of ‘Korean nationalism’ are still 
influential in the minds of many Koreans as liberation in 1945 was achieved by foreign 
powers and American influence has prevailed since then.
In this vain, the notion of ‘Korean nationalism of resistance’ differs from that of 
Marshall’s idea of civic nationalism, in that it made no direct contributions to the 
development of civil rights. As Lee (1979b: 60-64) asserts, this form of Korean nationalism 
was not one which gave rise to groups of capitalists and bourgeois; thus a critical factor 
contributing towards the development of civil society and democracy was missing in the 
Korean context. Yet, as we will see, it sometimes contributed to the mobilisation of civil 
power, which sometimes functioned as a driving force of social reform which eventually 
led to the development of basic civil rights.
Research Methods and Their Limits
This thesis principally takes a historical approach. As Castles (1989: 12) claims, a 
“historical approach is essential....in providing analytical leverage on the role of human 
agency in public policy, (as well as)...in making it possible to treat structural contexts as a 
totality.... History reveals the one sense in which it is meaningful to say that the sum is 
more than its parts: the sense in which human action is embedded in its particular context”. 
According to Skocpol, historical sociology has three different research strategies: 1) 
applying a general model to explain historical instances, 2) using concepts to develop a 
meaningful historical interpretation and 3) analysing causal regularities in history. Each 
strategy can either take the approach of a single case study or one of multiple case studies 
(Skocpol 1984: 362-386). Therefore, according to this classification, this research is a 
single case study sustained by a mixture of the first two strategies. This means that by 
adopting a case-oriented approach, this thesis uses a method that helps to achieve a 
“historically interpretive and causally analytic” goal in comparative study (Ragin 1987: 35). 
At the same time, the research uses two of three strategies. To answer the first research
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question, this thesis takes modernization approach guided by the first strategy. To answer 
questions 2 to 4, this research utilises the second strategy.
I have attempted to assess the quality of the historical materials using the following 
four criteria: authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning (Scott 1990: 6-8). To 
maintain these criteria at the highest possible level, the research data primarily comes from 
government documents, legislation, official statistics, and reports or documents of relevant 
organizations, and media articles. These primary sources were drawn from such institutions 
as the Korean National Assembly Library, relevant government ministries and research 
institutions, the British Library of Political and Economic Science, and the School of 
Oriental and African Studies Library. I supplemented these primary sources with secondary 
data using material drawn from books, journals, working papers and degree dissertations 
from those libraries and relevant websites. In addition, I returned to Korea for a year to 
interview civil servants in the welfare departments and scholars at various research centres.
In relation to the research methodology and the data collection, there are several key 
limitations. First, it often happens that the interpretation of historical data involves a ‘story­
telling’ or ‘narrative description’, which might be regarded as inappropriate for an 
academic work advancing a critique of generalised theorisation. This research is not 
exceptional in this regard. Indeed, it could also be argued that there is a precedent in many 
recent single-case studies that have followed this approach as exemplified by Skocpol’s 
work on USA social policy (1995). Second, as many scholars point out, there is a problem 
regarding the reliability of Korean statistical data. This is mainly because the country did 
not have an official statistical office until 1961, so that documents and statistics were often 
not published in a consistent and reliable manner. To avoid the use of possibly unreliable 
data from the various source agencies responsible for their production, this research uses 
up-to-date sources so that the data is in a consistent format compatible with international 
criteria. Third, and more fundamentally, the closed nature of politics during much of the 
period means that the records available are limited and rather uncritical. Accounts by 
insiders are rare and independent research by academics was limited especially in the early 
periods.
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Finally, one of the limitations of this thesis is that it does not examine in detail the 
significant events which occurred during the post-1997 period. This period marked a tumig 
point in Korean social policy with an overhaul of economic and welfare programmes, 
which was instituted by the Kim Dae Jung (Kim Taejung) administration. Several reason 
can be offered to explain this. First, the period of field study ended in 1997. Significant 
events have occurred since then. Korean economic and social policy has been overhauled 
and affected by world events. I discuss these briefly in the final chapter and reflect on the 
lasting legacy my chosen period has had on recent events. However, my main study of 
Korean secondary sources, interviews and primary data relates to the period up to 1997. 
Second, the limited space of the thesis did not allow me to discuss in greater detail the post- 
1997 changes to Korean social policy. Thus, I put a sub-section in the concluding chapter 
as ‘an epilogue* to outline an overview of the changes from the viewpoint of citizenship, 
while leaving a more detailed examination for further research. Third, I would contend that 
my focus on the period of Korean history from pre-modem to 1997 is appropriate and 
sufficient on the grounds that it contains the major driving forces and undercurrent shaping 
the development of social policy and, more broadly, citizenship in Korea.
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Chapter 2
Citizenship Theory
This chapter aims to develop a framework for a comparative study of citizenship that 
claims universal applicability, principally focusing on T. H. Marshall’s theory. For this, it 
first looks into the details of the theory by examining its three elements, tracing Marshall’s 
evolving ideas and additions made by later scholars. Following on from this, I will adopt 
three complementary perspectives of the development of welfare states, partly as a response 
to criticism raised against the theory and partly as an attempt to build a universal 
framework.
2.1 Three Episodes of Citizenship History
In an attempt to define the origins of modem definition of citizenship, some (UN 
Centre for Human Rights 1992; Gouldner 1994; Habermas 1994; Oliver and Heater 1994) 
go back to the ancient Greek period and examine the political system of that time. However, 
to find the origin of modem citizenship in the Greek period seems to pose critical problems. 
As Turner (1994: 3) points out, whilst modem citizenship asserts the ideal of equal status 
regardless of an individual’s economic and social situation, the Greek political system was 
based on a slave economy, as well as on a paternalistic system which precluded women and 
slaves from legal participation in the political process. This characteristic of the Greek 
socio-political system imposed an unavoidable limitation on the fiirther development of 
citizenship ideas of that time.
A more convincing approach, which can overcome the shortcomings of the ancient- 
society-based approach, is that based on the ‘modernisation’ process. For modernisation 
scholars, citizenship has its origins in the late middle age, and the development of 
citizenship is understood as the process of modernisation (Marshall 1963b; Bendix 1964;
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Durkheim 1984; Turner and Hamilton 1994). For them, the starting point of modem 
citizenship commenced with the structural differentiation of society, or social division, 
from feudal mode of social relationship. This differentiation was driven by the civil and 
industrial revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in association with 
liberation of subjecthood from the feudal system, or regime ancienne (Bottomore 1992: 56). 
Well-recognised examples of such a new trend included the French Revolution of 1789, the 
civil movements and the emergence of cities in Britain, the USA and elsewhere in Europe, 
which had a direct effect on the emergence of modem society.
Departing from this generalised explanation, each country experienced a different 
history of citizenship, reflecting the differences in its indigenous systems of culture, 
geography, and politics. Comparing the West with the East in terms of modes of 
interrelationship between states and individuals, Nisbet (1994: 7-8) argued that citizenship 
development in western societies progressed differently from oriental societies. Generally 
speaking, Asian societies presented a social structure in which individual lives were 
controlled by family, clan, village, and caste by which the power of king or emperor was 
prevented from penetrating into civil life. In the West, however, from the late middle Ages 
history has been concerned with stories of individualisation. Through such associational 
forms as the guild and town, the individual and sovereign were brought closer together in 
legal and administrative terms. This trend in the West proved to be instrumental to the 
formation of citizenship, and resulted in its faster development in the West relative to the 
East. Yet, it is not just the contrast between the West and the East that produce such 
differences.
The differences are also found among western societies. As Turner and Hamilton 
(1994: 7-8) argue, there have been three fundamentally different experiences of citizenship 
history in the West. The first is the British tradition that is centred around the historical 
relationship between welfare and citizenship and a debate focussed primarily on the nature 
of social class and the development of democracy. Second, there is a North American 
tradition of citizenship in relation to ethnicity, the core of which has been the relationship 
between ethnic groups, nationalism and the state. Americans have been concerned with the
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need to absorb a multiplicity of groups from other nation states, and to weld them into a 
cohesive society, which owe allegiance to the institutions of their new country. The last 
tradition is a European debate about citizenship. This has focussed on the issues of the 
relationship between the public and the private, or civil society and individuals. However, 
these debates are interrelated in terms of interpreting the nature of citizenship, and also 
reveal some similarity with Nisbet’s accounts on the emergence of citizenship in that they 
explain citizenship history based on the relationship between the state and civil society.
The principal approach this thesis supports is that of T.H. Marshall, since it is most 
closely associated with social policy. But, the others will be also considered at appropriate 
points.
2.2 T. H. Marshall’s Citizenship Theory
T.H. Marshall characterises the modernisation history of western societies as the 
evolution of three rights: civil, political and social. According to his definition, “citizenship 
is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the 
status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed” 
(Marshall 1963b: 87). He explained that civil rights had their inception in the eighteenth 
century, with political and social rights following on in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries respectively. Furthermore, he emphasised the important point that each of these 
three rights are independent in terms of developmental processes and character, but they 
must be interdependent and supplement each other in order to embody a full citizenship 
through which equality of status can be achieved. These three rights are characterised as 
follows.
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2.2.1 Civil Rights
Civil rights are defined as rights indispensable for realising individual freedom, which 
are composed of “liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to 
own property and to conclude valid contracts and the right to justice” (Marshall 1963b: 74). 
These rights had made their initial appearance in Britain through the establishments of 
Habeas Corpus (1679) and the Toleration Act (1689) and the gradual abolition of the 
censorship of the press, but also were extended by Catholic Emancipation Act (1829) and 
the repeal of the Combination Acts (1824) (Marshall 1963b: 77). However, more visible 
and direct effects on the embodiment of civil rights were made by the Industrial Revolution 
and civil movements, which swept the western countries in those times. Through the 
achievement of civil rights, citizens came to have a legal foundation for free contracts, and 
property accumulation.
This definition denotes two important characteristics of civil rights. First, it addresses 
the issue of how they have emerged into an individual personhood from the feudal social 
system. Whilst some scholars go back to the ancient city-states to find prototypal models of 
citizenship (for example, Riesenberg 1992), most attribute its origin to socio-economic 
changes in modem history, in particular to the personal emancipation from the hierarchy 
imposed by the medieval social order. Discussions of this kind are usually accompanied by 
explanations of the people’s connection to the central power of the state and to citizens ’ 
movements that sought more equal status. They centre on such civil revolutions in 
European countries as the French Revolution, or the so-called ‘Glorious Bloodless 
Revolution in England’ in 1688. At the same time, this process also requires us to consider 
economic transformations in society, because the changing basis of economic power was a 
main tool for individuals to acquire civil and political rights in those times. The growth of 
free cities and their attainment of economic and political autonomy from central 
government are critical for understanding different aspects of social changes in different 
countries (Weber 1923: 315-337).
Second, civil rights have a close connection to the capitalist economy, as their pillars 
are defined as the rights to property, to conclude contracts and equality before the law.
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They all play an important role in enabling the capitalist production mechanism to work 
efficiently. Thus they could be argued as having a functional role to support capitalism. 
Civil rights interpret the idea of freedom as a passive one, ‘freedom from’ (usually, the 
state). Thus, equality of citizen was advocated only with respect to law and construed as 
‘the equal right to natural freedom”, which emphasised equal opportunity rather than 
equality of condition or/and result. The core idea of these rights was concisely expressed by 
Tawney (1938: 111): “the law is just. It punishes equally the rich and the poor for stealing 
bread.” The idea of equal opportunity means that individuals not only have an equal right to 
develop and realise their own aptitude and ability, but also get just what they paid or 
invested. This principle is to give ultimate priority to the market mechanism. The state 
should intervene in the market only when society is disordered and the market cannot carry 
out its function of productive activity by social problems like poverty, disease and crime, in 
which the state played a ‘caretaker’ role of night-watcher. In such a society, equality is 
considered to be attainable through an acknowledgement of the existence of inequality, 
rather than through the active attempt to remove it.
222 Political Rights
Political rights refer to “the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a 
member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the member of such a 
body. The corresponding institutions are parliament and councils of local government” 
(Marshall 1963b: 74). The growth of these rights was firstly due to the growth of civil 
society in the wake of such civil revolutions as the French revolution. Secondly it is 
ascribable to the rapidly growing working class movement in the nineteenth and the 
twentieth centuries.
In the transitional process from feudal system to capitalism, the new class of
bourgeoisie, which could accumulate magnificent wealth, came to have the opportunity to
participate in the parliamentary system in return for tax paying. However, in that period, the
franchises were unequally distributed only to educated wealthy males, so as to take the
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form of a closed “group monopoly” (Marshall 1963b: 80). While the emergence of civil 
rights made it possible for people to express their own interests, these were limited only to 
a few elite groups who had property and education. As long as this group controlled 
legislative power, the majority of the population was oppressed in exercising its ability to 
change life opportunities and oppressive structures in society. In most cases, public 
problems were regarded as private matters with which the legislators, who comprised the 
elite, did not need to concern themselves.
The growing power of legislatures and the widening electoral base of those legislatures 
in Europe and the United States form the second strand of Marshall’s historical account. 
From this view, it is important to note that even though Marshall discusses political rights 
in terms of the expansion of the franchise, their developments should be considered in the 
broader context of democracy; that is, political rights ought to be construed as being one of 
two principal contributors to the development of the welfare system: capitalism and 
democracy (Flora and Alber 1981). This interpretation may encompass what Marshall 
termed ‘democratic citizenship’ (Marshall 1963b: 80).
As political rights were expanded to the general public as a result of labour and 
political movements, they were able to elect or expel a legislator who did or did not 
advocate their interests, so that they could better obtain social measures from the 
government. The emergence of democratic government gave the opportunity to construct a 
collective society. They came to the realisation that the problems with which they were 
confronted derived from the social structure and that they could produce a social consensus 
to reform it. The development of the welfare state and the guarantee of social rights were 
seen as a good example of their attempt to reconstruct the structure of oppression and 
opportunity (Twine 1994: 174).
The developmental history of civil and political rights was driven by conflict 
particularly through the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The combination of both 
civil rights in the economic stage and political rights in the political stage provided an 
ideological basis on which capitalism could grow in civil society (Twine 1994). From a
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historical perspective, however, even though democracy and market capitalism have 
developed alongside each other, there exists a basic tension between both; whilst 
democracy supports the notion of vertical equality insofar as it upholds ‘one-vote-per- 
person’, capitalism upholds individuals’ differential power and influence accorded by 
unequal holdings of wealth. As Marshall describes it, “citizenship and the capitalist system 
in the twentieth century were at war” (Marshall 1963b: 87). A compromise therefore needs 
to be established between principles of democracy and capitalism in order for democracy to 
become a viable choice. In other words, whilst those who do not have the means of 
production, on the one hand, need to come to terms with the private property system, those 
who possess the means of production need not only accept the distributive needs of other 
social classes for resources, but also concede, at least in part, the need for a political system 
which would implement a program of redistribution, on the other hand (Przeworski and 
Wallerstein 1985: 72). Marshall understands this compromise as the development of social 
rights.
2.23 Social Rights
Social rights are conceptualised as being on a continuum of rights “from the right to a 
modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the foil in the social 
heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the 
society. The institutions most closely connected with it are the educational system and the 
social services” (Marshall 1963b: 74). In the narrow meaning, therefore, social rights can 
be obtained through community membership and functional relations among members. But, 
if the wider perspective is taken to the national level, the rights to the minimum level of 
economic welfare and social security can be warranted by market regulation (labour 
legislation), supplements (social security) and substitutes (social services) by government 
(Flora and Alber 1981: 40).
The expansion from political rights to social right means that basic human rights have
been transferred from the political to the social arena, and the most important set of rights
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in the latter arena is that secured by social welfare services. As social rights come into force, 
the individuals can participate fully in community life. The critical point is that there is a 
fundamental difference between civil and political rights based on liberalism and 
democracy and social rights expressed by the welfare state. Whilst individualistic principles 
are defined in a passive way so as to be based on ‘negative freedom’ (Berlin 1969: 122- 
123), social rights require the active and interventionist political system or government. 
These social rights give the material basis to the formal status of citizenship and thus secure 
a certain level of material well-being required to fully exercise the participatory rights in 
community life (Van Steenbergen 1993: 3).
The second key feature of social rights is related to the need to make the other two 
rights more effective. Indeed, unless a basic level of economic security could be assured 
and thus certain behaviour could be performed, typical civil rights such as freedom of life 
and conscience may lose some part of their moral importance in individual life (Moon 
1988: 42). As Twine (1994: 104) describes, civil right and political right have to be 
supported by social rights. If not, the tripod of citizenship would lose its balance because 
the three components of citizenship are interdependent. If social rights were not secured, 
civil and political rights of workers and their families would be even more difficult to be 
acquired. In the meantime, when these three rights become integrated into one set of rights, 
society can be said as achieving the full citizenship by which all community members can 
enjoy a civilised life.
The third requirement of social citizenship is to assure equal social value for every 
member of society that would enable the acquisition of full membership in community and 
participation in a way of life which society regards as being worthy of value. The idea of 
equal social value implies that there should be a minimum level of resources or the 
presence of a ‘safety net’ sufficient to sustain one’s status in society (Moon 1988: 42). This 
might result in social integration, or social solidarity.
Many argue that the Marshall’s account of social rights is principally based on the 
British context, and thus not properly applicable for other societies, especially for non-
32
European ones which did not experience the development of civil and political rights. This 
will be discussed in detail in the later part of this chapter. Yet, the point we should note 
here is that most countries of these days progressed to the extent to name themselves as a 
welfare state that enshrine the idea of social rights in their welfare institutions. Thus, little 
reason arises to deny the possibility of social rights to social rights beyond their birthplace.
In Britain, social rights have been embodied through various social welfare services 
between the late nineteenth to the twentieth centuries in the soil of political rights already 
achieved. The substance of these rights were found in many welfare-related laws from the 
Elizabeth Poor Law (1601), of which Marshall appreciated the strengths but also criticised 
weaknesses (Marshall 1975: 35-44), to Speenhamland System (1795) for which Polanyi 
appreciated as a big step from the pre-modem to modem society (Polanyi 1944: 77-85). 
However, the most distinctive feature of social rights appeared in what Beveridge termed as 
‘social insurance and allied services’. This report suggested the state had a responsibility to 
slay the ‘five giants’ (or structural problems in capitalism) such as ‘want, disease, 
ignorance, idleness, and squalor’ (Beveridge 1942).
The famous report was primarily concerned with reforming social insurance though 
various assumptions were explicitly made about a free national health service, family 
allowances and full employment. The report also recommended a National Assistance 
scheme that would and did create a national safety net or a national minimum for all 
residents. Social insurance was to be universal and compulsory in coverage covering 
sickness, unemployment, and old age. It was this combination which not only caught the 
British political imagination but was also internationally influential (Hills et al. 1994).
Marshall’s citizenship theory seems to share some critical points in common with 
Beverage’s report, without the apparent limitations contained in the report. They stand on 
common ground in that both maintain the liberalistic doctrine that state should not have to 
ignore individual’s incentive, opportunity and responsibility in implementing the social 
insurance. But, Beveridge’s report failed to be implemented in its authentic form, leaving a 
legacy of a public assistance state in the post-war Britain (Glennerster and Evans 1994). In
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this context, Parker (1975: 61) argues, Beveridge’s ‘minimum living standard’ was not 
citizenship, but comprised certain types of state benefits that caused recipients a feeling of 
stigma. Marshall’s social rights appear to overcome this weakness by asserting the right to 
state benefits. Whilst Beveridge enlarged the definition of social welfare from social 
assistance to social services, Marshall took the argument about social rights beyond social 
insurance including education, health and housing in his definition.
In modem capitalist society, welfare policy plays a critical role to ensure a minimum 
income and high standards of social service for individuals and families regardless of their 
productive ability and social status or class property (Briggs 1961). Indeed, Marshall has 
argued that this relates to ensuring optimal welfare for all people, and does not simply mean 
securing a minimum level of welfare for them (Marshall 1972: 29-30). In this sense, social 
policy could be seen as aiming to minimise the people’s exposure to and dependence on the 
market, to diminish commodification of the labour force as far as possible and to pursue 
social solidarity and equality (Esping-Andersen 1985a: 145-149). Mouffe also presented a 
similar view arguing that all citizens, irrespective of their status, have to acknowledge new 
rights that could be acquired in the production activity by which we as citizens could secure 
not only political rights but also economic and social rights (Mouffe 1988, re-quoted in 
Lister 1990: 460).
In this sense, social rights might be regarded as a direct challenge to social class which 
stratifies a society to the extent that most people have to sell their labour in exchange for a 
certain standard of living. As Marshall pointed out, social rights have to be considered as an 
instrument by which social interests reach beyond social class to equal status, and all 
people can obtain economic and social security. Therefore, Marshall’s analysis of 
citizenship theory can be constmed in its narrowest sense as the hierarchical promotion of 
individuals in society through the egalitarian distribution of income and educational 
opportunity (Marshall 1972).
However, a more important contribution of Marshall’s analysis is the examination of 
the relationship that exists between citizenship and social class. A critical focus is on how
34
far citizenship has diminished social inequality and achieved equality o f status within a 
given surrounding of capitalist economy. Accordingly, the relationship between social 
rights and ‘right to welfare’ should not be defined simply in one-dimensional way. Social 
rights have as their principal meaning ‘rights to benefits’, but it also has to be stressed that 
such benefits received through social rights should be wide and universal. The core o f 
citizenship approach, as formulating the reality o f social rights, is that these rights should 
be created so as to protect an individual’s standing as a community member who has full 
participatory rights in community life. In other words, social rights are based on the notion 
o f need which is the critical criterion for guaranteeing individuals access to a livelihood in 
society (Harris 1987: 50). For social rights, as rights to redistribution, are rooted more in 
equal social value rather than in equal natural rights. From this kind of logic the notion is 
derived that all people who possess social citizenship have ‘rights to welfare’ which 
legitimises the active state intervention in the market.
I have examined the dynamics o f three rights’ developmental process and their 
characteristics. Although each right is distinctive with respect to the formation period and 
circumstance, it is critical to note that three rights have to be incorporated into one 
framework for the sake o f coherence. The early to mid twentieth century was the time o f 
great expansion of the three rights, with social rights completing the last stage of 
citizenship development. Table 2-1 shows that process in a summarised way.
Table 2-1 Growth of Citizenship
Civil Rights Political Rights Social Rights
Characteristic
Period
The eighteenth 
century
The nineteenth 
century
The twentieth century
Defining Principle Individual freedom Political freedom Social freedom
Typical measure Habeas corpus, 
freedom of speech, 
thought and faith; 
freedom to enter into 
legal contracts
Rights to vote, 
parliamentary reform, 
payment for MPs
Free education, 
pensions, health care, 
the welfare state
 ► Cumulative  ►
Source: (Pierson 1991: 23)
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Early in the development of citizenship, civil and political rights were most the core 
position of citizenship status. The degree of economic welfare, education and health care 
that citizens could enjoy was completely a personal matter. These were regarded as 
‘private’ activities in that they had to be acquired by individual endeavour in the market 
place. However, social citizenship in Marshall’s view was eventually achieved in the 
twentieth century through the foundational establishment of civil and political rights. Social 
citizenship refers to rights which exist independently of an individuals’ status in the market 
and comprises education, medical care and other resources necessary for economic security 
(Plant 1992: 15-16). From Marshall’s perspective, achieving social citizenship means 
declaring “the end of history” or at least “the end of citizenship history” (Van Steenbergen 
1993: 3).
2.3 Evolution of T.H. Marshall’s Ideas
T.H. Marshall’s basic notion of citizenship rights draws on two earlier theorists; Alfred 
Marshall and Leonard Trelawney Hobhouse. Alfred Marshall, writing at the turn of 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, argued the importance of education and work 
experience as tools of enlightenment and embourgeoisement of citizens. He asserted: 
“through technical progress, extensive education and short hours of work a gentlemen- 
occupied society would be assured, from which the long time o f toil had been excluded and 
in which no one would have an occupation which tended to make him anything else than a 
gentleman” (Halsey 1975: 11). He also demonstrates that “by reducing the incidence of 
soul-destroying manual labour and extending educational and cultural opportunities, the 
divisive effect of class would give way to new forms of social consensus and co-operation 
within a society” (Pinker 1995: 104).
The second influential scholar in forming T.H. Marshall’s ideas was Hobhouse, who 
encapsulated, in Liberalism, various kinds of liberty in the order of historical development: 
civil liberty, fiscal liberty, personal liberty, social liberty, economic liberty, domestic liberty,
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local, racial and national liberty, international liberty and political liberty and popular 
sovereignty (Rees 1996: 8). It was from his notion of a historical sequence of emerging 
liberties that Marshall was to draw his ideas of a sequence of emerging rights.
Influenced by these scholars, T.H. Marshall visualised a world that was characterised 
by the notions of equal status and rights based on citizenship. He thought that in modem 
society all members of society, as citizens, have civil, political and social rights, so that 
they eventually could enjoy individual freedom, political participation and a modicum of 
economic welfare and security, as well as civilised life according to the standards 
prevailing in the society (Marshall 1963b: 74). Moreover, he envisaged, through the 
establishment of citizenship rights, that the modem capitalist society could modify the 
inequality of social class into a society of equal basic rights, though not equal income. 
Citizenship rights, as he points out, ‘raise the floor-level in the basement and remodel the 
whole building, and they might even end by converting a skyscraper into a bungalow 
(Marshall 1963b: 110-111).
This Marshall’s original ideas on citizenship were to undergo further refinement as he 
witnessed social changes after the inception of citizenship theory. In this vein, Rees (1995) 
argues that there is ‘the other T.H. Marshall’ who is different from one that is generally 
understood. Marshall’s early ideas, he noticed, evolved. Indeed, it would be strange if they 
had not.
Many evidences of this change, or refinements, in Marshall’s notion of citizenship are 
found by comparing his early writings Sociology at the Crossroads with his later work The 
Right to Welfare. The first sign of this move found his articulation of the notion of rights by 
constructing a hierarchy of rights and expectations. When writing ‘Citizenship and Social 
Class’, he merely referred to the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security in a 
rather broad and abstract way. He gave no formal definition of a right as can be seen in the 
following:
“Benefits in the form o f a service have the characteristic that
the rights o f the citizen cannot be precisely defined. The
37
qualitative element is too great. A modicum o f legally
enforceable rights may be granted, but what matters to the
citizen is the superstructure o f legitimate expectations I t  is
much harder to ensure that his (citizen) ailments will be 
properly cared for. And so we find that legislation, instead of 
being the decisive step that puts policy into immediate effect, 
acquire more and more the character o f a declaration o f pohcy 
that it is hoped to pu t into effect some day”’ (Marshall 1963b:
118).
Some critical questions arise from this passage which Marshall seems to address in his 
later writings: Was Marshall strongly adhering to an ideal conception of rights by which, if 
there are no entitlements strictly enforceable at law, there are no rights? What did he imply 
by the notion of ‘legitimate expectation’?
In ‘Afterthought on the Right to Welfare’ he came to construct a hierarchy of rights and 
expectations. According to his explanation, first comes the level of precisely defined and 
legally enforceable rights. Next comes the right to have one’s claim assessed by exercise of 
discretion in accordance with current pohcy. The third level is occupied by ‘legitimate 
expectations’ which are based on the avowed aims of pohcy or, the commitments as to
benefits or services to be provided for the citizens. The fourth level of the hierarchy is the
generally accepted standard by which social pohcy and its performance are judged 
(Marshall 1981: 96-98). Here we notice the new phrases of expectation and discretion 
which are not found in the earlier work. He included in the category of rights not only 
‘legal rights’ but also ‘discretion’, ‘expectation’ and ‘proper standard’ which are not in 
general regarded as ‘rights’. Marshall held the view that ‘almost any benefit or service that 
is really designed to satisfy a particular individual need must include an element of 
discretion’. In this context, Marshall asserted that ‘there can be no legal right in the fullest 
sense to benefit the award of which is subject to discretion’ (Marshall 1981: 86)
He also pointed out that discretion and professionalism could guarantee the relative 
autonomy of a professional concerned to choose and achieve a higher degree of services
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and benefits, and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of administration (Marshall 
1981: 87). Here, it becomes evident that he expanded the range of rights, and incorporated 
professional incorporation and discretion into the methods of giving shape to citizenship 
idea. However, it must be noted here that the notions of discretion and professionalism are 
quite distinct from the notion of rights. The policy of discretion is likely to infringe the 
principle of rights. Furthermore, the notion of professionalism connected with the ideas o f 
‘discretion’ and ‘proper standard’, as Marshall (1981: 96) admitted, results in difficulties 
‘for an officer to have to resort to moral judgement of the kind which should be excluded 
from their decision’. For him, professionalism is a requirement to define the claimant’s 
needs and allocate the scarce resources. The professional’s and association’s duties and 
rights are to criticise policy and contribute to its improvement, and moreover to act as a 
pressure group in national and local politics (Marshall 1981: 96).
However, exercising professionalism in social policy entails several problems. As 
Wilding (1982: ch.4) points out, a profession serves its own interests rather than the broader 
public interests, so that what develops is services organised around professional skills 
rather than client needs. It also leads to the biased development of services because the 
dominant group in particular professions are able to dominate policy. The division of 
responsibility turns out to be lack of co-ordination among professions. Alcock (1991: 66) 
also reviews the problems of professionalism. He argues that whilst, in the evolution of the 
welfare state, discretion and professionalism have come to play an increasingly dominant 
role within many welfare services, the discretionary provision based on the judgement of 
state bureaucracy and professionals caused serious problems such as poor quality services 
and alienation of claimants. For example, the means-tested benefits have led to low levels 
of take-up of beneficiary, effectively excluding many people who do have acknowledged 
rights to payments. As regards to this point, Titmuss (1968b; 1971) suggests an appropriate 
use of the professional’s discretionary power, which help overcome weaknesses of the 
professionalism while emphasising necessity for assuring recipients’ rights. He asserts the 
importance of professional intervention in social service delivery, but also warned of its
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overuse. For those scholars, the problem seems to remain unsolved of how to make these 
conflicting notions of right and discretion compatible.
Marshall has acknowledged that there existed both ‘elements of optimism and a feeling 
of alarm’, along with ‘doubt and disillusion’ about the way the British welfare system had 
evolved (Marshall 1970: 12-14). His essay ‘Value Problems of Welfare-Capitalism’ shows 
how much he anguished about having a grip on the changing circumstance by trying to 
make compatible three contesting elements in complex modem society; to borrow his terms, 
‘man's value in the market (capitalist value), his value as a citizen (democratic value) and 
his value for himself (welfare value)’ (Marshall 1972: 30).
Accordingly, the change in Marshall’s definition of citizenship was made from an ideal 
vision of citizenship confined merely to equal status and rights, to a more realistic 
calculation of changing social conditions. He observed that private elements were intruding 
into state-based welfare services in the wake of the development of social insurance 
programmes. He realised that all citizens have to buy citizenship rights to social security 
through the contributory insurance system, which means that citizenship rights root not in 
mere membership of community achieved by birth, but in contract and contribution, and 
that those who are outside or on the margins of labour market such as mothers, home carers, 
the long term sick and disabled could be excluded. His main concern of this time, therefore, 
became how to integrate and co-ordinate the public sectors with private ones.
The destination Marshall finally reached through this series of refinements of the 
original citizenship was ‘welfare pluralism’ in which not just the state but also other social 
actors participate in providing welfare, while publicly provided services constitute a 
majority of welfare provision (Rees 1985: Ch. 13). To use Marshall’s term, a ‘welfare
society’ which recognises its collective responsibility to seek to achieve welfare, and
not only to relieve destitution or eradicate penury’ (Marshall 1981: 88). The exercise of 
discretion, which Marshall added to the boundary of rights, has to be understood in this 
context. For him, it can be taken as an evidence of an obligation on the part of society to 
meet needs regardless whether or not specified legal rights exist. It is the status of
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citizenship that makes this kind of right an authentic one. What the courts cannot do is to 
‘convert discretion into right in cases where the law has left an area free for discretionary 
judgements’ (Marshall 1981: 98). He came to emphasise the co-operative roles of the 
welfare providers like the formal provisions of statutory services and informal family and 
community services.
The evolution of Marshall’s thoughts reflects the history of consensus and conflicts in 
social pohcy since the beginning of twentieth century. It seems that his continuous theme is 
how to accommodate such conflicts as occurred in relation to the changes o f social 
institutions and values and social pohcy practice. He believed that although social policies 
have to reflect such a new trend as emerging social security measures, their main value lies 
in preserving such basic principles as rights to and state responsibility for welfare 
provisions. Nonetheless, we need to see the idea of ‘static citizenship’ that most social 
pohcy theorists understand, as well as that of ‘dynamic citizenship’ which continuously 
changes its response to other social developments.
2.4 Principles of Social Citizenship
Through this discussion on the dynamic citizenship, it has been found that the 
underlying ideology of social rights is welfare pluralism. From this understanding, the 
following principles might be deduced as underlying the ideals of social pohcy in any 
society, such as rights to welfare, active state commitment, participation, universalism, and 
adequate welfare benefits.
2.4.1 Rights to Welfare
Social rights are sustained by the fundamental acknowledgement that all citizens in
society have a right to a basic standard of living. This acknowledgement stipulates that the
self-esteem of recipients should not be devalued through receiving benefits. The idea that
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welfare services have to be guaranteed as a right denotes that social services should not be 
delivered just thorough the channels of charity, professional discretion or personal practices, 
but also through the state’s commitment to people’s welfare. Moreover, the 
acknowledgement of welfare rights includes the rights to request qualified services from the 
state (Alcock 1991: 71-72). In this point, the state has primary responsibility to take charge 
of people’s welfare through the legal system, because modem welfare society is grounded 
not on the institutionalised charity but on the idea of frill membership in community and the 
idea of citizenship which is requisite for protecting and enforcing such membership. In this 
context, democratic political system legitimises the state’s commitment to welfare and the 
people’s non-stigmatised right to welfare (Moon 1988: 30).
Thus, social rights deny the conventional belief in ‘beneficial-behaviour’ which 
characterises paternalism and professionalism, which are conventionally found in the 
charity-based activities. Instead, they produced a new paradigm on which citizen rights are 
bestowed on protection from the intervention of professional and patriarchal groups. In 
other words, the belief that the possessor has a duty to provide something for the non­
possessor has gone. In the meantime, what has emerged is the belief that the non-possessor 
has rights to receive benefits (Culpitt 1992: 4-5). Under the new paradigm of social 
citizenship, welfare is about rights sustained by everyone’s entitlement to welfare which is 
sustained by social legislation and/or the state’s enforcement. It is not a caring motivated by 
the private virtue of compassion (Ignatieff 1991: 34).
2.4.2 Active State Commitment
The acknowledgement of welfare rights naturally leads to the notion of active
intervention of the state in people’s welfare. One of the major contents of social rights, a
minimum basic standard of living for all citizens, justifies this role of the state, partly
because social contingencies in large magnitude are usually too big to be handled by
individuals alone and partly because the state’s intervention in the private market is
legitimised by the development of democratic politics. Even though Marshall seems to take
the role of the state to uphold citizenship rights for granted (Barbalet 1988: 109), it is
42
critical to re-emphasise its role, because the level of citizenship growth can vary depending 
on the different level of the state commitment to welfare in different countries. This 
responsibility of the state is primarily expressed in the national legal system, because the 
political capability of the modem state for policy making is specifically defined by the legal 
system (Ho 1980).
Many examples can be gleaned throughout the history of the welfare state. First, they 
are manifested in countries’ constitutions as evidenced by the Constitution of the Republic 
of France of 1848 and the Weimar Constitution in Germany of 1919. The French 
Constitution, which was the first to formulate the features of ‘social right’ in western 
history, stipulates that the Republic had to support the citizens’ life by both helping the 
poor to work and providing the disabled without the family with assistance. The Weimar 
Constitution also articulated in Article 151 that the order of economic life had to coincide 
with the principle of justice that aimed to assure the individual a life worthy of a human 
being. For this, it arranged such regulations as the protection of workers and the middle 
class. Its Article 153 made clear that the right to property be exercised for increasing public 
welfare, and 9 items from Clause 157 set up social rights about work so as to secure 
citizens basic social rights (Paek 1992: 65). Another examples are the various social acts, as 
evidenced by the Poor Law of 1601 and the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 as well as 
the Speenhamland system (1795) (Cranston 1985). It would be undeniable to assert that 
most countries in the world have institutionalised social legislation for their citizens.
Third example is found in the international context. International organisations such as 
UN and ILO have also manifested the state responsibility for promoting people’s welfare. 
Article 1 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 acknowledges that all human 
not only have freedom from the birth but also are equal in terms of dignity and rights. 
Article 22 stipulates that everyone has the rights to social security as a member of society. 
These features of social rights have appeared in many other statements such as The 
Covenants on Human Rights of 1966 and the ILO Treaties of 1921, 1928 and 1952 (UN 
Centre for Human Rights 1992: 24-26). All these examples reveal not just that social
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legislation is one of the cornerstones of the modem welfare state, but also that the state 
welfare responsibility is pivotal in assuring social citizenship for people (Cranston 1985).
2.43 Participation
To become a full citizen in society is related to effective ability of individuals to 
participate in social life. According to Deacon (1992: 7), the important analytical focus in 
modem citizenship study has been moved from the view that citizenship could be 
established just by providing members with economic and social goods, to the idea that 
citizenship requires active expression of citizens with various needs and their active 
participation in social mechanism that exists to meet those needs. If somebody lacks certain 
essential life chances, or does not have methods by which she or he enjoys social benefits 
and opportunity of consumption generally available, it means that they are at risk of 
exclusion from participating in the mainstream of society in which they live, so that they 
can explicitly request resources necessary for returning to socially accepted life way. The 
right to welfare is to guarantee to meet such needs. For if such needs are not fulfilled the 
community membership might be under the threat. To need something implies that citizens 
might suffer serious loss of identity without it. Such threats to existence or self-respect 
deny an individual to participate in the commonly accepted social life style. Therefore, this 
idea is closely relevant to the notion of equality (Harris 1987: 147-154), and participation 
emerges as the necessary tool to achieve equality.
The equal status implied in citizenship denotes the right to participate in the course of
service planning and decision-making which has an important influence on people’s lives
but does not rely on specialised knowledge. Furthermore, it gives people the rights to
research and criticise the common form of provision and administrative process (Parker
1975: 153; Janosky 1998). In addition, universal access to certain services derived from the
idea of rights creates a common membership o f persons by enabling their participation in
the course of consuming and transferring resources (Walzer 1988: 21). Accordingly, the
precondition of participation is acknowledging that every citizen has a right to access to
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resources. In turn, a secured participation right helps realise a welfare society in which 
social solidarity can be maximised.
2.4.4 Universalism
One of the basic tenets of Marshall’s social rights is the rejection of stigma which could 
be attached to the recipients of welfare services. That is to say, welfare benefits should not 
be accompanied by the feeling of stigma. Citizenship rights imply that it be claimed 
without shame. According to Titmuss, stigma means a ‘spoiled identity’ which derives 
from various reasons such as poverty, ethnicity and class experienced in society where we 
live (Titmuss 1968a: 142). Stigmatisation is often said to attach to services which are only 
attainable after a means test. Applicants may have to undergo the test that examines not 
only financial means but also private life and individual behaviour. As Miller (1987: 13, re­
quoted in Twine 1994: 97) critically points, stigma threatens not only those who have to 
bear the direct brunt of stigmatisation but also has an insidious effect on social programmes 
and the society at large.
Social provisions delivered through means test seem to be unable to assure social rights 
in full measure. Stigma resulting from the application of means testing can damage the 
applicant’s self-identity as well as eroding his/her capacity to fimction as a normal person. 
Furthermore, it is possible that in the process of selecting the recipient by such a test, many 
people who are in real need could be overlooked. Moreover, the resultant self-definition of 
oneself as poor is the same as asserting to the world that “I am an unequal person” (Titmuss 
1968a: 164). Because money (mainly lack of money) is relevant to individual and families ’ 
self-respect (Titmuss 1968a: 134), such a declaration causes loss of status, dignity and self­
esteem (Titmuss 1968a: 129). This is not the case if the means test is applied for a high 
status good, for example university education. However, if all the users of a service are the 
poor, acceptance of the service stigmatises the recipients. The Poor Law clearly 
exemplified this point in which the public assistance beneficiary obtained social rights at 
the expense of political rights.
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To solve this dilemma of stigma attached to welfare services, Plant (1990: 23) suggests 
a principle that if people with needs have right to welfare, or right to fulfil their needs, it is 
of no use asking how the transfer, which is resulted from the request of rights, embody the 
stigma. In reality, this kind of solution can be achieved by making welfare provision 
universally available. If social services come to be used on a universal basis, stigma might 
be avoided. Thus, the benefits based on right have to rest on the principle of universality. 
By achieving universality, social services can not only remove social stigma from the 
recipients, but also achieve social solidarity via a maximum degree of risk pooling and 
redistribution.
However, it seems unrealistic to implement universality of social welfare services. For 
even though social stigma could be removed, psychological stigma felt by recipients could 
still remain. In this respect, Titmuss (1968a: Ch. 10) introduced the idea of ‘positive 
discrimination*. That is to say, in providing public services, the universality has to be the 
basic principle of public services provision. However, the principle of selectivity has to be 
applied for clients with special needs, so that they could maximise the use of their own 
resource, opportunity and experience. Accordingly, the need test that is based on the idea of 
positive discrimination does not require the proof of poverty.
2.45 Adequacy of Benefits
As mentioned above, social rights are defined by the notion that citizens are not just
entitled to the modicum level of economic security to live the life of a civilised being
according to the standards prevailing in the society. For Marshall, the way to realise these
rights was to guarantee a national minimum for all citizens through welfare provisions. In
his time, guaranteeing a national minimum might be seen as a notion that is enough to
assure social rights for all citizens and to express active welfare responsibility of the state.
But, since then, this notion has been defined by ambiguity rather than a clear criterion
(Atkinson 1991). Furthermore, it has changed as the welfare state underwent both the
Golden Age and retrenchment. In these days, accordingly, the idea of national minimum is
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practicing in variously different degrees according to country’s idiosyncratic culture and 
tradition of welfare politics (Esping-Andersen 1996). For example, in the UK, it is 
understood as providing a basic level of public assistance, with the poor being targeted on. 
In the meantime, it is expressed in social democratic countries by the way of assuring 
‘decommodification’ through welfare services (Esping-Andersen 1990).
Despite this difference in individual countries interpreting the notion of national 
minimum, it can be argued, there is a general agreement among countries regarding it. That 
is to say, the criterion of minimum living expense set by each society can be regarded as 
being well compatible to the Marshall’s notion of it. Each year, many countries around the 
world such as the UK, the USA, Canada, and Japan announce their own level of minimum 
living expense reflecting their socio-economic situation (for more details, see Park 1994b). 
To take Korea as a specific example, between the 1970s and the 1980s several scholars and 
research centres calculated the minimum living expense, suggesting that the wage and/or 
welfare benefits reflect it. From the 1990s, this role was taken over by government and 
trade unions (see Hwang 2002: 214, Table 5.2). This trend manifests that more official and 
national-level organisations has been involved in setting up a social standard of living. As it 
has become a general phenomenon across the world that each country produces such a 
living standard appropriate for its own set of socio-economic conditions, it would not be a 
logical jump to regard the standard as a modem definition of national minimum. Therefore, 
guaranteeing economic security as a part of social rights in a country can be interpreted as 
securing a minimum living standard.
These principles of social citizenship do not stand by themselves but are justified by its 
duty system. According to Marshall (1963b: 117), the corresponding duties of citizenship 
should be acknowledged, if citizenship is provided as a defence of rights, so that rights and 
duties of citizenship can become balanced. Marshall offers a list of citizen’s obligations that 
conform generally to the conventional action of civic duties. His list includes ‘paying taxes 
and insurance contributions’, ‘educating one’s family’, ‘military service’, and albeit in 
rather vague terms, ‘to live the life of a good citizen’ and ‘promoting the welfare of the 
community’ (Marshall 1963b: 122-123).
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Among those duties, taxpaying, which use to be a means by which the bourgeois 
gained political rights in the time of absolutist political regime, can be expanded to include 
the duty of ‘social insurance contribution’. This is particularly necessary in the context of 
the modem welfare state, since the principles such as active state commitment, 
universalism, and adequate benefit are principally maintained by government revenue and 
social security contribution. The Scandinavian model of the welfare state provides a classic 
example in which an unavoidable feature of universal welfare system with active state 
commitment is a heavy tax burden (Rothstein 1998: 145-46). But, such a burden does not 
take place only in the social democratic cases. In fact, it is a widely recognised 
phenomenon across the different welfare regimes, manifesting that the duty of insurance 
contribution, in particular taxpaying, is a buttress sustaining welfare system (Sjoberg 1999). 
The duty to work if capable of doing so was built into “welfare systems” from the 
beginning and has been strengthened in the later twentieth century.
The duties of promoting community welfare and education are key features of the 
principle of participation and to facilitate the growth of a plural welfare society. For 
citizenship scholars such as Marshall and Titmuss, an integrated society is one where 
citizens show an interest in their fellows’ welfare and seek to establish a welfare system to 
reflect such interests (Harris 1987: 57). In such a society, the unique responsibility of social 
rights is grounded on mutual co-operation and altruistic behaviour by which recipients, as 
full citizens, are protected from stigma and helped to access the general living standard in 
their community (Janowitz 1980). Accordingly, an integrated society requires, as a 
precondition for its maintenance, citizens’ spirit of participation to promote community 
welfare.
In modem society, education is also necessary helping citizens to understand and utilise 
their rights. Marshall originally viewed education as playing a functional role of supplying 
labour power with high quality to labour market. This is particularly the case in the early 
phase of industrial development. This duty also includes 'civic education' which is, in 
Janowitz's term, 'a measure of understanding of national political traditions, and of the 
organisation of contemporary political and governmental institutions, as well as the
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person's linkage to these institutions.' It also denotes 'a sense of group membership in the 
larger society' (Janowitz 1980: 11). Education helps people, on the one hand, to conduct 
their basic duties and rights and on the other hand, to be qualified to participate in social 
life. In this context, Fraser (1984: Ch.4) describes education system as laying the material 
foundation of civil consciousness and the welfare state in the UK. Consequently, the 
principles of citizenship are consolidated in the reciprocal interactions between rights and 
duties.
2.5 Criticism
The more influential a theory is the more abundant the accompanying criticisms. As a 
theory, citizenship has been censured in detail by such influential critics as Mishra (1981: 
Ch.2). His criticism goes like this:
Firstly, citizenship rights refer to just statutory rights so as not to include other ways of 
meeting needs, for example occupational benefits, voluntary and charitable activities. To 
have an accurate comprehension of welfare, particularly where social rights are concerned, 
these other forms of welfare provision needs to be taken into account.
Second, the scope of the debate of citizenship developments seems limited to Western 
democracy. Other nations, even some democracies, did not follow the supposed 
developmental path set out by Marshall. State welfare in socialist countries like the former 
USSR can hardly be understood in terms of citizenship. In this context, scholars (Robson 
1976: 16-17; Bottomore 1992: 62-63) claim that socialist countries could not be called a 
welfare state due to their lack of provision for civil and political rights. Moreover, social 
rights that people enjoy in modem democratic states cannot be predetermined by the 
transcendental notion of citizenship. In the case of America, while civil and political rights 
were initially granted to white males, social rights, excluding education, were only slowly 
introduced (Phyllis 1989: 5). Similarly, German developments of citizenship presented a 
rather different picture to that described by Marshall. Bismarck first introduced social rights
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to the working classes in order to prohibit the blossom of civil and political rights (Mann 
1994). Social rights were the tools to hold over the other rights. In this point, citizenship 
seems rather British-centred, and does not appear to be universally applicable to other 
societies.
Third, the contents and attributes of social rights are not clear. Marshall's definition of 
social rights does not address the question of what is the appropriate level of economic 
welfare and security. In addition, Mishra has queried the criteria used in a determination of 
a civilised standard of living, and moreover, criticised the vagueness of the notion of social 
rights.
Fourth, Mishra goes on to argue that social rights do not logically come within the 
same category of civil and political rights. In Western democracy, the establishment of 
'adult franchise' and 'equality before law' are to present the nature of civil and political 
rights in their own ways. On the other hand, social rights do not have such a separate and 
restrictive attribute. That certain services become social rights, or that the benefit level and 
quality of public policy are judged by non-market principles, means that social rights could 
not be determined on a one-off basis. In democratic societies, it could not be said that the 
essence of civil and political rights reflects different issues, for example policy differences 
amongst parties. However, social policy manifests the elements and disposition of the 
political issues because it is related, in part, to the redistribution of social wealth whereas 
civil and political rights are not. Indeed, the first two sets of rights make up an institutional 
boundary within which the distributional conflicts are contained. If civil and political rights 
could be considered to form “the rules of a game”, then social rights must be considered to 
comprise “the results of the game”. Given that social rights are not as restrictive as the first 
two rights, the inclusion of social rights in citizenship is to ignore an essential difference 
distinguishing the latter from the former.
Fifthly, Marshall's discussion on citizenship omits an evaluation of the interrelation of 
these rights with changes of social structure. He fails to analyse such factors as the balance 
of power in different groups, the dispositional changes of ideology, belief and social class
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and their connection with developments of rights, and the effects of the industrialisation of 
society. In short, his evolutionary explanation of citizenship overlooks the significant 
impacts of social groups and their conflicts within different countries as well as failing to 
account for the changing nature of social rights throughout different historical periods. 
Other scholars (Giddens 1982; Bottomore 1992: 55) also demonstrate as one of the defects 
of Marshall's citizenship the absence of an explanation of class struggles and their effects 
on citizenship development.
These criticisms expose significant limitations of citizenship as a theory. Above all, 
they challenge the extent to which citizenship theory can be extended beyond the specific 
context of the UK or European societies. But, several counter-arguments can be raised 
against these critics. In relation to the first criticism, citizenship is not confined to the 
provision of legal welfare as Mishra pointed out. When Marshall refers to social welfare 
services as the means of embodying social rights, it should be understood that he indicates 
not only statutory rights but also voluntary and informal welfare sectors. Marshall’s 
positing the duty of the promotion of community welfare and plural welfare society 
obviously indicates that he had in mind other forms of welfare services such as voluntary 
works or private welfare activities. Marshall states, in a comprehensive way, 'social 
services' as the methods for embodying social citizenship, and hence does not restrict it to a 
narrow meaning of legal rights.
The critique of the geographical circumscription of the theory seems to lose its ground. 
If it were the early twentieth century, Mishra’s and Robson’s arguments could be regarded 
as reasonable. However, most countries in the present time attempt to secure for their 
people social rights as a normal form of social protection. It is also noteworthy that, since 
the late 1980s when former Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries were dissolved, there 
has been a gradual increase in citizens’ civil and political rights as well. In the case of 
social rights, they already possessed a type of public service system more advanced than in 
capitalist system (Feher et al. 1983; Dixon and Macarov 1992). Flora and Heidenheimer 
(1981: 23) express this point as follows:
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I t  is not true that a most democratic and capitalistic society has 
arranged social welfare earlier than the others. Fascist 
countries after the First World War did not change the system  
in whole, but even advanced it in some degree. Furthermore, the 
Russian experience exempliGes that the non-democratic, non- 
capitalistic country had established a similar system. Therefore, 
the welfare state is a general phenomenon of modernisation, 
and is not exclusively confined to ‘democratic-capitalistic’ 
system.
Other scholars also give supporting voice to this stance (Mann 1994). It could thus be 
concluded that while citizenship rights in each country shows their idiosyncratic 
progression and speed of development depending on its dominant beliefs, culture and 
ideology, they demonstrate a kind of conversion process, or generalisation of the 
development in recent times as well
In relation to the assessment that discussion of citizenship growth ignored changes in 
social structure and their effect, Marshall, in fact, did not discuss the social class at length 
in the essay of 1949, and elsewhere refers to it as ‘natural and logical processes’ (Marshall 
1975: 14). Thus, Mishra’s attack appears to be justifiable. However, the fact cannot be 
overlooked that Marshall did not dismiss the contributors of conflicts and struggles in 
portraying citizenship history. He was indeed talking about class conflict in another essay 
in the same book (Marshall 1963a).
However, even if there are some limits to be found in citizenship theory and its 
implementation in the programmes of social policy, the critical point to consider is that 
citizenship theory upholds a fundamental tenet of social policy, exposing the possibility of 
harmonious coexistence amongst widely disparate groups in society. As Marshall (1981: 
128) points out, the welfare state is an expression not of structure, but of spirit, and 
therefore citizenship rights and duties do not require universal principles to determine what 
citizenship shall be. Every society creates its own image of citizenship against which 
achievement can be measured and towards which aspirations can be directed.
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2.6 Framework: Citizenship for Comparative Study
Since Marshall triggered off citizenship discussion in academic communities, many 
intellectuals have contributed to expanding the horizon of his idea. Their interests are 
sometimes expressed in restricted way to present a picture of British citizenship and its 
corresponding social policy arrangements, but also at other times exceed beyond the 
borderline of its birthplace. Taking it into account that the original boundary of Marshall’s 
attention is for the most part confined to the British experience, and he never expected his 
theory to be exported to other countries (Bridges 1994: 6; Pinker 1996: 16), the tremendous 
academic interest in this theory reveals how strong an influence his theory has had within 
social policy circles.
Despite the unexpectedness of citizenship theory applying to non-British context, on 
the other hand, Marshall did admit the need for comparative study on social policy in other 
countries as a way to "find useful concepts for the analysis of welfare policy, its measures 
and institutions” (Marshall 1961: 286) as well as to "improve mutual understanding” 
(Marshall 1963b: 46). Regarding citizenship theory, he also opened a plausible flexibility of 
its application to other countries by asserting that as “a status bestowed on those who are 
full members of a community”, citizenship has “no universal principle that determines what 
those rights and duties shall be, but societies in which citizenship is a developing institution 
create an image of an ideal citizenship against which achievement can be measured and 
towards which aspiration can be directed” (Marshall 1963b: 87). From this point, it can be 
deduced that each country has its own soils and roots of citizenship, which play a critical 
role in producing different images of citizenship in different countries.
In feet, Marshall’s model of citizenship evolution based on the sequential development 
of three rights has been challenged by many critics. Some countries such as Bismarckian 
Germany and former Soviet Block countries developed social rights first with the other two 
rights constrained. Some others, such as, in particular, the third world countries experienced
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liberation from colonial masters after the Second World War, and commenced their nation- 
building history with all three citizenship rights introduced at once by western colonialist 
powers. However, many soon lost their civil right tradition, and only recently built up 
democratic institutions and barely developed social rights. The British case, therefore, 
could be referred to as one model type, but not the only one. The different trajectory of 
citizenship development in different societies necessitates the development of a universal 
framework of citizenship study which can be applied to other societies. But, our starting 
point has to be the position Marshall took to understand citizenship history.
According to Marshall, the twentieth century is the time when citizenship development 
reached its culmination, with the three established rights constituting a full citizenship. In a 
full citizenship, the three components of citizenship rights are equally important in 
sustaining the entity of citizenship. This can be diagrammed as follows.
54
Diagram 2-1 Framework of Citizenship Study
SOCIAL RIGHTS
I
POLITICAL 
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Parliamentarism
Party Politics
Democracy
Right to Welfare 
State Commitment 
Participation 
Universalism 
Adequacy of Benefits
FULL
CITIZENSHIP
\
CIVIL RIGHTS
Human
Emancipation
Market
Bourgeois Class 
Civil Society
1
PRECONDITIONS
Cultural Foundation 
Political Foundation 
Economic Foundation 
Social Foundation :
■■'V '■
As seen in the framework, three pillars sustain full citizenship: civil, political and social 
rights. Civil rights began to develop in parallel with human emancipation, but also 
understood as serving a necessary function for market mechanism that exposes its intrinsic 
limitations to equal citizenship. At the same time, they are made a foundation stone on 
which both bourgeois class and the working class can grow in seeking for the establishment 
of civil society and free labour movement. Thus, civil rights are the mechanism that not just 
sustains market economy but also expedites the development of civil society by fulfilling
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the citizen’s duties such as taxpaying and military services. Political rights developed on 
the basis of civil rights and are sustained by democratic political system characterised by 
parliamentarism and party politics. These rights first enable bourgeois class to participate in 
the political processes. Being extended to the common populous, they help the working 
class to participate in the political arena. Thus, the full implementation of political rights 
lays a stepping-stone for democratic power struggle which help realises the social 
compromise of conflicts between contesting principles of civil rights and political rights by 
justifying state intervention in social market economy. This compromising process 
becomes the cause of social rights’ emergence. By instituting social rights, the exercise of 
civil rights become restricted in part, but social welfare system comes to birth. The 
relationship of both rights is complementary. The last pillar of citizenship is interpreted as 
harbouring the five principles discussed above. According to Marshall, this tripod of 
citizenship maintains modem society, and a lack of any of them would result in a collapse 
of the citizenship as a whole.
Through this discussion, several reference points can be deduced for a universal 
application of citizenship theory. It is generally believed that a society which has an early 
history of industrialisation, mainly European countries, is prone to develop a liberal society, 
earlier than other countries, by generating a great deal of merchant class and labour (Moore 
1967; Thompson 1968). In this context, civil rights can be measured by such variables as 
the growth level of bourgeois class and the labour class, as well as the development level of 
civil society. Political rights can be measured by the variables of parliamentary democracy 
and party politics because they can be used as a yardstick in determining how widely 
political windows open in a society, so that social actors such as civil organisations and 
trade union can express their policy ideas and participate in the political processes.
As for social rights, the ‘rights to welfare’ can be measured by whether a country has 
established a system of social legislations so that people can legally claim for welfare 
provision from the state. Thus, social legislations can also be a part of a second principle, 
‘state commitment to welfare’. But, its implementation capacities are largely brought about 
by social budgets. From this logic, both the social legislation and the social budget are
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likely to be the primary tools to investigate two principles of rights to welfare and state 
commitment. Then, social welfare system is followed as a second way for assessment of 
citizenship, because the welfare system is the area where we could analyse the consequence 
of the state activity according to the other principle of social rights such as participation, 
universalism, and adequate benefits. Thus, welfare-related law system, budget, and 
practical services could be used as the means of assessing the growth level of social 
citizenship in a society.
Another important variable that most scholars missed but has to be taken into account 
includes such preconditions as cultural, political, economic, and social ones. Though 
citizenship develops in the context of each country’s idiosyncratic socio-politico-economic 
tradition, such preconditions have been overlooked in the comparative study of social 
policy (Goodman, White, and Kwon 1998b; Baldock 1999). For example, Esping-Andersen 
(1990), one of comparative scholars who put social citizenship at the heart of their analysis, 
sees the Scandinavian countries as having gone furthest towards ‘de-commodifmg’ social 
security which embodies the spirit of social rights. However, this approach deals only with 
the present outcomes of social rights in specific countries, failing to generalise the theory 
for a universal applicability, which requires discussions on civil and political rights, not to 
mention social rights.
Commenting on welfare arrangements in different societies, however, Pinker calls for 
our attention to a “welfare culture” which “includes the complex meaning and values which 
influence the choice made in social policy and therefore determine people’s notion of 
obligation and entitlement, and the conventions through which these notions find practical 
expression” (Pinker 1986: 114). Being extended to the wider area of citizenship, his remark 
can be regarded as emphasising the importance of looking into its socio-political roots to 
comprehend the current image of citizenship in any society. The study of citizenship, 
therefore, requires considering not just the progress of society, but also the relational 
attributes between individuals, individual and society, individual and the state, and society 
and the state, which is inevitably affected by such intrinsic factors as religion, custom and 
tradition (Tilly 1995a: 8; Prak 1999: 17). A study of the foundations of citizenship should
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be undertaken as a first step in attempting to build a comprehensive framework for 
comparative study.
The fact that Marshall’s citizenship theory is principally based on the modernisation 
approach also requires us to consider two additional perspectives. First, the theory is based 
on the historical development of three citizenship rights, making a historical approach a 
necessary methodology in exploring citizenship growth in a certain society. At the same 
time, this approach is also critical in order to answer the second and the third questions of 
this study. Second, as many scholars point out (Turner 1986; Barbalet 1988), the 
development of citizenship in the western societies is filled with struggles between social 
classes and social groups, rather than a linear logical extension from civil to social rights. 
This is particularly true of the case of social rights in which social compromise is seen as a 
result of a clash of class interests with different interests gaining more in same situation 
than others (Ginsburg 1979; Korpi 1983; Esping-Andersen 1985b; Baldwin 1990). These 
two points necessitate the inclusion, in the framework of the thesis, of two supplementary 
approaches, ‘historical sociology’ and ‘power resource theory’.
The approach o f ‘historical sociology’ has been conventionally adopted and articulated 
by many social historians such as Moor (1967), Thompson (1968), and political scientists 
such as Skocpol (1979) and Pierson (2000a). This approach is basically comparative, partly 
because it analyses societies across different periods in their history, often focusing on 
major social transformations such as - political, economic or cultural - revolutions. It is also 
comparative in space, that is, it compares historical developments in different societies. 
This approach has emerged during the 1960s and 1970s with important studies on class 
formation (both working class and bourgeoisie), state developments and revolutions, social 
policy and the welfare state. Most of these analyses have focussed either on socio-economic 
aspects or on politico-institutional ones, sometimes also on the relation between the two.
As for the study of social policy, Skocpol underlines four kinds of processes which 
draw our attention in explaining the origins and transformation of national systems of social 
provisions: “1) the establishment and transformation of state and party organisations
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through which politicians pursue policy initiatives; 2) the effects of political institutions and 
procedures on the identities, goals, and capacities of social groups that become involved in 
the politics of social policy making; 3) the fit... between the goals and capacities of various 
politically active groups, and the historically changing points of access and leverage 
allowed by a nation’s political institutions; and 4) the way in which previously established 
social policies affect subsequent politics” (Skocpol 1992: 41). These four processes can be 
interpreted as a pattern identification search for recurrent structures and sequences across 
time and space (Tilly 2001).
Being associated with another perspective of historical institutionalism, this approach 
has become further expanded by Pierson (2000a). He emphasises the notion of an 
‘increasing return’ process that emphasises specific patterns of timing and sequence are 
critical in the developmental process of social institutions as policy feedback. His main 
point is that the past constructs the way to inform policy choices of social groups and state 
elites in the present and future. It rests on the notion that history contains a record of human 
successes and failures in dealing with problems persisting into the present, that if long-term 
trends exist, their causes are likely to continue, and that recent history limits or defines 
what will happen next. Notwithstanding the possibility of this perspective falling into a trap 
of historicism (Popper 1960), this perspective can provide a useful tool, especially for 
identifying a particular path of the developmental trajectory of certain policy, idea, and/or 
driving forces in a country’s social welfare system
The other approach, power resource theory, has been suggested mainly by social 
democratic scholars such as Korpi, Esping-Andersen and Baldwin, and casts a direct 
challenge to the modernisation thesis. According to their arguments, the achievement of 
social rights in modem society is the outcome of democratic power struggles between 
social classes in unequally distributed power within the existing relationship of capitalist 
production. Accordingly, the critical institutions in distributive processes are markets and 
political democracy, and an important determinant of conflicts of interests is class (Korpi 
1989: 309-10). That is to say, in the capitalist market system, those such as workers, 
farmers and salaried employees are assumed as relatively disadvantaged in terms of
59
economic resources, and thus expected to make a collective attempt to achieve equality in 
socio-economic area. In this process, democratic politics, which are principled by an 
equality of power of all citizens via the right to vote and the right to organise for collective 
action, became a legitimised stage of conflict resolution (Korpi 1985: 38-39; 1989: 312).
In this perspective, the important points to be considered for comparative study are 
these: 1) whether a society has witnessed the growth of labour and farmers in terms of their 
ability not just to unionise themselves for a collective action but also to build a political 
force so that they could send their representative(s) to the parliament, establish their own 
political party, and/or help other party elected to power through a political coalition, and 2) 
how political system has accommodated such interest conflicts in democratic way. In short, 
this perspective sees the empowerment of those with relatively weak power, such as the 
working class, and the establishment of democratic politics as the preconditions for the 
expansion of social rights. The history of the welfare state development in the western 
societies, scholars argue, has proven that democratic class struggles and their influence on 
distributive processes has played a critical role in determining the size and shape of the 
welfare states and driving social rights toward more universal form (Esping-Andersen 
1985b; Korpi 1989; 1990). Albeit the criticism that the power resource approach cannot be 
applied to Liberal Britain and Bismarck’s German social policy (Borg and Castles 1981; 
Baldwin 1998: 313), it still provides a useful tool for us not just to overcome the defects of 
modernisation approach but also to widen our viewpoint on the cause of the development of 
the welfare state as well as the expansion of social rights.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter has sought to build a universal framework of citizenship study by 
examining the main contents of T. H. Marshall’s citizenship theory and by including what 
Marshall failed to acknowledge in interpreting citizenship history. Through the examination 
of the main contents of citizenship, it has been found that Marshall’s citizenship is mainly
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based on the modernisation understanding of history that sees the expansion of three 
citizenship rights as a process of logical evolution over time. Second, it has been identified 
that by introducing the notion of rights to the terrain of social policy, the theory has brought 
in a new paradigm for social policy. Third, it has been also discovered that in contrast to the 
general understanding of the theory which sees it as affiliated with the social democratic 
notion of social policy, it is principally based on welfare pluralism in which the idea of a 
welfare society commands an overwhelming priority. Finally, the examination helped 
deduce five principles of social rights which will function as an analytical tool to look into 
the level of social policy development in society.
Three criticisms of Marshall have been discussed: 1) his discussion is confined to the 
British experience of social development; 2) Marshall took for granted the hidden dynamics 
of citizenship development which can take place in a different fashion in different societies; 
3) due to its modernisation approach, the theory has failed to take into account the variable 
of social conflicts that many scholars hold as a critical driving force of social rights 
expansion. To resolve these defects, the thesis added three supplementary viewpoints to the 
existing citizenship theory. First, it will explore the way in which legal, political rights and 
civil society can evolve in a non western context though in a very different way and time 
sequence. Second, it uses an historical sociology approach to do this. Thirdly, it 
incorporates power resource theory discussing the power centres that helped shape the 
foundations of social policy in Korea. This process was that of, to borrow from Baldwin 
(1992), ‘contextualisation’ in understanding the welfare state, in order to build a universal 
framework for the comparative study of citizenship. Thus, this framework integrates the 
modernisation and conflict models of social policy development.
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Chapter 3
Foundations of Citizenship in Korea; Looking for 
Common Ground
The aim of this chapter is to identify whether traditional Korea had any of the 
foundations for citizenship that could be found in western societies. This is to find out 
whether Korea had some common ground on which citizenship began to develop. For this, 
the chapter briefly discusses the modernisation model of social development as a theoretical 
base, as it is basically concerned with the issue of how civil society, characterised by the 
embodiment of civil and political rights, has emerged in a nation. By discussing the model, 
it will identify common traits which are universally found in the processes of western 
modernisation. Based on the identified traits, then, the chapter will look into each of the 
cultural, political, economic, and social foundations of citizenship in Korea. Through this 
discussion, the last part of the chapter will examine whether Korea had a ‘seed’ of 
citizenship sown into its tradition. If both Korean and western societies were to show 
similarity we can assume that Marshall’s citizenship might be applied to the Korean social 
system. If they are not, it would help us comprehend factors which have made them 
different and come to a better understanding of contemporary pictures of each.
The limited space of this thesis does not permit a full account of pre-modem Korea. It 
discusses examples of key formative elements in society that capture some of its distinctive 
features.
3.1 Preconditions of Civil Society
Accounting for the civilisation in post-medieval Europe and elsewhere, Max Weber 
prescribed four principal conditions for it that were, he claimed, peculiar to western society. 
Protestantism comes first as a religious factor, holding the distinctive economic ethics for 
the growth of capitalism in modem Europe (Weber 1920-lb: Ch.2). The ethic is founded on
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the ground of the rationalisation of thought and behaviour, that is, a disciplined labour force 
and a regularised investment of capital. The disciplined labour force is understood as 
having an influence on people’s economic attitudes through the concept of ‘calling’. 
Introduced by the Reformation, it refers to the idea that the highest form of moral 
obligation of the individuals is to fulfil their duty of making money in secular affairs.
The regularised investment of capital made possible the regular reproduction of capital 
for the purpose of economic efficiency. The accumulation of wealth should be operated in 
the way that self-discipline is so imposed on investors that they seek a “positively frugal 
life style” (Giddens 1992: xii), not to maximise the profits. For, in the view of 
Protestantism, “man is dominated by the making of money, and by acquisition as the 
ultimate purpose of his life. Economic acquisition is no longer subordinated to man as the 
means for the satisfaction of his material needs” (Weber 1920-lb: 53).
A second criterion of modernisation is whether a society had independent cities from 
the pre-modem period. According to Weber (1923: 315-337), the West had already 
developed them long before 1789, creating small-scale citizenship. Old-regime French 
cities typically recognised classes of citizens who enjoyed political and economic rights the 
rest of the population lacked. Such an existence of autonomous cities holds two vital factors 
for the augmentation of civil society. First, it means a certain level of autonomy a 
municipal government could maintain from central government. Such a relative freedom 
helped local lords empowered and monarchs’ political power decentralised, enabling them 
to mn various free activities such as a citizen army, police, law court, self-jurisdiction, a 
criminal code and tax levy (Black 1984: 45). At the same time, it assured the city residents 
of limited but various civil rights such as a reasonable amount of personal freedom, 
freedom of expression, security from violence, and private property rights. This mechanism 
contributed to establishing an infrastructure for civil society in Europe (Runciman 1978: 
293-298).
The other factor bears a close relevance to a political system. In such a self-autonomy 
system, the growth of citizen’s political power, or representative democracy, became a
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main feature. The development of this power relation between citizens and monarch was 
generally found in Europe, but particularly salient in England through a reciprocal 
mechanism between king and local lords in which the latter gained the reward of local 
autonomy in return for their civic duties such as military services and tax for the former. 
This phenomenon became more distinctive in the period of absolute regimes. It was even 
possible under the regimes that the new bourgeois class with economic power was able to 
deal with an absolute monarch over their civil rights. Thus, in western society, the free city 
was the cornerstone for the development of democracy as well as the bourgeois class.
A third element in Weber’s description of modernisation is the advancement of 
bureaucracy. The bureaucratisation can be extended in its meaning to encompass the 
emergence of the modem form of administration. It is characterised by continuity, 
efficiency, hierarchy, clearly defined regulations, and the separation of public office from 
private ownership or control over resources, the use of documentary records and the 
salaried employment of full-time professional experts with career-long tenure (Runciman 
1978: 287). It cannot be denied that Weber was anxious about its side effects such as the 
bureaucratisation of power and the power shift from leaders to the technocrats. He thought 
this might reduce the capacity of organisations, institutions or societies to change, 
inhibiting the progress of capitalism in particular (Pinker 1971: 41-43; Runciman 1978: 
312-313). However, the development of bureaucracy, along with the birth of the modem 
state, is critical to expand citizenship across a whole nation because it creates new ties 
between the centre and its local citizens through the development of a national 
administration system 1 . Historically, the formation of the nation state called for
1 The characteristics of the state administration varied with the political culture of each 
country, producing a different picture of policy making. Whilst Britain developed a liberal form 
of government with the power of monarch being diminished, Germany built up paternalistic 
and authoritarian features of administration with weak civil society and strong tie between 
bureaucratic elites and the dominant landed, commercial and industrial classes. These 
peculiarities were reflected in the different policy making processes in each country. British 
social reforms were initiated and driven mainly by a few reform-minded social elites and civil 
servants with profound influence of social findings advanced by civil organisations’ researches 
(Pinker 1971). The German version of social reforms was led principally by the state elites 
inside the administration circle (Rimlinger 1971). With little inheritance of pre-industrial or 
pre-democratic legacy, American government developed neither top-down nor bottom-up 
reforms. Instead, it generated the figure of weak centred government, with farmers and trade
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bureaucratic means to enforce social changes from the top (Skocpol 1985: 9). As Tilly 
(1995b: 228-231) holds, the extension of citizenship required direct rule, that is, an 
imposition throughout a unified territory of a relatively standard system in which an 
effective hierarchy of state officials reaches from the national centre into individual 
localities or even households, then back to the centre.
Fourth, the discussion of bureaucracy naturally leads to the last element of 
modernisation, or the building of modem state. Among its various traits, most vital to 
citizenship development is the principle of the rule of law. The standard form of legal 
system overarching a whole territory of a sovereign laid a foundation on which citizens can 
be assured of a formal set of civil and political rights. In contrast to feudal society in which 
only the right to govern existed, the codification of rights and duties of all adults who are 
classified as citizens enabled them to stand in a direct relation to the sovereign authority of 
a country (Bendix 1964: 74). This idea of a law-governed society gained further credence 
by the political idea of ‘social contract’ advanced by Hobbes and Rousseau, and was given 
an economic justification by Adam Smith. Eventually, along with the development of free 
cities, these new ideas contributed to the advent of a new bourgeois class enthused by the 
notions of equal economic opportunity and egalitarianism in industrial society. In this vein, 
Rousseau emphasised the notion of the “science of legislation”, a key point of which is that 
civil society should be supported only by a civil state that is mled and controlled by laws 
(Master 1968: 291).
In summary, the discussion of modernisation and the emergence of civil society in 
western societies has identified four common preconditions: 1) Protestantism as a religious 
drive; 2) autonomous cities as the cornerstone for the growth of the bourgeois class and 
democracy; 3) bureaucracy as the foundation of a national administration system; and 4) 
the modem state as a tool to realise the principle of the mle of law. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, however, the development of civil society in the West does not reveal a
union officials assuming the leadership in driving social reforms (Skocpol 1985: 27; 1995: 12). 
Such countries as Peru, Turkey, Egypt and Meiji Japan experienced revolution and came to 
construct a modem form of state in recent times. These countries tend to have social reforms 
imposed from above (Skocpol 1985:10).
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linear progression of civil and political rights. In many countries, it was rather driven by 
various forms of conflicts among social forces, which sometimes took the form of 
revolution. Thus, along with the four preconditions identified above, it is also important to 
consider whether a society experienced a revolution in the transitional course from feudal 
to modem society. In fact, in France, the 1789 Revolution was critical in bringing 
modernisation to the society, and so were bourgeois revolutions in Britain such as the 
‘Glorious Bloodless Revolution’ of 1688. These five preconditions will guide our 
discussion of the foundations of citizenship in traditional Korea2.
3.2 Cultural Foundation: Confucian Tradition of Citizenship?
Confucianism is, in essence, a political philosophy3 which aspires towards a moral and 
institutional foundation for the policy by which a people’s well being is guaranteed in 
harmonious reciprocity between the state and its people (Yu 1998b: 120). This definition 
reflects its origins in the ancient China of the sixth to fifth centuries B.C. where civil wars 
devastated much of the society. Its origins were therefore attributed to the recognition of a 
people’s mined life, and its extension of concern was primarily towards securing social 
peace and people’s welfare, which from the Confucian view can be achieved only by
2 The traditional period referred to here covers the years of the Chos6n dynasty (1392-1910), as 
some five hundred years of those can be regarded as representing the pre-modem system and 
having an immediate influence on the shaping of the people’s lives up to the present. Pre­
modem Korea experienced a relatively peaceful social order. The realm underwent occasional 
turmoil in both domestic and international matters, but otherwise had maintained a political 
stability until eventually colonised by Japan in 1910.
3 There are some disputes over whether Confucianism is religion or political philosophy. On the 
one hand, considering its emphasis on the ancestral rituals it seems to have an affinity with 
religion. However, in so far as there are no Confucian precept on such religious aspects as ‘the 
salvation of the individual soul’ and ‘a life of after-death’, as found in Buddhism and 
Christianity, that its main focus is directed towards how to manage the matters of human 
society, Confucianism is regarded as having a essentially political orientation rather than a 
religious one. This is particularly so as Neo-Confucianism came to be dominant in traditional 
Korea. In this regard, Grayson (1995: 77) claims that Confucianism is comprehensive, having a 
wide influence on the Korean people’s life, culturally, politically and socially.
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reinstating morality and decorum. From this understanding emerged several teachings 
defining the basic relationship between individuals, community and the state.
Since its inception, Confucianism in traditional China experienced stagnation and 
renewal, reaching the emergence of Neo-Confucianism during the Sung dynasty (960- 
1279). Neo-Confucianism came into being by the efforts of Chu Hsi who combined the 
teaching of Confucius with the elements of Buddhist and Taoist, and thus understood the 
universe and all objects in it being composed of two inherent forces: Li, an immaterial 
universal principle or laws, and Ch 7, the substance of which all material things are made 
(for more details, see Joe 1972: 299-300). The basic relationship, more details of which will 
be discussed in the following section of this chapter, was seen as a basic order of the 
metaphysically organised universe (Grayson 1995: 79).
Though no official record has confirmed when Confiicianism was first introduced to 
Korea, it is generally believed that it was between 372 and 682 when each of three 
kingdoms of ancient Korea (Koguryo: 37 B.C. to 668 A.D., Paekche: 18 B.C to 663 A.D., 
and Silla: 57 B.C. to 935 A.D.) began to use the Chinese writing system (Joe 1972: 109). 
Since the introduction, Confucianism had co-existed with Buddhism and shamanism as one 
of the major sources of Korean culture until the Choson dynasty officially banned 
Buddhism and adopted Confucianism as the only legitimised ideology. Thus, what had 
more fundamental effect on Korean culture was ‘Neo-Confucianism’ that was introduced to 
Korea around the end of Koryo dynasty (918-1392) by An Hyang and further sophisticated 
during the Choson dynasty by Korean Confucians such as Yi Hwang and Yi Yi (Joe 1972: 
250-3, 300; Lee 1984: 217-8).
It is not easy to identify any stands of citizenship from Confucian thought. The 
important preconditions for citizenship development are different. In contrast to values such 
as individualism, civil society, and political democracy cherished in the western tradition of 
citizenship, the oriental values rather lean towards group identity in which individuals are 
regarded as a part of family, community and/or the state so that an individual becomes
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invisible and group becomes indivisible. In this tradition, the growth of civil society and/or 
democracy was relied upon the notion of duty rather than rights of people.
Nonetheless, there are some features that are unique to Confucian thought but also 
appear to be compatible with the basic ideas of citizenship. Most Confucian scholars would 
not disagree that the main pillars of Confucianism are epitomised by the following: people- 
based thoughts (minbensixiang, minbon sasang in Korean), politics of the rule by morality 
(<dezhi, tbkch 7 in Korean), politics of the rule by decorum (lizhi, yech ’i in Korean), a 
society with great solidarity (datongshehui, taedong sahoe in Korean), and politics of 
kingly way (wangdaozhengzhi, wangdo chdngch’i in Korean). Those principles can be 
interpreted as being closely related to the modem expressions of humanitarianism, 
democracy and social solidarity, which are all regarded as intrinsic values of citizenship. 
Accordingly, it can be claimed that Korean society, though strongly influenced by 
Confucianism, had a capacity for citizenship development.
In this thesis, only those Confucian concepts that are closely relevant to citizenship idea 
will be discussed4.
3.2.1 Ki (the Self)
In Confucianism, it is the self that occupies the core of the universe. Everything comes 
from and back to the self. If something turns out to be failure, the person in question has to 
first take responsibility for it, rather than accusing others. Therefore, one has to love and 
cultivate oneself before loving others, and then one’s love should extend to others with an
4 It cannot be denied that Buddhism has also had a certain level of influence on Koreans’ life. 
Given that it spread out into the Korean peninsula earlier than Confucianism, around the 
fourth century in Kogury6, it may be unreasonable to disregard its effects on the society. In 
fact, it enjoyed the status of a national religion during the Koryd dynasty, before the Chos6n 
dynasty. However, as the Yi family, which regarded it as the core cause of political corruption 
(Grayson 1995: 78), came to power, Buddhism became officially banned in the country. This 
limited its opportunity to exercise a major influence.
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open mind (Analects o f Confucius, vol.3). In the same manner, the task of overcoming a 
turbulent world and establishing an ideal society belongs first to the self.
In the Confucian view of this kind, individuals cannot exist beyond the boundary of 
morality and ethics, thus their lives are closely bound up with others. This basic human 
relationship is well encapsulated in five interwoven relationships as the foundation of an 
ideal society: 1) the ruler and the ruled with loyalty, 2) parents and children with filial piety, 
3) husband and wife with obedience, 4) the elder and the younger siblings with respect, and 
5) friends with trust. In this kind of social matrix, the underlying personal ethic is to 
cultivate individual's moral life. Held up by his self-cultivation, one comes to rule his 
family and subsequently a country, and eventually achieve a morally unified world 
(xiushenjijiazhiguopingtianxia, Susinjega ch ’igukp ydngch ’onha in Korean). Therefore, an 
individual initially occupies the lowest part of social life, but his/her relationship with 
others is naturally extended to the wider domains such as family, community and the state.
Due to the understanding of ‘individuality’ in the context of family or group 
relationship, some have contended that Confucianism never recognises the kind of 
individuality extolled in western individualism (De Bary 1991). It is assumed that 
individual identity is defined within an interwoven network of family and/or state and takes 
precedence over one’s status as an independent person. Personal welfare rests on the 
prosperity of the community where she or he belongs and, the balance and order of whole 
society is more significant than the personal satisfaction of needs. It is consequently 
apparent that welfare recipients in Korean society are psychologically vulnerable to stigma, 
even if not imposed by non-welfare beneficiaries. Moreover, this notion of ‘my 
responsibility’ has hampered people relying on the government for relief, and instead made 
them arrange self-protection measures like personal savings and private insurance.
However, it would be inaccurate to argue that there is no individualism in Confucian 
thought. In fact it acknowledges a certain level of individuation, even though not as much 
as the West did. De Bary seems to make contradictory comments on the attributes of 
Confucianism. As he points out (De Bary 1998), the practices of self-cultivation exerted
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chiefly via life-long learning testify its acknowledgement of basically self-oriented social 
activity. One distinctive institutional evidence of an individuals' morality in Confucianism 
was a national examination system which individuals had to decide to take to be a 
government officer. This signified the acceptance of individual initiative, because the 
examination required an individual choice and personal endeavour towards self­
advancement. Furthermore, in Confucianism the process of learning in and of itself means 
being a person willing to stand on his/her own.
Here one critical question arises: Why has this notion of individuality not developed 
into the type of modem liberationist individualism? One of the possibly answers for this is 
that a person’s group-centred identity takes so strong a position in a people’s psychology 
that one cannot be true to his/her own inmost self. It may be argued that this is self­
centredness or “Confucian individualism” rather than the real form individualism takes in 
western culture (De Bary 1998: 25). It is therefore important to note that Confucianism 
allows room for the development of individualism even though it has a predominantly 
group-centred ethic for relationships.
3.2.2 Minbon Sasang (people-oriented thoughts)
Confucianism had its inception during a long period of civil war in ancient China that 
was heavily exploitive of people in socio-economic terms. Confucian scholars tried to solve 
this socio-political problem by emphasising people-oriented politics, and placed political 
priority on people’s health and welfare. Confucius claims that heaven first makes the 
people and then nominates a mler to act on behalf of the people’s interest (Shu ching; the 
Book o f History, vol.4), which provides a moral basis for putting the priority on people over 
government power.
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This idea was developed into a comprehensive system of philosophy by two great 
scholars: Mencius and Hsun-tzu. They both differed in their view on human nature5, but 
shared similar criteria for visualising a well-ordered society in that they both agreed that 
when the people were well fed and clothed according to their age and status, there would be 
peace and virtuous living. A ruler’s overriding duty was to ensure that people were 
materially well supported and morally well led by his leadership, as conferred on him the 
‘Mandate of Heaven’. Therefore, the government was regarded as a moral institute under 
which a ‘moral leader’ was assisted by morally impeccable bureaucrats in governing the 
state. Lack or loss of moral leadership on the part of the ruler, who, for instance, exploits 
his people for private profits, can result in the forfeiture of his mandate, and a subsequent 
rebellion may be justified (Joe 1972: 101). Even if this uprising could not be carried out by 
the people in an agony of life, it obviously has the meaning of the minbon in that the ruling 
class as representatives of the grass roots plays the main role of the political campaign. In 
this vein, Hsun-tzu acknowledged a 'resistance right’ of the people.
Arising from this mode of thinking, Mencius detailed five guiding principles as the 
means of laying the firm foundation of rulers’ morality (Mencius, vol.5). First, the king has 
to set his subjects free from the obligation of corvee and army services during the farming 
season to secure their economic stability. Second, a rational tax-levy system has to be 
established through dingtianzhi (chdngjdnje in Korean,), a land system by which all lands of 
the ruler are to be equally distributed to his people and the tax to be levied on equal base. 
Third, the tax rate should be within the range of one ninth to one tenth of their total 
production. Fourth, the ruler should provide his people with a permanent basis for 
livelihood and school education. Fifth, the government should arrange a sensible 
punishment system applying equally to all persons.
In these specified ruling principles, priority is given to a ruler's winning over people’s 
mind, not to putting control over them (Ch'oe 1984). The basic scheme is to construct a
5 While Mencius claimed that man’s innate nature was good, Hsun-tzu emphasized the inborn 
“evil” of man.
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human society based on economic stability and human morality. This is the central political 
condition for the welfare state stipulated in Confucianism.
3.23 Taedong Sahoe (Society with Great Solidarity)
Taedong sahoe is an ideal society which Confucian scholars envisage as a place where 
a great moral principle could realise itself. This kind of society has the following 
characteristics. First, all property and wealth in society have to be shared evenly by all 
members. This also applies to the ruler so that rulership should not be conferred by 
inheritance. Second, the productive activity of the people is for the whole community, and a 
trustworthy leader possessing a high morality has to be elected to take charge of the 
distributional role. Third, each member of the society has to take into consideration the 
interests of elders and children. In addition, the able bodied should participate in work, but 
the disabled who has lost his labour power should be supported by the community. Fourth, 
the relationship between members is maintained through reciprocity of mutual help, but 
does not rely on the formal notion of duty and responsibility. Fifth, social evils such as 
machination, deception, theft, plunder and wars should be banished from society to secure a 
peaceful social life {Li chi: The Book o f  Rites).
This view of an ideal society has similar attributes with a socialist or communist 
society, and indeed functioned as the basis of a philosophical decree for Chinese 
socialisation (Ch’oe 1992b: 31). At the same time, this vision of society contains the idea of 
social solidarity and civil society activity that are strongly maintained in the western idea of 
citizenship. In traditional Korea, this idealism was translated into a Confucian practice as 
the form of taedong kye, which is a voluntary social, economical protection system running 
through a common saving fund and mutual help among people in a same village. This will 
be discussed later.
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3.2.4 Wangdo Chdngch’i (Politics of Kingly Way)
Confucianism is a philosophy that served the ruling class by imposing a hierarchical 
relationship in society (Pu 1996; Ch'oe 1999). Through the relationship, it defined all socio­
politico-economic life of the people from the personal concept of obligation and entitlement 
as an individual and/or a group member, to the people’s way of conceiving of their king’s 
legitimacy. At the same time, it also defined the king’s political attitude towards his people. 
In this relationship, the requirement is not just that people obey their monarch but also that 
monarch endeavour to stabilise the people’s life. In particular, the monarch’s failure to do 
so would justify a revolution by the people, as denoted by the idea of minbon sasang. 
Accordingly, welfare measures arranged by the state leadership were regarded as an 
important instrument of rulers for obtaining legitimacy from the people as well as 
controlling them. But, they were the expression of a ruler’s benevolence rather than the 
recipients’ rights, thus was hardly regarded as harbouring the ideas of citizenship. Rather, it 
can be stated that the king’s welfare responsibility arises not from a sense of obligation but 
from a sense of ‘noblesse oblige’, which consequently produces intermittent welfare 
arrangements according to the ruler’s attitude.
Yet, whatever the motive may be, a king had to take responsibility for relieving the 
poor by policies of a ‘good and benevolent government’, as conceived of having received 
the mandate of the heaven. This is what Kim (1997c) calls ch ’aekkiron (the theory of king’s 
obligation) to subject’s well-being. “Because people’s adversity is assumed to be caused by 
the king’s lack of morality, he argues, the state should redeem them from their suffering by 
funding through the nation treasury and ordering local officials to protect them” (Kim 
1997c: 30).
Taking this obligation as one governing principle, most rulers in pre-modem Korea 
exerted themselves to arrange welfare measures according to their own beliefs. Reflecting 
the nature of social contingency of that period which was closely related to natural disaster, 
the primary focus of state welfare was on the relief of four kinds of destitutions; widowers 
and widows, orphans, childless persons and unaided persons, all of whom lacked intimate 
support from the community and thus had been major targets of the state’s welfare
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activities from the period of ancient China (Ku 1970: 49). Various welfare programmes 
were introduced by different governments. Some monarchs relied on a rice-rationing 
system sourced through the national granary (kokchin), and a tax relief system for victims 
of natural catastrophes (chojo kammydri). Others visited the old and the orphans and gave 
out some clothing and grains with consolation (sagung kuhyul). When confronted with 
severe calamities, the kings also pardoned some prisoners, and sometimes, as a personal act 
of repentance, abstained from taking fine food and leisurely pleasure, praying for the 
people’s immediate relief from the hardship (Kim 1997c: 33). Whilst some of those 
arrangements experienced changes over the pre-modem period, some, kokchin in particular, 
remained durable as a principal welfare policy of government. This holds that welfare 
measures were critical in traditional Korea_for the menarche to maintain the socio-political 
system.
This discussion shows that traditional Korea had an ambivalent foundation for the 
development of civil society. Profoundly influenced by Confiician teachings, it had quite a 
different tradition to its western counterparts as witnessed by the emphasis paid to group 
identity and strict social hierarchy, instead of a persons’ individuality. On the other hand, 
the society also maintained a substantial commitment to such citizenship-related ideas as 
the people-centred idea, social solidarity and people’s well-being. The combination of these 
two traits helped shape a unique picture of old Korea in which such citizenship-related 
ideas were used as an instrument of maintaining a harmonious society, rather than 
promoting the development of civil society. Yet, it seems worthy of noting that traditional 
Korea shared similar features to the West in cultural foundation. A similar story seems to 
go with political foundation of citizenship.
3.3 Political Foundation
There are arguments over whether traditional Korea was a feudal system. According to 
Fukuyama (1995: 132), Japan did have a decentralised political power and localised
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lordship as in the West, whereas other North-East Asian countries such as Korea and China 
lacked these traits of feudalism, and hence did not have the capacity of developing free 
cities and the dynamics of power balancing between kings and local aristocracy. This 
curbed, he argues, the proliferation of the reciprocity of “social trust” in all North East 
Asian societies but Japan. On the other hand, Weber (1920-1 a) noticed a substantial growth 
of independent cities and guild associations in traditional Chinese society even though it 
was not precisely the same in nature as in the West. It appears that this difference in 
understanding traditional Asian societies is due to the way that the two scholars perceived 
whether there was centripetal or centrifugal power dynamics between the centre and local 
province. In contrast to the centrifugal characteristics of western society, Asian society, 
except Japan, had a highly centralised monarchical power overarching the entire territory. 
Jacobs (1985: 1) defines this kind of feature as “patrimonial social order” in which no 
reciprocity of services and rewards between superior and inferior took place. If we assume 
such a power relationship is correct Fukuyama is right to conclude that there was ‘no 
feudalism’ in China and Korea. This thesis, thus, avoids using the term ‘feudal’, and instead 
uses such terms as ‘pre-modem’, ‘old’, and ‘traditional’ to refer to Korean society before 
modernisation.
The political structure of pre-modem Korea had two main institutional components. 
Profoundly influenced by Confucianism and Chinese political culture, traditional Korea 
developed a highly organised bureaucratic system. From the outset of the Chos6n dynasty, 
there was a well-developed ministry system in the central government and governors in the 
province offices. However, this does not mean that Korean monarchs exerted the centripetal 
power. As several scholars (Palais 1975; Kohli 1994: 1271-2) have pointed out, the power 
of Korean kings was limited for several reasons. First, the landed yangban class6, which
6 In traditional Korea, there were four social classes. At the top was the yangban class, which, 
as a privileged stratum, was composed of the royal family, the nobility and professional 
military and entitled to the highest position in political administrative system. Next was the 
chungin, literally the middle people who were educated and examined for special skills, and 
then appointed only to lower civil service rank as technicians, such as interpreters, 
accountants, astrologers and lawyers. The third was the sangmin, or commoners, and mainly 
consisted of farmers. At the bottom of the social strata were the ch’dnmin, or lowly people.
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was the principal constituent of the state bureaucracy recruited through the national 
examination system, limited monarch’s power. The bureaucrats were deeply engaged in all 
state affairs but were also highly factionalised. In the Choson dynasty, the bureaucracy of 
this type sometimes helped achieve the balance of power between the monarch and the 
officials, but mostly functioned to limit the scope of the monarch’s power as their factional 
interests were directed towards more enhanced political influence.
Second, despite the well-organised bureaucratic system, the power of the central 
government was not strong enough to reach the periphery. While the kings appointed the 
county magistrates, the officials were rotated too frequently before they could have 
established a comprehensive authority over a newly appointed jurisdiction (Kohli 1994: 
1271). This led to the local administration being substantially managed and sustained by 
hyangni, non-salaried functionaries who, as a hereditary group, consisted of local people. 
As the hyangni were allowed to collect local taxes and not required to rotate, they could 
maintain a substantial level of independence from the central government, while at the 
same time the power of the kings was attenuated. Consequently, both the well-organised 
bureaucracy and the limited scope of a monarch’s power resulted in a political structure that 
was both centralised and weak (Palais 1975: 5).
This dual structure of politics made it much less feasible for traditional Korea to lay 
down the foundations for citizenship development. While being effectively checked by the 
yangban class, the kings were still able to maintain control over their subjects, as proven by 
their power to officially monopolise all the land of the territory and to levy taxes. The well- 
developed bureaucracy played a contradictory role. Whilst it functioned to limit the scope 
of the monarchs’ power, it operated as a mechanism which attracted more yangban to the 
state bureaucracy to sustain the existing political structure. In contrast to the West, thus, 
what we can see in the experience of pre-modem Korea is the absence of the role of local 
lords. By entering to officialdom, the yangban class helped fortify the status quo of the 
centralised politics. This was done by imposing Confucian teachings on the people to serve
Under this category were such denigrated occupations as slaves, entertainers, prostitutes, 
butchers, and Buddhist priests.
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the ruler. As Palais points out (1975), it was the rulership of this kind that made the 
continuity of the dynasty possible and inhibited localised civil movements.
The feet that Korea was a status-based and agricultural society added further barriers to 
the possibility of social movements led by the people. Even though there were several 
revolts raised by anti-establishmentarians and /or peasants, the kings were able to suppress 
them by using their supreme power. Pre-modem Korea lacked a tradition of municipal 
autonomy and o f organised elites. What is more, the European conceptions of sovereignty 
and the shift of political power from the monarch to the people were absent in Korea’s 
political culture up until the final period of the dynasty, helping to maintain the basic 
political structure of pre-modem Korea.
Changes to this political tradition began to appear from the early nineteenth century 
along with the decline of monarchic power. It came with the death of King Chongjo in 
1800 and the enthronement of ten year-old Sunjo, which gave rise to what is called sedo 
chongch 7. This can be defined by governance by royal in-law families with concentrated 
power in their hands. The rise of in-law families in politics produced serious problems. 
Among them, the most serious was the corrupt national tax system as they used it as 
embezzling instruments to fill private pockets. This occurred not just in the level of central 
administration but also in that of local offices as local magistrates and functionaries utilised 
national taxation and the grain loan system. Second, such a political system enabled high 
officials or a person in a politically influential position to traffic official posts in exchange 
for bribes (Lee 1984: 247-9). This led to widespread political corruption in which those 
who wanted to gain official posts needed to intensify their exploitation of the peasantry. 
Thus, the effects of sedo chongch 7 were not just the weakening of monarchic power but 
also the increased tax burden that fell directly on the shoulders of the peasantry.
An immediate consequence of this was expressed in mounting grievance and revolts by 
the people, but also provided a momentum to bring about changes to the socio-political 
profile of the society in the long run. For instance, such political corruption and exploitation 
led to the outbreak of the Hong Kyong-nae Rebellion in P’yongan Province in 1811. The
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rebellion was initially organised by discontented yangban, but was soon joined by various 
social groups such as merchants and peasants of the province, spreading to districts north of 
the Ch’ongch’on River and set a formidable challenge to the central government (Cumings 
1997: 83). The rebellion was eventually put down by government forces but provided 
stimulus for other popular uprisings across the country by that time, as exemplified by the 
outbreak of the popular uprising in Chinju, southeast area of the country, in 1862 (Lee 
1984: 254). The continued occurrence of popular uprisings signalled the society breaking 
gradually away from pre-modem traits.
As Henderson (1978: 36-55) observes, the last half-century of the Choson dynasty 
(1860-1910) began to show a substantial number of social movements with this social 
hierarchy being less distinctive and free economic activity more vivid. The change was 
mainly driven by the reform movements launched by elites as well as the general populace 
of the society, but also by the direct intervention of foreign powers such as Japan. This 
enabled the country to embark on a journey to modernisation, making the sign of 
citizenship visible in Korea history. A few examples of the movements, the effects of which 
can be considered to be profound on the modernisation of the society, are discussed below.
3.3.1 Kapsitt Chongbyon, Political Incident in 1884
The outbreak of kapsin chongbyon was caused mainly by two factors. One was the 
extensive involvement of China in the domestic matters of Korea. From the early period, 
the dynasty had been under the constant influence of China, and it reached the culmination 
by 1882 in the wake of the military mutiny (imo kullari) in which Queen Min and her 
faction requested the Chinese army into Korea to quell the mutiny instigated by her father- 
in-law Taew6n’gun (1820-1898)7. By the time of this incident, Chinese “overlords” such as 
Ma Chien-chung and Yuan Shink’ai exercised overwhelming power over Korean affairs. 
Ma was appointed a deputy-minister in the Korean Foreign Office and supervised almost
7 For details of this mutiny, see Lee 1984: 271-3.
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all the foreign affairs. Yuan took complete control over Korean Army at that time. This 
excessive intervention of China caused Korean elites to review the Korea-China 
relationship (Nahm 1988: 155).
The other factor was a few intellectuals’ encounter with foreign civilisations. Most of 
the leaders of the kapsin political incident were from the yangban class with a background 
of Confucian teaching. In addition, many had firsthand experience of other civilisations 
through being members of goodwill missions either to Japan or America. Among those 
progressives, Kim Okkyun and Park Yonghyo visited Japan several times in 1882 and 
developed a strong desire to make their country both modem and independent. They were 
impressed with the progress made by the new Japanese leaders who had brought about the 
Meiji Restoration in Japan. Hong Yongsik and So Kwangbom visited the United States in
1883 as members of the first Korean diplomatic mission. They were also impressed by its 
military and economic strength, and wanted to implement reform measures to transform 
Korea into a modem state and establish its independence from China (Nahm 1988: 157; 
Korea Ministry of Education 1999: 79-80).
The modernisation proposals they put forward involved the reform of various 
institutions of the society. While pushing for the complete independence of Korea from 
China, they also argued for political, educational, taxation, and social reforms, including 
the equality of the sexes as well as the abolition of the social hierarchy system. In order to 
propel full-scale reforms, they established a political party called Kaehwa-dang, or 
Progressive Party, and submitted petitions to King Kojong (1852-1919), urging the 
modernisation of agriculture, military, postal services and transportation system (Lee 1984: 
277-8). But, they soon encountered a bold challenge from their opponents.
The challenge was made through a reactionary Sadaedang, or literally the ‘Party 
Subservient to the Big Power’, China. The reformers sometimes went in fear of their lives 
as they discovered that their opponents were planning to take radical action to eliminate 
them (Nahm 1988: 158). In desperation, they initiated a bloody palace coup on December 4,
1884 with the support of Japanese legation guards. A reform government was established
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on the next day under King Kojong and the reformers took over key positions in the 
government. But only two days after the establishment of the new government, they had to 
face a strong reaction from the Chinese army under Yuan Shink’ai’s command (Nahm 
1988: 159). It was too powerful for the small revolutionary group to compete.
The revolution came to end within three days as the major leaders were arrested by the 
Chinese army and some fled abroad. Nonetheless, the political incident was historically 
significant. It was the first attempt in Korean history for organised elites to reject the 
subservient relationship with China, and to establish an independent country. It was also an 
attempt to abrogate pre-modem institutions by abandoning social caste system and to lay 
the foundation for the development of civil rights by establishing an equality of people. In 
other words, the kapsin incident was the first in a sequence of socio-political movements 
that took place during the transitional period from pre-modem to modem Korea.
3.3.2 Kabo Reform
Ten years after the kapsin chongbyon, another modernisation movement, called Kabo 
Reform, took place in seeking the social transformation of Korea. This movement was 
driven by external as well as internal pressures. The main driving force of the reform was 
Japan which intended to have a rationale for its army to be stationed in Korea and to 
achieve a solid ground to ensure a Korean market for its products. For this, Japan brought 
about the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and pushed the Chinese army out of Korea. At 
the same time, Japan embarked on a forced reform to gain control over the Korean 
government (Lee 1984: 288-90). Internally, the Korean government by that time was under 
immense pressure to reform due to peasant’s uprisings, in particular the Tonghak Peasants 
Uprising which will be discussed later. At the same time, Korean intellectuals felt that since 
the kapsin incident failed Korea had been loosing the momentum to modernisation, and 
needed to take reform measures by itself (Kim 1998b: 60). These were three driving forces 
of the reform, but most influential was the Japanese interests.
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Japan carried out modernisation programmes, modelled on its Meiji Reform, in the 
name of “strengthening Korea’s national security and promoting political stability, social 
order, and economic and cultural progress” (Nahm 1988: 179). Faced with strong 
opposition from the Korean government which wanted to herald modernisation 
programmes by itself, however, Japan resorted to arms to impose its programmes by 
occupying the royal palace and assassinating the Korean queen in 1895, as Korea claims 
but Japan denies. It replaced the old policing agencies and set up the supreme organ of the 
state called Kun’guk kimuch’o, or Deliberative Council. Upon its inception, eight Amuns 
(ministries) were established: Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Treasury, Justice, Military 
Affairs, Agriculture and Commerce, Education, and Industry, with all the heads of 
ministries filled by pro-Japanese figures such as Kim Hongjip, Oh Yunjong, Kim Yunsik 
and Park Chongyang. Thus, the reform was allegedly carried out by the Korean government, 
but was in fact under Japanese direction (Cumings 1997: 120-1).
The reform brought upon radical change to old Korea. In what was called Hongbom 
14cho, or the 14-article decree for political reform, King Kojong promised a whole range 
reform across the entire society. It comprised the establishment of firm national 
independence from China, the improvement of education and technical teaching, the 
strengthening of the military, the revision of legal codes in order to protect the lives and 
properties of the people, and the abolishment of class distinction (SSultae Sahoe PalchSn 
Yon’guso 1996: 170). Moreover, the reform reconstructed the government system by 
curtailing the prerogatives of the monarch. It made a separation between administration and 
royal affairs by depriving the king of his rights to appoint high officials and to control 
financial matters. It abolished the status-based national examination system and opened the 
possibility for any person to be able to participate in it. In addition, it acknowledged the 
independence of the judiciary from the administration. Powers to arrest and detain lay with 
the police and the judiciary respectively. The power of local administrators was also 
diminished so that they could not exercise the military and judicial power which they used 
to hold (Soultae Sahoe Palchon Yon'guso 1996: 171-2). These measures might have laid a 
foundation on which civil and political rights could have been established.
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In relation to economic reform, the establishment of the new Treasury made a 
distinction between the national budget and the finance of the royal family in order to 
streamline financial matters of the state. What is more, the reform brought about the 
adoption of a new monetary system based on the silver standard, the payment of taxes in 
cash instead of goods, and the western system of weights and measures. Several measures 
were also taken to invigorate free commercial activities. The measures included the 
exemption of miscellaneous taxes for merchants and the abolition of Yug-uijdn, the state- 
mandated shops that had an exclusive trading privileges for such commonly purchased 
items as silk, cotton, paper, ramie fabric, fish, and the deregulation of business opening. 
However, the economic reforms did not extend to the land tenure system, and gave no 
benefits to tenant farmers and sharecroppers. For this reason, the economic reform is 
sometimes portrayed as one that facilitated the transformation of landowners into a 
bourgeois class (Soultae Sahoe Palchon Yon’guso 1996: 160).
Social reform was no less fundamental than the previous two fields. The reform 
abolished the official endorsement of social status and slavery system. The torture of 
criminals was forbidden, so too was the practice of guilt-by-association. Thus, the modern 
foundations for civil rights began to be laid. At the same time, the liberation from servitude 
enabled people to move freely about the country and to achieve a degree of social mobility 
(Lee 1984: 292). With the abolished social hierarchy which used to put the merchant class 
in the lowest level of people’s job acknowledgement, what increased was the opportunity 
for free market activity. This meant that the Confucian ideal society and the actual class 
system were fading away. People grew to utilise their free status to promote their economic 
status, with less hindrance from discrimination imposed by the traditional Confucian 
culture.
However, the Kabo reform movement ended incomplete due to the changed political 
situation of Korea. The influence of Japan on Korea collapsed in the wake of the Tripartite 
Intervention of 1895, in which Russia, France and Germany made a joint demand for Japan 
to return the Liaot’ung Peninsula to China. This incident was seen by Korean politicians as 
proving Japan’s weakness on the international stage. Simultaneously, Japan’s assassination
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of the Korean queen (1895) sparked a revival of strong nationalism among Koreans, and 
subsequently gave rise to a robust anti-Japan sentiment across the country (Cumings 1997: 
119-123). Japan began to abandon its ambitions in Korea by May 1895, and the major 
reform leaders were forced to flee to Japan. The Korean cabinet was filled with pro-Russian 
figures.
The reform movement, however brief, brought a fundamental change to the fabric of 
traditional Korea. It marked a critical juncture in Korean history that brought about a 
structural break from pre-modem to modem society. Simultaneously, the reform helped 
Korea establish the basic components of civil rights. Given that the reform was principally 
driven by Japan, it can be claimed, Japan helped to modernise Korea. But it was only at the 
commencing stage of modernisation. In the long run, its persistent intervention caused the 
dismantlement of citizenship foundation, which will be discussed in the next chapter.
33 3  Tonghak Peasant Uprising
The Tonghak Peasant Uprising in 1894 was one of the attempts that the Korean masses 
tried to bring about a more egalitarian society during the Choson period. But it can be 
distinguished from the others in that it received the most nationwide support from the 
general populace, and hence made a critical contribution to the dissolution of the old social 
system. The movement was motivated by multiple factors. Politically, it was motivated by 
the people’s resentment against the royal-in-law-family which was widely believed to have 
been corrupt. This undermined the authority of the monarchy. It was also motivated by anti- 
Japanese sentiment which was brought to a peak in the wake of the alleged Japan’s 
assassination of the Korean queen in 1895.
Economically, it was triggered off by the devastated life of Korean farmers which was 
partially caused by the exploitive yangban class and officials’ pandemic corruption, and 
partially by the intrusion of foreign capital into an unprepared agricultural Korean economy. 
The exploitation of farmers by the upper classes created a strong antipathy against the
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ruling class. In addition, the intrusion of foreign capital, Japanese in particular, drove their 
life on the edge of collapse by causing high inflation and depriving them of the opportunity 
to earn extra income during non-farming seasons. Accordingly, peasants became indebted 
and were increasingly losing their land (Kim 1998b: 22-41; Korea Ministry of Education 
1999: 84).
Ideologically, the uprising was inspired by what is called Tonghak, literally Eastern 
Learning8, the basic tenet of which is egalitarianism based on the oneness between human 
and Hanonim, or the Lord. According to its teaching, Hananim and human spirit merged 
when an individual accepted Hananim as the supreme spirit of the universe. Since all such 
humans now possessed Hananim1 s spirit, they were morally obligated to treat each other as 
equals, regardless of age, sex and social status (Innaech on) (Shin 1989). This notion was 
based on the social consciousness that human being deserved self-dignity and equality.
Motivated by these factors, the uprising naturally came to demand the abolition of the 
inherited status system and the establishment of human rights and economic well-being 
through the equal distribution of land and the punishment of exploiting local magistrates. 
Considering its causes, the uprising can be understood as having the characteristics of anti­
imperialism as well as nationalism. In fact, it is most frequently discussed as an example of 
rising national identity, as well as an uprising against the imperialistic powers of Japan and 
China (Chung 1969: 118-32; Shin 1989: 28-33). More significantly, the uprising was also a 
class conflict between the corrupt aristocracy struggling to protect their self-interests and 
the suppressed peasantry beginning to assert their basic civil rights (Han'guk Minjungsa 
Yon'guhoe 1986: 77-89; Han'guk Yoksa Yon'guhoe 1989: 263-272). In short, it can be 
characterised as the movement against both pre-modem social system and imperialist.
8 Tonghak was founded by Ch’oe Che-u (1824-1864) during the reign of King Ch’olchong (1831- 
1863), in opposition to “Western Learning”, or Catholicism which was introduced to Korea 
around the late eighteenth century and was believed mostly by social elites with reform mind. 
Tonghak took its doctrines principally from Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism. In addition, 
it also took some elements from Catholicism and popular shamanistic beliefs, especially those 
which were regarded as being supportive of the idea of human equality. Due to the basic creed 
of human equality, it soon received wide support from the general populace, especially from the 
peasantry, becoming not just a religious but also a social movement (Lee 1984: 258-9).
84
The uprising was suppressed by a coalition of China and Japan and the Korean ruling 
class. Despite its immediate failure, the peasant movement had profound effects on Korean 
society, harbingering the future modernisation movements in Korea. It helped give rise to 
the Kabo Reform Movement, which expedited the dissolution of the old social system. 
Anti-imperialist feeling encouraged the people to form a voluntary army looking for 
independence from foreign intervention, mainly Japanese. Meanwhile, it led the cornered 
government to open the door to foreign powers. The king had to call on foreign help, 
mainly Japanese and Chinese, in order to suppress the insurgence. As Shin (1987: 98) 
points out, “Tonghak was just one of the social movements at that time that attempted to 
make a fundamental change in Korea. If Japan and China had not been involved in the 
uprising, such movements might have made it possible to dismantle the old regime more 
thoroughly”.
There was another case of reform movement which was strongly influenced by 
Protestant Christianity. Introduced to Korea by American missionaries such as Horace N. 
Allen in 1884 and Horace G. Underwood in 1885, it soon gained wide acceptance from 
various social groups running from social elites to the general populace as its ideas of 
Western liberal thought well captured the attention of Korean people who were suffering 
from internal and external problems like the mass uprisings and the intrusion of foreign 
powers. Having arrived in Korea, the missionaries carried out various social and political 
programmes through such as medical work, education, and the formation of Korean 
organisations like Seoul Young Men’s Christian Association, which sometime helped 
Korean develop nationalistic thought (Lee 1984: 334-5).
One of the most distinctive examples of this Christian movement was Tongnip hydphoe, 
or the Independence Club. This was an enlightenment movement founded by Dr S6 
Chaep’il and his colleagues in 1896, and supported by various social groups such as 
students, working class, women and the underprivileged. It advocated a new idea of 
western democracy and campaigned to acquire personal liberty, property rights, freedom of 
speech, the press, and assembly, and the rights of people to participate in politics (Ku 1985: 
2; Kim 1998b: 111-113). Thus, this was the movement that most specifically delineated the
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introduction of basic rights to Korea people by that time. But, it lasted only for two years 
until it was dissolved by Korean reactionaries such as many of the Yangban class who did 
not want to lose their prerogatives and privileges in the society. Thus, despite its strong 
advocate for the basic rights, it soon lost its momentum (Nahm 1988: 192).
These are just a few examples of social reform movements held in Korea at the end of 
the Choson dynasty. They testify that Korean society by the end of the nineteenth century 
was a relatively turbulent society, but progressively moving toward what is now called a 
‘modem society’. The interests in social reform were expressed by various parts of the 
society, including the officials of the government. They had similar aspirations, regardless 
of their different socio-political backgrounds, for a more equal society overriding the old 
traditional system. They were motivated by either western civilisation or nationalism, or by 
both. This means that a political foundation for the growth of civil society began to appear 
in Korea from this time.
3.4 Economic Foundation
The development of free cities, which was underpinned by the ideas of city autonomy 
and property rights, was important in establishing civil society. In contrast to Europe and its 
Asian neighbours China and Japan (Weber 1920-la; Ikegami 1996), the pre-modem Korea 
did not develop independent cities and/or nationwide markets. There was a merchant class, 
but its size was almost ignorable in term of their proportion to the total population. There 
were such a few cities as Seoul, then Hanyang, and Kaesong where relatively free 
economic activity was developed. However, merchants never enjoyed such self-governing 
power in their cities as their western counterparts did. In addition, most of them ran small­
sized business.
There are several reasons for this. One was the agricultural foundation of the pre­
modem Korean economy. The agricultural culture limited people’s life within a world 
which the horizon of their land defined. Their world was the clan and family-based village
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community. At the same time, the emotional attachment to the land and ancestral village 
provides few opportunities for demographic mobility, leaving the society static. As Weber 
points out, this strong “kinship tie” had a powerful influence on people’s life, so that even 
“the immigrant into the city retained his ties with his native community, with his ancestral 
land and the shrine of his ancestors” (Weber 1920-la: 4). This condition rendered the 
society capable of arranging family-and/or-small-community-bounded mutual protection on 
the one hand, but also hampered social division on the other -  one of the key factors of 
modernisation and the development of capitalistic social structure. In this vein, some 
western academics argue that an agricultural society, which concentrated in the king’s 
exclusive power to hold all the lands and control all irrigation system, was conducive to an 
‘Asiatic mode of production’ (Marx 1857) or ‘oriental despotism’ (Wittfogel 1957), in 
which ownership of private property was not allowed and the scope of social mobility was 
limited.
Another reason was political. The centralised power of a sovereign made it possible for 
him to supervise most economic activity. As agriculture was the main foundation of the 
economy of that time, the principal economic policy of rulers was focussed on 
‘guaranteeing the reproduction of the formers’ household without a hitch’ by introducing, 
for example, new farming tools and rice planting methods (Ch'oe 1998b: 81-82). On the 
contrary, commercial market activity was assumed as having a supplementary role to the 
regulated national economy. The state managed commercial trade via two government 
employed merchant groups: Chijonin, the owners of street shops in Chongno, a special 
commercial block in Seoul, and Kongin, state-employed merchants who were responsible 
for presenting to the central government the local products as tribute from local provinces. 
Chijonin, in particular, was mandated by the government to monopolise commercial 
demands of people in return for the service of supplying the state with commercial goods. 
The monopolistic power allowed its members to rule out any private trade that dealt with 
the same items as theirs (Kiimnanjdn ’gwon). Along with the state economic policy leaning 
toward agriculture, the state regulation on commercial activities laid a rigorous obstacle 
against the growth of cities as well as the trades.
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A third reason lay in people’s psychological reluctance to be a merchant, which was 
strongly influenced by the Confucian perception of status in which traders are ranked last 
while scholars, farmers and craftsman took the first, the second, and the third respectively. 
In contrast to Protestantism in the West, this Confucian influence inhibited people from 
having any economic motivation, and resulted in preferring to be a scholar or government 
officer, rather than a trader. In addition, the government officially banned foreign trade by 
commoners for the reason that they were not permitted to travel abroad as individuals. 
Consequently, this created a state of not just underdeveloped commercial capital, but also a 
lack of human capital. Korea could not benefit from knowledge or skills obtained abroad.
From the seventeenth century Korea began to develop a kind of mercantilism, with the 
number of merchants increased. The transition was driven by several forces: the increase of 
agricultural productivity with newly-introduced tools and methods, the gradual weakening 
of social hierarchy driven, for example, by the people’s private purchasing of social status 
with their increased wealth, ideologically the influence of pragmatic Silhak thought, the 
growth of private merchants and artisans, the growth of population, the increasing foreign 
trade, and the introduction of a currency system. They all had direct or indirect effects on 
the economics, but the first three were particularly distinctive (Lee 1984: 226-236).
The adoption of new farming implements and the increasing size of the population 
nearly doubled agricultural productivity (Ch’oe 1998b: 83). At the same time, this also 
expedited the concentration of land into a few landowners’ hands, resulting in the 
displacement of peasants from their land. Some of them moved into cities, but most became 
rootless. The dispossessed_farmers did not join the city dwellers. Instead, they moved to 
mountain areas and involved in slash and bum agriculture in which they obtained a very 
small-sized farming field by burning the woods. What is more, despite the increase in the 
number of private merchants, they still occupied a small portion of the whole population. 
By the end of the dynasty, those who engaged exclusively in industrial occupations 
accounted for less than one percent of the entire household population. Other merchants ran 
small-sized businesses and combined jobs, half farmer and half merchant (Ch’oe 1998b:
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129). Thus, such new conditions failed to bring a substantial change to the agriculture- 
based society.
This process of social change in Korea was different from that which occurred in 
western European countries. In the case of Britain, the economic transformation stimulated 
a movement of workers away from the agricultural sector towards industry-based 
occupations9. This did not happen in Korea. There was an increase in the number of 
merchants who had come from peasant backgrounds. Followed by the gradual weakening 
of the hierarchy system, there was a distinctive growth in middle class during the 
seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries. However, they never moved into a world of 
business. The new city immigrants did not lose their connection to local villages. They 
were not true city dwellers. In traditional Korea, a city itself was not an independent unit 
either economically or psychologically.
Consequently, the expansion of a market economy in the last half of the dynasty was 
functional for stabilising and strengthening the agricultural base of the economy, rather 
than contributing to the dissolution of farming households. For instance, whilst there were 
some 50,000 people living in London by the year 1520, Seoul, then the largest city, had a 
population of 103,000 in 1428 (Kim 1971: 140). However, despite a steady increase of the 
whole population, the number of city inhabitants did not change much, remaining stationary 
at approximately 200,000 until the end of the nineteenth century (Son 1993: 34-36), while 
that of London jumped up to some 2,800,000 by 1861 (Mayne 1952: 109). Accordingly, it 
can be said that the progress of commerce in traditional Korea rather hampered the creation 
of working class necessary for the developments of capitalist industrialisation, as well as
9 In Britain, the transformation process of the agricultural labour force took place at a steady 
and stable pace. For example, in 1801 the proportion of those engaged in the primary industry 
such as agriculture to the total occupied population was 35.9 per cent, while those in the 
secondary industry such as manufacture accounted for 40.9 per cent. Fifty years later, this 
proportion changed sharply with the number of workers in the primary industry having 
declined to 21.7 per cent and that in the secondary industry having jumped to 58.7 per cent. In 
1901 this trend became more salient with the former accounting for just 8.7 per cent and the 
latter for 67.7 per cent (Deane and W.A.Cole 1962: 142, Table 30). This meant that the 
agricultural labour in the UK during the economic transformation was mostly absorbed into 
the industrial sectors.
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civil society. In other words, the economic foundation for the growth of citizenship in 
traditional Korea was weaker than the cultural and political ones.
3.5 Social Foundation
In traditional Korea, one’s social life was primarily determined by clan and village 
group membership. For that reason, the life base of people becomes a group-bounded 
network with hierarchically related people feeling psycho-socially committed to each 
member’s personal and social affairs. This is what Choi and Choi (1990: passim) call ‘‘we- 
ness”, a social bond that Koreans perceived as a limit of their psychological and social 
interaction. From this consciousness of a strong tie derives a narrowly defined 
philanthropic community spirit. As Wong (1998: 28) points out for the Chinese case, 
physical and psychological distance is used for the criteria of defining their membership. If 
they belong to a same group, they easily show strong sympathy for other member’s matters. 
If they do not, however, they generally are apathetic to one another.
This trait of community spirit certainly contributes to the growth of mutual help and 
protection activities, but for the most part within a family and/or village. A group rarely 
extends its welfare concern for members outside itself and its activities do not cover a 
larger community, for instance a whole society, which in turn results in putting a 
developmental limitation on a nationwide assistance system. This led Confucian thinkers to 
suggest that the central government provide services to those who are not members of any 
group, especially when the scope of contingencies, for example natural disasters and 
nationwide famine, are too wide to be covered by such small social activities. Accordingly, 
traditional Korea developed welfare activities arranged by both voluntary societies and the 
state.
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3.5.1 Civil Organisations and Welfare Activities
Among voluntary welfare activities of Koreans, the most distinctive example is the kye 
(mutual finance association), as it has the longest history in Korean society and is still in 
operation across Korea though considerably shrunk. The kye is commonly defined as “a 
village-based voluntary organisation or society having the interest of profit making through 
money and grains collected from each member family as a membership fee, in order to 
promote each member’s well being (Pak and Gamble 1975; Yi 1983: 199). Due to the 
geographic circumscription of its operation, the kye operated in regionally specific and 
distinctive form (for example, see Pak and Gamble 1975: 46-51; Eikemeier 1980: 68-76). 
But, we can still identify some major features which are commonly shared by the different 
kyes: 1) mutual aid; 2) membership limited to the villagers; 3) membership fee paid at the 
time of organisation and collected on monthly basis or at times when it is necessary; 4) the 
fund makes a profit from its loans to members or non-members by charging interest, but 
this surplus is then distributed to each member in accordance with his/her contribution 
record; and 5) the order in which each member receives payment is settled when the kye is 
organised. If a special case is noticed, however, it can claim priority for the payment 
regardless of the order. It provides principally a lump sum of cash out of the common fund 
for the cases such as funerals, weddings, sicknesses and ancestral rituals that usually 
require an unexpected heavy expenditure (Pak and Gamble 1975). Based on these features, 
the kye played a significant role for the social and economic stability of villagers in 
traditional.Korea.
There are arguments among scholars over the characteristics of the kye10. This is partly 
because the kye itself has experienced substantial adjustment to social change, resulting in
10 The kye had many different names according to its organisational objects. For example, 
snagpbgye was organised for the case of funerals, hon-ingye for weddings, taedonggye for 
village’s common interest such as to construct village reservoir or repair roads, chongchingye 
for promoting friendship and solidarity among the clem members, and u-gye for purchasing a 
farm animal, especially oxen (Yi 1970: 70-72; Pak and Gamble 1975: 48-50). Notwithstanding 
their various names, the basic operational principles of the kye are similar to each other as 
described above. Thus, such various names prove its wide and strong influence on people’s life. 
For instance, in 1920 there ware some 480 independent kye organisations with 814,133 
members across Korea (Pak and Gamble 1975: 47).
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its functional diversification and transformation. Organised initially as a meeting for a 
religious ceremony in ancient agricultural villages (Kim 1966), it used to be the 
organisation for villagers’ meetings and ancestral rituals. Therefore, its original role was to 
arrange villagers’ cooperation for common interests (Chang 1969: 6). Its functional turning 
point came with Japanese invasions upon the Choson dynasty (1592 and 1597). The 
aftermath of the wars not only forced people into an increased tax burden and ruined life, 
but also brought about the weakening of a public assistance system for the poor (Na 1997: 
222-233). Accordingly, the people had to seek some kind of voluntary measures to protect 
their lives, especially to overcome financial difficulties caused by the excessive tax levy. 
The kye, which already had a historical foundation, was adapted to meet their new situation 
by developing a financial function. In addition, whilst its membership was still mainly 
based on a geographical identity, it gradually began to include other areas such as trading 
guilds, peddler associations and artisans association around the end of the dynasty. At the 
same time, it began to offer free labour services and emotional sympathy for members in 
addition to financial support. Thus, whilst the early kye aimed to raise funds for ancestor 
veneration, the later types of the kye was specialised in welfare, cooperative mutual help, 
and especially funding or avoiding usury (Jacobs 1985: 37).
This kye system provides some connection between traditional and modem welfare 
measures in Korean social policy. At the same time, it presents a clue for understanding 
continuity, substantial change, and/or interruption in the sequential development of Korean 
citizenship. Through its functions, the kye developed some features which operated in 
traditional Korean society, but are almost identical with the principles of modem banking 
as well as social insurance. As members contribute for a common fund, they have the right 
to receive payment. In addition, the kye also produces horizontal, rather than vertical, 
redistributive effects between members over time, because all members have to contribute 
the same fee irrespective of their personal wealth (Na 1997: 239-240). This suggests that 
some critical ideas of citizenship such as social solidarity and civil participation were 
conceived in old Korea as in western societies. A western traveller acknowledges this by 
describing the Korean kye of that time as follows:
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‘This Kyei.... which presents one o f the most noteworthy 
features o f Korea, develops into insurance companies, mutual 
benefit association, money-lending syndicates, tontines, 
marriage and burial clubs, (and) great trading guilds. With its 
innumerable association.... Korean life is singularly complex; 
and the Korean business world is far more fully organised than 
ours, nearly all the traders in the country being members of 
guilds, powerfully bound together, and having the common 
feature o f mutual helpfulness in time of need” (Bishop 1898:
272).
This supports the view that in traditional Korea, the kye was seen as seeding a potential 
development of social insurance as well as a trade union movement, or the idea of social 
solidarity. This was a social trait ubiquitously found in traditional Korea before 
colonisation in 1910. However, this tradition was brought into a severe constraint by 
Japanese rule and never successfully institutionalised in full measure in Korea until the end 
of the 1980s, which will be discussed in the next parts of the thesis.
In addition to the kye, we can offer another distinctive example of a mutual welfare 
activity: the turye. The turye was an organisation of mutual labour cooperation in order to 
deal with the whole range of farming-related affairs within a village. Its membership was 
compulsory so that all male adults in a village had to join the turye. If they failed or were 
not willing to do, they had to accept certain punishments. However, widows, the disabled 
and elderly were exempted from the membership with no such penalties, and received full 
benefits from the common labour services (Shin 1987: 466-478). Therefore, its main object 
was to promote community solidarity through labour redistribution among villagers, which 
subsequently helped to increase the productivity and the efficiency of agricultural activity. 
By fostering the circumstance in which all villagers could share not just common labour 
and assistance but also common rules and leisure, it helped to lay the foundation of social 
solidarity.
93
Another noteworthy function of the turye with respect to citizenship idea was that it 
was run in a democratic way. As an organisation, it elected a president and some secretaries. 
All members had to attend an election and vote for their supporting candidate by their 
hands. An elected candidate was regarded as a servant working for village’s common good, 
and a defeated candidate had to accept the election result. In addition, even though one 
member was elected to the position, he was not exempted from participation in common 
labour (Shin 1987: 481, 504-506). We here see some basic principles of modem democracy 
to have operated in traditional Korea: representative politics via popular and direct election.
While these two examples of civil organisation were developed on the basis of the 
grassroots activities, there was another example, or sowon which, as private academies, was 
organised and led by Neo-Confiician literati in local regions (,sarim). It was modelled after 
the Chinese shu-yiian and officially set up by a Neo-Confiician scholar and magistrate of 
P’uunggi county Chu Se-bung in 1543. At the beginning, the sowon had two major 
functions: honouring of a personage, especially outstanding Korean Confucianists, and the 
education of young scholars. By those functions, the sowon attempted to promote the study 
as well as the promulgation of Neo-Confiician philosophy as the way of distributing its high 
moral principles across the society (Lee 1984: 207; Smith 2003: xix).
Under the favourable patronage of the government, the sowon experienced a rapid 
growth in its numbers and political influence for the next three hundred years. In 1550, the 
first sowon, called Paegundong sowon, was chartered by King Myongjong (1545-1567) 
with the grants of books, tax-free land and slaves, and this gave a momentum to the flourish 
of the private academies across Korea. For instance, in 1608 there were more than one 
hundred sowon in Korea, with the number of the royally chartered ones also increasing 
(Lee 1984: 207). This numerical increase continued so that during the reign of King 
Sukchong (1674-1720) some 300 sowon were newly established, and by the eighteenth 
century its total number reached around 1,000 in Korea (Chong 1997b: 259; Smith 2003: 
xx). This numerical growth also enabled them to enhance their political influence. Through 
the national examination system, the academies could send their students to government 
service in the capital, and in the end, dominate the political process (Lee 1984: 206).
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The traits of civil society that the sowon maintained stemmed mainly from two factors. 
First, it functioned to assemble and transmit public opinion about major government policy. 
This was done by the literati in the sowon sending a ‘petition letter* directly to the king so 
as to make him aware of other ideas on national policies, and/or by the scholar-officials 
from the sowdn closely involving in the process of policy making by occupying the major 
positions in the government. Politically, thus, the sowon was the institution that produced 
leading opinions, and had a substantial influence on the government’s policy making 
(Chong 1997b: 179-182). Economically, the sowon was an autonomous sector which was 
free from taxation with land and slaves granted from the king. As mentioned above, this 
economic autonomy was made possible mainly through the royal charter. With the growth 
of their political influence, the economic power was further enhanced to the point that they 
became a centre of socio-cultural life in the countryside and sometimes conducted 
administrative and judicial functions which were originally belonged to local officials 
(Smith 2003: xx). In this respect, the sowon can be regarded the strongest source of civil 
society in traditional Korea in that it could make a direct influence on government policies 
as well as maintaining the autonomous economic unit, one of the critical preconditions for 
the growth of civil society and civil rights.
However, the characteristics of the sowon began to change from 1575, with its 
educational function shrinking and its political power expanding. This change occurred in 
line with the development of ‘factional strife’ (tangjaeng). According to Lee (1984: 208), 
the principal cause of the factional strife was the power struggle between Neo-Confiician 
literati over the limited number of the government positions. By this time, Choson 
witnessed population growth along with a relatively long period of peace, the revival of the 
Neo-Confiician literati after four times of ‘literati purge’ between 1498 and 1545, and the 
widened opportunity of them to enter into the officialdom via the national examinations. 
But, the increase in the number of the government posts did not progress apace with that of 
yangban wishing to enter into the officialdom. This naturally led to confrontation and 
political cronyism among scholar-officials from different sowon backgrounds, developing 
four major factions by 1670: Northerners (Pug’in), Southerners (Namin), an Old Doctrine
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(Noron), and a Young Doctrine (Soron)11. Since then, this characteristic shift of the sowon 
had produced both positive and negative effects on Korean politics and the development of 
civil society.
Viewed positively, the development of the sdwdn and its political influence in 
traditional Korea can be seen as a system of checks and balances and some kind of 
competition between different political interests. In this regard, the sdwdn can be claimed 
as having helped traditional Korea to develop a ‘sprout’ of modem politics, that is, party 
politics (Chong 1997b: 338-9). More negatively, however, the growth of the countryside- 
based sdwdn and its over-involvement in the social and political activities led to not just the 
retrenchment of the central government’s power but also a political stagnation which 
sometimes hindered the political progress of the country. Simultaneously, its economic 
base, which had been enjoying the government’s preference such as tax-free land, grew to 
weaken the national economy. This was particularly serious between 1592 and 1636 when 
the economy was severely affected by foreign invasions by the Japanese and Manchu 
(Smith 2003: xx). These problems drove several kings, especially those who wanted to 
strengthen their power, to employ certain measures to address the problems- . Accordingly, 
the negative effects of the sdwdn appeared to overshadow the positive ones. Nonetheless, it 
may not be inappropriate to underestimate the role of the sdwdn in pre-modem Korea as a 
source of civil society. The sdwdn proved that the pre-modem Korea had high potential to 
develop civil society. It was particularly so before the sdwdn underwent the characteristic 
change.
11 There were further divisions among them after 1762 when a political conflict occurred over 
the punishment of Crown Prince Changh5n, developing two more factions, Sip’a (Party of 
Expediency) and Py5kp’a (Party of Principle), but those four are regarded as the major actors of 
the tangjaeng in Korean history. For the details of this development of those factions, see Lee 
1984: 221-3.
12 For instance, King Y6ngjo (1724-1776) and ChSngjo (1776-1800) put in practice what was 
called t ’angpydngch'aek, policy of impartiality that aimed at treating equally men from the 
different sdwdn in official appointments. At the same time, King Y6ngjo closed some 300 sdwdn 
during his reign to reduce their strength. But, such measures were not enough to solve out the 
problems in the long run: there still remained some 700 sdwdn by 1738 and their influence was 
soon revived and lasted until 1871 when Taew5n’gun, the father of King Kojong, confiscated 
their lands and banned all but 47 of them (Lee 1984: 223, 262; Chong 1997b: 269-300)].
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In conclusion, the discussion of pre-modem Korea shows that the society had the 
potential basis on which civil society could develop, but with limits. Such a basis was laid 
and developed not just by the mutual help and protection activities of the general populace 
but also by the political and economic empowerment of the yangban class via the sowon. 
Yet, it has to be noted that the sources of civil society had limits in realising themselves. 
The voluntary activities were principally confined within the boundary of the village. This 
means that while their practices were found across the country, they were not under a 
systemic guidance. This left the central government to arrange welfare measures. The 
empowerment of the local literati class was identified as the strongest source of civil 
society in traditional Korea. But it also revealed limits in exercising its influence as a civil 
society, especially after the end of the sixteenth century. It cannot be denied that those 
limits curbed the further growth of civil activities in traditional Korea.
3.5.2 The state Welfare Measures
As seen above, Confucian tradition asserted that political legitimacy of a monarch was 
to be achieved through a monarch’s obligation to arrange welfare measures for their 
subjects, as a way of stabilising the people’s fife. But due to the traits of the obligation as 
noblesse oblige, welfare measures varied depending on the different extents of the kings’ 
commitments. Nonetheless, several examples, which had relative continuity regardless of 
the change of kings, can be taken to illustrate the state’s welfare measures. As natural 
disaster and subsequent poverty were the main adverse contingencies of those days, the 
state’s actions were for the most part focussed on two kinds of need: poverty relief and 
medical assistance.
With regard to poverty relief the government ran two different systems: preventive
(pihwang) and ex post facto measures (kuhwang). The proactive measures were practiced
mainly through state-owned granaries. Under the sangp’yongch’ang system (1409-1608),
grain was bought at a higher price than in the private market when it was a good harvest
year, and sold to the poor in turn at a lower price when it was a lean year. This aimed to
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prevent the people from suffering unexpected hardship through a bad crop by controlling 
the grain prices. Another example, uich’ang (1392-1525), was a grains-loan system 
whereby the first half of reserved grains was saved for the next year and the second half 
was loaned to the people, which had to be repaid with 10 or 20% interest rate in the next 
harvest season. The interest profits went for poor relief fund (Ha 1997: 55-60).
The post-active measures were targeted on the needy such as widowers or widows, 
orphans and childless persons, the elderly, and victims of natural catastrophes who lacked a 
family or kinship support. To take child services as an example, the government established 
an office called Chinhulch’ong (1530-1894), and codified some programmes. The office 
housed beggars under age ten and the neglected under age three until the spring or autumn. 
For homeless children, it built accommodation with meals provided appropriate to their age. 
The women who took care of abandoned children received enough food to support the 
children and themselves. The family that was willing to foster orphans had to get 
permission from the office and a foster period had to last for more than sixty days. The 
officials were responsible for supervising the conditions of children’s nutrition and then- 
foster homes by checking the children’s activity. If they found the children to have been 
mistreated, foster parents would be reprimanded. If the officials neglected their 
responsibility for supervision, they would be reported and punished by a royal inspector 
(Ha 1997: 63-65).
There were also provided other services for the elderly and victims of natural disasters. 
In contrast to the child services, however, service methods for the elderly were not so 
detailed and were left to the kings’ discretion. Providing some food for the elderly was the 
main service, but the beneficiary was usually over seventy, which seems to have reflected 
the notion that people’s longevity testified to a king’s high morality and thus the king had 
to acknowledge it. To relieve the victims of natural tragedy and the poor, public assistance 
was granted in the forms of free meals, tax reliefj exemption of corvee and military service, 
and so on, usually combining with the operation of a national granary system.
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Medical services for people were institutionalised from the outset of the dynasty, and 
extended to the poor by 1424. Two main institutions, named Hyeminseo (1392-1882) and 
Tongseo taebiwon (1036-1822), offered free services for servants and the homeless, in 
particular for all those with diseases. They were functionally divided, so that the former 
was practiced for treating general diseases and the latter for infectious diseases. These 
services usually came together with poor relief measures and continued for relatively long 
periods over the dynasty. Moreover, the services were not just limited to the capital area but 
also covered local provinces as necessary, for example, when a serious epidemic or 
catastrophe struck a certain area. Thus, it can be claimed that traditional Korea developed a 
sort of public health service for the poor as well as the general populace, though small in its 
scale.
This discussion reveals that the social foundation of citizenship growth in Korea has a 
different story to the other foundations. In contrast to the others, the social foundation had a 
firm ground in traditional Korea sustained by well-developed civil organisations and the 
state’s welfare arrangements. Thus, it seems acceptable to assert that the society indeed 
maintained the possibility that the underlying citizenship ideas such as civil society, social 
solidarity and democratic politics could flourish in the future.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to answer the first question whether Korea has the historical 
and cultural foundations to secure citizenship rights. It has found that traditional Korea did 
have the foundations for citizenship development. Yet, they were weak and quite different 
to those of western societies. Regarding cultural foundation, Korea, profoundly influenced 
by Confucianism, first had a quite different perception of the person compared to the West. 
In Korea, individuality could not be realised independent of his/her group identity and 
hence people could not be set free from the responsibility for the realisation of the group 
interests. This sort of perception helped maintain a highly hierarchical society but also
99
undermined the possibility of the growth of free citizen. In the meantime, the society was 
also sustained by ideas in close connection to citizenship rights. Though not in the same 
context of western citizenship, Confucianism emphasised such ideas as people-centred 
thoughts, social solidarity and political legitimacy of a monarch mainly through noblesse 
oblige. These traits seem to have little significance for citizenship in the Marshallian sense, 
but would have been familiar to a Victorian notion of citizenship (Harris 1995).
Politically, there was a well-developed bureaucratic system, but it was primarily used 
for sustaining the rulers’ authority. What is more, the centralised power of monarchs 
enabled them to patemalistically control their subjects. Even though the dynasty maintained 
a legal code (Kydngguk taejon: 1485-1865), it was just for a minor regulation of ruling 
activity, and did not bring about a codification of legal citizenship. This effectively barred 
the growth of movements attempting to pursue citizenship in Korea. However, such a 
tradition began to change especially from the end of the nineteenth century with rising 
demands for social reform from the various angles of the society and sometimes by the 
imposition of foreign powers. This certainly helped the society move toward a modem one 
by reducing the king’s power and introducing western civilisation. But it also widened the 
opportunity for foreign powers to intervene in Korea, which eventually frustrated the 
reform movements and thus deprived the society of the opportunity to carry out 
modernisation programmes by itself.
Economically, not just the. strong power of the king but also the emphasis on social 
hierarchy and kinship inhibited the growth of independent cities and free mercantile activity. 
Thus, there was little potentiality for Korea to develop civil society or the new bourgeois 
class, and later a working class. This structure of economic foundation did not change much 
even by the time of the attenuation of the king’s power. In feet, there was seen a growth of 
commercial cities and trade by the end of Choson dynasty. But, neither the growth taken 
place at national level nor the merchants came to form a civil force to challenge the 
sovereign power. Thus, economic foundation was the weakest point in citizenship 
foundations in Korea.
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Social foundation reveals a story which is quite different from the others, but close to 
the western idea of citizenship though it was laid by the different ideology of Confucianism. 
It was exampled by the local Neo-Confiicianists-led sowon as well as popular organisations 
such as the kye and the turye. The first showed the possibility that a modem type of politics, 
symbolised by party politics, and autonomous economic sectors could develop in traditional 
Korea, despite some adverse influence on the society. By accentuating group identity, the 
other two contributed to the construction of a network of mutuality based on voluntary civil 
organisations. They did almost the same function of promoting social solidarity and 
members’ well-being as a guild did in the western free cities. Furthermore, this mutuality 
produced an embryonic stage of democratic mle, or self-government. However, these 
activities were practiced mainly within the boundary of the family and natural villages. 
Such a shortcoming was overcome by the state’s involvement in poor relief and public 
health at national level. This was motivated by the Confiician teaching that obligated king 
to stabilise the life of his subjects, but contributed to the state arranging welfare measures 
for the people, which led to a substantial level of state welfare developed in traditional 
Korea.
The discussion of citizenship foundations in Korea shows that the society was different 
from what Marshall modelled for his citizenship theory. But also, it holds that the society 
did not lack all the basic conditions for citizenship growth. Especially, such conditions 
became more tangible by the end of the nineteenth century. This led to a provisional 
conclusion that despite much difference in the details of those foundations, traditional 
Korea was a “seed-bed” society, to borrow a term from Parsons (1966: 95), for the further 
development of citizenship.
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Chapter 4
Dismantlement of the Foundations of Citizenship
Imperialism and its corollary, colonialism, have been seen by some academics as 
introducing a ‘metamorphosed’ capitalism to a colonised nation, transplanting a ‘husk’ of 
capitalism, whilst destroying that country’s potential to embark on its own indigenous form 
of capitalism. The colonial power’s main concern is to exploit the colony’s raw materials 
for imperial purposes. This subsequently destroys the colony’s traditional economic 
structure often based on agriculture and hand craftsmanship (Harrison 1988; Larrain 1989: 
Ch 2). Economic subjugation is, however, not the only consequence of colonisation: it also 
dismantles all, or most, of the aspects of a people’s socio-political life. Medora and Woddis 
(1952: 17) describe this situation.
“As a result. ..., the peoples o f these (colonised) countries were 
transformed into semi-slavery, or else completely destroyed.
They were robbed of their lands, and the wealth of their fields 
and mines was piped away to the capital cities of the
conquerors. Their men, women and children formed a reservoir 
of human labour which could be driven and taxed without
mercy, paid  miserable wages and fiercely exploited. Attacks 
were even made on the national spirit o f the oppressed people 
by the destruction of their languages and their national 
culture”.
Historians argue that Korea suffered from these kinds of colonial exploitation after 
becoming a Japanese colony in 1910 (Ku 1985; Kang 1994b; 1994c). The Japanese
annexation of Korea put its people under a militaristic rule that deprived them of their
sovereign rights. Every aspect of Korean life was affected. Before colonisation, social 
reform movements, launched by both elites and the populace, and sometimes imposed by 
foreign powers, had begun to project the idea of a more equal society, as the absolute power
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of the monarch declined. Moreover, Korea had experienced some growth in free market 
activities and the emergence of a merchant class by the end of the nineteenth century. 
However, the Japanese occupations deactivated, and reversed the direction of, such a drive 
toward social modernisation by imposing unprecedented changes on every aspect of society. 
Politically, Korea came under the rule of the Japanese emperor. Economically, it became a 
major resource for Japan’s exploitation, whereby the pre-modem mode of production 
relationship was further reinforced. Socially, the defining features of the traditional culture 
such as mutual help and responsibility almost disappeared. Thus, most of the foundations 
for citizenship growth were dismantled by Japan’s colonisation.
4.1 Dismantlement of Political Foundation
In the West, a firmly established state was a political foundation on which citizenship 
rights could be implemented. In Korea, losing sovereignty meant that the conditions for the 
development of citizenship were not soundly established. The period between the last half 
of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, when Korea was 
making gradual progress toward creating a modem society, was critical for citizenship 
development. Japanese rule over Korea reversed such a trend and fundamentally 
constrained the growth of citizenship. Koreans were deprived of all rights and privileges 
that they would have enjoyed as citizens of an independent country.
Colonial Korea was ruled by the Japanese Governor-General of Korea, who was 
usually a former or serving army general (Chosen sotokufu). Having been appointed by the 
Japanese emperor, he wielded supreme power in Korea, covering not just administration 
but also legislation and justice. In turn, the Korean monarch was stripped of all his 
authority and the Korean army was dissolved. The Japanese governor was empowered to 
issue laws, decrees, and regulations and to appoint civil servants. In addition, he held 
supreme command over the army and the navy in Korea, so as to mobilise Japanese troops 
in Korea and to dispatch them to Manchuria (Kim 1986: 187-188; Nahm 1988: 224).
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The governor was supported in his role by the Japanese gendarmerie and the civil 
police. The Department of Security established its branches in each provincial capital, and a 
centralised police system emerged as more police stations were set up in cities, towns and 
villages. Commencing with 5,683 policemen in 1910, by 1941 there were some 60,000 
policemen in Korea, which accounted for one policeman to every 400 people (Nahm 1988: 
225).
The rule by the Japanese governor was, therefore, synonymous with rule by the 
gendarmerie, which was authorised to engage in a wide range of auxiliary roles not 
commonly associated with policing. It sought to gain information about, and to crush any 
independence movement. It rigidly regulated press activity and the association and 
assembly of political and/or religious groups. In the area of justice, police were empowered 
to arbitrate in civil suits and to act as substitute prosecutors. A policy of political exclusion 
of the native population was another feature of the colonial administration. As the 
Governor-General took over most administrative control of Korea, the entire central 
executive was organised along Japanese functional lines and staffed by Japanese. As of 31 
March of 1919, there were seven major departments and twenty-seven executive 
committees in the office of the Governor-General. Only a small number of Koreans were 
employed in the lowest auxiliary roles within these departments (Kim 1986: 203).
Despite a formal proclamation that the colonial government would appoint as many 
Korean civil servants as possible, there existed a tacit agreement between Japanese 
politicians not to employ any Koreans unless absolutely required, specifically in 
professions related to science and technology and the law (Park 1946: 31, 40; Haggard et al. 
1997: 873). Officially, thus, there were opportunities for Koreans to participate in the 
colonial bureaucracy. But the windows of opportunity were obviously narrow for them. 
Even though successful in gaining a position, they were only assigned to such positions as 
clerks and lower level functionaries (Haggard, Kang, and Moon 1997: 873). There were no 
genuine avenues for participation in political decision-making for Koreans during this 
period.
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Prior to its annexation, Korea had developed a sophisticated bureaucratic system of 
government. As seen in the previous chapter, the Kabo reform had transformed the old 
administration into that of a modem cabinet government (Naegak). But, the sudden 
takeover of Korean politics by Japan extinguished the cabinet system, and established a 
‘police state’, which deprived Koreans of basic civil and political rights. At the same time, 
the political exclusion of Koreans made the task of rebuilding the political foundations of 
Korean citizenship a monumentally difficult one during the post colonial period.
4.2 Dismantlement of Economic Foundation
Whilst the political dismantlement of a citizenship base in colonial Korea was executed 
at a super-structural level, its economic erosion was carried out at a substructure level, 
hence having more direct and substantial effects on the Korean’s life. The systematic 
appropriation of economic and human resources by colonial Japan was the main contributor 
to the dissolution of indigenous economic structures and to the extreme impoverishment of 
many Koreans.
4.2.1 Economic Exploitation
The economic exploitation was committed throughout the colonial period, and 
sometimes took various forms depending on Japan’s changing national objectives and 
requirements. In the early period of the annexation, a land survey was undertaken to 
determine what resources were available for exploitation. In 1930s, it took the form of 
extracting natural resources as well as human resources for war mobilisation.
The land survey (1910-1919) was the first colonial business Japan conducted in Korea.
Immediately after the annexation of Korea, Japan embarked on a full-scale accounting of
state and private land holdings under the auspices of the Bureau of Land Survey established
in 1910, and the Land Survey Ordinance (1912). The ostensible rationale of the survey was
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to modernise the pre-modem structure o f land ownership by registering land titles, 
assessing the value of land for tax purposes and preparing accurate topographical maps (Ku 
1985: 16; Ch'oe 1998b: 226-227). However, the actual purposes were to do with ensuring 
the stable supply o f revenue for the Governor-General, to identify and occupy state-owned 
land, and eventually to establish a basis for the appropriation o f  Korean agricultural output. 
(Nahm 1988: 227; Yu 1997: 331).
The completion of the land survey was part o f a fundamental reorganisation of the 
major economic sector, or the agricultural sector. The ordinance required all Korean 
landowners and tillers to report their legal ownership or rights to cultivate the land within 
six days. They also had to report the location, size, and quality o f their land. The onerous 
nature o f the reporting requirements, along with anti-colonial sentiment, resulted in 
widespread lack of compliance, and the consequent confiscation of land into government 
ownership (Lee 1984: 318-9).
Table 4-1 Structural Change of Korean Farmers by Land Survey
%
Years Owners Part-owners Tenants
1913 21.8 38.8 39.4
1922 20.4 39.0 40.6
1927 20.2 35.1 44.7
1932 18.4 31.4 50.2 . ' i m
1937 19.2 25.6 55.2
1939 19.0 25.3 55.7
Source: (Ch'oe 1998b: 244, Table 6-3)
The consequence o f the survey was the widened opportunity for both Japanese capital 
and farmers to dominate economic activities as well as the dismantlement o f the foundation 
o f Koreans’ life. After the survey, the number of Japanese emigrants to Korea steadily 
increased from 171, 543 in 1910 to 424,700 in 1925, and to 650,100 in 1939. Many of these 
immigrants were farmers and provided with free or low-priced lands. Consequently, in
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1939 there were some 45,000 Japanese landowners in Korean agriculture (Nahm 1988: 
227). On the contrary, the number of Korean households that owned land declined, whereas 
that of tenants increased.
Table 4-1 shows the overall effects of the survey on the structure of Korean farmers. In 
1913 when the survey just began, the proportion of land owners to the total agricultural 
household was 21.8, while that of half-independent-and-half-tenants consisting of 38.8 per 
cent and that of tenants 39.4 per cent. This structure markedly changed in 1939. The ratio 
of land owners and part-owners declined by 2.8 per cent and 13.5 per cent respectively, 
while that of tenants increased to 16.3 per cent. Thus, the most severely effected by the 
survey were the tenant class, following by the part-owners. Data from Cholla Province 
shows more devastating effects of the survey on the exclusively agriculture-based region. 
According to Shin (1987: 326, Table 17), the agricultural population of the province was 
composed of 30 per cent of landowners and 70 per cent of tenants by the end of the Choson 
dynasty. But, in 1934 this composition markedly changed, landowners accounting for only 
5 per cent and tenants for 95 per cent. This devastating impact on the livelihood of Korean 
farmers meant that the social basis on which new civil power could have emerged was 
seriously undermined.
This exploitative economic policy of colonial Japan was intensified by economic 
hardship of its domestic market from the late 1910s till the end of the 1920s. In 1918, Japan 
had a nationwide food shortage and related riots. By the end of the 1920s, its economy was 
severely affected by the worldwide economic recession. This hardship drove the Japanese 
domestic market into a slump, threatening the interests of capitalists and leading to 
exploration of foreign markets. In order to secure lucrative foreign markets for its industry, 
Japan attempted to build an imperial economic bloc tying its colonies together. In Korea, 
Japan’s economic policy came up with the plan to make Korea its major provisions supplier. 
For this, two Proposals for Increase of Rice Production in 1921-1926 and 1927-36 were 
launched. The first proposal aimed to extend arable land via land reclamation and the 
improvement of irrigation system. The second one targeted increased productivity of the 
land through the improvement of seeds and the introduction of commercial fertilizer. At the
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same time, it encouraged a large number of Japanese to come to Korea under the 
sponsorship of both the Oriental Developmental Company and the Japanese Ministry of 
Colonisation (Nahm 1988: 237; Ch’oe 1998b: 266-267). This effort of the Japan’s 
economic exploitation was further intensified in association with two events of the Chinese- 
Japanese war in 1937 and the Pacific War in 1941, and the scope of its exploitation 
comprised almost all sectors of Korean industry.
Through these measures, Korean agriculture experienced a certain level of 
modernisation with the expansion of cultivatable land and an improvement of agricultural 
institutions, as well as an increase in rice productivity. For example, the area of cultivatable 
paddy fields increased from 3,680,000 acres in 1919 to 4,290,000 acres by 1939 (Nahm 
1988: 237). But, the benefits of the modernisation were mostly reaped by Japan. During the 
Japanese rule, the increasing rate of rice export to Japan always outnumbered that of 
agricultural productivity (Ch'oe 1998b: 269, Table 7-1).
Natural resources were also exposed to similar policy of exploitation. Among these 
were mining products such as gold, iron and coal. Having already realised large reserve of 
natural resources in Korea before the annexation, Japan was particularly keen to develop 
the mining industry from the outset of colonisation. It conducted thorough research on 
Korea’s capacity of natural resources from 1911 to 1917, and announced the Ordinance for 
the Mining Industry in Korea in 1916, which banned the ownership of mines by Koreans 
whilst encouraging such Japanese firms as the Mitsubishi and Mitsui groups to invest in 
major mining sites. Shortly after the annexation, the share of Japanese total mine 
production in Korea was 26 per cent while Korean companies produced 4.8 per cent, other 
foreign companies, mainly American, 72.6 per cent. Ten years later, however, the Japanese 
share dramatically increased to 80 per cent and Koreans only 0.4 per cent and other 
foreigners 19.7 per cent (Kim 1998b: 430). Indeed, Japan subordinated the mining industry 
to the needs of the war industry by putting into government control such minerals as gold, 
silver, iron, tungsten and graphite that were indispensable for the war industry. (Kim 
1998b: 430-431).
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The dissolution of the economic foundation and the separation of people from their 
land in colonial Korea might on the surface be regarded as similar to the process that gave 
rise to a new bourgeois as well as a capitalist class in the West. In this vein, some scholars 
(Nakamura 1991; Hori and An 1993; Kim 1993b) argue that Japanese economic policy 
helped Korea lay a foundation for capitalism. The land survey and two Proposals for 
Increase of Rice Production, they hold, were instrumental in creating a labour force “free” 
to move away from binding pre-modem ties to the land. In addition, the Japanese policy of 
industrialisation in Korea during the 1930s consolidated the foundations of capitalism by 
introducing heavy and light industries and modem systems of finance, communication and 
traffic to a backward country. Hence, they argue that whilst the Korean economy was 
subordinated to Japan’s interest during the colonial period, it also received a number of key 
benefits of industrialisation for the future development of capitalism.
Yet, the former landlords in Korea were prevented by Japanese economic policies to 
evolve into the new bourgeois class, in contrast to western societies. The majority were 
deprived of their lands and were reduced to subsistence livelihoods and thus unable to 
secure the necessary capital with which they could start afresh in business. Some of them 
were able to maintain or even increase the portion of their land, mainly in return for their 
pro-Japanist activities. But, they still remained on the firm, instead of developing into 
capitalist. In general, this inhibited the growth of independent Korean national capital, or 
the bourgeois class. This did not allow for a structural break of the society from the pre­
modem mode of production, which diminished the potential growth of civil society 
necessary for the development of civil and political rights.
4.2.2 New Bourgeois Class?
Along with the landlord class, another potential source of a new bourgeois class was
groups of Korean manufacturers and merchants. As some scholars point out (for example,
Kang 1974; McNamara 1990), Korean economy had shown the seeds of capitalism
development in the late Choson dynasty. Even Eckert, who attributes the growth of Korean
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economy to the economic policies of colonial Japan, acknowledges that the Korean 
economy witnessed “the emergence of a native entrepreneurial class that eventually turned 
its attention to industry” before being colonised (Eckert 1991: 65). To some extent, it could 
be argued, the economic policies of the colonial Japan helped Korea experience the 
advance of indigenous industrialists, as exampled by the rise of Koran companies such as 
the Kyongbang chaebol and Choson Mining Company (for details, see Eckert 1991 56-59; 
Kohli 1994). Yet, they were just a few in number and their entrepreneurial success was 
made possible due to their collaboration with Japanese colonial policies (Haggard, Kang, 
and Moon 1997: 875). Accordingly, the mode of industrialisation driven by the colonial 
Japan was not comprehensive in scope and only benefited a few Korean capitalists. More 
importantly, it held back the momentum toward capitalism, which was about to gear up 
along with the emergence of the native entrepreneurial class by the end of the dynasty. This 
hindered a transition of the Korean economy from the agriculture-based to the secondary 
industry.
The protective Company Law of 1910 can be seen as a representative example of the 
Japanese industrial policy in Korea. It prescribed that all commercial and industrial 
companies in Korea should either have Japanese co-investors or managerial staff in order to 
acquire government licences, effectively stymieing their potential contribution to the 
formation of a bourgeois class. Due to such a restriction, in 1929 for example, the 
proportion of capital owned by Koreans compared to that in Japanese possession was just 
9.7 per cent. Moreover, out of the total value of capital in Korea, only 6.4 per cent was held 
by Koreans whilst 62.4 per cent by the Japanese13 (Seoul Sahoegwahak Yon'guso 1992: 57). 
This skewed accumulation of capital prohibited Korean industrialists from playing anything 
but a token role in the economic affairs of the colony.
In summary, the Japanese economic policy in Korea resulted in the restriction of 
industrial and commercial activities of Koreans while strengthening the pre-modem land 
tenure system (Shin 1977: 74, 163). This significantly reduced the realisation at the outset
13 Additionally, there was a joint-owned capital by Koreans and Japanese, which was 
45,785,000 won, 30.8 per cent of the total capital in Korea.
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of modem history of Korea for the development of a bourgeois class and civil society 
which could serve as a potential source of liberal reform and the development of civil and 
political rights.
4.23 Creation of a Free Labour Force?
Until the late 1920s few farmers had joined the industrial working class. Although most 
farmers were forced by circumstances into wage-earning activities, they dwelled chiefly in 
rural areas, working on the farm as tenant-workers under contracts with landowners. The 
number of these bankrupt self-cultivators or tenants, which were present from the 
seventeenth century onwards, significantly increased after the survey, resulting in a surplus 
of agricultural labour power. This concentration of labour power in rural areas was 
witnessed by the fact that in 1928, 9.8 million or 80.6 per cent of the employed population 
worked in agriculture, while only 0.6 million or 2.1 per cent were involved in mining and 
factory work (Park 1999: 12).
This concentration of wageworkers in farming led to high rents to the landowners, with 
between 58 and 90 per cent of harvests being paid out by tenants. In addition, tenants had to 
pay other fees such as water fees and transportation costs, so that the net income of a tenant 
was frequently less than 25 per cent of the harvest to live on. This of course brought about a 
social polarisation between landlords and tenants. The number of landowner-tenant 
disputes increased from 667 cases in 1931 to 25,834 in 1935 (Nahm 1988: 239).
This situation also drove many bankrupt formers into starvation and destitution, 
particularly during the period of what is popularly called the “spring starvation”, or “the 
barley hills”. General Ugaki, the Japanese Governor-General to Korea from June 1931 to 
August 1936, gave a frank and poignant description of the famine: (Korean peasants had)
“to dig out and eat the roots of trees on the mountains and fields or beg from every door
to keep themselves alive” (Nahm 1988: 239). In 1930, about 60 or 70 per cent of all tenants 
had no grain to plant in the spring (Lee 1986: 53).
I l l
The resultant social polarisation and starvation caused a mass exodus of villagers to 
urban centres either in Korea or overseas to Japan and such colonial outposts as Manchuria. 
During the latter colonial period, the main driver of emigration was Japan’s war 
mobilisation of Korean people for munitions production as well as military service, and 
thus the number of migrants increased markedly. After 1938, the growing demand for 
reinforcements to the Japanese army led to the conscription of Korean youth and also 
‘comfort women’ into forcible service in the Japanese imperial army (Steinberg 1989: 46; 
Howard 1995). By 1944, the number of Koreans living overseas reached 2.8 million, or 
11.6 per cent of the entire Korean population (Kim 1998b: 425).
Intra-migration of Koreans within the peninsula was accelerated from the 1930s to the 
early 1940s as Japan concentrated military-related industries in the middle and northern 
areas of the peninsula. This concentration made it necessary for the Japanese governor to 
move the agricultural population in the southern areas to the newly developing industrial 
centres (Han 1963: 124). According to Park (1999: 16), between 1930 and 1940, the 
greatest increase in the number of non-agricultural employment was seen in Kyonggi 
province and North and South Hamgyong provinces, in the middle and northern parts of the 
country respectively, with an addition of more than 100,000 workers in total The ‘colonial 
industrialisation’ and the inflow of agricultural population into the industrial centres led a 
rapid urbanisation. In the case of Seoul, the population increased more than threefold from 
343,000 in 1925 to 1,114,000 in 1940. According to Kim (1998b), between 1932 and 1942 
the average urban population quadrupled, whilst rural areas had just a 15 per cent growth.
This urbanisation might be regarded as similar to that which occurred in western 
societies. Indeed, it brought about a change in the urban labour market structure. By 1930, 
out of the 1.16 million urban workers, the largest group of 40.4 per cent (468,000) 
consisted of the informal urban labour market, floating in search of daily employment. 
Domestic workers constituted 27 per cent, or 319,000, constituting the second largest group, 
and factory and mining workers the third with only 5.4 per cent, or 73,000 (Park 1999: 14). 
The rate of Korean employment increased slightly towards the end of the colonial period: 
formal-sector jobs in industries and mining grew from 2.1 per cent of the entire employed
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population in 1931 to 7.2 per cent in 1942 (Park 1999: 16). However, most Korean workers 
were employed in insecure and menial positions, with few benefits to working conditions to 
be gained from urbanisation.
Thus, what Japan brought to Korea by way of policies of ‘agricultural modernisation’ 
and ‘industrialisation’ was a segmented structure of labour market in which the majority of 
the population remained on the land, whereas a small proportion of destitute workers 
participated in secondary and the tertiary industries. According to Park (1999: 15), whilst 
the industrialisation by Japan created a demand for labour and made a large scale out­
migration from the agricultural sector, there were still 71 per cent of workers engaged in the 
rural sector in 1945. As for the urban workers, they were mostly casual workers and/or the 
long-term unemployed. Under such conditions, they could not organise themselves 
effectively to represent their interests. This means that colonised Korea lacked another 
significant force for social reform in the form of an organised working class.
4.3 Dismantlement of Social Foundation
As seen in the previous chapter, traditional Korean society carried several antecedents 
of citizenship development. Strongly influenced by Confucianism and ecologically based 
on agriculture, Korean social bonds were centred on the ancestral village where many 
generations of clans had lived. The large extended familial system was common since 
labour concentration during the farming season was required. A well-developed 
bureaucracy helped the central government maintain its political power, but this also 
enabled village people to develop a certain degree of autonomy and a mutual help system. 
These circumstances enabled Koreans to organise such voluntary associations as the kye 
and the turye. These were the traditional forms of not just labour and financial help but also 
self-governance and a community-based cooperative ethos among Koreans. Along with 
state welfare measures, they constituted what may be considered as the social foundation of 
citizenship growth in traditional Korea.
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The Japanese rule over Korea undermined and altered traditional life patterns. Its first 
impact was seen in the destabilisation of family life. As seen above, the land survey during 
1910s and colonial industrialisation between 1930 and 1940 drove the majority of 
agricultural families into tenant and/or vagabond status. The bankruptcy of small-scale 
home industries, higher farm rent, water tax, and rising daily living expenses made massive 
indebtedness and extreme poverty widespread among Koreans (Sunwoo 1970: 259-260). 
This brought about an enormous out-migration of agricultural population, in particular 
among the young male farmers, but sometimes women and children as well (Hori and An 
1993: 138). This situation led to the break-up of the traditional large family system, 
creating a situation whereby older family members and children were required to take on 
traditionally male farming roles (Mun 1990b: 111, 124). At the same time, this exodus 
caused the dissolution of the rural community and thus the mutual help system. In the urban 
areas, the growth of urban population increased the frequency of social problems such as 
the incidence of crime and alienation of disadvantaged groups (Mun 1990b: 125-126).
Creating such harsh conditions, the Japanese rule also undermined the foundations of 
the self-help organisations, which experienced a rapid decline and/or change in their 
characteristics. Korean social historians (for example, Kang 1980; Shin 1987) account for 
this from several different perspectives, although they are in agreement about the critical 
impact which Japanese colonial rule had on the functioning of these organisations. 
According to Shin (1987: 507-516), several factors combined to explain the decline of, for 
example, the kye system. First, the intrusion of the Japanese currency system into the 
Korean agricultural economy and its consequential development of inflation damaged the 
community esprit de corps, causing villagers to be significantly less concerned with 
sustaining the ethic of mutual co-operation for the benefit of the community.
A second reason was that the Japanese land survey not only ruined the livelihood of 
individual farmers, but also led to the confiscation of all the communal lands of a village, a 
major financial resource for self-organisation. This meant that the voluntary organisations 
lost a critical economic base to finance themselves (Park 1984: 21).
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A third reason was that the coercive control of the Japanese gendarmerie made 
dysfunctional all components of self-governance in rural communities. To make its control 
effective, the colonial Japanese rule established /?2jw?(to wnship) - centred administration 
system by merging and abolishing the traditional administrative units of village and 
township. The number of administrative units decreased from 4,408 in 1910 to 2,512 in 
1917, with tong-ri (village) shrinking from 71,852 to 28,283 (Kim 1984: 54). The main 
intention of this restructuring was to unify the administrative and tax systems, but also had 
the effect of substantially weakening the community ties based on historically significant 
natural village. In addition, the installation of a police station in each myon worked 
effectively to suppress patriotic and anti-Japanese movements (Kang 1980: 327). In the 
wake of this, village people lost their identity, and the voluntary motivation for self-help 
disappeared in many communities.
Fourthly, the land survey created a group of agricultural wageworkers by separating 
them from their lands. But Japanese economic policy in Korea was focussed on the 
promotion of agricultural productivity until the 1920s, which led to an over-surplus of 
farming workers who had to agree, due to high competition with other workers, on a 
subjugating contract with landowners. This markedly weakened the necessity of mutual 
labour help, and polarised villagers (Cho 1987; Yi 1989).
Fifthly, the foundation of the voluntary organisations was undermined by the Japanese 
endeavour to create a ‘patriotic unit’, a work team which all villagers over the age of 
fourteen were obliged to join and to participate in collective works. By introducing this new 
system, Japan intentionally disorganised the kye system (Shin 1987: 509). The number of 
the kyes rapidly decreased until the middle of 1920s. For example, in North Ch’ungch’ong 
province, there were 620 kyes in 1913. The number was markedly diminished to 81 by 
1926. However, they were resurrected with a completely different set of characteristics, 
with its number rising again to 169 in 1937 (Kim 1984: 59; Park 1984: 23). Why did the 
system come to experience such extremes during the colonial period? During the former 
period, the colonial administration could not tolerate self-governance in Korean 
communities and moreover regarded it as a source of anti-Japanese sentiment. During the
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later time, however, Japan changed its policy to utilise the organisations for labour and the 
tax mobilisation of Koreans (Shin 1987: 512).
Accordingly, the kye became stripped of its original function as a voluntary, 
autonomous mutual help system, as members came to be paid for their labour contribution. 
They were forbidden to participate in any decision-making process, which engendered 
communal passivity (Kim 1984: 66-67). In turn, they were forced to undertake public 
works such as road repairing and irrigation works. The public function of the kye became 
one of urging villagers to save money and to promote frugality, but the underlying intention 
was to secure a stable taxation source for colonial revenue (Kim 1984: 64).
During the colonial period, Korean society appeared to undergo a transformation from 
gemeinschaft to gesellschaf characteristics. But, the velocity and magnitude of the 
transition, as overseen by a colonial regime, were too rapid and radical to carry over unique 
elements of social traditions into the new phase of social development. Accordingly, the 
social foundation of citizenship growth in traditional Korea was dismantled during the 
colonial period, with consequent devastating effects on the institutions of civil society.
4.4 Social Rights under Colonial Rule
As Midgley (1981: 51-52) observed, one of the outcomes of colonisation is the 
transplantation of social welfare measures from colonial masters to their subject nations. 
Along with the basic institutions of social control such as a criminal law, juvenile courts, 
and reformatories to tackle the problems of urban criminals and vagabonds, they also 
introduced basic social security systems such as public assistance to support the urban 
destitute. Family-related legislation was also enacted to ensure that those who had 
abandoned or failed to support their dependants to make restitution. In the course of this 
policy transplantation, special attention was given to children and adolescents. Social 
services copied to the colonised territories were practised in a similar fashion to that of the 
parent country. Britain copied verbatim the English Poor Law and the English Children’s
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and Young Person’s Act of 1933 to establish new welfare system in its colonies. France ran 
the same income maintenance system in its colonies as in the mainland (Midgley 1981: 52).
These imported welfare institutions provided an essential foundation on which the 
colonised countries could implement more systematic welfare measures after independence. 
However, as Midgley also maintains (1981), the priority of colonial administration was that 
of controlling the subject nation. What is called social control theory seems to be better 
applied to this stage of social policy development in the third world countries (Piven and 
Cloward 1972; Higgins 1980).
The modem development of social policy in Korea began with Japan replicating its 
public assistance system in the colony. This section will attempt to identify why Japan 
introduced the system and what impact it had on the development of Korean social policy 
from its inception. For this, a brief examination of the public assistance programme that 
was operating in mainland Japan during the colonial period will be made.
4.4.1 Japanese Public Assistance before 1945
Japan developed social services from the latter half of the nineteenth century. It 
introduced the Relief Regulation in 1875 to provide public relief to those who had neither 
means nor anyone to support them, and who were less than thirteen years old, chronically 
ill, or more than seventy years old. The act was replaced by the Relief and Protection Law 
in 1929, but was not implemented until 1932 when it was allocated budget funds. (Taira 
1967: 96, 100).
In 1917, Japan introduced another public assistance system in Okayama, called the
Relief Counsellor Commission. This was established, as a local-based service, to utilise the
voluntary resources of local citizens with ‘good’ reputation. Under this system, volunteers
or “counsellors” conducted an intensive survey of, and provided relief for, the poor (Taira
1967: 96-97). The volunteers classified the poor into two categories: those who were in an
immediate need of relief due to, for instance, sickness and other contingencies; and those
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who were expected to need public relief if any incident fell on them. It became a 
nationwide system in 1918 in the wake of a rice riot which swept the country (Shin 1983: 
17, re-quoted in Shin 1985: 36-38), and introduced to all prefectures and more than 20 
municipalities across Japan in 1928 (Taira 1967: 97)14. Through this series of expansions, 
the counsellor system developed into the official public assistance programme in Japan.
The underlying purpose of such state welfare programmes was that of exercising social 
control. The government utilised the commissioners in surveying people’s living condition, 
but also for monitoring possible ‘dangerous persons’ (Shin 1985: 38). The commissioners 
were given both roles of regulating and providing relief to the poor. This approach to 
welfare is more likely to emphasise informal sectors such as individual and family than the 
state in taking responsibility of welfare. This was made clear by Japanese Minister of 
Social Affairs, Koshi Ichio, of that time on the definition of social responsibility:
'!social responsibility is understood as extending the notion of 
familial responsibility onto the stage of the entire society. All 
people need to pay their interests to promoting good o f the 
entire society, to regard other people's hardship as i f  your family 
members had, and thus try to reduce it  with co-operation o f each 
other”{Lee 1982: 254).
This makes explicit the government’s adherence to the notion that the principal 
responsibility for welfare belonged to families and the broader community. The state was 
regarded neither as a welfare provider nor financer. There was little financial commitment 
from the central and/or municipal government, but increasing demands for voluntary 
contributions (Shin 1985: 39).
Engagement in war and empire building made the government move further away from 
the responsibility for public relief, bringing a decline and characteristic changes to it. The 
amendment of Relief and Protection Law in 1937 accentuated the responsibility of family
14 Lee (1982: 254) states that this number of commissioners well exceeded that of public 
assistance recipients. By 1925, there were 8,600 public relief recipients in Japan.
118
members to look after the poor, and on the “instructive” role of the relief commissioners to 
enlighten them. At the same time, two existing groups of the poor under the commissioner 
system were re-categorised into another two: those who received relief only for the public 
interest of maintaining social order and those who were eligible for military service and 
industrial work (Kikue 1977: 250, re-quoted in Lee 1982: 265). The greatest proportion of 
public assistance was of course centred on the second category, in particular children and 
beneficiaries of the military assistance. Thus, the Japanese public assistance in wartime was 
used as a tool for investing in potential manpower, rather than for the purposes of pooling 
social risk and/or redistributing wealth.
The development of social policy of this kind can be characterised as ‘social 
instrumentalism’, which understands social policy as an instrument to serve the state 
interests and reduces the egalitarian idea of sharing the suffering of social members to a 
secondary purpose (Lee 1982: 271). Under this condition, social welfare was driven by 
paternalism and authoritarianism. The Japanese public assistance of that time had those 
features and had a direct influence on Korean social policy.
4.4.2 Copy of Japanese Public Assistance System to Korea
Colonial Japan transplanted its public assistance programmes to Korea. First 
established were the Relief Counsellor Commission in December 1927 and then the Relief 
and Protection Law in March 1944. Three factors help us to understand Japan’s motive of 
introducing such programmes to Korea. First was to maintain social order of the society 
which, in the 1920s, was disturbed by a myriad number of the destitute across Korea caused 
by the Japanese economic policies. The worst case was that of t ’omang-min, the urban poor 
who dwelled in a cave house (t’ogul) in city. Some of these destitute were the existing city 
dwellers who experienced a bankruptcy as Japanese capital started to encroach into Korean 
cities, but most were constituted by out-migrants from rural villages after being deprived of 
the means of livelihood. To take Seoul, as an example, where the largest number of 
t ’omang-min was found, statistics shows a sharp increase in their number from just 53
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households in 1922 to 867 in 1928, more than a sixteen-fold increase over 6 years (Park 
1998). This trend gained further momentum, the number reaching 4,292 families, or 20,911 
people in 1939 (Yu 1997: 338).
The standard of living of many households was extremely low. All family members 
lived together in one cave, the average size of which was 1.5 p  ’yong, or 5.931 square yards. 
Most of them were unemployed. Even if they found a job, it did not secure decent living 
conditions. One survey, which was conducted on 1,536 Seoul t ’omang-mins in 1931, 
reveals that none were employed in the formal sector as a factory worker. About 30 per 
cent (462) of them were day labourers, 13 per cent (200) were construction workers, while 
10.7 per cent (164) were ‘A-frame’ (chige) carriers. Others could not be classified into one 
category, and most engaging in miscellaneous works such as hawkers, rickshaw men, and 
shopkeepers (Kang 1986).
This problem was even worse in rural areas. In 1931 there were some 163,000 beggars,
1.048.000 paupers across Korea that had to rely on any source of help for living, and
4.203.000 in destitution who were barely self-sufficient (Yu 1997: 338). The total number 
of 5,414,000 meant that 27.5 per cent of the total Korean population suffered from 
destitution.
The introduction of the poor relief programme was intended to deal with these 
problems, but the methods employed reveals that it was deeply coercive. For example, the 
assistance for hwajdnmin, or swidden cultivators, was provided in the form of subsidy to 
help them move and settle on fanning land. But, the primary purpose of this programme 
was to protect Korean forests to ensure lucrative exports to Japan. The Japanese simply 
banned the cultivation of fire-fields, and expelled people from their settlements. 
Accordingly, the government subsidy caused the existing hwajdnmin to become indebted 
and drove more into an impoverished and desperate existence (Kang 1987: 233-234).
The commissioner system was also essentially a means of exercising control over the
poor. Under the system, the Japanese governor nominated some Koreans with pro-Japanese
attitudes to undertake a supportive visiting to poor families. They surveyed their living and
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medical conditions and provided, if necessary, counselling and a relief. A census 
registration was also another important part of their responsibility (Yu 1997: 246). Thus, it 
might be regarded as friendly visiting such as seen in the case of Britain. But, as Shin 
(1985) points out, its hidden agenda was to control each Korean family case by case, in 
particular through the census registration. The home-visiting commissioners had to keep in 
close cooperation with local police, so as to report or refer, for example, those in mental 
disorder, missing and abandoned children to a police station. In addition, one of the 
commissioner’s roles, or the census registration, was that of detecting any possible 
emergence o f ‘dangerous activity’ against Japan (Yu 1997: 361).
Furthermore, public assistance was the only form of social security that was introduced 
to Korea. Any social insurance programme such as national pension and health insurance, 
which had already been introduced in Japan by that time and required state contribution, 
was not imported to Korea. The second reason for the introduction was related to the 
process of ‘Japanisation’ to which Koreans had to submit. The Korean national 
independence movement on March 1, 1919, called Samil tongnip undong, was a turning 
point in Japanese policy on Korea. The movement, although finally crushed by Japanese 
force, caused the colonial government to become ever more vigilant for another possible 
uprising by Koreans. This paved the way for a move away from rule-by-gendarmes to that 
of a “cultural policy” (bufika seiji: 1919-1931) and that of “war mobilisation” (1931-1945).
The core of the changing policies was to assimilate traditional Korean culture within a 
Japanese one. This was to destroy the roots of Korean nationalism and radical 
consciousness on the one hand, and to maximise the war mobilisation on the other. Their 
detailed programmes included a ban on any cultural expression which might promote 
nationalistic sentiment, the frequent closure of mass media written in Korean, like the daily 
newspapers the Tonga Ilbo and the Choson Ilbo, and the publishing of literature in Japanese 
(Lee 1984: 353). This effort was further intensified from 1931 onwards as Japan engaged in 
the war with China. In 1938, under the names of naisen ittai, or the ‘united body of Japan 
and Korea’, and naisen yuuwa, or ‘reconciliation between Japanese and Korean’, Korean 
history was rewritten. Koreans were banned from wearing white cotton clothes, a symbol of
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their ethnic consciousness. Japan also tightened the ban on the use of the Korean language, 
which had been in operation since 1911. The use of Korean language was prohibited in all 
schools, Japanese becoming the national language of Korea (Choy 1971: 151). Failure to 
speak Japanese meant the deprivation of many ‘rights’ such as food ration cards and public 
certificates (Nahm 1988: 255). In 1939, Koreans were forced to convert their family and 
personal names to Japanese conventions, but never permitted names with any resemblance 
to Japanese emperors, aristocrats, or other important figures past or present. 84 per cent of 
Koreans changed their names, losing their indigenous identity (Nahm 1988: 233). 
Ideological suppression also invaded on the Korean’s belief system. All Koreans were 
obliged to worship the Japanese emperor and to participate in State shintd rituals at 
designated shintd shrines.
In this context, the Japanese portion of the financial contribution to the anti-poverty 
policy in Korea was named “grace money from the emperor” (Ha 1984; Shin 1985). By the 
same token, Japan understood social work as a tool to “enlighten” those who were assumed 
to be “dirty, unsanitary, and uncivilised” through the grace of the Japanese emperor, (Park 
1998: 146). The public poor relief programme was essentially driven by the imperatives of 
the colonial power for a culturally assimilated and subordinated populace.
The third intention can be identified by looking into the details of the public assistance 
programme. The programme divided the Korean poor into two categories: the deserving 
poor who did not have the capacity to work or who were temporarily suffering from natural 
disasters, and the undeserving poor who were able bodied, that is, the agricultural poor, 
hwajonmin, and t ’omang-min. The people under the first category were provided, according 
to their contingency, disaster relief destitution relief relief for ill vagrants, and medical 
relief (Yu 1997). Despite these various kinds of benefits, however, the major method to 
provide such benefits was limited to a year-end assistance of a one-off kind. Even though 
the commissioners made house visits, their main duty was to “guide” poor families to be 
more frugal, to save up more money and to be more responsible for their family members. 
Providing assistance was their secondary job. As Shin states (1985: 56), despite the 
Japanese formal record that commissioners handled 10,061 cases of the poor in northern
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and eastern areas of Seoul between 1928 and 1930, genuine cases of relief assistance 
numbered only 4,004 cases.
Those in the second category, the ‘undeserving poor’, were not eligible for public 
assistance. Different methods of assistance were applied to different targets. For the 
agricultural poor, a self-renovation plan called ‘Movement to Promote an Agricultural 
Community’ was launched, aiming at the elimination of spring starvation and family debts. 
In order to achieve these goals, the colonial government emphasised the value of self-help 
and the curtailment of family expenses (An and Park 1980: 199-216). There was no grant or 
subsidy for the rural peasants from the government.
As MacPherson (1982: 45) points out, the developmental context of social policy in a 
colonised country is understood as reflecting both its political and economic traditions and 
the requirements of the colonial motherland. But, this does not appear to apply in the 
Korean context. The poverty policy in colonised Korea was aligned with the colonial 
government’s needs for maintaining social order and achieving ideological indoctrination 
and war mobilisation. Consequently, the public assistance programme in colonial Korea 
remained congruent with mainland Japan in terms of its basic characteristics: instrumental, 
paternalistic and authoritarian. It only reflected the imperatives of colonial Japan, but failed 
to reflect Korea’s own welfare traditions. Moreover, the Japanese poor policy in Korea not 
only polarised Korean society (Yu 1997: 361), but also made a new tradition of ‘passive 
citizen and highly centralised government power’ for fixture social policy making (Chung 
1996:318-21).
4.5 Conclusion: Citizenship, End of the Beginning
The Japanese annexation of Korea for 35 years brought about unprecedented changes, 
dismantling the indigenous foundations of citizenship in Korea. Its effects were particularly 
devastating since promising civil movements were at a nascent stage of development. 
Reform movements were all left unfinished. More than anything else, the colonial situation
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prevented Korean people from developing modem civil ideas, as their energies were 
focussed on winning independence from Japan. The control by the Japanese gendarmerie 
deprived Koreans of basic civil rights, let alone political ones. The freedom of speech, press, 
assembly and association and equality before the law were removed from the Korean’s 
experience.
Economic exploitation by the Japanese precluded the preconditions necessary for the 
growth of citizenship. The land survey and the plan for promotion of rice productivity 
dismantled the farmer class and drove them into an impoverished peasant status. This 
prohibited Korean landlords from developing into a bourgeois class and farmers into civil 
power for modernisation. From the latter half of the 1930s, a process of colonial 
industrialisation occurred in Korea and military industrial infrastructure was established, 
which, for the most part, made redundant the role of Korean industrialists. This in turn 
deprived them of the opportunity to become a driving force for liberal social reform. In the 
wake of the industrialisation there occurred a mass exodus of agricultural population and 
urbanisation. However, it did not mean that Korea came to have such a foundation of 
citizenship as free cities. The ‘industrialisation* driven by Japan did not bring a break in the 
traditional structure of the Korean economy, as proven by the fact that the post-colonial 
economy of Korea continued to be based on agriculture. Furthermore, this process of mass 
social dislocation further entrenched the destitution of many Koreans and accelerated the 
dissolution process of traditional family and community ties.
This had a profound effect on the dismantlement of the social foundation of citizenship. 
Civil organisations, which had previously prospered under the ethos of mutuality, social 
solidarity and democratic principles, virtually disappeared or underwent a radical change in 
their characteristics. Consequently, they were no longer able to carry out their genuine 
functions. Colonial Japan transplanted its welfare programmes with social control in mind, 
thus these operated under the characteristics of paternalism, authoritarianism and 
instrumentalism. These features may be seen as equivalent to some of the Bismarck’s 
German social policies. But a critical point to be made is that the welfare programmes in
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colonised Korea were not internally driven. Thus, they failed to reflect the idiosyncratic 
traditions of the country.
In summary, this discussion shows that the process of modernisation in Korea was 
obstructed by the Japanese colonial policy. This had a detrimental effect on the traditional 
foundations of Korean citizenship, leaving little on which indigenous movements could 
pursue social rights. As a result of colonisation, Korea lost what Marshall seems to take for 
granted in the context of British citizenship and was therefore not able to follow the process 
of modernisation by the standards of the West. Thus, it might be unrealistic to expect the 
growth of civil society in Korea, not to mention citizenship, which could lead us to 
conclude that the modernisation approach does not apply to the Korean case. This lack of 
modernisation experience and the structural break with its past made for a fragile 
foundation on which citizenship could develop in post-colonial Korea.
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Chapter 5
Post-war Reconstruction: 1945-1960
To citizenship scholars such as Marshall and Titmuss, the Second World War and its 
aftermath were crucial for finally establishing the third pillar of citizenship, social rights. 
Likewise, the liberation of Korea, which occurred on 15 August 1945 in the wake of the 
victory of the Allied forces in the Second World War, Korean liberation brought about 
fundamental changes to the society, placing it at the threshold of a modem society. 
Following liberation, the monarchism was consigned to history and a modernised 
bureaucratic administration was installed. The traditional social hierarchy system became 
redundant and equal status was officially granted to all citizens. The American system of 
liberal democracy and the capitalist mode of production were fortified by the occupying 
power. From a Marshallian perspective, this could be seen as the institutionalisation of two 
of the three major pillars of citizenship - civil liberties and a democratic state. Reflecting 
Marshall’s classical sequence of citizenship development, the introduction of these two 
components in the early post-war years may have appeared to contribute to the eventual 
development of a full complement of citizenship rights for Koreans.
As Henderson (1978) points out, however, post-liberation Korea was drawn into a 
period of considerable political and social turmoil. Rather than social consensus for the 
reconstruction effort, there were fierce conflicts between various social groups over how to 
best achieve nation building and reconcile different ideological orientations. This is in 
marked contrast to the British experience of the 1940s where national consensus had been 
achieved for the purposes of post-war reconstruction. This thereby calls into question the 
extent to which Korean society could realise the promise of citizenship in such a different 
context. Furthermore, this raises another related question: whether post-war Korea was 
capable of developing the driving factors for citizenship growth, such as the bourgeois class 
and civil organisations, the bases of which underwent considerable alteration during the 
colonial period.
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5.1 Promise
In conjunction with the inception of nationhood in 1948, Korea made apparent progress 
in citizenship development. The First Constitution promulgated on 7 July 1948 codified 
civil and political rights as basic rights of a citizen. It guaranteed equality before the law, 
freedom of speech, press and association, property rights, equality of the sexes, privacy, 
freedom of religion, rights to equal education, and free compulsory primary education 
(Articles from 8 to 16, 22 and 23). There was also an acknowledgement of worker’s rights 
to association, collective bargaining and action (Article 17 and 18). Basic political rights 
such as the right to vote and eligibility for election were also enacted in the constitution 
(Articles 25 and 26). Furthermore, social rights were contained in Article 19 that stipulated 
that “the elderly and those who are incapable of sustaining their lives due to a disease or 
any other reason for which their ability to work was deprived are eligible for state 
protection as prescribed by law”.
The principle of a democratic government system was also stipulated in the constitution 
which was modelled on the US Constitution. It codified the principle of the separation of 
powers, dividing the structure of government into the administration, the legislature, and 
the judiciary. The legislature held the power not just to make laws but also to institute 
impeachment proceedings against the President, Vice-President, ministers of Cabinet (State 
Affairs Council), judges, and other public officials appointed by law. Its members were 
elected for a four-year term by a universal, equal, direct, and secret vote. The judiciary 
consisted of three courts: the Supreme Court, the High Court, and the District Court. 
Through this system, up to three appeals could be made.
On the one hand, the establishment of nationhood and the subsequent promulgation of 
the constitution appeared to have set up a framework of democratic government. In 
particular, the constitution seemed on face value to have enshrined certain rights drawn 
from western ideas of citizenship. However, the recent traditions on which this new
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constitution was grafted were simply too weak. As will be seen in subsequent chapters, the 
graft did not take - at least initially. Rather, successive administrations since that time have 
moved to override those political and civil rights whenever the opportunity arose.
5.2 Frustration: American Occupation and Aftermaths
The three years of American occupation immediately after the liberation (1945-1948) 
was a formative period in modem Korean history. During this period, there was an urgent 
need to lay a firm foundation for the development of a set of stable social and political 
institutions. However, from the outset, there were two major sources of instability. The 
main reason for this stemmed from the manner in which national liberation was achieved 
with the help of a foreign power. On the one hand, the liberation rendered the country to 
reinstate sovereignty. But, it also made two international superpowers, America and Russia, 
directly intervene in Korean matters. America occupied the southern part of the peninsula, 
aiming to install liberal democracy while Russia installing a socialist state in the north 
(Henderson 1978: Ch.5; Cumings 1989). This drove the country into a quasi-colonial status, 
along with the division of the peninsula into two political systems. From the formative 
period, Korea moved toward a modernisation which was quite different from the West.
The American occupational government had a number of overwhelming challenges to 
tackle, such as the power vacuum left by the Japanese, oppressive government institutions, 
a bankrupted economy and social disorder. These matters were dealt with in accordance 
with American foreign policy in the East Asian region, and were therefore not primarily 
driven by Korean interests and expectations. The major political legacy of American 
policies at the time was the further entrenchment of authoritarianism affecting civil and 
political rights. Economically, it oversaw a decline in national economic output15 and the 
dampening of attempts at radical economic restructuring through, for instance, land reform.
15 For example, the total output of the Korean secondary industry was decreased from 
46,715million won in 1941 to 679 million won in 1948, or -83 per cent (Ch'oe 1998b: 378).
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Instead, what was strengthened was the dependence of the local economy on foreign aid, 
especially American. Socially, it obstructed the growth of civil society by reinforcing 
ideological rigidity and restraining the growth of the bourgeois class and/or the working 
class. In a nutshell, the occupation assisted in laying the foundation for the future 
development of the society, but its overall initial impact on institutions was quite regressive.
5.2.1 The Political Aftermath 
Divisions and Birth of Anti-communism
An immediate effect of the American and Russian occupation came with the division of 
the peninsula, physically as well as ideologically. The physical partition effectively placed 
the south in a ferocious military confrontation with the communist north. An immediate 
outcome of the partition was the outbreak of the Korean War (1950-1953), which claimed 
around one million casualties (Park 1994a: 124) and destruction of one-quarter to the entire 
national wealth, worth US$3 billion, about three times the total GNP in 1953 (Krause 1997: 
108-109). Even though an armistice ended the war in 1953, the ideology of cold war 
between the West and the East came to dominate the political and social landscape of 
Korea. The military tension has remained virtually unchanged, leaving the country still 
divided by ideology, as well as claiming a significant proportion of national resources for 
maintaining the balance of power between the two political systems (Cumings 1997). Such 
economic destruction and the installation of anti-communism put a curb on the new 
promise of citizenship in post-war Korea.
An enduring legacy of the partition was the pervasive influence of anti-communism 
along with that of liberal democracy. Until the time of national liberation, Korean society 
did not have such an ideological rigidity slanting toward liberal democracy. Indeed, during 
the Japanese occupation, it was both the socialists and the nationalists that motivated and 
guided most of the independent movements, including the March First Movement in 1919. 
After the liberation, they stood on the frontline in seeking radical social reform for an
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egalitarian society. They argued for various reform measures, running from the abolition of 
the colonial power apparatus to a bold land reform to sever the pre-modem production 
relations between the landowners and the tenants. Such arguments were supported by many 
Koreans who had experienced political oppression and economic exploitation under 
colonial mle. Indeed, amongst the grass-roots of society there was a clearly a greater 
sympathy for leftist-oriented ideas than for liberal democracy (Cumings 1990: 187-188; 
Kang 1994g: 334). In many respects, Korean society had the flexibility to embrace various 
ideological viewpoints, like many European countries in the early twentieth century (Lipset 
1983: 73).
Such a range of ideological positions was not apparent in post-liberation Korea. This 
was chiefly due to the emergence of two ideologically polarised groups over the issue of 
whether Korea needed to submit to the American intervention. One was represented by the 
Choson People’s Party (Choson Inmindang) led by Yo Un-hyong and the Korean 
Communist Party (Choson Kongsandang) led by Pak Hon-y6ng, with the membership of 
leftists and nationalists, most of whom were workers, peasants and independent movement 
activists during the colonial period. Its opponent was the reactionary Han’guk Minjudang 
(Korean Democratic Party: KDP), which supported the intervention. The former 
campaigned against the intervention and for a radical programme of socio-political reform 
to remove the legacies of the colonial administration (Lee 1984: 376-7). Thus, the issue of 
whether to accept the foreign intervention became the focal point for fierce ideological 
conflict. Korean politics inexorably moved towards a contest between supporters of ‘liberal 
democracy’ vs. socialism
Under the exclusive dominance of America, such a conflict gave formal rise to anti­
communism. It took place through the dissolution of the anti-interventionist groups by the 
American administration, which formed a conservative coalition with the KDP and made it 
the solely legitimised political party in Korea (Park 1994a: Ch.2; Kim 1999a: 21-32). As 
the popular groups turned away from their initial support of the American intervention, they 
were accused of being anti-nationalists and flunkeys of the Soviet Union. Subsequently, 
they were labelled as “socialist revolutionaries” aiming to overthrow the existing political
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system, and met with strong negative public opinion. While the people withdrew their 
support from the popular groups, the ultra-conservatives came to reinstate their political 
legitimacy which had been severely damaged by their pro-Japanist activities (Kang 1994g: 
335-336). Consequently, the process of quashing debate over the American intervention 
formalised anti-communism in Korea, as well as allowing conservative political elites to 
advance on the centre stage of politics. Once the ultra-conservatives held political 
hegemony and anti-communism became an entrenched ideology, it became a useful tool for 
the ruling elites to control the society and secure their interests.
Two typical examples can be taken to explain the ruling elites’ use of ideology to 
oppress their dissidents. One relates to a civil uprising in Cheju island (April 1948) and the 
other to a military insurrection in the Yosu and Sunch’on region (October 1948), the south­
eastern area of the country, which was directly influenced by the former. Both uprisings 
were, although instigated by communists, principally based on the nationalist movement, as 
evidenced by their demands for national reunification and the withdrawal o f American 
intervention from Korea. Thus, in contrast to the government claims, the uprisings were 
rather closer to broad-based popular movements, with the majority of participants being 
peasants (Cumings 1997: 202-209, 217-224). They were ruthlessly crushed by the state 
leadership, resulting in casualties of some 30,000 people in the Cheju incident (Kang 
1994d: 301; Cumings 1997: 221), and more than 4,000 deaths in the Yosu and Sunch’on 
incident (Kang 1994d: 305). In order to justify such a violent oppression, however, the 
government launched a political propaganda offensive around the bogey of socialism as the 
major source of social disorder (Kang 1994d: 305; Park 1994a: 69-79; Kim 1999a: 25-28). 
This manipulation effectively worked to undermine people’s attitude to socialism as well as 
to rationalise the government’s use of violence on antigovernment protests. Consequently, 
this led to the people’s tacit support for the anticommunism agenda of the regime.
The Korean War, which was initiated by the communist north, led to the consolidation 
of anti-communism as it was used as a pretext for the Syngman Rhee (Yi Sungman) 
government to orchestrate propaganda and launch successive ideological campaigns against 
its political opponents. With the outbreak of war, nationwide political campaigns against
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dissidents were conducted by the state elites under the National Security Act 
(Kukkaboanbop) which was enacted in December 1948. Such a bold political campaign led 
by the state leaders was successful in bringing about widespread acceptance of 
anticommunist rhetoric in political and social debate and discourse, making the society 
ideologically polarised. The dichotomy that identifies all social movements with socialism 
and liberal democracy with the only legitimate ideological position had become to operate 
as a norm.
This ideological inflexibility made for a rigid society dominated by an extremely 
conservative set of social institutions. Due to government suppression, almost all 
organisations with grass-roots support as well as leftist movements were driven 
underground. However, just as serious for opposition groups and supporters was the 
development of widespread antipathy against anything that might be associated with 
communism. Distrust and schism caused by the sustained ideological war penetrated into 
the basic unit of society, sometimes pitting family members against each other (Kang 
1994g: 332-333). Anti-communism in the Korean context encompassed anti-American 
and/or anti-government critiques or protest movements. There was no tolerance for views 
other than those supportive of the ruling ideology. Under such conditions, the indigenous 
growth of civil rights could not be expected.
Emergence of Authoritarian Politics
Another political effect of the American intervention was the emergence of 
authoritarianism in Korean politics which can be epitomised by the term ‘imperial 
presidency’. When the American military government embarked on the occupation task to 
transplant ‘liberal democracy’ to Korea, the nation was in the throes of competing power 
struggles and debates on its future. In an urgent need for, but also as a convenient way of, 
establishing socio-political stability (Chin 1995: 132), the military government decided to 
utilise the existing political infrastructures and individuals who had worked for the previous
132
colonial administration. This enabled former pro-Japanists to resume their positions of 
influence and standing in post-liberation politics, as was the case for administrative 
personnel, army and police officers (Henderson 1978: 159-161; Park 1994a: 49-56; 
Cumings 1997: 192-202). With most posts in the new government filled by pro-American 
and pro-KDP figures, the essential features of the previous colonial administration and 
other governing apparatus remained substantially intact.
The survival of the Japanese legacy meant that the totalitarian political culture 
characterising the colonial administration continued to influence the post-liberation society. 
In a society where the Confiician notion of social hierarchy was firmly rooted and anti­
communism resulted in social inflexibility, the transmission of such a political culture was 
directly conducive to the growth of authoritarian politics that could be characterised as a 
strong state presiding over a weak civil society (Hahm 1999). Thus the persistence of the 
colonial legacy directly contributed to the arrival of an authoritarianism that became the 
pillar around which political practice has evolved since 1945. This consequently eroded the 
foundation for the development of democratic political system under the guise of liberal 
democracy (Chin 1995). So did the promise for civil and political rights.
This began to show its adverse effects along with the establishment of the conservative 
Rhee regime in 1948 which owed its existence to the political alliance with both the 
American military government and the KDP. As the period of the American occupation 
formally terminated and the political coalition with the KDP broke up, and was unable to 
receive any support from both the existing ruling class and the popular groups, Rhee came 
to rely on autocratic rule with the support of the police, army and an advisory team. In this 
political oligarchy, the state bureaucracy re-emerged as a strong conservative force as well 
as a powerful instrument to control society. At the same time, most political power was 
concentrated in one person, the president, giving birth to an ‘imperial presidency’ (Ko 
1994: 186).
During the Rhee regime, the imperial presidency was realised through political 
engineering assisted by anti-communism. For instance, during the Korean War Rhee was
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struggling to be re-elected for a second term, as his hold over power was losing ground. In 
order to secure re-election, Rhee had to amend the constitution and institute direct elections. 
To amend the constitution, he proclaimed martial law across Pusan where the wartime exile 
government was installed, and mobilised his personal anti-communist organisations and 
had them move to dissolve the NA. A de facto political coup was engineered by the 
president and his political clique. He ordered the police to arrest about fifty assembly 
members, who opposed the constitutional amendment, on the charge that they had received 
financial support from an international communist organisation. Surrounded by the police 
force and army, the assembly passed the amendment of the constitution (1994a: 288-289; 
Kang 1994d: 386).
Similar acts of political manoeuvring were widely committed by the ruling elites. In 
March 1949 a sort of McCarthyism swept the NA, with the arrest of 13 members charged 
with communist sympathies. In September 1956 an anonymous group assailed with a gun 
Chang Myon, the vice president electee who was from opposition party and defeated 
Rhee’s running mate Yi Kibung in the 1956 presidential election (Kang 1994a: 229). In 
January 1959 the government put Cho Pong-am to death under the forged accusation of a 
spy activity. As the candidate of the opposition party, Chinbodang (Progressive Party), he 
had almost defeated Rhee in the same 1956 election and emerged as a prominent political 
opponent (Yoksa Pip'yong 2000: 249-250). This series of political manipulations enabled 
Rhee and the ruling party to maximise the concentration of political power and to be 
autonomous from civil society, while diminishing the possibility for civil and political 
rights to develop in Korea. Despite the demise of the Rhee regime in 1960, such practices 
left an enduring legacy on Korean politics, and were taken up by successive military 
dictatorships between the 1960s and the 1980s.
5 2 2  The Economic Aftermath
Scholarly discussions on the perpetuation of political authoritarianism have generally
focussed on the state’s role in economic development. As seen in the case of Third World
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countries where the local economy was heavily dependent on foreign market after de­
colonisation, rapid industrialisation required bold state interventions to create favourable 
circumstances for investments of foreign capital and business activities, and in turn to 
regulate labour movements and political dissidents (1973; Schmitter 1974; O'Donnell 1979). 
This discussion is mainly based on Latin American countries, which have different socio­
political histories from Korea. Thus it needs to be supplemented by analysis of some other, 
mainly political, factors unique to the Korean context; that is, such components as the 
persisting influence of colonial traditions and the impact of the national division and 
ideological polarisation need to be additionally considered (Lim 1986; Park 1992).
The structure of socio-economy remained almost the same as prior to the Japanese 
occupation, with agriculture the main basis of the national economy. This was mainly due 
to the Japanese economic strategy to hinder landowners from transforming to commercial 
bourgeois status. Indeed, by the time of liberation, over 50 per cent of all fanning 
households could be said to belong to the tenant class compared with just 14.2 per cent 
operating as independent formers (Han'guk Minjungsa Yon'guhoe 1986: 260).
The economy was further weakened by the sudden collapse of Japanese rule and 
national partition. Japan may have left an economic legacy of such fixed assets as factories, 
power stations and banks to the country, but financial capital, more than 90 per cent of 
which was in Japanese possession by the end of the colonial rule, was repatriated (Mason et 
al. 1980: 76; Kim and Kim 1997b: 6-7). The resultant deficiency of capital combined with a 
largely unskilled work-force effectively immobilised the engines of economic development 
(Yi 1995; Yi 1996: 64; Kim and Kim 1997b: 8). In addition, most heavy industry such as 
power stations and chemical fertiliser plants were concentrated in the northern regions, 
whilst the south remained primarily an agricultural region. But, the national partition 
prevented the south from making use of such infrastructure as a springboard of economic 
development. This inequitable industrialisation of economic resources created in the south 
hyperinflation and mass poverty (Nahm 1988: 351-353; Kim and Kim 1997b: 7-9). 
Consequently, the colonial economy legacy and the loss of the northern part of the 
peninsula caused great economic instability and hardship in post-war Korea
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The economic imperative then became one of creating a more modernised system by 
abolishing the exploitive tenant relationship and launching the capitalist mode of 
production. During this economic reconstruction, the most urgent task facing the 
government was to undertake land reform and to distribute the property left by the Japanese. 
But, the difficulties of handling this task hampered by the socio-political conditions of that 
time, and hindered the creation of the bourgeois class, one of the critical sources of civil 
society.
Failed Land Reform
In Europe, land reform signified a new phase in economic development. It marked the 
end of the feudalistic relationship of production between landlords and tenants, and created 
the preconditions for a capitalistic mode of production by enabling the emergence of the 
bourgeois class, acknowledging basic civil rights such as property rights and free contract, 
and finally generating the mass working class.
The official beginning of land reform in Korea was made in 1950 following the 
enactment of the Reform Act of Farming Land in 1949, but the substantial changes 
occurred from 1948 when the American military government began to distribute first the 
nationalised land that had been under possession of the Japanese during the colonial period. 
The reform was initiate by farmers’ demand to abolish the exploitative landlord-tenant 
relationship, but the progress of the reform reflected the dynamics of post-war political 
turbulence (Kang 1994e: 89-91; Park 1994a: 57). Whilst leftists and nationalists sought 
equal distribution of the land to all the farmers via the method of ‘non-compensatory 
confiscation and free distribution’, the KDP’s scheme of ‘onerous confiscation and credit 
distribution’ was finally approved in the NA where the conservatives occupied the majority 
of seats (Kang 1994e: 91-99). As most tenant farmers could not afford to purchase the 
allocated lands, the number of independent formers fell (Kang 1994a: 305). Moreover, 
substantial amounts of the land, which were supposed to be redistributed by the government,
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were privately traded before the official reform took place in 1950. Indeed, the total amount 
of land that was in fact bought and redistributed by the government under the reform 
scheme accounted for just 27% of the gross area of tenant land possessed by Korean 
landowners (Kang 1994e: 113).
Nevertheless, the process of land reform resulted in a tangible decrease in the size of 
landowner class by dismantling the traditional structures of land ownership. As of 1945,
63.4 per cent of the entire farming land was cultivated by tenants, but this number 
decreased to 11.9 per cent by 1960. At the same time, the number of tenants declined from
83.5 per cent of the agricultural population in 1945 to 26.3 per cent in 1949 (Kang 1994e: 
121). This resulted in one unexpected outcome of the growth of Korean capitalism; whilst 
the agricultural capital was transformed into industrial capital, the majority of landowners 
did not turn to capitalist enterprises. In other words, the land reform was successful in 
disbanding the pre-modem production mode, but failed to create significant numbers of the 
bourgeois class, or the middle class in modem terms.
The principal reason for this failure was that the land reform lost its momentum due to 
the effects of the Korean War. In addition to the destmction of basic economic facilities, 
the war caused the economic structure to regress to pre-land reform conditions (Park 1994a: 
125-128; Kim and Kim 1997b: 11; Krause 1997: 108-109). After the war, the Korean 
economy had to rely exclusively on inflows of foreign capital and aid for reconstruction. 
However, consumer goods-based foreign aid and the nation’s heavy reliance on foreign aid 
for securing industrial raw materials generated high inflation levels along with a fluctuating 
exchange rate. In particular, the importation of surplus agricultural products from America 
led to the adoption o f a low rice price policy for the domestic market, which decreased 
already low levels of agricultural productivity (1994a: 315; Kang 1994e: 125). 
Consequently, a substantial number of independent farmers, who had been created through 
the land reform, lapsed back into tenant status (Kang 1994e: 144-149).
137
Beginning of State Economic Management and Hybrid Birth of Bourgeois Class
As with the process of land reform, the settlement and conversion of Japanese-owned 
enterprises, including banks, factories and land, reflected the political dynamics of the 
period. The leftists and nationalists called for the nationalisation of the property whilst the 
right argued for the preferential allocation of these extensive assets to those already 
dominating economic affairs (Kang 1994e: 62-63; Park 1994a: 51-64). The allocation of 
nationalised property after liberation, factories in particular, was directed to a small number 
o f ‘comprador capitalists’16 who were supportive of the American occupational government, 
the KDP and thereby the ruling leadership (Park 1994a: 61). Popular organisations boldly 
opposed these policies, and sought to participate in the management and redistribution of 
colonial property by forming self-governing organisations. However, these were prohibited 
by the American military government and thus there was no organised opposition to those 
who stood to benefit from the allocation of property (Kang 1994a: 308; 1994e: 69-77).
The redistribution of nationalised property to private individuals, effectively created an 
entrepreneur class, and signalled the transition of the Korean economy away from a pre­
modem to a modem capitalist system (Kang 1994e). However, from the outset of this 
monopolistic phase of Korean capitalist development, small or middle-sized companies 
were not encouraged to grow, constraining the development of a middle-class.
A more serious and enduring effect of the property allocation was that it created the 
condition by which the political elites could control the business sector. A de facto start of 
what is called Chdnggyong yuch ’ak (a close-alliance relationship between political and 
business circles, which critics argue have had a detrimental impact on the realisation of a 
democratic society) was made at this time (Haggard, Kang, and Moon 1997: 872). 
Employment selection, the distribution of jobs, resources and foreign aid, and patronage in 
particular came under the government’s control, as occurred in many Third World countries
16 This term was originally used to “denote the main indigenous agent in trading-houses on the 
China coast”. These days, it is extended to refer to “a social class deemed to be compliant with 
foreign interests, and uninterested in developing the national economy”, thus having a 
contrasting meaning to the term, “national bourgeoisie” (Marshall 1998:105).
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(MacPherson 1982). This seriously damaged the foundation on which the bourgeois class 
could have grown as a challenging force against the authoritarian state.
The linkages between the state and business became far closer as the Korean economy 
was reliant on an inflow of foreign aid, mainly from the USA, for the post-war 
reconstruction during the 1950s. A large portion of the aid was commodity-based, most of 
which was in the form of consumer goods or raw materials which required immediate 
processing. The lack of heavy industry-infrastructure and the reliance on foreign aid forced 
the Rhee regime to embark on su-ip taech’e san-ophwa (an Import-Substitute 
Industrialisation policy: ISI) which contributed to the growth of light industry based on the 
“three whites” (sugar, flour, and cotton textiles), and also allowed the state to intervene in 
the market (Ch'oe 1998b: 386-7). The state oversaw the allocation of economic resources to 
established large-scale businesses as a way to be administratively efficient as well as to 
expedite the reconstruction of the economy. At the same time, Rhee and the ruling elites 
regarded the relationship as a tool to mobilise large-scale political funds, which were 
necessary for maintaining their political power. As for the business-sector, the exclusive 
allocation of resources and other special preferences of the government helped them to 
monopolise the local market with windfall profits (Kim 1976).
A symbiotic relationship was created between the state leadership and business, in 
which the state acts to allocate resources whilst business serves as an agent of 
industrialisation and provider of political funds. This enabled the state to have a 
superintendent position over the business sector, which, in turn, was required to seek after 
privileged connections with those in power. This afforded the state with far extended 
autonomy from capitalists than had been generated during the building process of the post­
liberation government (Ch'oe 1998b: 386-7). This relationship became further strengthened 
during the military regimes as they sought active involvement in the market to manage the 
economy.
In conclusion, the economic aftermath of the American occupation and the resultant 
installation of the Rhee regime came with the development of a particular mode of
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capitalism. It was a mode of capitalism that encouraged neither the free competition of 
entrepreneurs (bourgeois) nor the development of civil society. Along with the political 
aftermath, this also hampered the ‘promised’ civil and political rights from growing in post­
war Korea.
5.23 The Social Aftermath: Weak Labour Class
The weakness of Korean civil society, which was virtually dissolved in the wake of 
Japanese colonialism, was further compounded by the American occupation and the 
subsequent installation of the Rhee regime. During the period of heightened conflicts and 
the war, those groups espousing progressive views were virtually extinguished by a 
concerted programme of repression (Henderson 1978: 140-147; Park 1994a: Ch.3; Kim 
1999a: 25-28). The incipient middle-class soon became subjugated to the interests of the 
state leadership, and thus failed to constitute a force of civil society. Whilst liberation 
seemed to open up opportunities for the labour class to become a driving force for the 
expansion of citizenship rights, they also became a target for state control. The following 
discussion is focussed on labour movement but will help us have a clear picture of these 
features.
The temporary power vacuum following liberation made room for the unprecedented 
growth of labour organisations, and indeed they appeared to flourish for a time with the 
establishment of several hundred labour unions. Riding on this momentum, a nationwide 
organisation, called Choson nodongjohap chon’guk p’yong-uihoe (the National Council for 
Korean Labour Unions: NCKLU), was established in November 1945 and helped the 
dispersed individual unions to become united under one umbrella organisation. It was 
estimated that there were some 1194 unions and about half a million workers, attending its 
inaugural meeting, making it the largest labour and leftist organisation by that time (Kim 
1993d: 85). In many respects, the power of the working class appeared to be rapidly 
gaining in strength and support from members.
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But they soon became a major target of state control driven by anticommunism as well 
as the state-business relationship. The state sought to maintain control over industrial 
relations by strategically nurturing a state-sponsored labour union. In some cases, the state 
directly participated in industrial bargaining with labour for the sake of capitalists, creating 
a state-labour basis for negotiations instead of an employer-employee one. However, these 
were followed by more blatant moves towards exerting state control over any activities 
designated by the state as ‘pro-communist’. Particularly due to the widely held perception 
that the NCKLU had been created for socialist purposes, any labour disputes were regarded 
as being communist attempts to overthrow the existing order. Under such relentless 
ideological assaults, independent unions were driven to underground activity from 1947, 
and what emerged was a state-engineered system of industrial relations.
Such a system was achieved through the establishment of Han’guk nodongjohap 
ch’ong-yonmaeng (the Federation of Korean Trade Unions: FKTU) in March 1946, which 
became the sole official labour organisation. Established under the auspices of the state, 
however, the FKTU did not function as a genuine union. It was rather an anticommunist 
political organisation established by the conservative elites in order to curb leftist labour 
power. Thus, its leaders served the interests of the Rhee regime in return for certain 
political privileges and material benefits. It sometimes mobilised large numbers of people 
for Rhee at political or election campaigns to counter the opposition’s mobilisation of 
supporters (Kim 1982).
The structure of the economy was another impediment to the growth of labour power. 
Until the end of the Rhee regime the economy was still based on agriculture, the majority 
of the population still participating in agriculture (61.9 per cent of the whole population in 
1955 and 58.3 per cent in 1960) (Mason, Kim, Perkins, Kim, and Cole 1980: 211, Table 45). 
The class structure in the secondary industry was not favourable for the formation of a 
strong working class. Industrialisation was still at an incipient stage of development. In 
1957, the employment rate was just above 62 per cent, and declined to 56.6 per cent in 
1960. In particular, the number of the employees, who worked in companies with more 
than five employees and thus had a greater likelihood of participating in trade union activity,
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was only 1.76 per cent of the entire employable population (above age 14). The ratio was 
further reduced to 1.56 per cent in 1960. This feature meant that most employees were 
hired in small-sized workplaces with less than four employees, and thus had little potential 
to develop a labour organisation (FKTU 1979: 431, Table 6.1). At the same time, the 
displacement of the population to urban centres created intense competition for mainly low- 
paying jobs in often substandard conditions, which further polarised the working class 
(Han'guk Minjungsa Yon'guhoe 1986: 293).
It was extremely difficult, thus, for the Korean working class to raise issues regarding 
citizenship rights. Several times of industrial actions took place at a local and national level 
during the 1950s (FKTU 1979: 496), but they were all effectively controlled by the 
authoritarian state and the cooperation of the union leaders during this period. The working 
class was too weak to pose a challenge to the state. In contrast to the western tradition of 
the labour movement where a political alliance between a labour party and a trade union 
provided an effective base for achieving political and social citizenship, Korean labour did 
not have the opportunity to develop into a political force. On the contrary, this weak labour 
power made the Rhee regime less attentive to the labour concerns for the improvement of 
working and living conditions and for the implementation of social policy measures17. 
Social policy was not seen by the state elites as a pre-emptive measure to prevent possible 
social instability.
In conclusion, the social aftermaths of American occupation and the subsequent 
instalment of the Rhee regime consisted of a weakened civil society in which neither the 
bourgeois nor labour developed into a force for social reform. Using Marshall’s criteria,
17 In fact, the NCKLU sought the improvement of the working conditions and social policy. 
They consisted of such measures as the introduction of the minimum wage system, eight hour 
working, equal pay for equal work regardless of the difference of sex and age, two-month-paid- 
matemity leave and one-month-paid leave for all the labour, abolition of child labour under 14, 
the establishment of the basic amenities for workers and the immediate introduction of social 
insurance for the unemployed, invalids and survivors. These were all considered to be 
innovative ideas for the time, but were no longer canvassed after the dissolution of the NCKLU 
in 1947 (Kim 1993d: 85-86; Kim 1999f: 3).
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this meant a deficit of civil and political rights, which had a direct effect on the 
development of social rights in post-war Korea.
5.3 Crippling Social Rights
Given the absence of an indigenous driving force for social policy, government policies 
tended to be influenced by American interests in Korean social affairs. As in other areas, 
this enabled the Japanese legacy of social welfare to be maintained, as well as transplanting 
the American style of welfare administration.
53,1 Colonial Legacy of Social Welfare
In 1944, just before its defeat in the Pacific War, Japan brought in a public assistance 
system, under the name of Chosen kyugorei (Korean Relief Order, Choson kuholyong in 
Korean), to Korea, which was modelled on the Relief Law in their mainland, marking the 
first modem welfare programme in the history of Korean social policy with social control 
in mind. As a public relief programme, the decree defined the beneficiaries of the 
programme as: 1) the elderly over 65, 2) children under 13, 3) pregnant women, 4) the 
disabled, the invalid, veterans, or others who could not work due to similar restrictions. 
They would become eligible through a means test for such services as a living allowance, 
medical care, veterans allowance and funeral assistance. The services were supposed to be 
provided on the basis of residential care, but institutional care would also be made available 
(Yu 1997: 345; Yi et aL 1998: 316). It seems that this programme was quite extensive at 
face value, and compatible with an advanced form of public relief. However, this 
programme was not implemented during Japanese rule. Instead, it became the basis for the
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programme of public relief offered by the American military government and the Rhee 
18regime .
The public assistance at this time was principally sourced from foreign aid, therefore 
did not encompass a wider agenda of state responsibility for welfare, such as the 
guaranteeing of a national minimum. In this context, there was no fundamental difference 
between the public relief of the colonial time and that of the American occupation. Given 
this, the programme was not effective in alleviating the high levels of poverty in the 
country. For instance, in 1947 there were some 2 million people in need of the relief, but 
only 248,398 (12.4 per cent) received any assistance. Moreover, the level of the provisions 
was inadequate to support a minimal standard of living (Yi 1997: 445-446).
Another legacy of the Japanese occupation was the lack of the administrative capacity 
in the new government to deal with the issues of social welfare and public health in 
particular. This was mainly caused by the fact that the major positions of the colonial 
welfare apparatus had been monopolised by Japanese personnel and professions (Chung 
1992: 125). Accordingly, public health, one of the major welfare missions the regime had 
to carry out along with the public relief, lacked qualified Korean professionals to take up 
major health policy positions (Chung 1992: 148-151; Yi, Yi, and Oh 1998: 314-315). This 
native lack of the experience in designing and implementing a welfare programme enabled 
American methods of welfare administration and ideology to direct the course of Korean 
social policy.
53 2  The Implementation of an American Style of Welfare Administration
At the time of the American intervention, Korea was experiencing profound instability 
and changes to the family and community. Large-scale relocations of communities,
18 The only addition was the inclusion of children under the age of six into the relief system and 
the expansion of the service provision to refugees, the destitute and the unemployed (Yi, Yi, 
and Oh 1998: 317).
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following the end of the war, led to a decline in traditional mutual-help practices to 
maintain community cohesion. At the same time, mass poverty overtook the country 
creating critical shortages of food, essential living goods and housing (Mason, Kim, Perkins, 
Kim, and Cole 1980: 74-86; Mun 1990a: 4-7; Krause 1997: 106-109). Neither the 
American military government nor the Rhee regime was willing to implement social policy 
measures that could systematically address these intractable problems. When the American 
military government took over the responsibility for implementing welfare policies in 
Korea, it did not have the intention to develop a comprehensive modem welfare system. In 
contrast to the emergency relief programme delivered to post-war Japan, the American 
programme of relief in Korea was ad-hoc and inadequate, (for more details, see Yi, Yi, and 
Oh 1998).
However, the American administration brought in a modem type of welfare 
administration to Korea. The Americans established Pogonhusaengbu (the Department of 
Public Health and Welfare: DPHW) in 1946, streamlining the health care and other social 
welfare functions which had previously operated independently under the Japanese 
administration. As the American priority in the Korean welfare context was in public health, 
the department came to have an expanded functions covering those areas such as 
contagious diseases, medical services, preventive medicine, nursing, mental health, 
pharmacy, laboratories, research and analysis, and other welfare-related tasks (Chung 1992: 
126). Consequently, the department became the largest one in the American military 
government with the most comprehensive function for welfare policies. Also, the 
department was the first government ministry in the history of Korean social policy to 
systematically and professionally handle welfare tasks.
A more profound and far-reaching effect of the American occupation was the 
influence o f ‘liberalism’ or ‘market ideology’ on Korean social policy (Skocpol 1992: 15- 
23; 1995). As applied to the context of Korean welfare administration, this served to 
accentuate the role of individuals and/or private sectors in implementing and delivering 
health and public relief services. A large number of private welfare institutions were 
established during this time. The American military government gave up the state-centred
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welfare function and encouraged various private welfare institutions to take over the state’s 
role19. This resulted in the proliferation of charity groups, particularly those run by foreign 
and religious organisations, whose aim it was to assist victims of war, orphans, the destitute, 
vagabonds, and women in crisis. Indeed, in 1947, there were established 26 state or quasi- 
state-run welfare institutions across the country, while 76 were run by private groups or 
individuals (Yi 1997: 441).
These formed the basis of the American occupational government’s social welfare 
approach, which has continued to influence the delivery of welfare in contemporary Korea.
5 3 3  An Indifferent State
Despite the proliferation of private welfare organisations, the state did not attempt to 
develop an administrative system to oversee their activities. Moreover, the Rhee 
government sought to make up for a substantial shortage of qualified personnel and 
financial resources for welfare activities by merging many offices of the DPHW into five 
major bureaux (health, social welfare, labour, women and children and housing). It might 
be understood as an attempt to increase organisational efficiency, but due to a substantial 
lack of qualified personnel and financial resources, it resulted in the attenuation of the 
state’s role in social policy. In 1949, the new department experienced the health 
administration briefly being separated from it at the request of physicians and other health 
workers, but soon the two administrations were merged again under the new name of 
Pogonsahoebu_(Ministry of Health and Social Affairs: MHSA) in 1955, which operated 
until 1994 as a main ministry of social policy (1992: 150; Chung 1996: 331).
The enactment of Kullogijunbop (Labour Standard Law: LSL) in 1953 was another 
example of the state’s attitude to welfare issues. First of all, it was the only piece of social
19 Another reason for this emphasis on the role of private welfare was that welfare programmes 
by that time were mainly financed by foreign aid, and could therefore make up for government 
budgetary constraints.
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legislation that the Rhee regime enacted throughout its term. The law established the 
Retirement Benefit Scheme for the working class, but did not commit the state as a 
principal contributor to the fund (Kim 1992: 29). The scheme was basically run by both 
employer and employees without state contributions. As it was the first programme in 
Korean occupational welfare, it made the bipartite contribution principle a norm in Korean 
social security and had far-reaching influence on subsequent programmes.
In sum, instead of attempting to innovate the social policies and apparatus that could 
systematically address the welfare issues of that time, the Rhee regime was reliant on the 
Japanese legacy of social policy and the American way of welfare practices to assist the 
most disadvantaged members of society. In the context of a weak civil society and little 
popular demand for welfare measures, successive governments were reluctant to show 
commitment to advancing social policy.
5.4 Conclusion
This discussion shows that post-colonial Korea took a markedly different 
modernisation course to that taken by European nations. From the outset, Korea was driven 
by conflicts among various social groups caused by the sequence of events of the American 
occupation, the survival of the Japanese legacies, and the eventual holding of political 
power by reactionary conservatives in the new government. Instead of liberal democracy, 
those events made the society rapidly move to authoritarianism in which social control and 
political conspiracy were widespread, consequently dividing the country, economy, and the 
people, and carving the deep, long track which has run through the society thereafter 
(Helgesen 1998: 44-45). This can be compared with the society of Marshall’s post-war 
Britain. It seems that Marshall took for granted national consensus in the post-war Britain, 
when he discussed social citizenship.
In this socio-political turmoil, the promise of citizenship, which was accorded to the 
Korean Constitution by an external power, could not be sustained. Under authoritarian
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control, any popular and/or leftist-oriented social movement could not take root in the 
society. Neither a bourgeois class nor a working class developed as a driving force to 
sustain the promise. This weak civil society meant not just the underdevelopment of civil 
and political rights, but also a lack of a foundation for social rights. Whilst it was a nation 
state in the West that played a key role in institutionalising citizenship rights, Korea at the 
time of nation building was preoccupied with other pressing tasks: economic de­
colonisation (land reform), the re-structuring of the old governing system (exclusion of pro- 
Japanists from the ruling class) and the establishment of a reunited state. The process of 
dealing with these problems further disturbed the already weakened foundations for the 
growth of citizenship in society.
Social welfare policies were influenced by both the colonial legacy of public assistance 
and American style of welfare administration. While experiencing colonial occupation and 
the post-liberation turbulence, the indigenous foundations of social welfare such as the kye 
and other state welfare programmes were almost dismantled. This vacuum was filled with 
the imported traditions of welfare practice which contributed to the advent of more 
modernised welfare programmes in Korea. But, Korea failed to make the best use of the 
imported new system, due to the limited capacity of administration and resources. But, the 
more fundamental reason is derived from the absence of state interest in social policy 
coupled with the lack of civil power to pressure the state. Created during this formative 
period, the Korean principle of social policy, which emphasises the role of private and/or 
voluntary organisations in addressing welfare issues, has persisted up to the present, leaving 
the state with minimal involvement in the welfare area. As will be seen in later chapters, the 
welfare structures set up during this period mostly had a negative effect on the realisation 
of social rights in Korea.
148
Chapter 6
Citizenship under Developmental Authoritarianism
Korea between the 1960s and the 1980s was under the control of two military 
governments: Park Chung Hee (Park Chonghui) regime from 1961 to 1979 and Chun Doo 
Hwan (Chon Tuhwan) regime from 1980 to 1987. The society of this time was basically 
characterised by developmental authoritarianism, the practice of which was exclusively 
dedicated to economic growth and national security, while placing aside other issues such 
as democratic politics and social equality. Such a dedication enabled the society to achieve 
remarkable success in the former two areas, but not in the latter areas. The society in 
general had to experience heavy regulation by the state. Economic development did not 
progress in tandem with democratic development in Korea20.
In this disparity between capitalism and democracy, social policy developed, much in 
accordance with other military-led countries in the third world, as an instrument to serve 
two purposes: to legitimise the state elites’ seizure of power as well as to expedite the 
process of industrialisation (Cammack et al. 1993: 133-168; Lee 1993). While some 
modem welfare programmes began to emerge from the early 1960s, such basic principles 
as a minimalist state and the emphasis on the role of private and voluntary organisations, 
dating back to the Rhee period, continued to be dominant in Korean social policy making.
This chapter examines how the three pillars of citizenship developed under the two 
military regimes, and how it affected the formation of social policy in the Korean context.
20 For further elaboration of this phenomenon, refer to Song 1994a; Py5n 1996b; Cha et al. 
1997; Ch'oe 1998b.
6.1 Effects of State Economic Management
The ‘miraculous’ growth of Korean economy can be credited to the bold intervention 
of firstly the Park regime in the market mechanism, albeit with somewhat different 
emphases in approach. While the Park regime primarily strove to achieve accelerated 
industrial modernisation, the Chun regime struggled to maintain the momentum of rapid 
industrialisation due to changes in the world economy. It could also be argued that there 
were strategic changes to economic policy during the Park regime in response to changing 
economic circumstances, domestically and internationally, as can be seen in the examples 
of the policy of the ISI in the 1960s and that of Chunghwahak kong-dphwa (Heavy- 
Chemical Industrialisation: HCI) in the 1970s. However, the fundamental objective was the 
achievement of rapid economic growth through the maximisation of the country’s export 
capacity based on the policy of Shch'ul chudohydng san-dphwa (Export-Oriented 
Industrialisation: EOI). For this, the state came to play a leading role, under the name of the 
Five-Year Plan for Economic Development (Kyongje kaebal 5gaenyon kyehoek)21, by 
establishing industrial complexes in selected areas of the country and by persuading 
industrialists to join the economic strategy through such preferential treatment as massive 
financial subsidies, low-interest loans and tax credits (Kang 1994f: 120; Song 1994a: 95- 
101).
Many outcomes arose out of this interventionist policy, which played a critical role in 
the course of citizenship development. Among these was the consolidation of 
authoritarianism in the society, which was inherited from the Rhee regime and fortified by 
successive military coups. The need for the regimes to stabilise the local economy, 
particularly during the time of economic fluctuation, was expressed by the state’s bold
21 Since the launch of the first five-year plan in 1962, its name had changed three times until 
1997. The first was the Five-Year Plan for Economic Development, which continued until the 
end of the fourth plan (1981), and then changed to the Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social 
Development (Kyongjesahoe kaebal 5gaenyon kyehoek), in order to achieve the balanced 
development between economic arena and social arena. The new name lasted until 1992, the 
first year of the seventh plan, and the following year was changed again to the Five-Year Plan 
for New Economy (Sin’gy&ngje kaebal 5gaeny6n kyehoek), in an attempt of the government to 
respond to the changed economic environment in the early 1990s (Py6n and Kim 1996). This 
will be discussed more in Ch.7.
150
attempts to maintain a ‘peaceful’ society as a precondition for economic growth. This led 
directly to the consolidation of authoritarianism in which the president could make an 
extraordinary extent of political mobilisation for his political agendas through his imperial 
power. Under such a presidency, the need for a peaceful society led to the over­
development of the state apparatus, not to mention the presidential offices, concerning for 
economy and national security as typically exemplified by labour laws, national security 
laws and the establishment and operation of Chung-ang chongbobu (the Korean Central 
Intelligence Agency: KCIA) (Koo 1987: 172-3; Luedde-Neurath 1988; Kang 1994f: 75-76). 
Whilst all sections of society were subject to these laws, labour leaders and regime 
dissidents, in particular, bore the brunt of what was essentially a campaign of political and 
social repression. Whilst the state enjoyed a maximum level of autonomy from the business 
and social sectors, the effect of the economic management by the state came to have wide- 
reaching consequences on socio-politics in general.
6.1.1 Consolidation of Imperial Presidency
While strong presidential power was also a feature of the Rhee regime, the Yusin 
(literally, “revitalization”) Constitution (1972-1979) enacted by the Park regime enabled 
the presidency to exercise unprecedented unilateral authority over the affairs of government. 
Before the advent of this constitution, there had existed at least a perfunctory form of 
democratic politics as manifested in the several elections held during the 1960s. However, 
after the Yusin reform such components of democracy virtually disappeared, and the 
country became subject to autocratic control. In this context, an examination of the Yusin 
Constitution could make for a better understanding of the nature and impact of “imperial 
presidency” on citizenship development.
One of the most distinctive features of the Yusin Constitution was that it changed the
process of electing a president from direct to indirect voting, and allowed an incumbent
president to be re-elected without limitation (CK, 1972, Article 39, 47). To implement the
indirect system, the constitution legalised the establishment of T ’ong-il chuch’e kungmin
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hoe-ui (the National Council of Unification: NCU) consisting of 2,000 to 5,000 delegates 
(CK, 1972, Article 36). But it was no more than a rubberstamp organisation in many 
aspects. Whilst its membership was formally open to anybody of over the age of thirty via a 
direct election by the people (CK, 1972, Article 36, 37), some were directly appointed by 
the president and “nonconformists” were effectively excluded (Kang 1994a: 239). In 
addition, as the president took on the chairmanship of the organisation, he could intervene 
in and supervise the major procedures of a presidential election, hence assuring the 
possibility of lifetime presidency. The organisation functioned as a political “royal-guard” 
entrusted to put into practice the president’s political plans.
Second, the new constitution brought in a marked imbalance in the power relationship 
between the president and the major branches of the government, such as the legislature 
and the judiciaries. With regard to the NA, the new constitution empowered the president to 
select up to one-third of the Assembly (CK, 1972, Article 40), and also to dissolve the 
Assembly (CK, 1972, Article 59). These two enhanced powers alone were sufficient for the 
president to restrain the functions of the Assembly and to put it under his firm control.
Regarding the relationship with the judiciary, the 1972 Constitution endowed the 
president with the power to appoint all judges including the Chief Justice and Justices of 
the Supreme Court (Article 103). The role of the Supreme Court was substantially 
diminished by the new constitution. In the 1962 Constitution, the Supreme Court had the 
right to determine the constitutionality of laws and the dissolution of a political party by the 
state (Article 102). But this provision was removed in the 1972 Constitution, and the right 
was transferred to the new Constitutional Commission, the members of which were also 
nominated by the president (Article 111). The curtailment of the Supreme Court’s powers 
and the subordination of the Constitutional Commission to the president meant that no case 
of judgement on the unconstitutionally of any laws were made during the Yusin regime 
(The Constitutional Court of Korea 2002).
The president’s right to mobilise emergency measures (PEM, Taet’ongnyong 
pisangjoch ’igwon in Korean) was another new feature of the 1972 Constitution. While this
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right had been conferred on the president from the first constitution in 1948, it was further 
fortified in the 1972 Constitution. According to the first and the 1962 Constitutions, the 
president could proclaim emergency orders in times of domestic unrest, external threats, 
natural calamities, or serious financial or economic crisis, and when there was no time to 
await the convocation of the NA. He could also proclaim martial law when required for the 
maintenance of national security or public peace and order (CK, 1948, Article 57, 64 and 
CK, 1962, Article 73, 75). But, the 1962 Constitution also arranged a system to curb the 
misuse of such powers by prescribing that the president had to immediately report a 
declaration of emergency orders to the Assembly and obtain its approval (Article 63). In the 
case of martial law, he was also required to give immediate notice to the Assembly, and to 
lift it at a request of the Assembly (Article, 75).
Under the new constitution, the president was no longer obligated to obtain consent 
from the Assembly, and could instead notify declaration of an emergency decree and/or a 
martial law (CK, 1972, Article 53, 54). In addition, with regard to any emergency decrees, 
the Assembly was only able to ‘propose’, not prescribe that the president lift such decrees 
with a majority vote of its members (Article 53).
With the advent of the Chun regime in 1980, the Constitution was amended once again 
in an attempt to restore some semblance of democratic features to it, but its basic provisions 
still permitted the president to exercise autocratic rule. The 1980 Constitution introduced 
the seven-year-single-term system for presidency (Article 45), but the president was still to 
be elected through an indirect voting by an electoral college (Article 39). The constitution 
also abolished the NCU and reinstated the right of the Assembly to audit the government 
affairs, but, it also introduced the proportional representation system to the NA, the 
function of which was quite similar to that of the NCU in that the president and the ruling 
party dominated the political process (Kim 1999a: 319). The judiciary was also in the firm 
control of the president under the revised constitution. The president still had the power to 
appoint the Chief Justice and Justices of the Supreme Court, whilst the Chief Justice 
regained the right to appoint the general judges, as in the 1962 Constitution (CK, 1980, 
Article 103). In addition, the Constitutional Commission still took over the major roles of
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the Supreme Court, with its members appointed by the president (CK, 1980, Article 112). 
With respect to proclamation of emergency decrees and/or a martial law, the president was 
now required to obtain approval from the Assembly for carrying out such actions (CK, 
1980, Article 51, 52).
It can be argued that the Korean presidential system shares many key features in 
common with those countries that also have president-centred political systems. Similar 
constitutional provisions are found in several developing countries in Asia and Africa 
(Thailand, Gabon, for instance), as well as in the countries that have been influenced by the 
Roman law tradition (for example, France and America) (Kim 1997a). However, most 
president-centred systems also have a well-established system of check and balance, so as 
to maintain the balance of power between the three branches of the government. In contrast, 
the Korean constitutions during the two military regimes did not contain such features, and 
enabled successive Korean presidents to maintain their political power in a repressive way, 
and in turn for social groups to be submissive to them (Choi 1989a: 181; Oh 1999b: 59-60).
6.12 Unbalanced Growth of Government Apparatuses
As mentioned above, the supreme power of the Korean president was dedicated to the
rapid modernisation of the economy and national security, and thus social control to
achieve them. Naturally, this policy orientation led to the rapid expansion of the state
apparatuses responsible for economy and security, but to the laggard growth of other
ministries. The president’s commitment to the economy was reflected in the creation of
KySngjegihoegwon (Economic Planning Board: EPB) in 1961, Han’guk kaebal y6n’guw6n
(Korean Development Institute: KDI) in 1971 and the sustained strong power of the
presidential secretaries for economic affairs throughout both regimes. The president’s
attention to a ‘tamed’ society was manifested in the establishment of the KCIA in 1961, and
the enactment of both Pan’gongbop (Anti-communist Act: ACA) in 1961 and
Kukkaboanbop (National Security Law: NSL)in 1963 (Steinberg 1989: 130; Ahn and Kim
1997: 349-350; Krause 1997: 112). On the contrary, the lack of the president attention to
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welfare policies was expressed in the relative weakness of the MHSA and other social 
policy institutes in the government. They were relegated to one of the lowest ranks in the 
government hierarchy, their influence and policy making power being subjugated to those 
of the economic apparatus.
Rapid Expansion of the Apparatuses of Economy and Security
In 1961, immediately after coming to power, Park sought to restructure the government 
in order to strengthen their control over the state bureaucracy and to increase its 
effectiveness in promoting economic development. The first outcome of this political 
endeavour was the installation of the EPB and the expansion of the role of Chaemubu 
(Ministry of Finance: MOF). The former was given responsibility for economic planning 
and coordination, including national budgeting and control of foreign aid and investment. 
The latter was in charge of financial and monetary policies, controlling commercial and 
government banks and stock markets, as well as taxes and tariffs (Chung 1993: 97). While 
these two ministries were the principal leaders of economic policies, the head of the EPB 
was privileged with the role of coordinating and directing policy making in those ministries 
pertaining to economic affairs, such as the ministries of Finance, Commerce and Industry, 
Construction, Transportation, and Communication (Mason, Kim, Perkins, Kim, and Cole 
1980: 16; Chung 1992: 176-177).
The presidents* preoccupation with economic development was also seen through the 
policy of recruiting and promoting personnel in the economic ministries. In contrast to 
other ministries and branches where recruitment was open mostly to former military 
officers and non-technocrats (Choi 1993c; Cho 1998: 125; Helgesen 1998: 21-65), the 
economic ministries maintained a closed system in which young personnel were recruited 
principally through a highly competitive national examination. In particular, throughout the 
two regimes, almost all of the heads of the two core economic ministries, or the EPB and 
the MOF, have been career bureaucrats, who were offered a better career path than was to
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be found in other ministries. This professionalisation of the economic ministries was 
typified by high-qualified technocrats, who were able to hold a dominant position over 
other civil servants (Chung 1993: 95-96).
In relation to ‘national security’, the key apparatus was the KCIA, which was the 
equivalent of both the American CIA and FBI (Cumings 1997: 353), and became the most 
powerful intelligence and investigatory agency in the country during both military regimes. 
The agency maintained a complex set of interlocking institutional links with almost all of 
the government’s key decision-making bodies (Federation of American Scientists 1999). It 
also had a great deal of political autonomy, in that it did not have to report its activities to 
the NA, and its budget was not subject to the review of the Assembly or offices such as the 
Board of Audit and Inspection. Its head was one of a few government officials who could 
have face-to-face meetings with the president (Federation of American Scientists 1999). 
Thus, the KCIA operated as an independent agency, principally working for the president 
as a ‘praetorian guard’.
Its official duties were to supervise and coordinate both international and domestic 
intelligence activities and criminal investigation by all government intelligence agencies, 
including that of the military. Under authoritarian rule, however, the duties were further 
extended to cover the management of domestic politics in order to support and maintain 
executive power. Accordingly, the expanded role gave the agency almost unlimited power 
to investigate, interrogate and detain any persons accused of anti-state activities (Cole and 
Lyman 1971: 69-77; Choi 1989b). This was accompanied by restrictions on the freedom of 
speech and the press were all justified on account of the state’s idiosyncratic and often 
arbitrary interpretation of the National Security Law.
Laggard Welfare Apparatus
In contrast to such a high-speed expansion of the economic and security apparatus the 
social policy apparatus underwent stagnation, which was particularly salient during the
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Park regime. The weakness of the welfare apparatus could be attributed to a dearth of 
suitably qualified social policy personnel and inadequate recruitment and promotion of 
bright talent. Most of those officials who became involved in the welfare policy making 
process, including doctors, scholars and lawyers who were engaged in a voluntary capacity, 
did not constitute a coherent organisational arrangement to steer social policy making from 
planning to implementation22 (Son 1981).
Moreover, the president’s commitment to welfare policy was initially quite minimal. 
Regarding social policy consultation, there were no equivalent governmental meetings or 
forum as the Monthly Meeting for Economic Trends Report (Wolgan kyongje tonghyang 
pogo) headed by the president himself. Furthermore, there was no secretary responsible for 
welfare issues in the presidential office. The minister of the MHSA also held a lowly 
position in the government hierarchy. She or he was not privileged to have regular face-to- 
face meetings with the president unless the president felt it necessary, and sat at the end of 
the State Council meeting table, the furthest distance from the president. This symbolically 
indicated both the lack of the president’s attention to welfare and the weakness of the 
welfare minister in the government.
In this context, it is not surprising that there were few significant changes to the 
administrative structure and personnel of the welfare apparatus when compared with the 
previous government. The most noticeable change in the welfare apparatus at this time was 
the establishment of a small-sized research centre, Sahoe pojang sim-ui wiwonhoe (Social 
Security Committee: SSC), in 1962 which, as a consultative body to the minister of the 
MHSA, played a leading role in social policy making during the 1960s (Son 1981: 34). But, 
most members of the committee were employed as casual officials, and thus did not have 
the same, or at least similar, status as their counterparts in the economy ministries. Due to
22 The first discussion on welfare policy at the administrative level was made through what 
was called the Thursday Meeting’ that was rather informally carried out with the participation 
of eight semi-professions in the Bureau of Medicine of the MHSA (Son 1981: 10). This provides 
quite a contrasting image to the forums and meetings on economic issues that took place in a 
well-organised fashion during the same period.
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such a weak position, they could not attend the final stage of decision-making and express 
and defend their proposals (Son 1981: passim).
Another organisational change was the separation of the Bureau of Labour Affairs from 
the MHSA and its promotion to the level of Nodongch’ong (Agency of Labour Affairs: 
ALA) in 1963 with more resources and enhanced authority. It was a response to a growing 
influence of labour movements. There were also founded new welfare-related branches 
such as Wonhoch’o (the Office of the Veterans Administration), but they too lacked a 
significant influence in the government which undermined any initiatives on policy 
development (Chung 1992: 179-180).
The indifference of the state leadership to welfare issues continued in the new Chun 
regime, as the new president was also preoccupied with the economy and national stability 
in response to the economic stagnation and a rising tide of the democratisation movements 
in the early 1980s. Accordingly, the issue of social welfare was a low priority in the
v .
government policies. Even though the regime stipulated the construction of the welfare 
state as one of the primary national policies, it did not make substantial efforts to put this 
policy into practice (Kim 1992). In this circumstance, an expansion or empowerment of the 
welfare apparatus was virtually impossible.
Nonetheless, organisational divisions and a change of power relations occurred inside 
the MHSA. The ALA became an independent Nodongbu (Ministry of Labour Affairs: 
MLA) in 1981. The change of power relations was the decline of the professionalised SSC 
and the growth of quasi-technocrats in the MHSA. The civil servants came into the ministry 
through the entrance examination as generalists and formed a strong conservative force 
against progressive welfare programmes set forward by the more specialised SSC, which 
will be discussed later. The promotion and independent establishment of the MLA is seen 
as the reflection of the response of the regime to the rising labour struggles demanding for 
the improvement of working conditions such as low wages and long working hours, which 
became particularly salient from the late 1970s as the society had reached a high level of 
industrialisation (Kang 1994g: 106-109). The decline of the SSC and the rise of the quasi-
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social policy technocrats in the MHSA were a natural consequence of the incremental 
bureaucratisation of the ministry, as well as being indicative of the increasing diversity and 
complexity of the welfare issues that could not easily be addressed within the context of 
small committees such as the SSC.
This imbalance between the economy and the welfare apparatuses had various effects 
on the direction of Korean welfare administration. First, while the imbalance helped the 
economy apparatus to make best use of the advantages of modem bureaucracy, it exposed 
the welfare apparatus to the negative effects of bureaucratisation. Due to the well- 
streamlined decision-making process orchestrated by the president, the economic policies 
could have a maximum degree of flexibility in which a plan could be speedily implemented, 
reviewed, and/or changed in tandem with changing domestic and international 
circumstances (Mason, Kim, Perkins, Kim, and Cole 1980: 261). However, the 
administration of welfare policies did not have such a coordination power or body which 
could collect and harmonize different policy ideas and agendas. Whilst the MHSA had been 
developing into a leading ministry of welfare policies, it was never granted a 
comprehensive role covering the entire policy process running from the policy planning 
through to implementation and administration. One of the results of the lack of a policy 
coordination mechanism was the increasing discord over newly introduced welfare 
programmes not just inside the welfare ministry but also among all ministries of the 
government. In particular, a major organisational conflict was between the redistribution- 
policy-oriented SSC and the bureaucrats in the MHSA, which led eventually to the former 
being dissolved and the latter becoming a conservative group opposing the introduction of 
comprehensive, redistribution-oriented welfare programmes (Chung 1992).
Another effect of the organisational imbalance was the submission of welfare interests 
to economic interests. This occurred not just at the organisational level but also in relation 
to basic principles. As a high priority was paid to the economy, welfare logic was always 
formulated under the scrutiny of economic logic. Accordingly, from the outset of modern 
social programmes in Korea, market principles such as individual responsibility for social 
contingencies came to have dominance over welfare principles such as social solidarity
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through redistribution and a national minimum. In this context, welfare programmes were 
regarded as an instrument to secure sustained economic growth (Lee 1993).
Finally, the imperial presidency and the organisational power imbalance made the 
president both a directive issuer and a fmal-decision maker in major national policies, 
including welfare ones. During the two regimes, almost all of the major welfare 
programmes such as Kungmin pokchi yon’gum (National Welfare Pension: NWP) and 
Uiryobohom (Medical Insurance: MI) were initiated by a presidential directive. Also the 
decision as to whether and when certain programmes were to be implemented rested with 
the president. Thus, it became critical in the development of Korean social policy whether 
and how much attention the president paid to welfare issues. This tradition has remained 
substantially unchanged.
6.13 Repressed Civil Society
The other side of the early success of Korean economy reveals a dark story of a 
repressed society. As various political economists who have studied the third world have 
argued (Schmitter 1974; Stepan 1978; Collier and Collier 1979; O'Donnell et al. 1986: 11), 
this social repression can be attributed to a regime’s strong obsession with a ‘disciplined 
society’ in which low-wage and compliant labour are considered a necessary condition for 
the success of exported-oriented and labour-intensive industrialisation. The same story 
repeated itself in the Korean case of economic development as well During the period of 
the state economic management, the Korean working class was a principal target of state 
control (Lim 1986; Koo 1987: 174; Choi 1989b).
In contrast to many third world countries, Korea was subjected to a dogmatic ideology 
of anti-communism that was frequently utilised by the state elites as a tool to quell social 
disturbance and strengthen their political power. It was notably fostered and used by the 
military regimes and affected the whole population (Lim 1986). Not just labour leaders but 
political opponents, anti-regime dissidents, pro-democracy campaigners, and even the
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general citizens were frequently subject to ideology-driven state-sanctioned violence. 
Throughout the military regimes, the ideology was so effectively and intensively utilised as 
to entrap the whole society in what is called the “red complex”23. The entrapment of the 
society in such a complex consequently made the growth of civil society unattainable as 
well as the expansion of popular power, in contrast to the cases of the Latin American 
popular regimes between the 1930s and the 1970s (Brown 1997).
Anti-communism and Controlled Society
It would not be over-exaggeration to state that Korean society during the military 
regimes was in a ‘state of emergency’ in which the exercise of oppressive state control was 
ubiquitous and unlimited in time. The emergency situation was sustained by the various 
measures produced by the combined forces of anti-communism and the imperial presidency, 
and their resultant institutions such as the President’s Emergency Measure (PEM), 
Chiphoe-mit’ siwi-e kwanhan pop (the Law Concerning Association and Demonstration: 
LCAD), the Anti-communist Act (ACA), the National Security Law (NSL), and the Korea 
Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA).
Table 6-1 provides an overview of how many days per annum the society was under 
emergency control during the 18 years of the Park dictatorship. Between the 1960s and the 
early 1970s, martial law was most widely used by the president to tranquillise the socio­
political turmoil caused by a serious of incidents such as the 5.16 coup in 1961 and the 
government attempts to dispatch Korean army to Vietnam War in 1963, to normalise the 
diplomatic relation with Japan in 1964, and to introduce the Yusin Constitution in 1972. 
From the mid 1970s the PEM took over the martial law as the new Constitution bestowed 
the power on the president.
23 In Korea, the term is defined as a public fear caused by a communist threat, as well as social 
psychology that, on the basis of the fear, justifies or tolerates political suppression on human 
rights. In this sentiment, to be a leftist or a socialist has been no less them to be socially 
stigmatised and ostracised as an antisocial and/or anti-state (Kang 1997).
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Table 6-1 President’s  Em ergence M easures during the Park Regime
Year
The Third Republic The Fourth {Yusin) Republic
‘61 ‘62 ‘64 ‘65 ‘71 ‘72 ‘74 75 ‘76 ‘77 ‘78 ‘79
ML 228 340 57wmnmmm  flHBBHHi ■BBMBIH ■ R i i S? 1 VOVO
i
GD 30 25
PEM wmwmMMwmwm Throughout the whole period
* The skipped years had no day of the state emergency
ML: Martial Law
GD: Garrison Decree
PEM: President’s Emergency Measure
Source: (So 1995b: 111, 119)
The utilisation o f the PEM took place at various levels running from a simple 
restriction of the popular protests to a coercive deprivation of their civil and political rights. 
For example, under the Emergency Measure No.924that was most comprehensively applied 
to the society from 1975 to 1979, any kind o f criticism or canard against the government as 
well as the president was ruled out. Politicians were banned from running for presidency, 
and the power and function o f the NA and Judiciary were so considerably shrunk that they 
were not able to check the presidential power. Consequently, the people were forced to live 
in a time o f political darkness (Kim 1999c: 205-206). With the demise of Park in 1979, the 
PEM was withdrawn, but the new military leader Chun maintained the same autocratic tone 
by activating martial law until the consolidation of his power, without any change in basic 
characteristics of oppression (So 1995b: 119).
The anti-communist laws were another institutional tool that was conveniently utilised 
by the state leadership, to restrict the basic liberal rights of people and organisations. As 
seen in Figure 6-1, the government infringement on the rights was large in scale and 
remained fundamentally the same with an average 355 political detainees throughout the 
two regimes. Taking into account the LCAD, the average number of political detainees per 
annum rises to 811.
24 For the details of the Emergency Measure No. 1 to 8, see Kim 1978: 369-370.
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Figure 6-1 Detainees under Major Social Control Acts: 1963-1987
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The AC A was integrated into the NSL in 1981.
Sources: (S6 1995b: 112, 118, 124, 132)
(Kam 1993: 85)
The trend in the number of the detainees shows a close correlation with the timing of 
regime crisis. The sudden rise in 1968 reflects the time the Park regime faced the massive 
popular protests over the issues o f  the diplomatic normalisation and the anti-war campaign. 
The number of detainees in 1972 and 1977 was indicative o f widespread opposition 
towards the Park regime’s attempt to adopt the Yusin Constitution. The sharp rise in 
numbers o f detainees between 1985 and 1987 can be interpreted as the society undergoing 
the mass democratisation movement, which will be discussed in the following chapter. Its 
overall trend shows that the laws were continuously utilised by the state leadership as a 
basic tool o f social control. In a nutshell, the ideology-loaded laws effectively helped the 
state elites enforce a rigid society (Yonse Taehakkyo T'ongil Yon'guwdn 2001).
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In a nutshell, the social control driven by anti-communism brought about a constant 
curtailment of people’s basic rights, which extended to physical safety as well More 
seriously, such an oppressive measure produced a social environment in which the majority 
of people had to be vigilant not to infringe the laws of social control and thus not to 
challenge the authority of the government. In fact, the authoritarian control equipped with 
the ideology created a state of obedience in which people were forced to keep silent, and 
any criticism on the government policies was not regarded as exercising civil and political 
rights (Cho 1997a: 5).
Controlled Labour Class
The rapid industrialisation of Korean society during the two regimes brought about a 
profound change to the composition of the class structure and generated a rapid increase in 
the number of the working class and of the middle class. As Table 6-2 shows, the ratio of 
the employed in the primary sector declined from 63.0 per cent in 1963 to 24.9 per cent in 
1985, whilst that of the secondary and tertiary sectors went quite an opposite direction. In 
detail, the number of people employed in the manufacturing sector increased sharply from 
just 7.9 per cent in 1963 to 23.4 per cent in 1985, as was the case in the SOC and other 
service sectors from 28.3 per cent to 50.6 per cent during the same period.
Along with this rising industrial and service employment, urbanisation occurred with a 
record-breaking speed with rural population being absorbed to urban areas. Between 1960 
and 1987, the population living in cities with more than 20,000 inhabitants increased more 
than threefold and the number of urban areas by some 50 per cent. In particular, cities with 
over one million inhabitants experienced most rapid growth, sharing a rise in the urban 
population from 40.0 per cent to 59.9 per cent. For example, Seoul, the capital of the 
country, showed the increase in the number of the population from 3.8 million to over 10 
million at the end of 1988. Consequently, by the year 1990, the total number of the 
population dwelling in cities with more than 20,000 residents reached some 34.6 millions,
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or 78.6 per cent of the whole population of the country, growing up from 35.9 per cent in 
1960 and 49.9 per cent in 1970 (Mason, Kim, Perkins, Kim, and Cole 1980: 385-396; Song 
1994a: 21-23).
Table 6-2 Changing Industrial Structures by the Employment Pattern
%
Year Total
Agriculture, 
Fishery and
Mining and 
Manufacturing SOC and Other
Forestry Mining Manufacturing Services
1963 100.0 63.0 0.8 7.9 28.3
1965 100.0 MHHHI 1.0 I B H 31.2
1970 100.0 50.4 1.1 13.2 35.3
1975 100.0 45.7 0.5 18.6 35.2
1980 100.0 34.0 0.9 21.6 43.3
1985 100.0 24.9 1.0 23.4 50.6
* SOC and other services comprise all the tertiary industries such as construction, loading, food, 
communication, transportations, finance, insurance, and real estate.
Source: (Pyon 1996a: 184)
The rapid socio-economic modernisation in Korea led by the state could have generated 
basic preconditions for citizenship development in a very short time span. As seen in the 
western countries, the growth o f working and middle class and the development of large 
cities were a steppingstone on which three citizenship rights grew up. These features 
became part o f Korean experience from the 1970s, as the society entered full scale 
capitalism development. To what extent did these preconditions contribute to the growth o f 
citizenship in Korea? The answer is rather gloomy.
The state control o f labour began from the outset o f the Park regime25, but its full- 
scaled operation commenced from the early 1970s when the state faced the intensified 
demands o f labour unions in an organised form for improved working conditions, which 
rang an alarm bell to the existing modest labour policy (Kang 1994g: 97-106). The
25 For the details of labour control during the 1960s, see Choi 1989b: 84-85; Chong 1990: 109; 
Chung 1992: 173, 213; Kam 1993: 80.
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enactment of the Provisional Exceptional Law Concerning Labour Unions and Settlement 
of Labour Disputes in Foreign Invested Firms in 1969 signalled the state’s changed attitude 
to labour movements, even though the law was primarily concerned to protect the interests 
of foreign capital in Korea by prohibiting any labour disputes (Choi 1989b: 86-87). 
Following this, other measures were adopted in sequence. The promulgation of 
Kukkabowi-e kwanhan t’ukpyol choch’ibop (Law Concerning Special Measures for 
Safeguarding National Security) in 1971, the launch of the Yusin Constitution in 1972, and 
the twice revisions of the three labour relation laws, or Labour Union Act (Nodong 
chohappop), Labour Dispute Adjustment Law (Nodong chaeng-ui chojongbop) and Labour 
Committee Act (Nodong wiwonhoebop), in 1973 and 1974, they were all seen as a 
reflection of the urgent need of the state to impose controls over labour. Under the name of 
‘national security’, the 1971 law banned two out of three workers’ basic rights: the rights to 
collective bargaining and collective action that had been granted to the workers as a 
constitutional right since the 1948 Constitution, while the right to organise was retained 
(Choi 1989b: 88). The new Constitution opened the possibility for the state to restrict all the 
three basic rights by prescribing that the basic rights “were granted only within the scope 
defined by law”. At the same time, the Constitution deprived the public officers of all three 
basic labour rights (CK, 1972, Article 29).
These two amendments to the labour laws indicated that the strength of the state’s 
determination to control the activities of the labour movement. The 1973 revision was 
intended to reduce the autonomy of labour unions by providing more arbitrary power to the 
labour administration such as the ALA. The 1974 amendment was to strengthen the 
function of the labour-management council in order to promote “industrial productivity” 
and “industrial peace”, while considerably weakening the organisational structure and the 
role of trade unions (for more details, see Choi 1989b: 88-91; Kam 1993: 81).
Under the Chun presidency, labour control became further tightened, reflecting the fact 
that the local economy was in recession. The new regime introduced a series of anti-labour 
measures. As a first step, Chun promulgated ‘measures for the purification of labour 
community’ (Nodonggye chonghwa choch’i) on 14 August 1980, and deactivated most of
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the existing labour unions except a few that were in line with his policy. National and local 
union leaders, 191 persons in all, were forcefully evicted from their unions, and 106 local 
unions were closed. Furthermore, if any of the expelled leaders “failed to show adequate 
repentance for past sin”, they were sent to the paramilitary purification camps where many 
of them lost their lives (Ogle 1990: 102; Kang 1994g: 108-109).
In the same year, the Emergency Council for the National Security (Kukkabowi 
pisangdaech’aek wiwonhoe, 31 May 1980 to 11 April 1981) amended the three labour laws 
again. By this amendment, any industry-based labour unions were outlawed, and instead 
only factory-based unions were allowed. In the situation that all the local unions were under 
the umbrella influence of the FKTU, this new measure was intended to isolate one union 
from another and thereby to ensure that executive control of the central union would be 
maintained. In addition, the amendment abolished the union shop system, prohibited any 
intervention of a third party in labour issues of local unions, and confined any industrial 
actions to take place only within the boundary of the workplace. It was not possible for 
social or political group, even the state-endorsed FKTU, to get involved in the affairs of 
local unions. Thus, each local union was effectively isolated from any possible external link 
to support them. Even though there were organised workers as well as some labour disputes 
during the two regimes, the disputes were never carried out in a systematically organised 
fashion; they were too fragmented and shattered to build a militant labour force that could 
hope to have any influence on government policies, including social policy. Consequently, 
their bargaining power with the employers was dramatically reduced, and could not 
function as independent entities (Choi 1989b: 93-95; Ogle 1990: 103; Kam 1993: 81-82).
The destmctive consequences of state labour control were found in various aspects of 
Korean labour movements. As Table 6-3 shows, first of all, the organisation of trade union 
was limited in scale, despite the growth in the number of workers.
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Table 6-3 Strength of Working Class Power, 1963-1985
Year No. of
Union
Members
(thousands)
Organisation Rate (%) No. of
Unions A* B*' Disputes
1963 1,820 224 20.3 9.6 89
1965 2,255 302 22.4 11.2 97
1967 2,619 HHHHI 22.2 . 12.0 105
1969 2,939 445 21.3 12.4 70
1971 3,061 497 19.7 12.5 101
1973 2,865 548 20.4 9.6 -
1975 3,585 750 23.0 15.8 133
1977 4,042 955 24.3 16.7 96
1979 4,369 1,088 23.6 16.8 105
1981 2,414 967 19.6 14.6 186
1983 2,238 1,010 18.1 14.1 98
1985 2,534 1,004 15.7 12.4 265
Note: 1) No government data is available of the number of labour disputes between 1972 and 1974. 
*A: union membership as proportion of the total number of non-agricultural, regularly employed 
workers. All the government labour statistics follow this method.
**B: union membership as proportion of the total number of employed workers. Some labour 
research centres such as the KLI use this method.
Sources: (Koo 1993: 149, Table 4.1)
(KSO 1995: pp.299 and 401, Table 181and 182 respectively)
(So 1995b: pp.79 and 92 Table 15 and 25 respectively)
The diversification o f the employment structure and an increase in the size o f the 
workforce led to a gradual growth in the number of unions until 1980 when the revised 
labour law dissolved the unions at the middle-level and merged them into the factory-based 
ones. Nonetheless, the rate of unionisation was constantly low, compared to that o f other 
countries26. Even though following the government way of calculation (A), the rate had 
remained at about 21 per cent on the average during 24 years, and around 13.2 per cent, if
26 For example, as of 1970, Japan and Britain showed 34.5 and 48.0 per cent of unionisation 
rate respectively (FKTU 1979: 565).
168
we use a different mode of calculation (B). This low unionisation rate can largely be 
attributed to the sustained oppression by the state.
The corporatist labour control of the state brought about a dualisation between union 
leaders and common members. Union leaders developed into a ‘labour aristocracy’. 
Leaders built an intimate relation with the ruling elites and hence had an opportunity to 
enter into politics, while ordinary members were deprived of their basic labour rights, 
thereby being depoliticised (Park 1985: 352-353; Choi 1989b: 82-83, 146; Kim 1999c: 192- 
193).
Labour failed to become a major political force. They were not permitted their own 
representatives in the NA nor the right to organise a labour party, which could represent 
and advocate labour’s interests, for example, in promoting social legislation (Roh 1996). At 
the same time, the autocratic exercise of the state power meant that the opposition parties 
could not adequately advance the interests of the working class27. Thus, even though the 
working class was economically included as the main power propelling rapid 
industrialisation, they were compelled to be politically compliant, or at least silent.
Union activists rarely, if ever, paid any attention to social policy issues. In the 1960s 
their major concern was to maintain their existence (FKTU 1979). In the 1970s and the 
1980s, the main issues were about basic labour rights, wage levels, and labour condition, 
reflecting the state suppression as well as the adverse consequences of the rapid 
industrialisation28 (Kim 1992: 32). According to Kam’s analysis on the policy issues about 
which the FKTU expressed its participatory interests throughout the both regimes (Kam 
1993: 64-68), priority was given to the issue of securing basic labour rights (25.7 per cent);
27 For the details of the state control on the opposition parties during the Park regime, see Kim 
1983: 223-230; Ko 1985: 164-165; Ogle 1990: 91-92. For those during the Chun regime, see Kim 
1999a: 325-328; Kim 1999c: 248-250.
28 In addition, there was another factor which minimised the labours’ attention to welfare 
policy. During the Park regime, the principal focus of the opposition movements was to bring 
down the Park administration. During the Chun regime, the priorities were democratisation 
and national re-unification. Under these circumstances, there was little opportunity for 
redistributive welfare policies to capture the agenda of social groups, including the trade 
unions.
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the second by that of wage (13.4 per cent); the third by that of labour condition (13.1 per 
cent); and the fourth by that of the tax system (9.6 per cent). Little attention was paid to 
social policy issues, taking just 5.5 per cent of the total policy claims made by the FKTU.
In many aspects, Korean labour control by the interventionist state seems to be 
comparable with the points suggested by state corporatism theory. The theory holds that the 
state strategically involves manipulation of its relations with labour unions in order to keep 
the economy productive by controlling labour. For this, the state employs various methods 
such as 1) structuring them into officially sanctioned, non-competitive and compulsory 
unions; 2) providing subsidies; 3) imposing constraints on their demand-making, leadership 
and internal governance (Collier and Collier 1979: 968). The labour law also becomes a 
useful tool in this process. It performs a dual function as a tool of ‘inducement* when the 
government needs to obtain support from the working class29, but also as a tool to constrain 
the requests of the organised groups to participate in the political community when their 
support is no longer required30 (Collier and Collier 1979: 972-976).
In a nutshell, Korean civil society during the two military regimes was held in check. In 
contrast to the western history of modernisation, Korea did not experience the growth of 
organised labour during this period. The state-led industrialisation was successful in 
dissolving the traditional community based on fishery and farming as well as triggering 
mass emigration into urban areas. Along with this structural change, government economic 
policy, which was centred on the EOI and the low-grain-price policy, also deprived the 
farmers of the opportunity to build a unified organisation. Instead, industrialisation was 
combined with the expanding oppressive power of the state bolstered by the imperial
29 In this case, the state allows the organised labour to have basic protection from employers’ 
arbitrary power, which consists of such institutional arrangements as combination right and 
election of its own representatives. However, the extent to which the labour can enjoy such an 
arrangement is quite limited, because the state’s primary interest is directed to the matter of 
avoiding class conflicts and a disturbance of economic order (Collier and Collier 1979: 980).
30 To use Stepan’s term (1978: Ch 3), this selective approach of the state to society is 
distinguished as “inclusionaiy” and as “exclusionary”. In the former approach, the state elites 
try to forge a new equilibrium between the state and society in order to incorporate the 
working class into a new economic and political model. In the latter case, the elites exercise 
strong oppression over the working class to deactivate it.
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presidency system. In this context, neither social groups nor political parties were in a 
position to facilitate the development of welfare policies. This absence of the populace- 
based driving force meant that the society did not have a ‘democratic class struggle’. In 
Korea, it was rather the state inner circle centred on the president that played a decisive role 
in the implementation of welfare policies. This model of welfare policy development is one 
that is not represented in traditional accounts.
6.2 Birth of Exclusive Social Citizenship
The development of state welfare programmes in Korea suggests a rather different 
picture to Marshall’s account of citizenship development. In spite of civil and political 
rights being severely constrained, social rights, at least as represented by state welfare 
programmes began to emerge from the early 1960s. As seen in Appendix I, immediately 
after the military coup, President Park began to introduce a sequence of social legislation. 
Commencing with the enactment of the Public Assistant Act in 1961, other welfare laws 
were enacted in a very short period of time, mainly between 1962 and 1963. In particular, 
three major welfare laws that the administration passed in 196331 had significant effects on 
the future development of Korean social policy.
This state attention to welfare programmes gained momentum with rapid advances in 
industrialisation. In 1973, the Park regime enacted the NWP, and in 1977 put into effect 
national health insurance. Upon the advent of the Chun regime, various social services acts 
were newly introduced. In 1981 alone, three new welfare services acts were enacted for 
children, the elderly, and for the disabled. These appeared to be representative of the new 
phase of the ‘mass production’ of welfare programmes during the two military regimes, 
reflecting the economic strides made by the nation.
31 They are San-6p chaehae posang poh6mb6p (Industrial Accident Insurance Act: IAI), Uiryo 
poh6mbdp (Medical Insurance Act: MI), and Sahoebojang-e kwanhan kibonbop (Basic Law 
Concerning Social Security: BLCSS).
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Scholars in Korean social policy have presented various viewpoints regarding the 
emergence of welfare policy in Korea. Some argue that the main driving force of social 
policy development was the attempt of state elites to legitimise their illegal seizure of 
power (So 1995b; Kwon 1997b; Kwon 1999). Some (for example, Lee 1992; 1993) argue 
that Korean social policy was driven as a tool to accelerate the speed of industrialisation, as 
found in the cases of third world countries (Hardiman and Midgley 1982a), while others 
interpret it as a consequence of the Cold War tension in the peninsula (Kim 1993d), or as 
being the product of a class struggle taking place in the process of capitalist development of 
Korean economy (Won 1990). Depending on the political viewpoint taken, the first and the 
third arguments may be more convincing; an economic stance is likely to find the second 
argument more persuasive.
However, all these accounts have a common weakness in that they do not appear to 
have taken into account the fact that few of these welfare acts were effectively implemented. 
Most either took a long time to be implemented, or were relegated to a peripheral status. At 
the same time, between the 1960s and the 1970s, the vast majority of people were suffering 
form poverty. Relieving poverty by means of economic policy was heavily relied upon by 
state elites for ensuring political legitimacy (Kang 1994f: 191-195). This seems to counter 
the arguments in favour of the legitimisation approach of social policy development in 
Korea.
Claims that social policy reflected the impact of the cold war or class struggles also 
reveal some weaknesses. Firstly, the cold war viewpoint has a bias towards the political 
side of welfare decision-making and does not give due consideration to economic factors. 
Accordingly, to those who favour this viewpoint, such issues as the weakness of labour 
movement can be attributed to the ideology-driven oppression, which is, in deed, caused by 
social, political and economic factors. However, the Marxist viewpoint appears to pay 
attention to both politics and economy. But, as seen above, the Korean labour class was too 
oppressed and weak to challenge the authority of the state or capital. In addition, by 
focusing solely on medical insurance, both approaches fail to provide a comprehensive
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account which covers the whole terrain of Korean welfare policies. If other programmes 
were taken into account, their conclusion might be different.
The instrumentalist approach, which emphasises the state initiative for introducing a 
welfare programme, seems to offer a sounder basis for analysing the development of 
Korean welfare policies. As noted earlier, the basic logic throughout the two military 
regimes was “economic growth first, redistribution later” (Son-songjang hu-bunbae), a 
synonym with ‘economies of scale’ in which the idea of ‘trickle down’ became a norm in 
implementing welfare programmes. But, this approach still fails to explain why many 
welfare programmes were intensively enacted at the very beginning of each regime (1962 
and 1963 in the Park regime and 1981 in the Chun regime); that is, when welfare 
programmes were not needed as a tool of economic management, and then failed to be in 
operation for quite a long time. This dilemma leads us to consider the politics surrounding 
social policy making in Korea.
For this, we need to look into the policymaking process undertaken by the government. 
This will help us see the dynamics shown in the different roles and influences of major 
decision makers of each time, and their attitudes to welfare. Then, details of the state 
welfare programmes will be examined from the viewpoint of Marshall’s social rights. By 
this, we will evaluate the effects of these programmes on the social rights of Koreans 
during the military regimes, as well as the basic attitude of the Korean state to social policy. 
In order to streamline our discussion, we will concentrate on the major state programmes 
introduced by the two regimes, namely the IAI, the MI, and the NWP, and additionally the 
BLCSS.
6.2.1 Leading Actors in Social Policy Making
Considering the socio-economic conditions of the time, the enactment of three welfare 
laws could be seen as extraordinary in several respects. By that time, Korean society had 
not reached the level of social, economic, and political development that the
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industrialisation theory suggests as a precondition for the emergence of the welfare state 
(Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965). At the same time, there did not exist labour demand for 
social policy nor the functional necessity of the capitalist state in which the state has to 
protect labour power to the extent that the structure of capital accumulation is secured 
(Gough 1979; Offe 1984). Social groups and classes were neither aware of the importance 
of social security, nor were they able to express their interests in the policy making process. 
Businessmen, who were best placed to advance the interest of the middle class, were in a 
subordinated position to the military regimes. In particular, during the 1960s most of the 
state elites were unaware of the creation of social security programmes and had a negative 
attitude to such a programme. Moreover, the mass media expressed no particular interest in 
the cause of introducing the programmes (Son 1981: 19). Rather, the initiation of social 
policy came from a small-sized study group in the government.
Social Security Committee in the 1960s
The first move toward a modem welfare state in Korea was made by a small number of 
semi-professionals organising what was called the ‘Thursday Meetings’. The meetings 
were informal in nature, composed of such participants as doctors, lawyers and academics 
in the Bureau of Medicine of the MHSA (Son 1981: 10). This was in contrast to the forums 
and the meetings on economic issues that took place in a well-organised fashion during the 
same period.
During the previous Chang administration32, members of the Thursday Meetings had 
raised for discussion the introduction of medical insurance and other social security 
programmes. The meetings continued during the Park administration, producing various 
reports on the possible introduction of social security programmes. Their ideas on social
32 The Chang government was installed in 1960 in the wake of April 19 Student Uprisings and 
the consequent step-down of President Rhee. As the second government in modem Korean 
history, it was the cabinet system, having Yun Pos6n as the president and Chang Myon as the 
prime minister. It lasted only about one year as the Park Chung Hee’s military coup overthrew 
it in 1961 (Cumings 1997: 346).
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security policies were mainly received from literature on social security programmes in 
advanced countries or the recommendations of the international organisations such as ILO 
and WHO. At the same time, the Japanese model of social security was particularly 
attractive to those who had been educated during the Japanese colonial period. Also, 
Japanese administrative and legal systems were quite similar to those of Korea (Son 1981: 
28-47; Chung 1992: 185). These contributed to a preference by social policy makers for 
programmes which were familiar and therefore considered to be easier to administer.
However, they were not influential enough to make their voices heard by government. 
Even though they published many research reports33 in the early 1960s, none were adopted 
by, nor made any impression on, the military leaders. Accordingly, they sought to use 
personal contacts to persuade individuals who were part of the state, who in turn sought to 
persuade the President on the merits of social policy. In between the SSC and the President 
was Hong Chongch’ol, a member of Kukka chaegSn ch’oego hoeui (the Supreme Council 
for National Reconstruction: SCNR) who acted as an intermediary. This fractional ‘Fabian’ 
approach was successful in drawing Park’s attention to social policy, who had already 
declared the implementation of social security as one of the junta’s tasks but had been 
reluctant to pay substantial attention to it (Son 1981: 36-39). The first result of their 
successful strategy was both the establishment of the SSC in March 1962 and a policy 
directive issued by Park with the title of “establishing the social security system”34 in July 
of the same year (Son 1981: 30). The beginning of modem Korean social policy was thus 
made in an unofficial manner, reflecting the political culture of the time.
The establishment of the committee meant the formalisation of the informal collegial 
meetings and the promotion of the members* status to that of social policy specialists in the
33 For the details of the reports, see Son 1981: 20.
34 The detailed contents of the directives were as follows: 1) to increase income and protect 
citizens from the life risks such as unemployment, illness, and old age; 2) to establish a 
comprehensive and systematic social security system, but in accordance with the economic 
development plan; 3) to implement feasible social insurance programmes at a convenience of 
policy implementation (Son 1981: 34)
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administrative structure . The chairman’s directive signified the expression of the state’s 
formal engagement in social policy in Korea. Upon Park’s directive, each sub-team of the 
SSC embarked on active research and produced many policy reports on introducing social 
security programmes to the society. Their consultancy on matters relating to international 
research, especially the recommendations of the international organisations, helped them to 
develop a progressive approach to social security. Their progressive policy proposals 
reflected such basic principles as universalism, state responsibility and redistribution, which 
could be found in the social security programmes of more advanced European countries, in 
particular. Recommendations of the committee led to the introduction of three welfare 
institutions in 1963: the BLCSS, the IAI and the MI.
Despite its formal launch, however, the committee was still a minor advisory and 
research centre to the minister of the MHS A and its power, relative to that of the economic 
ministry, was still weak. In a rigid hierarchical administrative system, conflicts and 
struggles occurred between the committee specialists and other officials over the form and 
contents of the programmes to be adopted. Consequently, both the administrative conflicts 
and the relative weakness of the committee resulted in their original proposals being 
significantly altered before being implemented.
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs in the 1970s and 1980s
From the late 1960s, the SSC began to decline, while the MHSA advanced as the main 
body for social policy planning. Several reasons explain its decline. First, the state leaders, 
who had paid attention to social policy at the beginning, increasingly diverted their 
attention to the economy. Second, in the growing influence of the ministry, the 
aforementioned struggles with other officials and the congenital weakness of the SSC as an
35 The SSC consisted of total 8 members and four sub-teams. The Team of General Social 
Security was led by Mr. Cho Manje; the Team of Labour Affairs by Mr. Sim Kangsdp; the Team 
of Medical Insurance by Mr.Ch’oe Ch’onsong; and the Team of Public Assistance and Welfare 
Services by Mr. Han Sangmu (Son 1981: 34).
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advisory body were conducive to the declination. A third reason was more fundamental. 
From the 1970s, the society began to experience the negative effects of rapid 
industrialisation. The EOI, which was based on intensive capital investment in selected 
industries as well as targeted areas, generated disparities between rural and urban areas as 
well as between different social and occupational groups.
For instance, rapid economic growth was accompanied by growing inequality. The 
ratio of incomes of the poorest 40 per cent to the richest 20 per cent was .463 in 1965 and 
fell to .372 in 1976 (Adelman 1997: 539, Appendix Table 12-13). Overall Gini coefficients 
also deteriorated from .344 to .391 over the same period. During this time, the Gini 
coefficients of rural area worsened from .285 to .327, and that of employers from .384 
to .449 (Chung 1992: 212, Table 5-6). All these traits reflected the disparity in social 
equality, particularly evident among rural residents and small employers arising from 
economic developments in Korea. This increasing social polarisation and accompanying 
distributional conflicts made the state elite turn its attention to the larger sized and 
bureaucratically well-organised MHSA, and made for a greater emphasis on social policy 
matters (Chung 1992: 231).
A series of welfare programme introductions during the military regimes reveals the 
extent to which the state increased its attention on social policy. As will be seen in the next 
part of the chapter, the reason for this extended attention varies depending on the policy 
priorities of the state leadership. In 1973, it enacted first the NWP. In 1977, upon the 
legislation of Uiryobujob6p (Medical Assistance Act: MA), the state put both the MA and 
the MI into operation for public assistance beneficiaries and workplaces with more than 
500 regular employees. At the same time, the IAI continued to expand its coverage to those 
working in companies with more than 30 regular employees in 1972 and, a decade later, 
extended coverage to those in workplaces with more than 10 regular employees (Kim 
2000b: 153). Upon Chun’s assumption of power, the new regime enacted three welfare 
services laws and expanded the coverage of the MI to companies with more than 100 
regular employees (Nahm and Cho 1998: 93). In these successive changes to welfare
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programmes, it was the MHSA that played a leading role taking over from the SSC36. Yet, 
the MHSA still remained a relatively weak and minor ministry.
6.2 2  The Dynamics, Forms and Contents of Social Policy
In the early 1960s when Korea made its first steps toward a welfare state, social policy 
could be said to resemble an ‘arid landscape’. Apart from public assistance that was 
introduced by colonial Japan and remained nominally in place, there were no other state 
welfare programmes. A set of operating indigenous welfare programmes was not in 
evidence at this time. This meant that the introduction of a new welfare programme would 
be strongly influenced by foreign ideas of welfare. The basic principle was taken from the 
Beveridge model of social security at least in his rhetoric, which was based on the idea of 
guaranteeing a national minimum for all citizens. For the operational model, the Japanese 
one was adopted as desirable for administrative purposes (Son 1981; Na 1991: 29).
However, the structure of policy making did not allow the foreign principles of welfare 
to be implemented in their authentic forms. The basic principle of a national minimum 
standard of living was superseded by the state priorities on administrative expediency and 
minimal financial commitment. Accordingly, the state welfare programmes and their basic 
principles came to deviate from the Beveridge principle and take on key liberalistic 
characteristics, such as selectivity, categorical service provision, a minimalist state, and 
individual responsibility
36 This was with the exception of preparations for the NWP, which saw the proposals offered by 
the KDI being adopted by the state leaders. According to Kwon (1999), it was the KDI that 
played a dominant role in doing research and making policy proposals from the beginning of 
Korean social policy history. But, many authors assert that it was only in the case of the NWP 
that the research institute played a dominant role. This is important because if the economic 
institute, which had a stronger organisational power as well as received support from the 
stronger economy ministries than the MHSA, had played a dominant role for other welfare 
programmes as well, their forms and contents, which will be discussed later, should have taken 
another shape different to those which were finally implemented.
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Basic Law Concerning Social Security
This law had threefold purposes: 1) to define the basic principle and the programmes of 
Korean social security; 2) to identify the range of the state’s role; and 3) to institutionalise 
the SSC as a formal research organisation (Son 1981: 40).
The original contents of the bill suggested by the SSC largely emulated the 
international model , stipulating the state’s responsibility for key welfare provisions. But, 
during the examination of the bill in the standing committee of the SCNR, some important 
principles were either modified or eliminated especially in order to reduce the state 
responsibility for welfare provisions, and thus make citizen’s rights to welfare obscure 
(Chung 1992: 188). For example, the clause 1 of Article3 acknowledged the state’s 
responsibility for social security, but also allowed the state to relegate this responsibility to 
non-profit-seeking local private organisations or corporations. At the same time, clause 2 
prescribed that the social security system should not weaken the ethic of self-help (Son 
1981: 41), and may be considered to be comparable with the idea of self-help emphasised 
by Beveridge in his report (Beveridge 1942).
However, these should be considered in the context of the Korean legal system that had 
adopted the Roman law system in which the legal distinction between ‘higher’ laws (e.g. 
the constitution) and Tower’ ones (e.g. enforcement ordinance) is clear and strict; and also 
one where written legal codes become the foremost criteria in defining, for example, the 
role and the boundary of state responsibility in social policy. As the basic legal foundation 
of Korean social policy, the reservation in clause 1 in particular, could be used by the state 
to avoid or devolve its welfare responsibility. This was also evidenced in American social 
policy where the state’s responsibility for welfare is variously defined depending on 
different statutory interpretations under the same Roman law tradition (Melnick 1994).
37 For instance, the law divided social security into two systems - social insurance and public 
assistance, as suggested in the Beveridge report. In addition, it defined 11 risk categories to be 
protected by social security provisions, including sickness, unemployment, old age, industrial 
accidents, family and survivors, most of which were recommended by the ILO (Son 1981: 42).
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The role of the SSC was curtailed during the bill deliberations. The committee was 
originally proposed as an independent government’s body to have power of both research 
and policy recommendation, like the KDI. But after the examination, its status was 
downgraded to that of acting in an advisory role to the welfare minister. At the same time, 
its directorship was down-graded in status from ministerial to vice-ministerial level. The 
number of the committee members was reduced from 15 to 11, and their official status was 
that of an irregular employee unprotected by government personnel regulation. Thus the 
leading organisation for social policy planning in the 1960s was much reduced in size and 
had limited organisational capability (Son 1981: 43, 49).
Finally, the standing committee of the SCNR eliminated the eleven categories of social 
contingency which were originally proposed by the SSC. The law was meant to be a legal 
foundation for detailed services provisions of social security, but these were no longer 
specified by legislation (Chung 1992: 188-189).
Such restructuring and elimination reflected the predominant attitude of higher-ranking 
policy makers towards social policy. According to Son (1981: 42-43, 48-50), the primary 
reason policy makers rejected the original proposal was that they were apprehensive of a 
subsequent increase in people’s demands for welfare services, if the detailed social policy 
tasks were legally assigned to the state. In addition, the top policy makers believed that 
‘unproductive’ welfare programmes were a hindrance to economic growth, given their 
belief that all national resources ought to be concentrated on industrialisation and national 
security. Consequently, the BLCSS became the legal basis for the Park regime to justify its 
reluctant attitude to social security throughout its rule.
Industrial Accident Insurance
The origin of the IAI programme in Korea dated back to colonial times when Japan 
introduced it to selected economic sectors such as the communication, railroad, and mining 
in order to provide discretionary relief. But, the benefit level did not amount to more than
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poverty relief. Later, the American military government encouraged the programme to be a 
part of collective bargaining, as the LSL in 1953 prescribed the compensation for the 
industrial injuries as a responsibility of employers. Despite this gradual institutionalisation, 
however, the workers who could benefit from the programme were only those in large 
companies, which had a trade union and the employer’s ability to pay for the programme 
(Son 1981: 51-54; Nahmand Cho 1998: 209).
This circumstance made the SSC, which had developed a greater interest in introducing 
an unemployment programme, turn its attention to an industrial injury programme. At the 
same time, implementing an industrial compensation programme first appeared to them 
more reasonable and administratively plausible at that time. It was believed that the state- 
led industrialisation would produce an increasing number of injured workers in foreseeable 
future, and that when a worker became injured they would suffer a double burden from 
both the loss of income and medical cost (Son 1981: 35). In terms of administrative 
convenience, the LSL already required employers to pay into insurance fund, with the state 
making no financial contribution. In addition, by that time, the labour administration 
network was relatively well organised in local areas and the labour offices could rely on 
previous experience with the LSL. Thus, even if it implemented the LAI immediately, the 
state had no need to put in extra financial and administrative resources (Chung 1992: 190).
Unlike the BLCSS, the bill o f the LAI was passed in the standing committee of the 
SCNR nearly in its original form. There were some arguments among the members of the 
committee over the issues of coverage, contribution rate, and compulsory or voluntary 
participation. The major concern expressed by the junta members was the financial burden 
on businesses. It was believed that one junta member, Hong Chongch’ol, the major contact 
point and supporter of the SSC in the SCNR, played a critical role in putting through the 
law by lobbying other council members (Son 1981: 55-60; Chung 1992: 190).
The operational principle of the IAI was basically modelled on the Japanese system. 
The law promulgated workers’ right to compensation and employers’ compulsory 
participation, and its administration became the responsibility of the new ALA. However,
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when it was put into official operation in 1964, the programme did not start as a universal 
programme; rather, it began with the coverage of workplace with more than 500 regular 
employees, and was to expand the coverage gradually to those in smaller factories. Despite 
the gradual expansion of coverage, however, the programme failed to cover the majority of 
the working population. In 1965, the programme covered just 289 factories and 161,150 
workers, accounting for only 1.9 per cent of the whole workers. Twenty years later in 1982, 
the coverage was considerably expanded to companies with more than 10 regular 
employees (66,803 companies and 4,495,185 workers), but its take-up rate was just 30.0 
per cent (Nahm and Cho 1998: 211,216; Kim 2000b: 153-154). So, such basic principles of 
social security as a risk poking and social solidarity were not addressed by the programme.
The IAI, being the first social insurance programme introduced by Korean government, 
became the model for future programmes. Therefore, the segmented and gradual expansion 
of coverage became the basic approach taken by the government when introducing new 
social security programmes. At the same time, the attitude of the state to avoid financial 
responsibility and to seek after administrative convenience was made salient in the process 
of the IAI decision-making. As will be seen, the same approach is also found in the MI and 
the NWP.
Medical Insurance
Among the social insurance programmes, health policy was of particular concern and 
interest for members of the SSC due to their medical background. Since the inception of the 
Thursday seminars, health policy had been a focal point of their discussions, and they had 
already conducted surveys and produced a substantial number of preliminary reports on the 
nation’s medical infrastructure and health assessment of the population between 1960 and 
1962, before submitting the MI bill to the standing committee of the SCNR on 16 
December 1963. The reports revealed problems with the delivery of medical services in the 
country such as shortages of doctors in many regions and patients’ heavy reliance on
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pharmacies but a low rate of hospital utilisation (Son 1981: 62-64). The poor medical 
conditions encouraged the members to propose the MI.
The SSC proposal for the MI was modelled on the Japanese dual system: Health 
Insurance was for the employed. It was to be administered by two medical insurance 
societies: the government-managed medical societies for those in small companies with 
more than 5 regular employees and the non-governmental medical societies for those in 
large companies with more than 300 regular employees. National Health Insurance was for 
the non-employed general public, and run by local governments and the national health 
insurance societies (Son 1981: 66). The Japanese model was believed not only to be 
compatible with the existing structural constraints such as lack of infrastructure for health 
care, but also to solve such problems as the low level of administrative skills and 
organisational resources (Chung 1992: 191).
These structural constraints also led the SSC to take the segmented and gradual 
approach to the MI coverage. Instead of a universal programme, it recommended its 
implementation first in workplaces with more than 500 hundred regular employees. At the 
same time, following the Japanese model, it suggested the organisational form of a co­
operative system in which medical insurance societies, organised in each company, would 
independently finance and administer their own health insurance programme. A fixed rate 
system was suggested as a financing method (3 to 8 per cent of the payroll contribution 
based on standard monthly wage), but only the employees and the employers were 
responsible for the insurance fund. The state was only to subsidise administration costs, and 
hence it was free of direct administration as well as financial commitment (Son 1981: 64- 
65).
Due to those characteristics, the MI began as a quasi-social insurance, based on social 
insurance financing method but lacking other components. It lacked first the state 
responsibility. But a more serious blow to the programme came during the bill deliberation 
in the standing committee of the SCNR. The original bill proposed by the SSC contained 
compulsory participation in the programme, but changed into a voluntary membership for
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the reason that a compulsory scheme would raise the financial burden for both companies 
and the government (Son 1981: 67-69; Chung 1992: 192). Given the poor economic 
conditions of that time, there were few individuals or companies who sought to join the 
programme voluntarily. Accordingly, the MI did not function as a social insurance 
programme and was eventually scrapped.
The same logic was found in the MI as in the policy making process of the IAI. Both 
economic developmentalism and national security were conducive to less state 
responsibility and high accountability of individuals for social welfare. At the same time, 
the emphasis on administrative convenience led to the wholesale adoption of the imported 
programmes. But, an initial framework of a programme is to be a cornerstone for its future 
development by exerting an incremental influence. In spite of the failure in implementation, 
the basic forms and contents of the 1963 MI law became the groundwork of the 1977 MI, 
and led to hotly contested arguments within Korean social policy circle over what 
constituted a desirable MI programme.
Despite this formal legislation, very little happened to implement the MI for over a 
decade. Only 11 pilot schemes were conducted in several workplaces according to the 1963 
law and the first revision38 in 1970. This MI Act was revised a second time in 1976 and put 
into operation the next year, making the programme compulsory in companies with more 
than 500 employees (Category I), and voluntary in companies with less than 500 employees 
(Category II). In the same year, the government enacted two additional acts for medical 
care (the Medical Assistance for the poorest and the Medical Insurance Act for Civil 
Servants and Private School Teachers) and put these into effect in 1978. Owing to this 
consecutive expansion, some 10.49 per cent of the population came under the protection of 
the state medical system (Kwon 1999: 91).
38 The revision was led by the assemblymen and prescribed both compulsory and voluntary 
participation. Its main contents were 1) the expansion of coverage to the entire population; 2) 
the compulsory participation of the employees, civil servants and soldiers, and voluntary 
participation for the self-employed; 3) the employers’ responsibility for establishing their own 
insurance society. But, this revised law also failed to take effect due to the failure of making a 
follow-up enforcement ordinances (Yi 1990: 54).
184
What made this sudden change take place under unchanged conditions, namely, the 
absence of major public pressure and the relatively negative reaction from business groups? 
Many scholars have drawn on different perspectives to explain this change. Some ascribe it 
to the state’s response to the negative consequences of rapid industrialisation, such as the 
worsening distribution structure and widening inequality between social classes (Ch'a 1992; 
Chung 1992). Some attribute it to the growing influence of popular power (Won 1990), 
while some others credit it to the regime competition between South and North Korea, in 
which the northern part of the peninsula, as a socialist regime, was believed to have an 
advanced social security system that pressured the political leaders in the south to arrange 
some social security programmes before a dialogue took place between two systems during 
the period of detente from the early 1970s (Kim 1993d; Joo 1999).
Notwithstanding the difference in the perspectives, they shared one common factor. 
The 1976 revision was initiated on the directives of President Park and hence gathered 
rapid momentum. The first official message of the president regarding the implementation 
of the MI came in the president’s New Year address in 1973, announcing that Korea would 
have a medical care programme around the second half of the 1970s. To back up his 
proposal, Park appointed the progressive-minded Shin Hyonhwak as a minister of the 
MHSA in December 1975, and reiterated the importance of implementing the programme 
three times in 1976 alone (Kim 1993d: 122-123, 146-151). No clear evidence has been 
found to explain the president’s sudden decision to expedite its implementation. Given the 
domestic and international political situation of the time, the hypothesis of regime 
competition seems to be most persuasive. But, according to the documentation of the Chief 
Secretary of President of that time, Kim Chongryom, Park was principally driven by “social 
unbalances created by the rapid industrialisation, especially the high medical costs of the 
poor” (Kim 1990: 308). This clearly indicates that the resurrection of the MI in 1976 can be 
attributed to the president’s decisive attention to it.
The Park regime’s attention to medical security drove the immediate implementation of 
the MI. This time, the leading body was neither the SSC nor the economic policy-related 
bodies, but rather the MHSA. The ministry produced a working paper outlining the
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framework and long-term plan of the MI within two months, showing its enhanced 
bureaucratic capacity was enough to deal with the task (Chung 1992: 258). However, the 
organisational power of the SSC had been considerably weakened and excluded from the 
policy making process by this time. Although its research and policy proposals during the 
1960s came to have profound influence on the 1976 MI, they failed to maintain a close 
connection with the political leadership. They could not persuade the state leaders of the 
positive relationship between economic development and social development (Chung 1992: 
230; Kwon 1999: 55). Still holding the most influential power among the government 
bodies, the EPB did not show an immediate response to the introduction of the MI while 
drafting the plan for the fourth Five-Year-Plan-for-Economic Development. There were 
some disputes between the MHSA and the EPB over such issues as the organisational 
framework of the MI, the society-based operation, and a possible onerous cost burden on 
businesses (Chung 1992: 259). However, the disputes were soon quelled due to the strength 
of the president’s determination to push through the legislation with great speed. The 
MHSA proposal was put into operation in 1977 without substantial modification.
However, the hasty implementation of the MI produced several problems mainly 
stemming from the aborted 1963 MI structure adopted as a basis for the new scheme. The 
bipartite contribution system was maintained with the government subsidising only 
administration costs. For administrative convenience, the society-based organisational 
framework continued. For financial feasibility, the programme commenced in workplaces 
with more than 500 regular employees, with a plan of gradual expansion. The only 
differences from the 1963 plan were that the new MI included government officials and 
teachers of private schools, reflecting the strong influence of the Japanese system, and that 
the newly introduced MA began to cover the poorest segments of the population.
Among these, the organisational framework caused far-reaching problems. The 
independent administration and finance based on individual societies contributed to 
financial stability as well as to the administrative convenience of the programme. But, the 
framework also became a target of criticism of other government bodies. As briefly 
mentioned above, the EPB expressed opposition to the form from the beginning for the
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reason that it would soon generate an uncontrollable proliferation of insurance societies and 
their financial instabilities. Indeed, the first year of programme operation saw 8 societies 
and 513 local branches established across the country. Just two years later when the 
programme was expanded to workplaces with more than 300 regular employees, the 
number of the local branches increased significantly to 603 (KOSIS 2001a).
In the 1980s, the number of the societies began to decrease owing to a ‘merger project 
of the local branches’ by the government, but their total number remained high. In 1983 
after the MI was expanded to factories with more than 16 regular employees, the number of 
society increased to 21, but that of the local branches decreased to 146 (KOSIS 2001a). 
Accordingly, in order to control the numerous decentralised insurance societies, the MHSA 
had to create Chon’guk uiryobohom hyop-uihoe (National Medical Insurance Council: 
NMIC)39 at the central level, with the directorship taken by the vice president of Chon’guk 
kyongje-in yonhaphoe (the Federation of Korean Industrialists: FKI), the most powerful 
business organisation in the country. But, the establishment of the NMIC caused the 
inefficiencies related to high administration costs. It also led to a gradual bureaucratisation 
of the MI officials who developed into a conservative group against any progressive reform 
of the MI from 1980 by insisting on their own bureaucratic interests (Chung 1992: 308- 
312). At the same time, the directorship taken by the employer organisation virtually 
enabled capital to control not just the MI funds but also the labour sector.
Social solidarity through risk pooling and redistribution from the healthy to the sick 
was difficult to achieve. This phenomenon was partly due to the categorical approach of the 
programme coverage. Only those able to pay the contributions were included in the plan. 
They were mostly the middle class consisting of civil servants and the employees of large 
companies and the state. While the MA covered the poorest segment, its take-up rate was
39 It was renamed ChSn’guk uiryoboh6m chohap yfinhaphoe (the National Federation of the 
Medical Insurance Societies: NFMIS) in 1981 and came under the direct control of the MHSA. 
Under the new structure, the insurance societies were neither completely private nor public. 
While the societies managed the insurance funds and membership, the welfare ministry took 
responsibility for personnel administration and the budget of the insurance societies. 
Accordingly, the NFMIS became a quasi-public organisation, developing a conservative group 
interest (Chung 1992: 311; Kim 1996: 200).
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very low.40 Accordingly, a large portion of the population such as farmers and fishers, the 
workers in small factories and the self-employed were excluded from the state medical 
insurance schemes and indeed were required to pay higher medical fees due to the MI41, as 
evidenced by the low coverage ratio of both programmes42 and the maintenance of high 
private health costs43.
The operation system of the MI made this problem worse. Under the decentralised 
society-based system, each society was financially and administratively independent; they 
also differed in terms of contribution rates and benefits structures. As the MI expanded to 
smaller firms, however, this system produced increasing inequality between large 
company-based wealthy societies and small company-based poor societies. At the same 
time, the mounting number of insurance societies came to claim more administrative costs, 
driving the small societies to financial difficulties 44 (Ch'a 1997: 79-80; Nahm and Cho 
1998: 260; Kim2000d: 120-121).
Under the operational system, it was structurally impossible for any fund transfer to 
take place among the insurance societies. In this circumstance, any risk pooling, let alone 
redistribution, could not be expected to provide adequate coverage for all the insured. It 
might be assumed that redistribution effects could take place at least within one society, 
that is, between high-income earners and low-income earners. But, this became less
40 The number of persons protected by the MA was 2,095 (5.8 per cent) in 1977, and it did not 
significantly increase during the two military regimes. In the last year of the Park regime, it 
was 2,134 (5.7 per cent), and slightly increased in 1985 with 3,259 (8.0 per cent) (KSO 1998b: 
237, Table 156).
41 The MI initially brought about the decrease of physicians’ fees, as their services were paid 
through the insurance fund. In order to compensate for the loss of their income, physicians 
performed ‘over-treatment’ and raised their fee level in private practice, most of which were 
applied to the uninsured and those on low income, causing a regressive redistribution effect 
(Chung 1992: 264)
42 It was 14.6 per cent (3,205,076 persons) in 1977 and 52.1 per cent (17,948,172) in 1985 (KSO 
1998b: pp.236-7, Table 155 and 156 respectively)
43 It accounted for 62.3 per cent of total health expenditure in 1983 (Chung 1992: 255, Table 6- 
2).
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feasible due to the flat rate contribution system and the narrowness of the contribution base 
set up by the standard monthly wage, which covered only a small portion of total income 
and also took a relatively small portion of the total incomes of the higher income earners, in 
comparison to that of lower income owners. (Chung 1992: 319-320; Kim 1998d: 151-152).
In the early 1980s as the government planned to expand the coverage of the MI to the 
non-insured45, the exclusive and regressive nature of the MI became even more apparent. 
This provoked fierce disputes over its organisational form between progressive reformists 
and conservative reactionaries. The reformers consisted of social policy professionals, most 
of whom were members of the SSC, and some officials, including minister Ch’on Myong- 
gi, of the MHSA. Once again, pressure for reform was confined to a rather small number of 
experts and insiders. They argued that a unified system should be introduced in which all 
financing and administration of the MI were to be carried out by one central organisation 
and hence the financial risks and the administrative inefficiency could be minimised (Ch’a 
1997; Nahm and Cho 1998: 260-262; Kim 2000d).
The majority of officials in the ministry and the NMIC (later the NFMIS) expressed 
strong opposition towards this reformist idea, claiming that the unified system proposed by 
the reformists was administratively unworkable. The key point of their arguments was that 
the unified system would breach the actuarial principles of insurance. In the context that the 
MI was expected to expand to farmers and the self-employed, the integration of the 
independent societies into one would have to involve an ‘irrational’ fund transfer from 
company-based, wealthy insurance funds to the farmers’ and the self-employers’ 
financially weaker funds, which might cause financial trouble in the former. Moreover, 
because the incomes of the farmers’ and the self-employed were not completely open to 
scrutiny in contrast to those of wage earners, they argued, it would be very difficult under 
one administration system to set an equitable contribution rate between two different
44 For example, in the early 1980s, 23 out of 105 societies suffered financial deficits, and 59 
societies (56 per cent of all the societies) had already passed the financial safety line (Chung 
1992:317).
45 In 1980 there were five pilot schemes under operation across the country, to uncover possible 
problems and their solutions when the MI became applied nationwide.
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income sectors. Furthermore, in contrast to the unified system that could contribute large- 
scale bureaucratisation and thus become ineffective in reflecting changing medical 
circumstances (e.g. increasing utilisation rate), the current society-based system could 
maintain a high level of flexibility in responding to a changing environment. It would be 
relative easy to secure necessary funds and would be free from contributor’s sensitivity to 
any premium increase. Finally, the unified system would require direct financial and 
administrative involvement of the government, increasing the burden on the government 
side (Mun 1997: 198-199).
In the free of the over-expansion of the insurance societies, the minister of the MHSA, 
Ch’on Myong-gi, urged on by the SSC members, set up a working team in 1980 in order to 
evaluate, and to invent an appropriate alternative to, the current system The team hosted 
several seminars participated by bureaucrats, professionals, and social interest groups such 
as medical doctors and representatives of the insured (Chung 1992). At the same time, the 
minister held several inter-ministry meetings to persuade and earn support from other 
government bodies such as Prime Minister Offices and the EPB. When the minister’s 
reform plan was released, it was widely accepted not just by such government bodies but 
also by the ruling Minju chdnguidang (Democratic Justice Party: DIP), and the NA to the 
extent that the Health and Social Affair Committee (HSAC) of the Assembly deliberated 
the plan and agreed to present a reform bill in the 1982 regular session (Ch’a 1996: 181- 
183).
Strong reactions emerged from other groups. First of all, the conservative officials in 
the MHSA and the NFMIS opposed the minister’s plan, instead proposing a gradual merger 
plan of financially unsound societies into large societies. At the same time, the major 
employer organisations such as the FKI, Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(Han’guk sanggong hoe-uiso), Korean Trade Association (Han’guk muyok hyophoe), 
Han’guk kyong-yongja ch’onghyophoe (Korea Federation of Employers: KFE) opposed the 
plan by sending a protest letter to the welfare minister and lobbying the mass media and the 
presidential secretary’s office. The FKTU showed an ambivalent attitude regarding the 
reform. Initially, it opposed the unified system on the ground that such a system would
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transfer workers’ money to others. But, about one year later in 1981, the FKTU changed its 
attitude to support a unified system which would comprise all industrial workplaces, but not 
other sectors of economy. The union’s main intention was to defeat the employers’ 
intervention in the MI (Chung 1992: 324; Ch'a 1996: 184-185).
This heated dispute divided the Korean social policy community into two opposing 
camps, but it seems that the conflict was reflecting the organisational interests as well as 
class interests. For officials in both the MHSA and the NFMIS, the priority was paid to the 
preservation of their vested interests. For the business sectors, maintaining their influence 
on the MI and thus on labour was taken more seriously.
From early 1982, the reform proposals were submitted to the presidential office, by 
both the welfare minister and by the ruling party. Several deliberation meetings took place 
in the president’s office with the participation of the minister of the MHSA, the chairperson 
of the HSAC, the floor leader of the ruling DJP, and the presidential secretaries for state 
affairs. Among the participants, it was only the secretaries who strongly defended the 
current society-base system and resisting the reform proposal. It was widely believed that 
the secretaries were strongly affected by the lobbies of the employers’ groups and 
supported by the conservative officials in the MHSA. In a meeting on 8 December 1982, 
accepting the recommendations of the secretaries, President Chun finally ordered a review 
of the proposal, which in fact meant a dismissal of the reform plan by the president. Ten 
days later, the participants held another more informal meeting to review the reform plan, 
but the presidential secretaries’ comment that “the preservation of the current society-based 
system is the president’s will” signified the end of any further debate on the matter (Ch'a 
1996: 184-185).
The first round of the reform movement was vetoed by the president, reflecting the 
very nature of the authoritarian political culture in Korea. Soon after, reformists, including 
the SSC members, were arrested on the charge of being socialists, and were forced to leave 
the MHSA. They had to keep silent for a while regarding the organisational forms and 
eventually the underlying principles of social policy. A more important point we should
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note in this failed reform movement was that under such authoritarian Korean politics, a 
democratic political process was impossible. However even when such peripheral bodies as 
the ruling party, the NA, and the welfare ministry were collaborating to influence the policy 
making process, their endeavour was easily dismissed by one simple factor - ‘the 
president’s will’. Like those of economic policy, the decisions of social policy were made 
exclusively within the political inner circle composed of the president and a few of his 
advisors.
National Welfare Pension
There has been an argument over which government body first proposed the 
introduction of the NWP. In discussions of Korean pension policy, it is important to sort 
out whether the KDI or the MHSA played the leading role in its introduction, since they 
had different organisational purposes and functions. According to Son (1981), both 
organisations suggested the viability of its introduction at the same time in a preparation for 
the president’s New Year visit to their offices in 1973. According to Kwon (1999), it was 
the KDI that made such a proposal for the first time. On 25 November 1972 before the 
president’s visit, the KDI director, Kim Manje, met President Park to persuade him to 
introduce a pension programme. The principal motive of the KDI was to support the 
interest of economic development ; pension was seen as an important tool to mobilise 
domestic capital for financing the newly commenced HCI46 (Park 1975: 78-86; Kwon 
1999). In the meantime, the basic concern of the MHSA, Son (1981: 80) describes, was a 
temporary, expediential action taken amid preparations for the president’s visit.
Given that the policy focus of the Park regime was exclusively on the economy, 
Kwon’s explanation seems to have more credence. The factors illustrated by Son do not 
seem to be convincing, given the demographic profile of Korea with low per cent of the
46 According to preliminary research by the KDI, a national pension programme was expected 
to raise some 100 billion won within 2 years (Kim and Park 1972, re-quoted in Ham 1986: 52).
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aging population. In 1973 when the NWP was first considered by the government, people 
over 65 accounted for only 3.2 per cent of the total population. This number did not change 
much after 10 years, peaking at 4.0 per cent47 (KSO 1998b: 86, Table 3). In addition, the 
main social value of the society was still based on Confiician teachings that emphasised 
filial piety and familial protection for the elderly (Kim 1993c).
Persuaded by the two organisations, President Park made a formal declaration at the 
1973 New Year press conference that the nation would have a pension programme for all 
retired workers. After the address, the two offices launched research on a pension 
programme and in March produced substantively different proposals with the one exception 
being agreement that the government should only pay administration costs associated with 
any pension programme.
The MHSA took its standard approach of gradualism by recommending the staggered 
implementation first in workplaces with more than 500 regular employees and then 
expanding to other workplaces over time. It proposed a 2 to 3 per cent initial contribution 
rate and a gradual increase. With respect to the administration of the pension, the ministry 
recommended the installation of a new bureau under the MHSA and to utilise the 
administrative network of the ALA that already had experience of social insurance 
administration with the IAI. Regarding the management of the contribution funds, the 
ministry proposed a provident funds system and the utilisation of the funds through 
investments so as to be used to increase social welfare funds.
47 In western countries, the first public pension was introduced when the proportion of the 
elderly in whole population was more than 5 per cent. For example, the UK introduced it in 
1911 at 5.2 per cent of aging rate; America in 1930 at 5.4 per cent; and Germany in 1890 at 5.1 
per cent (Lee 1998: 28)
193
Table 6-4 Com parisons of the NWP Proposals
MHSA Plan KDI Plan M
Coverage
For workplaces with more than 500 
employees and gradually expanded 
to others
Those aged between 20 and 60 
years old
Contribution Rate 2 to 3 per cent and gradual increase 3 to 5 per cent
Administration New bureau under the MHSA Independent Social Security Office
r - *• Provident funds system,Fund Utilisation T . f . „ . n i? ^ ,Investment in Social Welfare Fund
Source: (Son 1981: 83; Ham 1986: 53)
Provident funds system, 
Investment in HCI fund
The KDI plan was more universal in coverage and therefore more costly than its 
counterpart. It proposed coverage for the entire population with a 3 to 5 per cent 
contribution rate. It recommended the creation of an independent administrative 
organisation and the use of the existing network of National Tax Office for contribution 
collections and reimbursement. Two points need to be made here. First, the KDI plan 
proposed the funds to be used for HCI investment. Second, the suggestion to establish 
Social Security Office outside the influence of the MHSA was intended to divert the funds 
to economic development without attracting opposition from other ministries. Due to these 
two factors, the KDI plan was widely believed to be intended to mobilise domestic capital 
(Ham 1986: 53; Chung 1992: 244-245).
These plans for a public pension were enough to gain public attention, especially as the 
KDI plan was principally reflected in the final draft. Along with the first public release o f 
the final draft on September 20 1973, critical opinions and opposition arose from many 
quarters including the FKI, the FKTU, and the mass media. Their main arguments were as 
follows; 1) the contribution rates (3 per cent for employees and 4 per cent for employers) 
were a heavy burden for employers, and thus the government should contribute 
proportionately to the funds, especially given that it was contributing to the pension funds 
for civil servants and soldiers; 2) The principal purpose of the pension was to increase 
domestic savings to fund industrialisation; 3) If the programme was designed for the 
purpose of income redistribution, its administration should be in charge of the MHSA, with
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a new independent office set up to collect the contribution and to manage the fund; 4) In 
general, it was inappropriate to implement the NWP first, given that the country had been 
neglecting more urgent programmes such as the minimum wage, medical insurance, and 
unemployment insurance (Son 1981: 85-86; Ham 1986: 53-4; Chung 1992: 246-245).
However, the government did not take these arguments seriously. Whilst it hosted a 
hearing48 in order to listen to public opinion, it did not let other opinions be reflected in the 
final decision. Moreover, there was no idea expressed by any group in the civil sectors. 
Simultaneously, neither the ruling nor opposition parties played any role in mediating 
specific social interests in the making of the NWP. During the deliberation of the bill in the 
NA, the opposition party demanded that the state make contributions to the fimds, but 
eventually supported the original plan. The ruling party expressed nothing more than a 
superficial concern for the programme (Chung 1992: 247; Ch'oe 1998a: 125-128).
On December 1973, the NA finally passed the NWP Bill without any significant 
changes to the final draft. It was scheduled to operate from January 1974. It had two 
categories of coverage: Category I was compulsorily applied to employees in workplaces 
with more than 30 employees and with monthly earnings of at least 15,000 won. Based on 
voluntary participation, Category II was to cover those who were excluded from Category I, 
such as the self-employed and employees in small companies with less than 30 employees 
(Chung 1992: 248).
Both employers and employees equally shared the contribution, the government 
subsidising only administration costs. Responding to the employers’ opposition, the 
contribution rate for employers was readjusted from 4 to 3 per cent, and the government 
was to subsidise 1 per cent of the contribution of the workers with less than 15,000 won 
earning in category II. The contribution from both sides were to be taxed according to the 
30 different levels of the standard monthly wage with the upper and lower income ceilings 
being 15,000 to 20,000 won respectively. The collected contributions were to remain in the
48 The attendants at the hearing were the FKI from employer side and the FKTU from labour 
side.
insurance fund until the end of the benefit period. For financial stability and the utilisation 
of the fund for industrialisation, the funded system was selected, rather than the pay-as-go 
method (Chung 1992: 249-250). The benefits consisted of an annuity to retired workers at 
age 60 (women 55) if the workers contributed for 20 years; disability benefits in case of 
worker’s injuries and disability; and survivor benefits for the dependents in case of a death 
of a worker, which appeared to reflect the benefit structure of the international standard 
recommended by the ILO (Son 1981: 83; Chung 1992: 248).
The NWP presented double features. The coverage of workplace with more than 30 
employees presented its most universalistic approach among the social insurance 
programmes scrutinised by the government until the late 1980s. Nonetheless, the 
programme was also categorical and selective, covering a small portion of the working 
class and excluding the majority of those on low-income and the self-employed. At the 
same time, the bipartite contribution system, which freed the state from a financial 
commitment, minimised redistribution effects, which became further deteriorated by the 
narrow contribution band between upper and bottom ceilings.
The hastily formulated NWP failed to be implemented. On 14 January 1974, just 
fourteen days after the commencement of the programme, President Park proclaimed 
Emergency Measure No. 3 for ‘the stabilisation of the people’s life’, and ordered the 
suspension of the NWP. He declared an economic emergency decree on 3 August, which 
froze the private loan market that was characterised by high interest rates and relieved the 
companies’ financial overburden by withholding debt payment and lowering the interest 
rate. These consecutive economic emergency measures provide a clue to why the state 
suddenly called off the programme. The Korean economy began to enter a recession 
affected by the first oil crisis in 1973. Along with this, a boom of overseas construction in 
Middle East conducted by Korean companies, which started in 1974, accelerated the 
increase in the workers’ wages and salaries, as the boom needed more specialised workers 
(Lee 1992: 158-159; 1998: 28). This changing economic environment put an increasing 
financial burden on the business sectors, and it was believed unbearable for both employers 
and employees to pay the contribution to the pension fund without state subsidies. As seen
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above, the primary concern of the government in formulating the NWP was the economy. 
But as the economic conditions changed and the local economy went into recession, the 
government had to discard the supportive instrument for industrialisation.
6.3 Conclusion
Throughout the period of the two military regimes in Korea, the twin themes of 
national policymaking were those of economic development and national security. These 
two goals, which required the mobilisation and concentration of all the national resources 
and energies, came to shape the basic characteristics of the political processes. While 
making possible unprecedented economic prosperity, the two goals gave a great level of 
autonomy for the state leadership characterised by an imperial presidency and exclusive 
politics. It produced an administrative cleavage that divided government bodies into the 
strong and the weak.
In this context, the components of democratic politics were frequently absent. Although 
there was a semblance of party politics during the period of authoritarian rule, there was not 
a progressive party in Korean politics. The ruling parties (Democratic Republican Party of 
the Park regime and the DJP of the Chun regime) were always under the firm control of the 
presidents. Opposition parties never made themselves the majority in the NA, due largely to 
the proportional representation system. At the same time, their political orientation was 
basically conservative and not in favour of progressive reform. Moreover, the nature of 
party politics made it impossible for political parties to represent the interests of most social 
groups.
Civil society was also unable to effectively challenge state power, despite larger 
numbers joining the middle class. From the mid-1970s, there was a growth in civil 
movements, but they were essentially a broad coalition of firstly anti-dictatorship (the 
1970s) and, in subsequent decades, pro-democracy supporters. However, trade unions and 
the working class were principal targets for corporatist control as well as of state
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anticommunist measures. With the exception of the state-controlled FKTU, Korean workers 
were not allowed to have independent unions, at both the national and local levels, nor 
establish political parties of their own. During the military governments, neither the civil 
sectors nor political parties functioned as an initiator of social policies.
In the combination of strong government and weak civil society, the leading actors in 
initiating and implementing welfare programmes were a small number of weak social 
policy experts inside the government and the president who was advised by non-welfare, 
economic technocrats. Accordingly, the introduction of the social security programmes 
took the features of administrative expediency and liberalistic welfare in which the 
selective, categorical coverage, the minimum level of state financial commitment, and the 
maximum level of the insured’s responsibility were accentuated. These features were found 
in all three social insurance programmes that emerged during this time.
It is difficult to find such basic principles of social rights as redistribution effect and 
social solidarity which are mainly derived from two sources: the benefit and financing 
schemes and the extent of coverage. In terms of financing, all the social insurance 
programmes strictly conformed to the bipartite principle. The government was to make no 
contribution to insurance funds, and only to subsidise administration costs. This resulted in 
the Korean government being labelled as a ‘regulator’ in social policy, which lacked any 
attention to redistribution (Kwon 1999). In terms of the coverage, the three programmes 
took a ‘selective occupation-based approach’, like the Japanese and German systems but 
unlike the British and Scandinavian ones, in which the high-income earners in the large 
company came to be first protected. Along with the narrowness of the contribution base set 
up by the standard monthly wage, this selectivism minimised the possibility for the 
redistributive effect, vertical as well as horizontal, to occur among the insured, nor did it 
social solidarity. Furthermore, the economic structure until the 1980s that was still based on 
the labour intensive, low income rewarding manufacturing, the majority of the working 
class, agricultural sector workers, and the self-employed were excluded from the state 
protection. In a nutshell, the Korean social security programmes had neither a redistribution 
effect nor risk pooling, and thus failed to harbour the principles of social rights.
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More importantly, the cancellation of both the NWP and the NI revealed the underlying 
attitude of the state to social policy. The successful implementation of the IAI has been 
argued as reflecting the state attention to the increasing industrial accidents and the 
necessity to keep labour power reproductive for the rapid industrialisation (Chung 1992; 
Lee 1993). Thus, the IAI can be understood as a supportive instrument for economic 
growth, or social cost, as Marxist scholars hold (Gough 1979). Then, how could the 
abortion of the two other programmes be explained? The abortion of the NI was due to the 
absence of the state’s intension to implement the enforcement ordinance. The NWP failed 
to survive owing to the president’s economic emergency measure. These two abortions 
should be understood by considering the contextual surroundings of the society of that time. 
They took place when the economy went into recession and the political crisis was high. As 
for the case of the NWP, the first oil crisis and rising financial burden on the business 
sectors were critical factors. As for that of the NI, the second oil crisis and its lasting impact 
on the local economy was decisive. Consequently, under the imperial power of the 
president, social policy became a peripheral institution vulnerable to changing politico- 
economic conditions.
The underlying principles of the Chun regime’s social policy were not much different 
to that of the Park regime. Despite the enactment of various pieces of legislation for welfare 
services for children, the elderly and the disabled (see Appendix 1), the new regime did not 
pay substantial attention to the revival of the aborted programmes or the introduction of a 
new programme such as the unemployment insurance. Rather, by enacting such welfare 
service laws, Chun tried to emphasise the necessity of informal, familial, community- 
oriented mutual supports and their cooperation with the state (Lee 1998: 29). Moreover, 
due to the lack of state attention to social policy, the new legislation for welfare services 
had to wait several years until the enforcement ordinances were made and put into effect.
This period of developmental authoritarianism was important in terms of citizenship 
development in Korea. A significant amount of welfare legislation was introduced that at 
least superficially resembles the Marshallian social welfare system. But it was introduced 
for the purpose of bolstering the developmental authoritarian regimes. Marshall did not
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really consider welfare to be an instrument of authoritarian rule. The emphasis of the 
Korean government, especially during the 1980s, on private responsibility for welfare 
provision could be assumed to have pursued the Marshallian “middle way”. However, as 
discussed in chapter 2, welfare pluralism is grounded in the idea that the state takes prime 
responsibility for welfare while civil sectors take only a supplementary role. In Korea, civil 
sectors de facto substituted for the state in welfare provision, which led to the failure of 
Korea’s social policy to enshrine the basic principles of social rights. This undermines 
Marshall’s ideal type of citizenship and shows its lack of generalisablilty. But, it also adds 
force to his claim that all three rights components have to be present in order to fulfil his 
ideal welfare middle way.
In conclusion, this discussion reveals that the development of Korean social policy 
under the military rule can not be explained by either citizenship theory or the power 
struggle approach. Since liberation, Korea had travelled far away from the western type of 
capitalism and democracy development. In Korea of that time, both civil and political rights 
were under suppression, so that they could not function as a source of social rights. In this 
situation, the possibility of a democratic power struggle, a major impetus for the 
development of the western welfare states, was not realised. Still, Pierson’s approach 
appears to be applicable in that the legacy of colonial Japan and the authoritarian Rhee 
regime continued. There was no critical juncture, as defined by Pierson (2000 a), to break 
the tradition of authoritarian policy making. This was not to come until 1997 (see Chapter 
9).
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Chapter 7
Expansion of Civil and Political Rights in Democratic 
Transition: 1987-1997
In modem Korean history, 1987 was a political turning point. There was a popular 
uprising that demanded radical reforms and the restoration of democracy in the society. The 
promise of political rights, Marshall’s second pillar, seemed, for a time, achievable. The 
constitution was amended so as to enable people to now elect the president by direct vote. 
Party politics and parliamentary democracy were formally reinstated. People’s civil rights 
were enhanced. Oppressive social legislation such as the Basic Press Law, which limited 
press freedom, were revised and/or abandoned. Civil movements led by various social 
groups and organisations began to flourish. Upon this high tide of democratic transition, 
labour-related laws were also amended to give an increased degree of freedom to labour 
movements.
Yet, the scope and the speed of the reform in post-1987 Korea did not meet with the 
expectations of those who had been participants during the peak of the demonstrations. In 
fact, the decade following 1987 can still be seen as part of a transitional period in which the 
old tradition of authoritarian control and a new trend of democratic politics coexisted. 
Politicians, who were entmsted by their electorate to steer the direction of reform, were still 
caught in the old paradigm o f ‘boss politics’, slowing down any rapid democratic transition. 
Despite the formal resurrection of democratic political features, the NA was not yet mature 
enough to check the power of the president. Labour movements still suffered from various 
legal restrictions as well as remaining subject to intimidation. The rhetoric of anti­
communism was still used as a tool to contain dissident sectors of society, leaders of social 
and labour movements being a major target. In a nutshell, this transitional period of reform 
lacked the components of participatory and representative democracy (Choi 1993b; Im 
1994: Ch. 10).
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This mixture of the old and new socio-political profiles was certainly reflected in the 
development of social policy during the period. After 1987, the MI and the NWP, which 
had not been implemented under the previous military regimes, were finally put into 
operation. New programmes such as Koyong Pohom (Employment Insurance: El) were 
also introduced. Most social programmes experienced substantial changes in form and 
content. This chapter discusses how those welfare changes took place in this political 
context and the outcome of these changes from the perspective of social rights.
7.1 Popular Movements and the Restoration of Political Rights
The 1980s in Korea began with another military coup and subsequent oppression of the 
civil and political sectors. However, the relentless state oppression helped sow the seeds of 
civil support for democracy, which swept across society from the second half of the decade 
to the early 1990s. The leading protagonists were initially a student group, but afterwards 
by groups such as opposition politicians, labourers, farmers, and intellectual leaders. Thus, 
the antigovemment and pro-democracy movement consisted of a broad coalition of social 
groups that cut across class and societal boundaries (Kang 1994f: 144-147; Kim 1999c: 
254-257).
7.1.1 An Upsurge in Democratisation Movements
It would be impossible to discuss the progress of Korean society without considering 
the role of students. During the late 1980s, Korean students, who had maintained a long 
tradition as prominent instigators of social change and thus were under the strict control of 
the state, advanced again on to the centre stage of the democratisation movement. Their 
main objective was to defeat the dictatorship and achieve democracy both on campus and 
on the political terrain. Within the universities, for example, they reorganised the 
government-controlled student organisations into self-governing ones. By way of protesting
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the imposition of military culture on academic life, they also rejected such established 
conventions as military training classes on campuses and compulsory conscription. They 
often initiated fierce street demonstrations, and sometimes voluntarily ran night schools in 
urban factory areas in order to raise workers’ social and political awareness. They sought to 
recruit supporters from factories in order to establish a conjoined strength between them 
and workers (Ogle 1990: 99; Kang 1994g: 258-275; Kluver 1998).
The principal agenda of democratisation movements was soon augmented by other 
issues such as national reunification and anti-Americanism. This reflected the widely held 
belief that the soldiers which ruthlessly crushed the Kwangju people could not have been 
mobilised without the consent, or connivance, of the American government, and also that 
the Korean economy was heavily subjugated to imperial interests of the core economy 
(Kang 1994f: 145; Kim 1999c: 255-256). The assurance of widespread support for their 
aims empowered the student activists to be more systematic and organisationally efficient 
in their bid to build student organisations at a national level, making them the most 
powerful of social movements.
Another remarkable feature was the explosion of labour movements, which had long 
been suppressed by the autocratic regimes since the 1960s. This time, the key issues 
extended from the demands for a right to a living wage to more politically contentious 
ones: the establishment of free unions, the dismantlement of government-controlled unions, 
and abolition of oppressive labour laws (Kim 1999c: 266). Dismissed labour leaders 
organised the Korean Worker’s Welfare Council (Han’guk nodongja pokchi hyobuihoe) in 
March 1984, in order to reconstruct democratic unions dissolved by the Chun regime in 
1980-1981. They also struggled to achieve legality for underground unions, abolish 
blacklists, and change the repressive labour laws (Kang 1994g: 109-111). There was a 
sharp increase in numbers of members and union bodies as well as strong industrial activity 
across workplaces.
Farmers, who were virtually never allowed to form their own organisation during the 
military regimes, began to organise themselves in protest to the oppressive low grain-price
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policy and the liberalisation of the imports of agricultural products. Religious groups, such 
as the Catholic and Protestant churches, played a leading role in organising the farmers. 
Their main agenda was that of promoting the democratisation of government-controlled 
agricultural cooperatives, which had been used to impose control on the farmers’ activities 
and a set-price policy on agricultural products. Another main agenda was the abolition of 
the import liberalisation of farm products (Kang 1994g: 149-167).
Political opposition leaders also began to raise their voice for democracy. On 18 May 
1983, the third anniversary of the Kwangju people’s uprising, Kim Young Sam (Kim 
Yongsam), the former leader of the opposition party (New Democratic Party) then under 
house arrest, commenced a hunger strike, demanding the democratisation of the country. In 
1985, Kim Dae Jung, who had been in America since 1982, returned to Korea, 
reinvigorating the democratic movement. Along with the mass student protests, these two 
events greatly resonated with the Korean people and provided the opportunity for social 
forces, which had been lying dormant, to build the ‘Headquarter of the National Movement 
for Achieving Democratic Constitution’ (Minjuh6nb6p chaengch’wi-rul wihan kungmin 
undong ponbu) on 27 May 1987; this was the largest nationwide antigovernment 
organisation since nationhood in 1948 and comprised 2,196 social leaders from virtually 
all social sectors running from opposition politicians through to labour activists, social 
intellectuals and feminists. They cooperated in promoting the organisation, setting up its 
branches in local areas across the country. Mobilising four or five million people at the 
peak of the demonstration, the movement managed to unite hitherto separate claims for 
democratisation into a united platform demanding political change. This antigoverament 
coalition proved a great challenge to the security of the regime (Seong 1992: 31; Kim 
1999a: 329-332; Kim 1999c: 258).
Amid such a torrent of antigovemment actions, a new opposition party Sinhan 
minjudang (New Korean Democratic Party: NKDP), was formed in 1985 by a group of 
politicians who had recently been set free from political restrictions, and sought to 
distinguish themselves from existing opposition parties for their complicity with the 
government. Even though having been established just one month prior to the general
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election on 12 February 1985, the new party achieved some landmark victories in the 
election. While the ruling party, the DJP, won the largest percentage of votes over the 
NKDP (35.3 per cent vs. 29.2 per cent), the new party not only outperformed the existing 
opposition parties, by winning 67 seats in the assembly, but also obtained the majority of 
votes in the five largest cities over the ruling party (40.2 per cent vs. 28.4 per cent). Along 
with the electoral success of the NKDP, the issue of the democratisation movements 
became a claim for the amendment of the constitution for direct and free presidential 
election (Ogle 1990: 100; Kim 1999a: 343-344; Kim 1999c: 254-257).
Chun’s reaction was defiant. On 13 April 1987, he declared the continuance of the 
existing constitution and banned any discussion on a constitutional reform and direct 
elections. Subsequently, the ruling DJP nominated one of the Chun’s fellow coup 
instigators, Roh Tae Woo (No Taeu), as its candidate for the next presidency (Ogle 1990: 
101; Kang 1994f: 156-157). The regime fell back on the oft-relied upon the ideology of 
anti-communism to divert people’s attention away from democratisation to issues of 
national security (Kang 1994a: 244). However, those measures only served to intensify the 
opposition. Fierce street demonstrations took place again across the country and reached its 
peak on 26 June 1987 with an estimated one million participants (Kang 1994a: 244-245).
1.12  Democratisation Programmes and Formation of a Conservative Regime
This political deadlock was aggravated by the deaths of two university students, which
drove the state leadership to the edge of political sustainability of their power. On 14
January 1987, one university student, arrested during a street demonstration, was killed in
Kukka anjon kihoekpu (the Agency for National Security Planning: ANSP; formerly the
KCIA) by torture. On 9 June 1987, some 1,000 students gathered at a university campus in
Seoul to commemorate the death of a fellow student and engaged in heated protests. During
these protests, another university student was killed by the actions of riot police. This
triggered off nationwide public outrage directed against the government and geared up the
momentum for the democratisation movement thereafter. Given the high state of tension
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between the government and the civil organisations, the death of the two students 
intensified democratic struggles striking a critical blow to regime stability (Kim 1999a: 
357-360, 365-368).
As the presidential candidate for the ruling party, Roh was forced to acknowledge 
popular demands for democratisation and this was expressed in the ‘6.29 Declaration’ 
(Kang 1994f: 159-161; Kim 1999c: 263-265). The declaration resolved to do the following: 
to amend the constitution so as to reinstate free direct presidential election; to release 
political prisoners, including Kim Dae Jung, and restore their civil and political rights, 
including the freedom of the press; to strengthen all the basic rights stipulated in the new 
constitution; by restoring local autonomy; to end violations of human right; and to carry out 
bold social reforms to build a more transparent, less corrupt society (Lee 1990: Appendix 1; 
Kim 1999a: 375). However, there remained many obstacles to the effective implementation 
of those reforms contained in the declaration, the major one being the dissolution of many 
of the protesting organisations as they lost their collective sense of purpose.
As a result of the 6.29 declaration, the politicians, who had been banned from any 
political activity in the Chun regime, were set free to participate in institutional politics, 
leading to hopes for the emergence of a president who would stand for democratic ideals 
and principles. Two opposition leaders, Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam who had been 
key dissidents during the Park era, were widely considered to be the best hope for 
democratic regime change. Despite strong expectations, however, the “two Kims” failed to 
provide a unified candidature against the ruling party candidate, instead engaging in 
traditional factionalism. Their failure to unite not only gave Roh the presidency of the Sixth 
Republic, but also made a decisive contribution to the further entrenchment of conservative 
politics (Ogle 1990: 101; Im 1994: 291-292). This meant that fresh hopes for rapid 
democratic reform were frustrated, and a period of reluctant engagement in further reform 
ensued (Chung 1992: 305).
The persistence of one-party domination produced some distinct consequences for the 
Korean politics at this time. First, the continuation of single party political domination
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enabled the president to remain at the centre stage of political processes. The core positions 
of the political apparatus and the ruling party were still occupied by former military 
personnel. This made it virtually impossible to bring about rapid changes to the existing 
political processes. Second, the long struggles for rights to political participation by 
opposition parties led to a situation whereby political parties were repeatedly organised, 
dissolved, and reorganised around a few charismatic leaders (Im 2000: 33-34; Steinberg 
2000). One remarkable example of this phenomenon was the formation of a conservative 
political coalition in 1990 in which Kim Young Sam and Kim Jong Pil (Kim Chongpil), the 
leaders of the opposition parties, Tongil minjudang (Unification and Democratic Party: 
UDP) and Sinminju konghwadang (New Democratic Republican Party: NDRP) 
respectively, brought the assemblymen under their influence and joined Roh Tae Woo’s 
ruling DJP to form a fortified conservative ruling party (Democratic Liberal Party, 
Minjujayudang in Korean). This coalition not only helped Kim Young Sam become the 
second president of the Six Republic, but also led to the consolidation of the conservative 
regime by destroying the best opportunity49 for rapid reform in post-1987 Korea (Chong 
1996: 10-12).
Accordingly, ‘political cronyism’ became so widespread that only few figures favoured 
by the president or a party leader controlled most of the political processes. It hindered the 
growth of democratic responsiveness and accountability, so that elected politicians 
frequently broke their election pledges with relative impunity. At the same time political 
conspiracy and corruption became ever widespread between businessmen and politicians, 
holding back the reform drive (Chong 1997a: 25-35; Kim 1999c: 312-313; Steinberg 2000).
49 In the 1988 general election, three opposition parties, including Kim Dae Jung’s P’ySnghwa 
minjudang (Peace and Democracy Party: PDP), had a landmark victory by outvoting the DJP. 
It was the first time since the 1961 military coup that an opposition party defeated a ruling 
party in an election, thereby enabling the NA to be empowered to check the authoritarian 
practices of presidential power and to bring about reform to society, including social welfare. 
But, the coalition broke down the political configuration in which the opposition parties 
outnumbered the ruling party, and fortified the nature of authoritarian politics (Jaung 2000: 
59; Kim 2000a).
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Third, such ‘boss politics’ meant that the party leader was almost solely responsible for 
shaping the official line of the party, and other members were required to submit to this for 
the sake of party solidarity. Traditionally, Korean parties existed to promote the interests of 
the leader. Such a custom consequently promoted rigidity in policymaking by which 
people’s demands for democratic reform, including welfare policies, were rarely 
accommodated. Thus, the crucial determinant of Korean policy making was essentially the 
political orientation of the president, rather than of the party coming to hold power (Jaung 
2000).
7.2 Persisting Authoritarian Politics
The 6.29 declaration certainly helped to expand citizens’ civil and political rights. But 
it did not constitute a watershed development having a sweeping impact on the whole 
society. The traditional characteristics of Korean politics such as strong presidential power 
and autocratic control changed too little to meet the people’s rising expectations of 
democracy. In this context, the achievement of the June victory was only a partial success 
for the civil sector.
7.2.1 Declining Presidential Power?
One of the distinctive impacts of the 6.29 declaration was to reduce the imperial power 
of the president. The constitutional amendment on 29 October 198750 first instituted 
presidential elections via universal, equal, direct, and secret ballot by the people (Article 
67), and stipulated a single, non-renewable five-year presidential term (Article 70). The 
new constitution authorised the president to proclaim an order equivalent to law under 
emergency situations (Article 76, Clause 1 and 2). But the term of the PEM was now 
formally removed from the constitution.
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The power of the NA was enhanced to be able to check any arbitrary use of presidential 
power. Under the new constitution, the president was required to immediately notify the 
proclamation of laws to the assembly, and failure to obtain the approval from the assembly 
would invalidate the proclamation (Article 76, Clause 3 and 4). This regulation equally 
applies to a proclamation of martial law, except that there shall be the concurrent vote of a 
majority of the total number of the assembly in order to request the president to lift the 
martial law (Article 77). In addition, the new constitution eliminated the president’s right to 
dissolve the NA, and conferred on the president right of veto to any Assembly’s decision 
(Article 53).
The judiciary also came to have a more expanded power, being more independent from 
the president’s control and influence. The president was still able to appoint the judges of 
the Constitutional Court (Article 111, Clause 2), but now had to obtain the consent of the 
NA when nominating the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the President of the 
Constitutional Court (Article 104, Clause 1 and Article 111, Clause 4). In addition, the 
Constitutional Commission, which took over the major role of the Supreme Court under the 
firm control of the president, was abolished. These measures enhanced the capacity of legal 
institutions to safeguard civil and political rights contained in the Korean constitution and 
thereby laid the foundation on which the democratic principle, constituting the separation 
of the three powers, could be institutionalised (Kim 1997b: 46-48).
Several laws, which had been used to suppress the basic rights of citizens, were also 
revised or abolished. The Basic Press Law, which exerted coercive control over the press, 
was formally abolished in November 1987, so the freedom of the press was reinstated. The 
Roh government also restored a measure of freedom to the press by lifting the bans on the 
publication and possession of works on communism and North Korea. Last, the local 
autonomy system was reinstated in 1991 on the basis of the Local Autonomy Law enacted 
in April 1988 (Kim 1999c: 285-286; Diamond and Shin 2000: 6-9). Consequently, the 
amendment of the constitution in 1987 was successful in legally restricting the imperial
50 This was the ninth constitutional revision since the nation building and is still effective.
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power of the president and bringing in the components of democracy, but unsuccessful in 
removing the conventional practice of authoritarian politics.
Indeed, the president still maintained firm control over the national security agencies as 
a safeguard to his power. Even though the new constitution reduced his power over the NA 
and the Judiciary, he still exerted considerable direct and/or indirect influence over their 
affairs. For example, even though the 1987 constitution prescribed that the Speaker of the 
Assembly should be elected through a vote of its members (Article 48), signalling the 
resurrection of parliamentary democracy, he was in feet nominated by the president as a 
head of the ruling party. While the new constitution granted a substantial degree of 
autonomy to the judiciary, the prosecution, another governmental apparatus executing legal 
justice, was still under the president’s firm control, as the nomination of its director was at 
the president’s discretion. Due to the presence of a strict hierarchy within their organisation, 
prosecutors were subjugated to the directors and thereby to the president, and thus were 
said to be functioning as a ‘handmaiden of power’.
The basic structure and traits of the administration was also little changed. The 
president-centred decision-making pattern was still dominant. The government apparatus 
such as the EPB, the MOF and the Presidential Secretariat still presided over peripheral 
ministries such as the MHSA. Moreover, despite the increasing power of the NA and the 
resurrection of the party politics, the final decisions on major national policies, including 
welfare policies, continued to be made mostly within ‘the inner cabinet’ centred around the 
president (Choi 1996b: 28-30; Im2000: 34).
1 2 2  Anti-communism, the Enduring Ideology
Despite significant and rapid socio-political changes, the ideology of anti-communism 
remained deeply rooted in Koreans’ psyche during the past fifty years. In addition, the 
political leadership intentionally manipulated and abused the ideology as a tool of political 
engineering in an attempt to secure the stability of their power. This became a political
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convention and little changed even after the achievement of the ‘democratic politics’ in 
1987.
Two major instruments, the National Security Law (NSL) and the Agency for National 
Security Planning (ANSP), were crucial for the government to sustain its ideological 
preference. After the 6.29 declaration, the NSL was amended twice in 1988 and 1991, but 
its basic traits remained untouched. In particular, its articles 5, 6, 7, and 8, which rule out 
any behaviour of praising, neglecting and/or encouraging any pro-North Korean activities, 
indiscriminately impacted on the expression of citizens’ political rights. Indeed, during the 
administration of the first civilian president, Kim Young Sam (1992-1997), a total number 
of 1,241 were arrested under the NSL alone (Kim 1997b: 49). Most violators were leaders 
of social movements such as social intellectuals, trade union members, students, and the 
members of various social groups. As we will see later, Roh utilised the law to escape from 
his political predicament by making the issue of national security outweigh social 
movements in the public’s mind. During the next two governments, the NSL continued to 
restrict the rights to political expression by labour movements (Cho 1997a; Min'gahyop 
2002).
While the NSL provided the legal basis for maintaining the ideology of anti­
communism, the ANSP played a support role with the stated intention of reducing its 
involvement in the domestic politics. However, its substantial role as an apparatus for 
social control remained little changed. Even in post-1987 society, it was involved in the 
investigation of people’s private life and the surveillance of opposition politicians as well 
as social and labour activists. The reinstatement of oppressive control of the state in 1989 
would have been impossible without its activities against the leaders of the political and 
social movements. This political engineering through the intelligence agency continued 
during the term of the Kim Young Sam’s administration. The agency’s right to investigate a 
citizens’ private fife was abolished in 1994 but attempts were made to reinstate it in 
December 1996, proving that the ruling elite still tried to utilise the agency as a basic tool 
of social control and regime stability (Kim 1997b: 51-52).
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The combined effects o f institutionalised authoritarianism and anti-communism were 
still obvious even in post-1987 society. Figure 7-1 reveals that the pattern of oppression 
experienced by civil society remained relatively constant during the transitional period to 
democracy.
Figure 7-1 Trend in Political Detainees: 1986-1997
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The high numbers of detainees, as well as the wide fluctuations of numbers between 
1986 and 1991, are indicative o f mass democratisation movements and industrial actions 
which occurred at this time (the temporary decrease in 1988 can be seen as reflecting the 
brief lull in such demonstrations following from the 6.29 Declaration). The high rise in the 
number o f the detainees in 1990 and 1992 denotes the resumption o f government attempts 
to crackdown on popular movements, industrial strikes in particular. The rise in 1994 
reflects unrest which followed the death o f the North Korean president, and a form o f 
‘McCarthyism’ which resulted from allegations made by one university president that
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“many chusap ’a 1 were secretly in every sector of the society” (Cho 1997a: 6). Finally, the 
rise in 1996 and 1997 reflects increasing economic instability and the consequent financial 
crisis and outbreak of industrial actions and social turmoil.
This shows that there was little difference between pre- and post-1987 Korea. When the 
military dictatorship was exercising most repressive social controls (between 1963 and 
1987), for instance, the average number of detainees was some 843. It did not significant 
change during the Kim Young Sam administration with the number being 788 persons. 
Accordingly, it can be said that post-1987 Korean society was still a controlled society, as it 
was under the previous military rule.
7.3 Growing Civil Society?
Another feature of post-1987 Korea was the rapid growth of civil sectors that used to 
be under severe suppression over the past forty years. Immediately after the people’s 
victory, there was a marked rise in the frequency of labour disputes seeking improvements 
of labour relations and working conditions. From the early 1990s, there was also a 
proliferation of various civil organisations and interest groups expressing diverse interests 
on a range of issues such as human rights, welfare policy, environment, and economic 
justice.
7.3.1 Labour Movements: Late Rise and Immature Fall
The June victory led to a series of the revisions of the labour-related laws between 
November 1987 and April 1988, expanding the scope of free labour activity. The limits to 
union foundation were eliminated, and the organisation of unions was liberalised. The
51 The abbreviation of chuch’e sasangp’a that refers to a political faction which follows the 
North Korean’s ideology of chuch’e sasang (literally, self-reliance) and North Korea’s policy of 
National Liberation People’s Revolution.
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union shop system was reinstated and the cooling-off period was shortened (Choi 1993a: 
119). By this series of legal reforms, the Korean workers were permitted freedom of 
association and the rights to collective action (Koo 1993: 156-157).
This series of legal reforms opened up many opportunities for labour unions to flourish. 
As Table 7-1 shows, there was unprecedented growth not just in the number of unions and 
their membership, but also in the number of industrial actions undertaken, particularly in 
the first three years after 1987.
Table 7-1 Strength of Working Class Power, 1986-1997
Year No. of Unions
Union
Members
(thousands)
Organisation Rate (%) 
A* B~
No. of 
Dispute
1986 2,658 1,036 16.8 12.3 276
1987 4,068 1,267 18.5 13.8 3,749
1988 6,142 1,707 19.5 17.8 1,873
1989 7,867 1,932 19.8 18.6 1,616
1990 7,698 1,887 18.4 17.2 322
1991 7,656 1,803 17.2 15.9 234
1992 7,527 1,735 16.4 15.0 235
1993 7,147 1,667 15.6 14.2 144
1994 7,025 1,659 14.5 13.5 121
1995 6,605 1,615 13.8 12.7 88
1996 6,424 1,559 13.3 12.2 85
1997 5,733 1,484 12.2 11.2 78
* and **: the same as the note of Table 6-3.
Sources: (KSO 1998a: 211, Table 4-41)
(Lee and Choi 1998: 63, Table 4)
(KLI2002)
There was a sharp increase in the number of labour strikes particularly between July 
and September 1987. Out o f the total 3,749 industrial actions in the year, 3,241 labour 
strikes occurred within a short period and 1,200 labour unions were newly organised across 
the country. This was certainly in sharp contrast to the average number of 171 strikes per
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year between 1980 and 1986 and some 2,600 unions before the declaration (Seong 1992: 1, 
34). Labour unions were able to set up for the first time their own independent national- 
level organisation, Chon’guk nodongjohap hyop-uihoe (the National Council of Trade 
Unions: NCTU) in January 1990, and later Chon’guk minju nodongjohap ch’ong- 
yQnmaeng (the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions: KCTU) in November 199552, 
rejecting the notion of corporatist control by the state (Ho 1997: 272).
The establishment of the KCTU independent from state influence was a watershed in 
the Korean labour movement. Despite a relatively low membership rate, amounting to just 
a quarter of organised labour and just 5 per cent of the nation’s employees, it was more 
effective in mobilising the working class for collective action than the state-established 
FKTU (Shin 2000b: 205-6). More importantly, the foundation of the KCTU meant the 
demise of exclusive state corporatism, and formation of a policy network led to the 
inclusion of the ‘legitimised’ representatives of labour in policy making. The first instance 
of this change was seen in the revision of the labour-related law in 1996 in which the 2 
representatives from the KCTU were able to enter into discussions on drafting the new 
labour law53.
In accordance with the establishment of the democratic union, the labour movement 
began to broaden its outlook, taking on the characteristics of class and political struggle. 
Owing to their experience of collaborations with other social groups in the democratic 
movements, labour was able to move beyond conventional demands for wage increases and 
the improvement of working conditions, to endorse an agenda of free independent labour 
unions, more democratic industrial relations and more equitable social conditions (Song 
1994b: 119-121; Ho 1997:271).
However, Table 7-1 also shows a sudden and sharp fall o f the indicators of labour 
activity from 1990, reflecting the resurgence of government oppression. The reinstatement
52 But, the organisation was not yet legalised as an official organisation.
53 The others were as follows: 3 from the FKTU, 5 from the Korea Federation Employers, 10 
public leaders, and 10 academics (Shin 2000b: 206).
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of labour controls was mainly driven by decline in the competitiveness of the 
manufacturing sector, which was caused by the end of the ‘three lows’ in the 1980s: low 
wages, low international oil prices, and low international interest rates. Along with wage 
increases after 1987, however, the rise of oil prices and interest rates by the end of the 
1980s increased the total cost of production and made the country’s economic performance 
less competitive in international market. This was clearly reflected in the decline of the 
GDP growth rate from 11.5 per cent between 1986 and 1988, to 6.4 per cent in 198954 
(Krause 1997: 129, 131). This worsening economic performance was a political liability to 
the state leadership since they had been relying on economic growth as means o f securing 
political legitimacy, and they again resorted to oppression of labour groups.
The labour-related laws still banned the intervention of a third party in any labour 
disputes and a worker’s rights to multiple union memberships, which helped the state 
isolate the working class from other social groups. Teachers, civil servants, and those 
working in government-run industries and the military industries were still denied the right 
to organisation and collective action. But, most restrictive of all, unions were prohibited 
from engaging in any political activity (Choi 1993a: 119-120; Kim 1995b: 25). In the new 
context of social liberalisation after 1987, however, the state had to employ different 
measures of social control from those of previous military regimes. The methods the 
government took to control labour after 1987 can be summarised as follows: first, instead 
of directly involving itself in industrial disputes, it authorised employers to take over a part 
of the state role by having them directly participate in collective bargaining (Koo 1993: 
132; Ho 1997). Second, the state adopted a kind of segregation strategy that isolated the 
workers from the other social movement groups such as students and intellectuals (Seong 
1992: 40; Song 1994b: 118). A final strategy the government chose was to associate the 
labour movement with communism and/or an incitement of North Korea, which effectively
54 This can be regarded as being high from a European viewpoint, as the 6.4 per cent GDP 
growth rate was more than twice that of the combined EU GDP growth rate (3.5%) and nearly 
three times that of the UK (2.2%) by that time (OECD 2001b: 48, Table 3.1). But it was a great 
problem to Korean economy especially when being seen from the past ‘miraculous’ growth rate.
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segregated the labour movement from the general populace, as well as emasculating its core 
power (Choi 1996a: 334-336; Ho 1997: 274).
Consequently, the basic structure of state corporatism changed little. The union 
organisational rate began to steadily decline, and the number of labour actions dropped 
sharply from 1990 (Song 1994b: 130-131; Ho 1997: 283; Kim 1999c: 279-281). The 
people’s victory appeared to have opened the way forward for the working class to form a 
challenging political force, but the resurrection of state control led to labour actions being 
carried out in a mostly uncoordinated and sporadic fashion. Until the mid-1990s, they were 
unable to build a nationwide coalition, and also failed to be united into a militant labour 
force (Seong 1992; Song 1994b; Choi 1996a). These characteristics severely constrained 
the normal development of class politics in Korean society.
1 3 2  Unorchestrated Growth of Civil and Interest Groups
The growth of the civil organisation in post-1987 Korea can be attributed to two factors. 
First, the expanded civil and political rights of citizens created open politics, so that they 
could express their opinions and interests more openly and freely. The other factor was the 
change in the international ideological landscape resulting from the collapse of the former 
Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc regimes. This event came as a great shock to many Korean 
intellectuals, who had pursued the reform of the society under the guidance of Marxist 
political economy. The event not only led to a paradigm shift in the social sciences but also 
helped to foster an acceptance of the new ideology of neo-conservatism, or neo-liberalism 
amongst the intelligentsia (ChSng et al. 1995: 268).
Riding on the gradual mitigation of socio-political tension after the 6.29 declaration, 
the two factors helped the civil sectors diversify their attention to issues as varied as the 
environment, consumer rights, women’s rights, education, human rights, and social welfare 
(Chong, Kim, and Yu 1995: 264, 274; Kim 2000c). Consequently, this new social trend led 
to an internal transformation of social groups from one characterised by a single-minded
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revolutionary ideals to one concerned with moderate reform and social pluralism, and 
consequently to the flourishing of civil organisations in post-1987 society. The emergence 
of a great number of civil organisations from the late 1980s onwards can be seen in this 
context.
It was estimated there were some 3,500 civil organisations across the country in 1997 
(Kim 2000c: 10). Among these, the organisation that conducted the most active and 
comprehensive role in checking authoritarian political power and demanding bold reforms 
to various social arenas was Ch’am-yo minjujuui-rul wihan simin yondae (the People’s 
Solidarity for Participatory Democracy: PSPD) founded in 1994. In particular, their 
promotions of social policy reforms have been the most prominent among the civil 
organisations. It installed for the first time a specialised sub-committee for social welfare 
reform, and has produced a large number of policy proposals and ran various education 
programmes. For example, in 1994, it launched a campaign for national minimum, by 
urging the state to acknowledge social rights as a basic birthright of people and to increase 
its responsibility for citizens’ welfare. For this, they put forward a number of lawsuits and 
petitions on behalf of the recipients of public assistance (PSPD 1994; Cho 1999). During 
the socio-political turmoil caused by the financial crisis in 1997, it played a critical role in 
bringing about radical changes to the Korean public assistance programme. In addition, it 
played a leading role in raising the public profile of social policy and pressuring the 
government to bring about rapid reform to other social security programmes, such as the 
pension programme and health insurance (Sim 2000: 451-453).
In contrast to the western experience, however, the Korean civil organisations did not 
have a broad grass-roots membership. The leaders and major participants of the civil 
organisations were mainly from middle class backgrounds such as students, lawyers, 
academics, church activists, and other social activists who stood on the frontline of 
antigovemment movements during the 1980s. Therefore, the growth of civil society in 
Korea, drawn essentially from the ranks the well-educated members of the middle class, 
lacked general support from the populace (Kim 1999b: 297). On the one hand, this helped a 
few of its leaders to be recruited or advanced into the political community since the mid-
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1990s (Seong 2000), but on the other hand, it also led to a certain conservativeness in their 
approach to social reforms (Kim and Kim 1997a: 218-219; Kim 2000c). Furthermore, the 
advent of a more relaxed socio-political environment, and the presidential election after the 
6.29 declaration saw further divisions appear in civil groups. After the 1987 mass uprising, 
they were gradually depoliticised and marginalized from the mainstream reform force (Kim 
1999b: 282-284).
Accordingly, notwithstanding the rapid growth in their density, scope and level of the 
organisation arrangements, the civil organisations were weak and peripherally recognised 
in Korean politics, while the state still maintained a controlling stance over the civil sectors 
(Seong 2000: 100-101). Whilst the reinstatement of procedural democracy enabled various 
civil and interest groups to prosper and to express their interests within the framework of 
institutional politics, there was little co-operation between the state and civil groups to 
tackle issues of mutual concern. This problem was exacerbated by immature nature of party 
politics. Despite their supposed role as a channel mediating two powers, political parties 
showed only a limited concern to address the policy concerns of civil organisations (Kim 
and Kim 1997a: 221; Kim 1999c: 308-309).
One consequence of this was the flourishing of interest groups while civil organisations 
were dormant. Unlike civil organisations, interest groups are prone to advocate an exclusive, 
group-bounded interest. Interest groups could be a progressive force for the development of 
a special programme on the one hand, but, on the other hand, more likely to be reactionary 
with respect to the whole process of a radical reform (Marshall 1998: 322). Thus, the 
empowerment of interest groups in post-1987 Korea promoted the likelihood that the two 
civil sectors would engage in bitter conflict over the general direction of the state policies, 
including welfare. Moreover, in the context of the history of Korean welfare politics, 
interest groups have had a longer presence and thus stronger power than the civil 
organisation, as seen in the development of the medical profession (see Ch. 5), so that they 
were better placed than the civil organisations to exert a decisive influence on the social 
policy making in Korea.
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Such a social trait was found in many cases of Korean social policy making from the 
mid-1990s55. Before that time, it was the state and bureaucrats that played a leading role in 
planning and implementing welfare programmes. Indeed, up to that time, Korea did not 
have a grass-root civil movement which could encourage and have an influence on the 
direction of social policy developments. This presents a contrast to western societies where 
civil organisations such as trade unions, friendly societies and charity organisations exerted 
a strong influence on shaping the early stage of social policy development. However, it 
became a general phenomenon in Korean social policy in the late 1990s that both the civil 
organisations and the interest groups came to exert a growing influence on the policy 
making. Welfare bureaucrats had to reflect the different interests expressed by such groups 
in designing and/or implementing a welfare programme. This phenomenon was seen most 
saliently in the area of health policy where physician groups such as the National 
Association of Physicians and the Korean Association of Medicine have traditionally 
maintained strong power (Kim 1999e).
7.33 Rising Attention to Social Policy, and Neo-liberalism
Another remarkable change in post-1987 Korean society was that there was an 
increasing attention to welfare issues from various sectors of society. Several reasons can 
be put forward to explain this phenomenon. First, the social sectors such as civil 
organisations, labour union, and interest groups began to diversify their range of concerns, 
including that of social policy. Second, industrialisation in Korea, having reached a mature 
stage by that time, helped people assign welfare issues to the public domain, where 
previously it was a matter of private accountability. Third, the reincarnation of procedural 
democracy, especially the direct presidential election and local autonomy, opened up the 
possibility of political competition in which politicians should compete to mobilise political
55 For a concise description of this change, see Kim 1999e.
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support from the general populace. Fourth, changing labour market condition, especially 
from the mid-1990s, made the government see social policy as a part of economic policies.
But, the growing attention to welfare issues, particularly when it comes to the 
implementation of policies, cannot be considered apart from the ideology that commands a 
dominant stance in society (George and Wilding 1994). This is particularly true in a 
transitional period like post-1987 Korea where the major political process was still carried 
out in the framework of authoritarianism. Thus the decisions on social policy were shaped 
by the state elites whose thinking was principally influenced by such authoritarian ideology. 
As noted earlier, neo-conservatism or neo-liberalism was introduced to Korea in the late 
1980s and became influential in the 1990s as the Kim Young Sam government declared 
segyehwa (globalisation) as the guiding philosophy behind state policies (Park and Hyon 
1992; Hallimdae Sahoe Pokchi Yon'guso 1996).
A blend of those new phenomenon played a crucial role in shaping the contours of 
social policy during this transitional period, contributing to the emergence of a welfare 
system peculiar to Korea society: less responsibility of the state and emphasis on ‘welfare 
pluralism’. Before discussing their detailed effects on welfare programmes, however, we 
need to examine the ideas expressed by the various contributing sectors.
First, labour unions were mainly concerned to improve civil and political rights such as 
those to do with a living wage, improved working conditions, the abolition of oppressive 
labour laws, and the establishment of democratic industrial relations. However, issues to do 
with social rights remained peripheral. This was partly because the working class was too 
oppressed to pay attention to issues other than fighting for basic rights, and partly because 
they were not able to build an independent peak organisation on the national level to 
coordinate the labour actions conducted at the local workplace level. Consequently, until 
the 1980s, the unions’ focus of attention was on the introduction of a minimum wage 
system.
This limited attention to social policy began to expand to other programmes in the
1990s, as labour came to establish their own independent democratic central organisation,
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the NCTU, as a springboard for labour mobilisation and the articulation of policy issues. 
Upon establishment, the peak organisation proclaimed it as a platform to work for such 
welfare objectives as the introduction of public housing, free education and medical 
services, taxation reform, and an expansion of the state’s financial commitment to social 
security programmes (Kim 1999d: 23; Kim 1999f). In 1995, in concert with its 
organisational expansion to the KCTU, the union’s demands for social welfare reform 
became more detailed and better articulated in a programme called a ‘Social Reform 
Struggle’ (Sahoegaehyok t ’ujaeng). This was carried out by setting the reforms of social 
security programmes as a future priority. For this, it urged the government to expand the 
medical insurance coverage as well as to unite the individual medical insurance societies 
into one financial and administrative system. At the same time, it also urged the 
government to bring a democratic management system to the pension fund, most of which 
had been borrowed by the government for industrial investments (KCTU 1995; 1997).
Riding on this trend, the state-controlled FKTU also began to express its interests in 
welfare issues, emphasising the necessity of struggles for the improvement of housing, 
medical services and education. The FKTU was particularly keen to establish a bank in 
which labour unions could invest and participate for management and individual workers 
were able to have an easier access to loans. Not surprisingly, the main motive for the FKTU 
to pay attention to labours’ welfare was quite different from that of the democratic NCTU, 
later KCTU. According to Seong (1992: 47-48), the primary motive of the FKTU was 
closely related to its need to restore its declining support base, due to the NCTU’s increased 
popularity with workers while itself losing legitimacy from its members by serving the state 
leadership. Although two labour organisations harboured different motivations, however, 
their increasing attention to welfare policies certainly pressured the state to take action for 
welfare improvement.
Second, the people’s perception of where welfare responsibility resides also changed 
since the late 1970s. According to a survey conducted of 2,000 nationwide random samples 
twice in October 1979 and July 1992, attitudes had made a gradual shift toward
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emphasising the role of the state from individual responsibility for welfare provision (Kim 
1993c).
Table 7-2 People’s Changing Attitude to Welfare Responsibility
Individual (Family) The State Both
1979 1992 1979 1992 1979 1992
Poverty 55.9 53.8(-2.1) 16.3
23.2
(+6.9) 27.8
22.8
(-5.0)
Unemployment 35.4 35.8(+0.4) 37.7
44.1
(+6.4) 26.7
20.5
(-6.2)
Disease 28.1 33.1(+5) 41.4
42.7
(+1.3) 30.3
24.0
(-6.3)
Housing 45.9 31.1(-14.8) 18.8
45.2
(+26.4) 35.4
23.5
(-11.9)
Average 41.3 38.5 
... (2,8)
28.6 38.8(+10.2) 30.5
| |  22.11 
. (-7,8)
Source: (Kim 1993c: excerpted from p.385, Table 1)
As Table 7-2 shows, Koreans used to believe that the primary responsibility fell to 
individuals and the family, reflecting the Confucian tradition of familialism. But, this was 
reversed in 1992, with people assigning more responsibility to the state. This phenomenon 
became especially distinctive in areas such as poverty, unemployment and housing. While 
there still remained a strong tendency for people to accept that individuals should be 
responsible for their own welfare, the gradual shift toward accepting a role for the state 
certainly contributed to the increased attention o f the government to welfare issues. In other 
words, in contrast to the previous period o f authoritarian oppression, Korean people 
increasingly regarded social rights as a part o f citizenship, as their civil and political rights 
had apparently been advanced after the people’s victory in 1987.
Third, reflecting the establishment of procedural democracy, politicians began to 
include welfare issues in their political agenda. Preparing for the general election in 1984, 
politicians, regardless o f whether ruling or opposition party, made the issue o f introducing a 
minimum wage a part of their election platform. In 1987 presidential election, the 
candidates also began to take account of welfare issues in their political agenda. In
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particular, the ruling party candidate, Roh Tae Woo, publicly promised to introduce a 
medical insurance covering the entire population, and also to recruit 4,000 social workers in 
local administration offices across the country (Kim 1993a: 221, 223).
This trend continued in the subsequent election campaigns. In the 1992 presidential 
election, all the candidates pledged to bring bold reforms to welfare programmes. 
Regarding the MI, the two opposition party candidates, Kim Dae Jung and Chong Chuyong, 
proposed to reform the society-based multiple system into one financial and administrative 
system, while the ruling party’s candidate, Kim Young Sam, argued for modest reform 
within the existing framework. Moreover, they all pledged to increase the ratio of the 
state’s financial contribution to the fund and to extend the days of medical insurance 
coverage. As for the pension programme, they all proposed to expand coverage to farmers 
and the self-employed in urban areas, and also to raise the ratio of government contribution. 
They all promised to introduce employment insurance, to expand nursery facilities, to 
improve welfare services for the disabled, and to reform the service delivery system by 
posting specialised social workers in the local administration offices (Joint Committee for 
Securing Welfare Budget 1992).
This mounting emphasis on social policy was first reflected in the government structure, 
leading to the new establishment of welfare institutions. In 1989, the Roh government 
established Pogon sahoe yon’guwon (the Korean Institute for Health and Social Affairs: 
KIHSA), a new research centre under the MHSA that took over the functions of research 
and survey from the SSC, but also had an organisational capacity far in excess of the old 
SSC. The Kim Young Sam government also established new government organisations 
such as Kungmin pokchi kihoektan (National Welfare Planning Board: NWPB), which had 
an exclusive mission to deal with social policy issues in the context of segyehwa 
(globalisation). At the same time, the government renamed the MHSA Pogdn pokchibu (the 
Ministry of Health and Welfare: MHW) in 1994, to publicise the government’s enhanced 
commitment to welfare issues (So 1995a). More importantly, a secretary for welfare affairs 
was, for the first time in Korean history, appointed to the President’s Office in 1995. This 
role involved taking charge of the issues related to labour and welfare, especially in the
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context of segyehwa (Yonhap News 1995). All these measures suggest that the 
responsibility for policy making was shifting from the previously limited expert-based one 
to bureaucrat-based one.
The emphasis on social policy also led to a tangible change in the direction of the 
government policy on welfare. In 1986 at the peak of the civil protest, President Chun 
announced ‘Kungmin pokchi chungjin pangari> (the Measures for Improving National 
Welfare). The main elements were 1) to extend the MI to the rural residents from 1988 and 
to the self-employed in the urban areas from 1989, 2) to put the national pension 
programme in operation in 1988, and 3) to implement the minimum wage system (Ch'oe 
1998a: 151). This trend continued. The Sixth Economic and Social Development Plan 
(1987-1991), which was announced in 1986, was redrawn by the new government in order 
to promote welfare policy as one of three principal objectives of the plan (two others were 
economic liberalisation and stabilisation) (ROKG 1987). The next Kim Young Sam 
government also redrew the seventh economic plan (1992-1996) into the Five-Year Plan for 
the New Economy in 1993 and set up as a part of the plan welfare targets such as the 
introduction of employment insurance, increasing support for the poor, and improving the 
quality of social services and their delivery system. In addition, to improve health services, 
the Kim government announced its intention to stabilise the medical insurance fund, to 
rationalise the administration of the insurance societies, to increase government subsidies, 
to expand the coverage gradually, and to activate a compensation system for private 
expenses incurred with medical treatments (Chong 1992; DHSA 1992). One noteworthy 
point here was that the new economic plan took as one of its major aims the establishment 
of the “Korean Welfare Model”, which emphasises the need for social development 
progressing commensurate with economic growth. It was the first time that the Korean 
government paid significant attention to social welfare as a core component of balanced 
development.
Welfare expansion gained further momentum, as President Kim declared segyehwa in 
1995. In relation to social policy, the term segyehwa was defined as follows: “to achieve a 
quality of life as comparable with the global standard enjoyed by the citizens in the
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advanced countries” (President's Office 1995: 3). To implement this idea, the government 
announced new principles and strategies for the future direction of social policy, which 
were articulated as follows: first, the principle of national minimum that could be achieved 
through the state responsibility of the welfare of the ‘deserving poor’, but also by 
emphasising the self-responsibility for those who are able to work. Second, the principle o f 
productive welfare obtained through pro-active, not remedial, welfare measures. Last, the 
principle of community-based welfare policy that could be attained through cooperation 
between the government and private and voluntary sectors such as civil organisations and 
the family (President's Office 1995).
In tandem with this trend, the NWPB also announced a special plan called Salmui chil- 
ui segyehwa-rul wihan kungmin pokchi-ui kibon kusang (the Basic Design of National 
Welfare for the Globalisation of Life Quality) in 1996 (NWPB 1996, re-quoted in Kim 
1998c). The key aims of the plan were 1) to harmonise growth and welfare so that welfare 
policies do not impact negatively on economic development; 2) to reflect the unique 
features of Korean society in the welfare system, by preserving and enhancing traditions 
such as familialism and mutual help; 3) to fortify a productive and preventive welfare 
system by focusing on the enhancement of individual capability for self-support instead of 
simple, protective income transfer; and 4) to diversify the range of welfare providers 
through the participation of companies and other private sectors.
Despite showing increased attention to social policy matters, however, welfare 
promises made by the presidential candidates were prone to end up as pure political rhetoric. 
Although there was a marked increase in demands for welfare reform from trade unions and 
civil organisations, the underlying principles of Korean social policy, such as a minimalist 
state and categorical and residual services, did not undergo a substantial change. 
Accordingly, we should ask what was still holding back the momentum toward a 
comprehensive and universal social policy.
As mentioned above, neo-liberalism underpinned Korean social policy of the post-1987 
period. As we have seen, this ideology was well reflected and manifested in the principles
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of social policy that both the Roh and Kim governments adopted as an expression of their 
increased concern for welfare matters. The adaptation of the ideology was particularly 
salient in the Kim government. Indeed, “pursuing a small but strong government” (Yonhap 
News 1994), the phrase used by the Kim government to proclaim the segyehwa drive, was 
reminiscent of the term the ‘minimal state’ which was commonly found in descriptions of 
the western welfare state during the ‘retrenchment’ period in the wake of the same ideology 
(Mishra 1984: 42). In the case of the western welfare states, a common phenomenon caused 
by the ideology was to devolve welfare responsibility from the state to other service 
providers while the government tightened welfare expenditure (Johnson 1987). This kind of 
welfare pluralism could also be found in Korean social policy principles, which emphasised 
the roles of individual, family, community and companies in providing welfare.
The personal saving rate never fell below 34 per cent during the transitional period with 
an average 36 per cent. This shows how much individuals continued to believe that they 
must secure themselves from adversities. Moreover, a more remarkable change in welfare 
provision was the emergence of the company-based occupational welfare, especially from 
the early 1990s, which indicated a marked increase in the employers’ responsibility for the 
welfare provisions (Yu 1998a: 463). At the state level, the Roh government enacted the Act 
for Corporate Welfare Fund in 1991 that stipulated that individual companies contribute 
towards a welfare fund consisting of 5 per cent of the previous year’s net profit, via 
consultation with the representatives of both employer and employee groups. The fund was 
given favourable tax considerations and was to be utilised for loans to workers. At the same 
time, the government approved the establishment of a labour bank56, and housing and other 
programmes were also arranged to provide financial help for workers (Seong 1992: 46-47; 
Yi 1994). At the level of individual workplaces, various welfare programmes also began to 
be introduced, running from on-site facilities, such as nurseries and welfare centres, to the
56 According to the initial plan, the business fund was to be raised from various social sectors. 
The KFTU and industrial unions were to contribute 6 million won, three commercial banks 6 
million won, five employer organisations 3 million won, and finally individual workers 15 
million won through a stock subscription (Seong 1992: 47). The fined contribution figure 
differed from the initial plan in that both capital and employers were to make a substantial 
deal of contribution to the welfare for workers.
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subsidising of commuting cost, meals and the tuition fees of employee’s children (Song 
1998; Yu 1998a). Accordingly, the expansion of occupational welfare brought in employers 
as official participants in the provision of welfare, and in turn enabled the state to remain as 
a regulator with minimal financial commitment (Seong 1992: 50-53; Yu 1998a: 463).
This growth of welfare pluralism between the two different settings, however, should 
be interpreted with caution. Western countries had already reached a mature stage of 
welfare state development with social security programmes covering the entire population. 
Neo-liberal moves made only partial inroads into these mature welfare states (Pierson 
2000b). But, the Korean welfare state was still at a formative stage of development with 
only a few state welfare programmes being residually and categorically implemented, when 
neo-conservatism became the guiding ideology of Korean social welfare. This gave the 
reluctant Korean state a rationale for minimising its responsibility for welfare provision, 
although a solid foundation had not yet been laid for social citizenship.
7.4 Conclusion
The chapter has discussed the development of civil and political rights in Korea as a 
background to discussing the development of social rights during the transitional period 
(1987-1997). The nationwide democratisation movements in the late 1980s brought 
substantial changes to society in many ways. First of all, it led to the demise of the 
authoritarian military regimes that had dominated Korean society for almost 30 years. In 
turn, it gave a great momentum to the enhancement of civil and political rights of its 
citizens. Along with the liberation of such rights, Korean society witnessed a rapid growth 
of trade union and civil organisations. Even though to some extent reversed, the labour 
force in Korea became politically stronger. The growth of civil organisation was interpreted 
by many as the civil expression of various social issues, one of which was of the expansion 
of social welfare programmes. There was also a partial reinstatement of parliamentary 
democracy, so that the NA became more responsive to public opinion. This was made by
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the institutional change such as the constitution and the reinstatement of electoral 
democracy. Owing to this change, the ruling DJP failed for the first time in modem Korean 
history to occupy the majority of seats in the NA.
However, the legacy of political authoritarianism remained. The ideological tool, anti­
communism, was still utilised by the state leadership in order to suppress the growth of 
civil power. Despite the institutional change that made possible the resurrection of 
democratic politics to a certain extent, the policy network, which gave a supreme priority to 
the will of the president and thus minimised the possibility for policy ideas from other 
sources such as trade unions and civil organisations to be accepted, did not change. 
Accordingly, policy making during the post-1987 period still revolved around the president 
and his small inner circle, as was the case in previous authoritarian military regimes. This 
incessant authoritarianism effectively caused civil groups to remain focussed on the issue of 
democratisation, but away from that of social policy. In a nutshell, Korean society during 
1987-1997 was in a transitional phase in which the components of authoritarian control and 
elements of democratic politics coexisted.
During this transitional period, Korean society progressed towards approximating 
Marshall’s ideal model of liberal democracy. Citizens’ civil and political rights experienced 
a tangible enhancement, though the old tradition of authoritarian rule still restrained their 
full realisation. The society was still a long way away from Marshall’s ideal model of 
citizenship. As was the case during the previous period, this period also puts into question 
the applicability to Korea of Marshall’s historical account of citizenship development. At 
the same time, it also suggests that his account needs to be developed so as to reflect more 
recent political-science accounts of welfare policy change. Marshall’s account failed to 
acknowledge how those features of a society in transition come to affect the realisation of 
civil and political rights. Welfare politics in modem society are exposed to conflicts among 
different social interests, sometimes causing a critical juncture in the developmental path of 
welfare policy (Pierson 2000a). As the Korean case shows, features of a transitional society 
seem to make such conflicts further complicated, often distracting people’s attention from 
welfare issues but causing them to concentrate on more fundamental issues like basic
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liberal right. This eventually leads to the development of social rights different from 
Marshall’s ideal model.
The next chapter discusses the development of social rights in Korea during the same 
period, based on the findings of this chapter.
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Chapter 8
Consolidation of Exclusive Social Rights
As we have seen in the previous chapter, Korea between 1987 and 1997 developed a 
mixed societal profile with the growth of some democratic components intermingling with 
the perpetuation of authoritarianism. The democratic components certainly helped basic 
civil and political rights expand to a tangible degree in the late twentieth century, and thus 
to lay the foundation of the expansion of social rights. Long established authoritarianism, as 
we have discussed in earlier chapters, however, still held back the drive, and diverted the 
direction of democratic reform Labour union activities still faced significant legal and 
physical restrictions; the president still exercised authoritarian control, though not to the 
same extent as in the past, with little change in the political processes; and anti-communism 
underpinned authoritarian politics. All those resulted in creeping or sustained 
authoritarianism at some level (Choi 1996b). The development of Korean social policy 
during this period certainly reflected these transitional features, which I will discuss in this 
chapter.
From the middle of the 1980s when the democratisation movement was at its high point, 
the government implemented a series of new welfare programmes and expanded the 
provision of existing programmes. First, the government revised the NWP of 1973 and 
came up with the National Pension Act (NP) in 1986, which they put into effect in 
workplaces with 10 or more regular employees in 1988. The MI, which had been in a 
partial operation for large companies since 1977, was extended to rural areas as well as to 
workplaces with more than 5 regular employees in 1988, and further to the urban areas, so 
as to be universal covering the entire population in 1989. In 1992, the government extended 
application of the NP to workplaces with five or more regular employees, and to the self- 
employed in rural areas as well as farmers and marine workers in 1995. Finally, the 
Employment Insurance Act (El) was enacted in 1993 and came into operation from 1995 in 
workplaces with more than 30 employees as the last in a series of four major social
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insurance programmes. With the implementation of the El, Korea finally implemented all 
four main social insurance programmes, representing the institutional face of the welfare 
state.
Many scholars (for example, Lee 1992: 168-169; Seong 1992; Kim and Seong 1993: 
301-332) see this pattern of welfare expansions from the perspective of power politics. 
They argue that the upsurge in militant civil and labour struggles throughout the 1980s 
posed challenges to the ruling coalition of the state elite and capital, forcing them to comply 
with some of their demands (Seong 1992: 41). This understanding appears to address the 
growth of labour-related programmes such as the implementation of the minimum wage, as 
well as the expansion of occupational welfare during that period (Park 1996). However, this 
approach does not explain why the trend of expansion and the new introduction of welfare 
programmes continued into the 1990s as well.
However, some scholars pay more attention to economic matters, reflecting the 
weaknesses of the power resource approach. In addition, they claim that the expansion of 
occupational welfare was partly due to changing conditions of the labour market that 
presented a shortage of skilled labour from that time (Song 1994b: 365), and partly due to 
the deliberate attempt of the state to relegate welfare responsibility to capital (Ch'oe 1992a; 
Song 1998: 11). In a similar vein, some others (Kim 1992; Shin 2000b) take the approach 
of path dependency or incrementalism, suggesting that the expansion of welfare provisions 
in post-1987 Korea was a continuation of existing policies, not a radical departure. Indeed, 
these scholars argue that the underlying philosophy of Korean social policy did not change 
during this period of the democratic transition. The sharp distinction between the economy 
and welfare still prevailed, with the latter regarded as a significant inpediment to economic 
growth. Accordingly, the expansion of welfare programmes after 1987, according to this 
line of argument, occurred in an ad hoc fashion, as was the case in the formative 
development of social policy in the Third World (Hardiman and Midgley 1982b: 77; 
MacPherson and Midgley 1987). However, this incremental approach alone does not 
provide a satisfactory explanation for the expansion of state-sponsored occupational 
welfare, the financial support for which could be detrimental to economic growth levels.
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None of these arguments seems to be comprehensive enough to provide a generalised 
description of Korean social policy during the transitional period. The coexistence of 
developmental authoritarianism and democratic components requires a more complex 
explanation.
At this point, the question again arises as to what was the driving force of the 
development of Korean social policy during the transitional period. To answer the question, 
we first need to look into the political dynamics in the government, to identify the different 
attitudes, roles and influences of the major decision makers on welfare programmes. Then, 
I will seek to evaluate the major contents of the state welfare programmes from the 
viewpoint of social citizenship. For the evaluation, we will take, as a reference point, a set 
of such basic principles as universality, comprehensiveness, adequacy, and redistributive 
effects. In order to streamline our discussion, we will concentrate on three major 
programmes introduced or expanded during this time (the NP, the MI, and the El). 
Furthermore, I will discuss the nature of the growth of occupational welfare to supplement 
my argument.
8.1 Dynamics of Policy making
According to the discussion above, Korean society during this transitional period can 
be characterized by three factors: emerging democratic politics, persisting authoritarianism, 
and encroaching neo-liberalism as a main ideology of state policies. In this section, we look 
into how the three factors intermingled and exerted impacts on social policymaking.
Presidential commitment and backing provided the impetus for two of the three social 
insurance programmes discussed in this chapter - that is, the NP and the MI. These had 
come about from President Chun’s proclamation of ‘the Measures for Improving National 
Welfare’. The third one, the El, also largely owed its existence to Kim Young Sam’s 
electoral pledge during the 1992 election. However, the question should be asked why the 
two presidents, Chun and Kim, came to make such pronouncements after a long period of
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effectively suppressing the civil sectors and when challenges to their regime had 
substantially disappeared. By the time of Chun’s announcement, there was neither a policy 
initiating force nor a notable opposition inside the government, between the SSC and the 
economy ministries during the Park regime. At the same time, the economy had recovered 
from the recession of the early 1980’s, so that there was little need for the state leadership 
to do something for regime legitimacy. By the time of Kim’s pledge to introduce the El, 
local politics were stable, and the economy was, because of positive trade performance and 
exposure to the global market, in a sound position. Thus, from the viewpoint of some 
conventional theories on the social policy development, there seemed to be no compelling 
reason for the Chun and Kim governments to introduce and/or expand the social insurance 
programmes.
Various reasons can be put forward to explain the respective regime’s renewed interest 
in welfare. This can be partially attributed to a revived industrial labour movement, which 
began to be militant from 1986 and challenged regime security as well as economic 
stability (Seong 1992; Kim and Seong 1993: 320-321). Another reason was that given there 
were three elections, presidential and general, between 1985 and 1988, it was almost 
impossible for any electoral candidates to disregard the welfare expectations of the 
electorate (Ch'oe 1998a: 174-175). Third, regarding introduction of the El, the growth 
levels of the economy slowed down from the early 1990s and the economy went into 
recession. This required the government to develop a series of economic measures that can 
be characterised by the promotion of labour market flexibility.
In the Kim government, the changing economic condition compelled both the state 
leadership and employers to consider the El as a part of economic policy.
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8.1.1 National Pension Policy
Background
The Park regime enacted the first pension programme in Korea in 1973 as part of its 
drive to mobilise domestic funds for industrialisation. However, they did not implement the 
programme due to the domestic economic recession in the wake of the oil crisis. Indeed, it 
was not reconsidered by the state leadership for more than 10 years. In the meantime, there 
had been growing concern for the aborted programme at the level of the government 
ministry, and especially after 1984, a noticeable shift toward the implementation of a 
national pension began to appear. In that year, the government set up an inter-departmental 
committee called Kungmin yon’gum chunbi wiwonhoe (the Preparation Committee of the 
National Pension) in order to look into the feasibility of introducing the programme. The 
committee was composed of vice-ministers from seven ministries including those of 
welfare and the economy, two delegates from both employer and employee groups, and 
five others, with the chair taken by the vice-minister of the MHSA. In particular, the EPB 
and its research institute, the KDI, were particularly committed to reinstating the aborted 
programme by hosting several hearings, seminars and interdepartmental meetings, and 
finally producing a proposal in June 1986. however, the welfare ministry, the MHSA, was 
still holding back from involvement (Oh 1987: 145-146; Chung 1992: 341; Park 1997: 44).
Despite this move inside government departments, the programme failed to attract 
active support from the state leadership or the civil sectors. The term ‘social security’ was a 
‘taboo’ subject not discussed directly with the president (Kim 1993a: 178-179). The 
political parties did not actively engage in debates about the pension programme, as they 
were more concerned with the implementation of a minimum wage for workers and the 
expansion of the MI coverage, reflecting the militant labour actions (Park 1997: 49). As 
civil sectors focussed on pushing for democratisation of the country, the pension 
programme was scarcely a priority. In particular, the main policy interests of the most 
powerful social group of that time, the working class, was still centred on such issues as 
low income levels and poor working conditions (Ch'oe 1998a: 157).
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Policy Making
President Chun’s announcement on the Measures for Improving National Welfare in 
1986 signalled a renewed interest in the pension programme. Upon the announcement, the 
MHSA, in cooperation with its research centre National Health Insurance Corporation (later 
the KIHSA), had to hasten to draft a proposal for a pension programme. Despite the 
MHSA’s proposal put forward in September 1986, however, such a hastiness resulted in 
the EPB’s plan being principally reflected in the final draft (Oh 1987: 146; Park 1997: 44- 
45).
Table 8-1 shows the key differences between two proposals and which proposal was 
finally adopted. The disputes between the two ministries related to three main issues: 1) 
management of the fund; 2) criteria for determining benefit eligibility, and 3) the form of 
contribution. The EPB’s proposal became the principal basis of the final draft. This reflects 
two factors: the dominant position of the EPB in the decision-making process of the 
pension programme, and considerable pressure on the state leadership to show resolve in 
the implementation process, rather than the form and contents of the programme (Oh 1987: 
151; Chung 1992: 342). Accordingly, the underlying emphasis of the new pension 
programme was again the economy, not welfare, as was the case in the 1973 law57. In 
particular, the issue of who should take charge of the fund management triggered the 
serious interest conflicts between the two ministries, and it was finally decided in favour of 
the EPB, to enable the minister of the EPB to convert at his discretion the fund to economic 
investment uses.
57 For example, in 1988 when the programme was put in operation for the first time, there was 
some 528 billion won accumulated for the pension fund. However, nothing was spent for 
welfare purposes: 54.6 per cent went into public investment and 45.4 per cent to financial 
investment. Since then, the proportion of welfare fund as of the total pension fund never 
exceeded 5 per cent (NPC 1997:18).
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Table 8-1 Differences in the Pension Proposals by the EPB and the MHSA
MHSA Proposal EPB Proposal Final Draft
State Subsidy 1% for the low income 
self-employed
No Subsidy The EPB Proposal
Usage of the Fund Investment in Kind 
(Preservation for 
Welfare Fund)
Financial Investment 
(Appropriation of 
Welfare Fund)
The EPB Proposal
Entitlement to ERP* Last 3 Years of the 
Entitlement
Whole Period of the 
Entitlement
Entitlement to RSR** Age 60 One Year after 
Disqualification
Contribution Rate
5 to 10% of real wages -Until 1992: 1.5% by 
both Employer and 
Employee 
- From 1993 to 1997: 
2% contribution each 
by Employer, 
Employee, and the 
Severance Pay 
Reserve 
- From 1998: 3% 
contribution
Based mainly on the 
EPB Proposal; gradual 
increase from 3% in 
1988, 6% in 1993, to 
9% in 1998
Body responsible for 
the Fund 
Management
Prime Minister as the 
Chairman
The Minister of the 
EPB as the Chairman
- The EPB Proposal 
for the Chairmanship 
- Two Secretaries from 
both the EPB and the 
MHSA
* Earnings Related Pension
* * Lump Sum Refund
Sources: (Ch'oe 1998a: 161) 
(Oh 1987: 156) 
(Kim 1993a: 186)
The labour union as well as the employer organisation put forward conflicting options 
concerning the contribution rate and the utilisation of the severance reserve fund. Not 
surprisingly, the KFE initially opposed the implementation o f the programme for the reason 
that 3 per cent of contribution rate was too heavy for the employers, given that they also 
had to pay progressive contributions to the severance fund. When the final decision was 
made by the president to implement the pension, the KFE could no longer express any
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further opposition to the idea. Instead, it suggested that from 1998 when the pension 
contribution rate would reach 9 per cent, the government would transform the remaining 
retirement reserve to an arbitrary one so that companies could manage it autonomously. In 
the meantime, the FKTU welcomed the pension policy initiative, and argued that the NP 
and the severance allowance should be treated separately (Oh 1987: 151; Ch'oe 1998a: 161).
Unlike the policy making process of the 1973 pension law, therefore, the re-evaluation 
of the programme in 1986 was distinctively different. Whereas the 1973 law was examined 
and enacted exclusively by the two ministries and their research institutes, the scrutinising 
process of the 1986 law was relatively open for the social groups to express their opinions. 
From the early period of policy design, both the EPB and the MHSA hosted several 
hearings and seminars with participants from the government, academia, the press, the 
FKTU, and the KFE (Park 1997: 44-45). It was significant that the representatives from 
both the trade union and the employer organisation were included in the discussions, 
because it indicated that the state leadership began to take into account the views of the 
civil sectors in state policy making.
Despite this sign of a more inclusive politics, however, authoritarian exclusiveness was 
still the norm of policy making. The voices of both groups were hardly heard during the 
policy examinations, and their suggestions were not taken into account in the final bill for 
the reason that they failed to reach a compromise (Ch’oe 1998a: 162). Furthermore, the NA 
did not play a particular role in introducing the pension programme. During the 
examination of the bill in the regular session of the NA, the assembly members did not pay 
much attention to the pension programme, and the biggest opposition party, Sinhan 
minjudang (New Korea Democratic Party), was still hosting out-of-parliament protests, 
demanding constitutional reform and democratisation. Consequently, the final draft of the 
pension programme was based on the EPB’s proposal and was passed in the NA on the 3 1st 
December 1986 with the title of National Pension Act.
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8.1.2 Medical Insurance
Background
The Roh administration extended MI coverage to rural areas in 1988 and to the urban 
self-employed in 1989 as an extension o f the Measures for Improving National Welfare 
programme, which the previous president Chun had declared in 1986. The main motive that 
drove Chun to make such an announcement was an attempt to ensure the likelihood of 
electoral success in the face of vehement popular protests. At the same time, the newly 
revitalised local economy, helped to make it more feasible to finance the Regional MI 
(Kwon 2002a: 3). The government preserved the original MI programme and only sought 
to increase the coverage of the law with the 1987 amendment. Accordingly, there was little 
significant conflict among policy makers and social groups over the issue of the coverage 
expansion itself. Rather, the conflicts emerged over the inclusion of farmers in 1988, and 
the administration of the law.
Policy Making
The new law classified three different types of medical insurance schemes (MI) to 
operate throughout Korea: Type I MI, or the Enterprise MI, was for wage earners; Type n, 
or the Regional MI, was for the self-employed in rural or urban areas; Type III was for civil 
servants and private school employees (Nahm and Cho 1998: 260; Shin 2000b: 174). The 
financing methods for each MI fimd differed accordingly. As for the Enterprise MI, both 
employer and employee contributed equally (50 per cent for each). The government 
instituted a flat sum scheme for farmers and the self-employed to make allowances for 
irregular incomes. This scheme consisted of two components: the basic contribution and the 
ability-related contribution. The former was an equal contribution in proportion to the 
number of family members in the household, whilst the latter took into consideration 
income and ownership of assets and car. At the same time, with respect to the Regional MI, 
the government subsidised 35 per cent of the fund including the administrative cost. For
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Type III MI, the contribution groups were divided into two categories: civil servants and 
private school employees. In the former case, the government and insurants contributed 
equally amounts (50 per cent for each). In the latter case, insurants contributed 50 per cent 
while schools paid 30 per cent and the government 20 per cent (Chung 1992: 332-333; 
Nahm and Cho 1998: 263-264).
In 1987, the coverage rate of the MI was just 51.1 per cent of the total population. 
However, in 1988 when the rural residents were included, the coverage rate rose to 68.8 per 
cent, and in 1989 when the self-employed in urban areas were included, it increased to 94.0 
per cent (KSO 1995: 236). However, the administrative system and financing method of the 
MI provoked fierce social conflicts from the outset of the coverage expansion, as the 
enhanced coverage also accompanied the increase in the number of insurance societies, 
which proliferated based on individual workplaces or a group of industries, and regional 
administrative units according to the categorisation of the MI. At the same time, there were 
also established two national-level organisations: ChSn’guk uiryobohom yonhaphoe (the 
National Federation of Medical Insurance: NFMI58) and Kong-gyo uiryobohdm kongdan 
(the Medical Insurance Corporation for Civil Servants and Private School Employees). All 
the insurance societies in the Type I and II belonged to the former, while the latter took 
charge of the Type III. Consequently, the number of insurance societies rose sharply from 
181 in 1987 to 312 in 1988, and further to 408 in 1989 (KOSIS 2001b), which widened the 
possibility for the administration system to be exposed to criticism for its ineffectiveness 
and inefficiency.
The financing methods of the MI, especially of the Regional MI, also carried a high 
possibility for the insured to resist contributions. The 35 per cent of the government subsidy 
for the Regional MI fund was as a landmark shift in the state’s attitude toward social 
security programme. Hitherto, the state had made no financial commitment to social 
insurance funds except administration cost. Even in the case of the Type III MI, the
58 It was previously known as the NFMIS. In 1988, with the change of the name, its role was 
enhanced to examine the reimbursement of medical fees in Type III to hospitals, which used to 
be in charge of the Korean Medical Insurance Corporation.
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government made contributions to the fund only as an employer, not as the state as outlined 
in the tripartite principle. However, such an unusual government contribution to the 
Regional MI fund was not enough to offset the unequal contribution paid by members, as 
compared with those in other MI types59. Under the society-based administration system in 
which each society was administratively as well as financially independent, societies set 
different contribution rate, depending on the economic and demographic condition of each 
society (Chung 1992: 332).
More seriously, the different MI contribution formulas held a high possibility for social 
conflict. For those insured in Type I and III MI, only their wages were used as the basis for 
calculating contributions, so usually amounting to only a small percentage of wages (2-8 
per cent depending on their society’s financial condition) (Nahm and Cho 1998: 262). At 
the same time, the medical costs of dependents were automatically covered by any 
contributions made by the insured. However, for those insured in the Regional MI, various 
criteria, such as income, assets, the number of family members, were used as the basis for 
setting the contribution rate. So, in contrast to other types, the contribution of the Regional 
MI became like a capitation tax in which the number of family member in a household was 
more important than economic ability. In addition, in industrialised societies, farmers and 
the self-employed were more likely to be vulnerable to cyclical downturns than wage- 
eamers. Consequently, there were problems with inequality of contribution not just in the 
Regional MI but also between the other types of the MI (Chung 1992: 333; Nahm and Cho 
1998: 263; Kwon 2002a: 9-11).
Not surprisingly, these two problems brought about an immediate protest from farmers 
who were one of the most disadvantaged groups in society of that time due to the state’s 
policy of rapid industrialisation at the price of their sacrifice. The farmers argued that 
contributions to the MI were disproportionately heavy for them60, and accordingly, their
59 The proportion of the government subsidy to the Regional MI fund was also gradually 
decreased. For instance, in 1988 it accounted for 44.1 per cent of the revenue of the fund, but it 
fell down to 25.6 per cent in 1998 (Kwon 2002a: 10)
60 Shin (2000b) regards the economic hardship of farmers as to be one of the major factors that 
drove the government to extend the coverage of the MI to non-wage earners. In his opinion, the
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protest was initially focussed on a platform of issues centred on the reform of the MI. These 
issues included a reduction in or exemption from contributions, a change of the contribution 
formula to that of the Type I and III systems, and an increase in the government subsidy to 
50 per cent. In addition, an improvement of health facilities in rural areas and the 
democratic control of insurance societies were proposed (Chung 1992: 333-334, 338; Ch'oe 
1998a: 203; Kwon 2002a: 4).
The reform movement of the MI initiated by farmers became a nationwide issue, 
reinstating societal tensions that had been dormant since the first round of the MI conflict in 
the early 1980s. Even though the two largest social forces of that time, the labour sector and 
the student groups, did not show notable interest in the MI reform movement, it was the 
first civil-sector-initiated movement specifically addressing the reform of a social security 
programme in the modem history of Korea. At the same time, it was also one of the fiercest 
social protests between the late 1980s and the early 1990s.
Facing robust protests from various social sectors, the government offered prompt 
countermeasures. On 3 April 1986, the government announced several measures for 
improving the Regional MI. First, the government subsidy was increased to 50 per cent 
from 35 per cent. Second, in order to promote convenience, farmers became able to pay 
contributions through the Cooperative Association for Farmers (Nong-dp hyoptong chohap), 
which as a semi-govemment organisation had its branches in the lowest level of the 
national administrative system. Third, the government introduced a new system by which 
the insured were allowed to pay contributions on a quarterly basis (Kim 1993a: 208; Ch'oe 
1998a: 227). These measures helped settle the social unrest caused by the unequal
Korean farmers had been victimised by the economy-centred priorities of state policy, and the 
state extended the coverage, in part, to relieve them from economic distress. However, the 
farmers’ reaction surfaced after the extended MI programme had been applied to them, not 
prior to or concurrent with the government’s expansion of the coverage plan. Thus, the farmers’ 
protest certainly helped the social sectors organise around the issue of the MI and the state 
raise its contribution to the fund. It does not seem that their protests affected the state’s 
determination to extend coverage. There is a time gap between the state’ initiation and the 
farmer’s involvement in the MI issues.
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contribution scheme, but still left another issue, namely the disputed administration system, 
unsolved, which required a revision of the MI law.
The politics of the MI reform increasingly focussed on the need to reform the 
administration system, leading both the government and the political parties to take the 
issue more seriously. During the planning phase of the coverage expansion, the government 
had conceived of a locally administered Regional MI. (Kim 1993a: 231; Ch'oe 1998a: 208). 
However, the heated demands for reform made the government reconsider its original plan. 
For this, the MHSA hosted several hearings and seminars in order to gauge public opinion 
(Yu 1996: 166), and finally released a report on four alternatives to a possible MI structure, 
including a unified administration system. However, the reform plan proposed by the 
government and the ruling DJP was to reduce the number of insurance societies by 
broadening the administrative territory of one society, whilst leaving the basic structure of 
the existing form unchanged (Chung 1992: 336; Ch'oe 1998a: 208-210).
These watered down reform proposals of the government led to protesting farmers 
gaining widespread support from various social groups such as religious and activist groups 
for the urban poor. This eventually led to the formation of an umbrella organisation, 
Chon’guk uiryobohom taech’aek wiwonhoe (the National Committee for the 
Countermeasure to the Medical Insurance: NCCMIS) established on 28 June 1988 (Kim 
1993a: 227; Ch'oe 1998a: 203-294). The establishment of the committee gave a great boost 
to the reform movement in many aspects; it helped the farmers’ demonstration to become 
better organised and their issues more clearly articulated with respect to the details of the 
MI reform. More importantly, the establishment of the committee broadened the boundary 
of the reform movement to include the issue of reforming the society-based administration 
system, in addition to the inequality of contribution (Chung 1992: 335; Ch'oe 1998a: 203- 
205). The committee organised a special task force, made up of progressive medical and 
social security professionals and legal advisors, to draw up an alternative medical insurance 
law, the Bill for National Health Insurance (Kungmin uiryobohomb6p-an). This advocated 
that the basic form of the MI be a unified system with a progressive contribution scheme, in
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order to maximise redistribution effects and social solidarity (Chung 1992: 334; Kim 
1993a: 227).
The four opposition parties were split on the issue of the reform agenda. The proposals 
of the two largest opposition parties, the PDP and the UDP, advocated a unified 
administration system, the introduction of a progressive contribution system, and the 
unification of the MI and the MA, while the NDRP supported the government’s plan (Yi 
1990: 107-111; Kim 1993a: 231). As noted earlier in the chapter, the majority of the NA 
was dominated by the opposition parties, making the assembly effective platform for 
decision-making. However, considered individually, each of the opposition parties was 
smaller than the ruling party in size61. Therefore, it was necessary for the three opposition 
parties to band together if the proposal for the unified system was to be passed in the NA.
The civil organisations played a decisive role in making the NDRP turn its stance to the 
unified system, by breaking into and occupying the building of the NDRP. Pressured by the 
militant action, the NDRP finally retreated from its proposal and joined the other two 
opposition parties (Chung 1992: 337; Yu 1996: 166). Accordingly, the ruling DJP had no 
alternative but to agree to supporting the bill of the unified system or face the prospect of 
an unfavourable outcome in the mid-term elections (Ch'oe 1998a: 207, 213). Finally, the 
bill for the National Medical Insurance Law was passed unanimously in the NA on 9 March 
1989. The new law was to bring about not just a unified administration of the MI but also a 
progressive financing system in which the contribution rate would be adjusted to income 
levels and the benefit structure would be equally applied to all the insured.
However, the persistent political culture of authoritarianism and the backlash from 
interest groups blocked the operation of the new law. As soon as the law was passed, the 
ruling DJP and the government began to campaign against the unified insurance system 
through the mass media. On the one hand, the spokesperson for the MHSA, Kim Chongdae, 
took charge of mobilising negative public opinion of the new law. On the other hand, the
61 Out of the total 299 seats in the assembly, the ruling DJP occupied 125 while the PDP, the 
UDP, and NDRP accounted for 70, 59, and 35 respectively (Ch'oe 1998a: 195).
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DJP and other government officials held several meetings and decided to propose that the 
president use his veto power (Yi 1990: 115; Cho 2001). The key point of their claims was 
that under the new system, Type I and III funds had to supplement the funds in the Type II 
in order to compensate for regional deficits, and that this would cause a unequal financial 
burden on the middle and upper income earners. This was the same logic that they utilised 
in the first round of the MI conflict in the early 1980s (Ch'oe 1998a: 218; Kwon 1999: 66).
The main reason that the ruling party and the government opposed the new law did not 
arise from the united system itself. Furthermore, they were not concerned about the 
redistributive effects of the MI. The compelling reason for the government’s decision was 
to maintain control over the allocation of major posts in insurance societies. In addition, 
they did not want to lose the support of the middle and upper classes that would have to 
contribute more to the new scheme. If the new contribution scheme, based only on the 
income and assets of the insured, came into effect, it would mean changes to the existing 
tax system, in order to make income assessments of the insured more transparent. This 
might cause a backlash from taxpayers. If the insurance societies were merged, it would 
require the state’s commitment to the MI, not as a regulator but as a provider. This was 
expected to increase the financial burden of the state. At the same time, if the system was to 
become united, the incumbent pro-ruling party figures in all the insurance societies might 
lose their jobs, which could undermine the political stance of the state leadership (Yi 1990: 
90-91; Kim 1996: 201-202; Ch'oe 1998a: 219).
Key interest groups such as the FKI and the KFE showed strong opposition to the new 
system. For them, the existing administration system based on individual workplaces was 
not just a tool to control the workers but was also a good source of financial security. For 
instance, by 1995, the insurance societies on workplaces had access to 300 billion won of 
accumulated MI funds. Even though employers did not have the right to directly invest the 
funds, they could make use of such funds, for private purposes, as a security for bank loans 
(Kim 1996: 198-199). They did not want to lose such ‘entitlements’ by letting the new 
system operate.
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Second, the central insurance organisation, the NFMI, also opposed the new proposal, 
since it challenged its exclusive bureaucratic privileges. As seen in the previous chapter, the 
forerunner of this organisation was the NMIC that was established in 1977 as a quasi-public 
organisation and had been developing vested interests within the bureaucracy through 
organizational expansions along with the growth of employees. Since its establishment, the 
organisation had continued to stand in opposition to the progressive reform movement of 
the MI62. From the outset of the second round of the MI conflict, it drew up several reports 
on ‘undesirable effects’ of the unified system. As the new law was passed in the NA, their 
defence became more systematic and vocal. Like the ruling party and the government, the 
organisation also made use of the mass media, in particular conservative newspapers, to 
mobilise negative public opinion of the new law. In addition to the common viewpoints 
shared by the reactionary groups, the NFMI argued that under the new system, wage 
earners in Type I and III would be required to pay 2 or 3 times more in contribution than in 
the current system. At the same time, the NFMI hosted various rallies, distributing 
statements and manifestos on the flaws of the unified system (Yi 1990: 93-94).
However, it is widely held that the primary purpose of the NFMI’s ‘defence’ was to 
preserve its bureaucratic interests, rather than to pursue what they advocated ostensibly. 
With the extension of the MI coverage, it became a powerful entity having 15,000 
employees across the individual societies in regions and workplaces. This organisational 
incrementalism was a powerful force. At the same time, a delegation of the national
62 Unlike the administrative structure in which all the Enterprise MI societies and the 
Regional MI societies belonged to one organisation, the NFMI saw internal divisions over their 
own bureaucratic interests. Primarily, the different financial conditions between the Type I 
societies and the Type II societies divided them. In contrast to employees in the former, those 
in the latter were insecure in terms of job security as well as their career path, as the regional 
societies were small in size and financially weak (Kwon 2002b: 16). Accordingly, the regional 
societies were supportive of the unified system from the beginning of the MI conflict, as they 
understood that die merger of MI funds would solve their problems. The first conflict occurred 
when employees in regional societies went on strike demanding a wage increase and society 
unification in 1989 (Yi 1990: 96). However, the gap between them became wider as Chiydk 
uiryobohom nodong chohap (the Trade Union of Regional Medical Insurance Societies: 
TURMIS) joined the progressive NCTU, while Chikchang uiryoboh&m nodong chohap (the 
Trade Union of Enterprise Medical Insurance) was a member of the conservative FKTU. Since 
then, the administratively unified unions have operated alongside the administration system of 
the MI.
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organisation consisted of directors from each individual society. Under these circumstances, 
the NFMI had to protect the interests of all the societies. The unified system was considered 
to be a threat to the integrity of the NFMI as well as to the job security of all the employees 
(Yi 1990: 96; Kim 1996: 200).
The protests of these anti-reform movements were powerful enough to gain a response 
from the presidential office. At the time, presidential power had diminished when compared 
with that held by the previous military regimes, while the NA emerged as a strong 
institution of policy- making. However, the new constitution revised in 1987 had conferred 
on the president the right to veto. Encouraged by such a negative public opinion of the 
united system, which was further fuelled by the mass media, and also unwilling to lose his 
traditional support base, President Roh vetoed the new law on the 24th March 1989 (Yi 
1990: 112; Kwon 1999: 67). The ostensible reason for exercising the veto was that the 
unified system would increase administrative difficulties and had the potential to infringe 
the individuaPs right to ownership of private property (Yonhap News 1998).
The annulment of the new MI law again resulted in protests from the reformists. The 
opposition parties announced official statements requesting the retraction of the veto, while 
the ruling DJP and the government suggested its original plan of a broadened society-based 
system. Civil organisations such as the NCCMI and the TURMIS staged large scale of 
rallies and infiltrated the buildings of the PDP and the NDRP. This deadlock was partially 
resolved by the resurrection of the anti-communism and national security issue, which 
came about when several leaders of social movement groups made unauthorised visits to 
North Korea (Yi 1990: 112; Ch’oe 1998a: 220). The resurrection of the anti-communism 
bogey helped the state to suppress civil dissent, but the debates on the new law continued in 
the NA, reflecting enhancing parliamentary democracy. However, soon after, the assembly 
was stripped of its revived function as an effective arena for policy making. The formation 
of the conservative coalition between the ruling party and the two opposition parties 
suddenly altered the power structure in the assembly, making the new ruling Democratic 
Liberal Party dominate the assembly and leaving the PDP the only minor opposition party. 
In this situation, it was impossible to conduct further debate on the unified MI system in the
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assembly. Consequently, the issue of the MI reform was removed again from policy 
discussion in Korea.
The story of the MI reform movement between the late 1980s and the early 1990s 
mirrors the socio-political characteristics of the transitional period. First, the fact that the 
movement was initiated and driven by social groups, farmers in particular, denotes that the 
civil sectors were gradually asserting their influence over policy making. At the same time, 
the active participation of all the political parties and the unanimous passing of the NI 
reform bill in the NA reflected the society increasingly assimilating components of 
democratic politics. However, this incident also revealed the enduring legacy of the 
authoritarian approach to policymaking. The president still made the final decisions on the 
expansion of the MI coverage as well as the rejection of the reform law. In addition, the 
prevailing influence of anti-communism and the weakness of the NA resulting from the 
formation of the grand coalition also points to this. As a result, the expansion of the MI 
coverage was superficial, lacking the underlying principle of social rights, which I will 
discuss in the next section of this chapter.
8.13 Employment Insurance 
Background
In Korea, policy discussions on a programme for the unemployed began from the late 
1970s, as the second world oil crisis increased unemployment in the local market. However, 
such discussions soon disappeared from the political community, partly due to the 
recovering economy, and mainly for the reasons that such a programme would cause a 
financial burden on employers and that an unemployment programme would produce 
negative effects such as increasing welfare dependency and declining incentives to work
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(Yi 1999: 98). Another economic downturn from 198963, which lasted throughout the 1990s, 
helped to reinstate discussions on an unemployment programme, and finally made the 
government include the El as part of the New Economic Plan.
The El was made by president Kim Young Sam, as a candidate of the ruling party for 
the 1992 presidential election, declared he would introduce the programme to honour his 
electoral promise. However, more fundamental motive for the MI introduction was related 
to the need to address important economic policies, as seen in the case of the pension 
programme. This can be shown in two ways. First, after being elected to the presidency, 
Kim appeared to have relegated his election pledge to the realm of political rhetoric (Ch'oe 
1998a: 239-240). Second, the programme implemented in 1995 included such schemes as 
Koyong anjong (Employment Stabilisation: ES) and Nodong nungnyok kaebal (Work 
Ability Development: WAD), in addition to Sil-op kub-yo (Unemployment Benefit: UB), 
under the umbrella of the Employment Insurance (Nahm and Cho 1998: 298). Thus, three 
components of unemployment insurance that many welfare states have introduced over a 
long time span were united in one policy.
The second point provides a crucial clue for identifying the real motive of the El 
introduction by inviting us to consider the economic aspects of the programme. In the early 
1990s, the Korean economy was experiencing several problems. Internationally, economic 
globalisation was progressing at high speed. The formation of the world economy regime 
such as World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995 did not only increase the exposure of 
regional economies to international markets, but also developed a system of economic 
regionalism represented by such entities as the European Union and the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Having been under the influence of international markets 
since nationhood, the Korean economy benefited from such a changing economic 
environment as seen by increasing exports. However, it also had to face adverse effects
63 The Korean economy that marked an average 12 per cent of the GNP growth between 1986 
and 1988 marked a sharp fall in 1989 with 6.9 per cent of GNP growth (KSO 1995: 117, Table 
32), as the ‘three low’ period ended.
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such as a resulting trade imbalance and the weakening competitiveness of local small 
industries.
The growth in workers’ wage that resulted from the growing power of trade unions 
together with growing global competition began to have a serious negative impact on the 
Korean economy of the 1990s. The manufacturing sector, which previously accounted for 
the majority of exports like textiles, clothing and footwear, lost its competitiveness in the 
international market (Krueger 1997: 324-325). At the same time, economic regionalism 
contributed to an increase in imports over exports, keeping the trade balance in continuous 
deficit. For instance, the balance of trade moved to a credit position from USS -1.9 million 
in 1985 to US$ 4,206 million in 1986 and further to US$11,445 million in 1989. However, 
in the next year, it made a sharp fall down to US$ -2,004 million, and deteriorated 
throughout the 1990s, with the exception of 1993 (KSO 1995: 204, Table 119).
As seen in Figure 8-1, this dismantled the traditional foundation of the EOI policy 
based on low-cost and labour-intensive production. This weakening economy drove the 
government to abandon the HCI policy and to look into new measures of economic 
adaptation to the changing environment. In this context, the Korean government came to 
put bolder emphasis on the industrial restructuring than had been the case from the early 
1980s.
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Figure 8-1 Growth Rate in GNP, Manufacturing, and Wage: 1986-1996
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Sources: (KSO 1995: excerpted from p.l 17, Table 32; 1998a: counted p. 192, Table 4-28).
Anticipating an increase in the number o f the unemployed in the wake o f industrial 
restructuring, the government also employed an active labour market policy to enhance the 
flexibility of the workforce. A prime example of this policy was the announcement of the 
‘New Manpower Policy’ (Sinlllyok chongch'aek) in 1993, key contents o f which were 1) 
“to develop flexible labour; 2) to construct a flexible labour market; 3) to establish the 
system for developing and training flexible manpower” (MLA 1993, re-quoted in Kim and 
Choi 1995: 225). This flexibility policy was carried out in two ways. First was that o f 
functional flexibility, which focussed on increasing the capability o f labour to move from 
one duty to another on a same production line. The second was that o f numerical flexibility, 
which emphasised suppleness in demand and supply o f labour in accordance with changing 
market conditions. In the context o f industrial restructuring, the former was principally
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applied to the high value-added industries, while the latter to declining industries (Kim and 
Choi 1995: 225-227; Yi 1999: 89).
In order to promote the functional flexibility of workers, the government reviewed its 
policy on the delivery of technology education in order to build a cooperative relationship 
between technology schools and training institutes on workplaces. At the same time, by 
converting workplace training into accredited technology schools, the policy sought to 
encourage companies to construct their own education programmes. This aimed not just to 
promote in-plant training but also to establish a programme of lifetime education within 
companies in order to help workers to obtain more practical skills whenever required (Kim 
and Choi 1995: 228).
The industrial restructuring focussed on product automation as well as smaller-scale 
production of multiple items which led to changes in the labour market structure with an 
increasing casualisation of the workforce. However, this did not significantly affect the 
overall unemployment rate, which remained stable between 1990 and 1997 with average 
2.4 per cent (KSO 1998a: 182, Table 4-19). Furthermore, the selective approach to 
restructuring industries, on the basis of their potential to succeed in the new economic 
environment, caused a two-tiered hierarchy of workers according to differences in age, sex, 
work ability, a type of job, and the size of company, as seen in Figure 8-2.
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Figure 8-2 Changing Structure of the Labour Market
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One of the most challenging tasks arising from the development of a two-tiered labour 
market was managing the imbalance o f labour supply between large companies in 
promising industries and small and/or middle-sized ones in declining ones. While the 
former was able to maintain a relatively stabilised labour supply under the support of the 
government, the latter was not in a position to offer competitive wages and conditions. 
Indeed, the latter mainly consisted o f the highly unpopular ‘3D’ (dirty, difficult and 
dangerous) jobs (Kim 1995a: 244; Yi 1999: 94).
Thus, the El in Korea can be understood as a part o f labour policy, rather than of social 
security. The government set up the ES scheme to tackle problems stemming from the 
imbalance in labour supply caused by the numerical flexibility policy. Similarly, the WAD 
was set up to support the functional flexibility policy by enhancing educational and training 
programmes, and the UB to tackle unemployment. According to one government report, the 
basic orientation of the El was “more focussed on the active labour policy represented by
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the prevention of unemployment, the balancing operation of supply and demand of 
manpower, the improvement of the employment structure and the development of work 
skills and training programmes for workers, rather than a reactive, mere provision of 
unemployment benefit” (Taskforce Team for Industrial Relations 1993: 16, re-quoted in 
Kim 1995a). Ministry of Labour Affairs (MLA) also expressed a similar point of view, 
stating that the El in Korea “does not focus on the provision of unemployment benefits. 
Rather, it emphasises a active manpower policy such as supporting the ES and the WAD 
schemes, and preventing unemployment” (MLA 1995).
Policy Making
In contrast to the environment in which other social insurance programmes were 
introduced, the introduction of the El shows that there was a ‘consensus* in Korea on the 
necessity of the programme. Since the early 1980s, the FKTU had continued to make 
claims for the introduction of an unemployment insurance for workers. During the 1990s, 
their demands for the introduction of the El became more explicit: they made various forms 
of petitions and visits to politicians and high government officials to persuade them to 
reconsider the El (FKTU 1995: 22). Employer organisations such as the KFE, Korean 
Trade Association, and the Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry also expressed 
interest in the EL In their viewpoint, the programme was seen as a measure to secure 
stability in labour supply and employment (KFE 1993). More importantly in the Korean 
context, all the political leaders also regarded the El as a requirement for their electoral 
success as well as an outcome of successful industrial restructuring. In spite of the different 
objectives expressed by the various parties, this general consensus gave great momentum to 
the speedy implementation of the El in Korea.
The official decision on the El introduction was announced in an economic ministry 
meeting held on 23 August 1991. following this announcement, the MLA and its research 
centre, Han’guk nodong yon’guwon (the Korea Labour Institute: KLI), set up a special task
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force called Koyong pohom kihoektan (the Research Team for the Employment Insurance) 
in May 1992, and produced a proposal called Koyong pohom silsi pang-an (the 
Implementation Plan of the Employment Insurance in Korea) in May 1993 (Ch'oe 1998a:
228-229; Yi 1999: 101). This reveals that unlike other programmes, in which the leading 
policy making body was the MHSA, the EPB and/or their research institutes, it was the 
MLA which took main responsibility for the El policy making. This gives greater weight to 
the view that the El was more concerned about the issues related to the labour market than 
those of welfare.
Upon the proposals release, conflicts again arose between labour and capital, as well as 
among government ministries over the details of the new programme. While labour tried to 
maximise the benefits of the programme, capital strove to minimise any financial burdens 
on them While agreeing on the basic idea of less financial commitment to be carried by the 
state, the ministries were divided over the issues disputed between labour and capital; 
whilst the MLA supported the labour’s stance, the economic ministries, such as the EPB 
and the San-opjawSnbu (the Ministry of Commerce and Resources: MCR), were in favour 
of promoting the interests of capital. The key points of the disputes could be categorised 
into the following four issues.
First, regarding coverage, the original plan recommended that the issue of coverage 
extent be left to the president’s decision, while labour group argued for it to be extended to 
workplaces with more than 5 employees and employers to workplaces with more than 150 
employees (Yi 1999: 104). The MLA recommended workplaces with more than 10 
employees to be covered by the programme, while both labour and capital continued to 
maintain their original stance. However, as the 1994 national budget did not take into 
account the implementation of the El, because the administrative system was not in place, 
many feared that the programme would not be implemented at all This crisis forced a 
compromise. It was agreed to implement the programme in workplaces with more than 30 
employees and to expand the coverage to those with 10 employees from 1998 (Yi 1999: 
105).
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However, this broad compromise between labour-capital-the MLA resulted in protests 
from some employer groups, such as the Korean Federation of Small Business claiming 
that the suggested coverage would impose an unsustainable financial burden. The stance of 
small business employers was supported by the MCR, which argued that in consideration of 
possible financial hardship arising from its implementation the coverage of the El should 
start from workplaces with more than 100 or 150 employees. Accordingly, they agreed to 
put the El into separate operation according to its three different schemes. The UB was to 
operate in workplaces with more than 30 employees and to be extended to those with more 
than 10 employees from 1998. Two other schemes, namely, the ES and the WAD were 
implemented in workplaces with more than 70 employees and to extend to those with more 
than 50 employees from 1998 (Yi 1999: 105-6).
Second, regarding the contribution method, the MLA plan proposed that the 
government should contribute towards administration costs, employers to the full cost of 
the ES and the WAD, and workers and employers to the UB at 50:50 ratio. Labour opposed 
the MLA plan and suggested that government should contribute not only to administration 
costs but also to some of the insurance funds. Employers insisted that the government not 
just pay administration costs, but also let them convert some of the severance funds to their 
El contribution. In the meantime, the EPB asserted that the provisions that made the 
financial commitment of government compulsory should become a discretionary one. (Yi 
1999: 106). In the end, the EPB succeeded in having only one of its recommendations put 
into El law. These were the clauses that stipulated that the state ought to pay the 
administration costs of the programme was converted into a provisional one, stating that 
“each year, the state can bear a whole or part of the administration costs of the El through a 
general account” (emphasis added) (Article 5, Employment Insurance Law).
A third area that caused conflict of interest was that of the UB. The MLA proposed that 
in order to be eligible for the basic benefit, applicants ought to have had a minimum 12- 
month employment record out of 18 months prior to unemployment, while labour 
recommended a minimum 6-month contribution. In terms of a waiting period, the ministry 
proposed two weeks, while labour and employers put forward one and four weeks
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respectively. However, the government accepted only one recommendation each from 
employees and employers. Originally, the MLA proposed, as the level of basic 
unemployment benefit, 50 per cent of the average wage of one year prior to unemployment, 
while labour suggested 60 per cent of the average wage for three months, and the employer 
group and the MCR recommended 50 per cent of ordinary wage. With the suggestions from 
both sides accepted, the final decision was set at 50% of the average wage (Ch'oe 1998a:
229-30; Yi 1999: 108).
Last, there was a dispute over the issue of utilising the severance reserve fund. The 
original plan made by the MLA did not address this issue. However, upon the release of the 
plan, the employer groups and the MCR began to insist that employers should be able to 
utilise their contributions to the fund. This idea was strongly opposed by trade unions 
(Ch'oe 1998a: 130; Yi 1999: 108-109). Consequently, this issue was left to the minister of 
the MLA as a matter requiring a further scrutiny (Article 3, Employment Insurance Law).
In many aspects, the policy making process of the El reveals a very similar pattern and 
logic to that seen in previous social insurance programmes. In terms of the decision-making 
process, the state leadership and a few in the economic ministerial team were still playing a 
dominant role in initiating and guiding a policy direction. As seen in the disputes over the 
issues of coverage and state financial commitment, the EPB and the MCR were still able to 
exercise a decisive influence on the final decision of the EI. However, the NA and political 
parties still played only a peripheral role. Except the formalistic examination of the MI bill 
and passing it unanimously, assembly members were too preoccupied with other issues to 
pay significant attention to the programme (Ch'oe 1998a: 231-232).
Instead of universal coverage, accordingly, the EI began as a categorical programme 
covering a small section of the working class. In addition, the principle of bipartite 
contribution without state financial commitment remained unchanged. The state maintained 
its regulatory role. Up until the previous introduction of the social insurance programmes, 
developmentalism had become a key philosophy of Korean social policy. Therefore, the 
basic principles of social policy became subject to the logic of economic development.
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Indeed, the underlying ideology underpinning Korean society of the 1990s became that of 
globalisation as represented by neo-conservatism or neo-liberalism. In the West, such a new 
ideology resulted in the reduced role of the state and an emphasis on the responsibility of 
the individual and community for welfare provision. In the same context, Jessop (1993) 
claims that the transition to a post-Fordist system of production has brought in a 
‘Schumpeterian workfare state’ where the conventional role of social policy embodied in 
Keynesian welfare state needs to be changed to address new issues such as labour market 
flexibility and international competitiveness. Having been introduced to Korean society, the 
new ideology enabled the state leadership to continuously utilise the same economy-centred 
logic and justify a reduced commitment to social welfare, despite rising demands.
On the other hand, the policy making process of the EI also reveals quite a different 
picture as compared to that of other social insurance programmes that were implemented 
previously. On this occasion unlike the past, the final decision on the EI reflected the policy 
ideas of labour to a substantial degree. This means that from the 1990s a political window 
began to open, so that labour unions could have a greater say in social policymaking. A 
noteworthy point is that such an open system of politics applied equally to both the state- 
sponsored FKTU but also to the democratic union NCTU that was operating illegally at that 
time (Yi 1999: 132). Thus, it was only from the early 1990s onwards that labour became as 
a significant contributor to social policy making owing to its enhanced organisational 
power.
8.2 Social Citizenship: Width vs. Depth
With the implementation of the EI in 1997, Korean society came to have four major 
programmes of social insurance, representing the public face of the welfare state. However, 
there arises the question of whether such an introduction and expansion of these 
programmes really served to promote social citizenship of Koreans in the sense envisaged
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by Marshall. To address this question, the following section discusses the details of each 
programme as they relate to the principles of social rights.
8.2.1 State Responsibility
There are many ways to measure the state’s responsibility for the people’s welfare, but 
this thesis adopts two methods that seem to be most appropriate to the Korean context. The 
first is to examine the legal basis for the welfare system and, in particular, welfare-related 
laws. This not only provides the state with grounds for involvement in the social market, 
but also can be a formal expression of the state’s commitment to welfare. Thus, the 
establishment of a legal system of welfare could be regarded as a prerequisite for a welfare 
state. However, such a legal welfare system may be a normative declaration of the state’s 
welfare will, especially given that the provisions of a welfare law are open to different 
interpretations depending on the set of traditions, political culture, and economic conditions 
peculiar to one country. Accordingly, it is important to take into account the state’s welfare 
budget in order to provide a practical measure of the state’s welfare priorities. This is due to 
the obvious reason that, despite beneficiaries’ eligibility and legal entitlements to welfare, 
they may not receive appropriate levels of benefit unless the national budget makes 
adequate provision for these.
The legislation behind the major social insurance laws during this period can be 
understood as the state expressing at least a normative obligation for the people’s welfare. 
Thus, this section focuses on social security expenditure in Korea.
As seen before, the Korean government adhered to the principle of bipartite 
contributions to social insurance funds, taking responsibility for administration costs only. 
The government, in the capacity of employer, contributed towards the insurance funds of 
civil servants only. The only exception to this principle was the government contribution to 
the Regional MI. As Table 8-2 shows, such a government policy can be seen in the legal 
social security expenditure.
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Table 8-2 Trend in Social Security Expenditure: 1987-1997
Billion Won anc %
Year Govt.Budget
Social
Security
Budget
Social Security Programmes Ratio of 
SSB to 
Govt. 
Budget
Ratio of 
SSB to 
GDP
Social
Insurance
Public
Assistance
Welfare
Services
1987 16,060 00 © 39.1 40.3 20.5 3.6 0.5
1988 18,429 820 45.6 38.2 16.2 4.4 0.6
1989 22,047 1,143 52.8 33.3 13.9 5.2 0.8
1990 27,456 1,487 59.0 26.0 15.1 5.4 0.8
1991 31,380 1,996 64.5 22.0 13.6 6.4 0.9
1992 33,502 2,419 66.6 19.1 14.2 7.2 1.0
1993 38,050 2,415 59.6 20.2 20.2 6.3 0.9
1994 43,250 2,614 61.6 20.6 18.3 6.0 0.9
1995 51,881 2,925 59.1 19.6 21.3 5.6 f i t8 Hi
1996 58,823 3,528 56.0 20.2 23.8 6.1 0.9
1997 67,579 4,207 53.9 22.0 24.1 6.2 1.0
Note: Social Security Budget (SSB) does not include health spending and severance reserve fund. 
Source: (MHW 1998b: 364-5, Table 9-1-3)
The table shows that the during the transitional period the share o f public assistance in 
total social security spending declined by more than half. The share o f social insurance 
expenditure increased, while that o f welfare services fluctuated within a narrow range 
(average 18.3 per cent). This change proves that the state had paid increasing attention to 
social insurance programmes, while maintaining the basic line o f other two programmes. 
The ratio of social security budget to government budget also increased to 6.2 per cent in 
1997 from 3.6 per cent in 1987. Yet, the ratio o f the social security budget to GDP 
remained constantly under 1 per cent for the most time, the only two exceptional years 
being 1992 and 1997. This can be compared to expenditure of between 20 to 30 per cent in 
European countries (for example, see Germany and the UK in Table 8-3 below).
This minimal responsibility o f the state can also be seen in the structure of the social 
security spending of Korean government.
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Figure 8-3 Trend in the Structure of Social Security Spending
25000
20000
m 10000
Year
Govt. —» - S IB  —* -E m p 'r  Total |
Govt.: Government spending for public assistance and welfare services 
SIB: Social Insurance Benefits for four major insurances
Emp’r: Employers (measured by the amount of severance funds paid to the retiring workers)
Total: Total
Source: (KoandKye 1998: 151)
As seen in Figure 8-3, its overall amount increased almost three times from 6,972 
billion won in 1990 to 20,563 billion won in 1996. However, such an increase can mainly 
be ascribed to the rise in social insurance benefits and employers’ contributions, to which 
government virtually contributed nothing. The share of the government’s contribution to 
total social security spending was continuously the lowest of the three sectors, and never 
exceeded that of social insurance benefits or that of employers.
An international comparison reveals the extent of the government’s low priority for 
welfare responsibility. Table 8-3 provides a simple comparison of total social expenditure 
in selected OECD countries between 1987 and 1997. It illustrates that all the surveyed 
OECD countries but Korea spent at least more than 10 per cent o f GDP for social policy
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expenditure (maximum 36.66 per cent in 1993 Sweden). However, during the same period, 
Korea’s expenditure did not exceed 5 per cent of GDP (average 2.54 per cent).
Table 8-3 International Trend in Total Social Expenditure as % of GDP
wmmmm Sweden Germany UK USA Japan Korea
1987 30.35 21.17 20.71 12.99 11.52 2.0
1988 30.87 21.21 19.38 12.92 11.20 3.3
1989 30.17 20.48 18.88 12.93 10.97 2.6
1990 31.02 20.29 21.62 13.36 10.80 HHHI
1991 33.18 24.17 23.41 14.41 10.94 2.96
1992 36.39 25.56 25.75 15.11 11.45 3.25
1993 36.66 26.37 26.46 15.36 12.07 3.33
1994 35.21 26.19 26.10 | 15.34 12.67 3.38
1995 33.03 26.70 25.84 15.41 13.47 3.67
1996 32.99 28.06 25.79 15.30 13.91 3.90
1997 32.26 27.74 25.33 14.93 14.32 4.27
Source: (Korea between 1987 and 1989, Roh and Kim 1995: Table III-4; the others, OECD 2001c)
Even though the nation’s spending for social policy had been steadily increasing, there 
remains a wide expenditure gap between Korea and other countries. This, however, does 
not mean that Korea was still weak in term o f economic power as compared to other 
countries. For example, in 1995 when Korea broke through the US$ 10,000 per capita GDP 
mark, it spent 3.67 per cent o f GDP for social security. Indeed, in 1978 when entering the 
same stage o f economic power, the USA and Germany spent 9.1 per cent and 25.3 per cent 
o f their GDP respectively. Further contrasts can be made with Japan, which spent 11.5 per 
cent when it achieved similar levels o f  economic development, and in the case o f the UK, 
which spent 17.7 per cent of GDP in 1986 (Kim 1998a: 95). Briefly, the low level of the 
government expenditure for social security denotes that the introduction and the expansion 
o f social insurance programmes during the transitional period did not bring about a change 
in the role of the state: it remained as a regulator with minimal commitment to welfare 
finance.
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Instead, welfare responsibility was substantially delegated to the private sectors such as 
employers, community groups and individual households. Table 8-4 reveals how much the 
private sector in Korea contributed to total social expenditure, as compared to other 
countries.
Table 8-4 Private Social Expenditure as a per cent of GDP at Market Price: 1993
Total Social Expenditure (A) Private Social Expenditure (B) B/A X 100
Sweden 40.59 2.34 5.76
Germany B i ; 9 f l l 2.88 9.13
UK 27.21 3.80 13.97
USA I H B '  9H K H H I  8.28 1  35.51
Korea 4.42 1.12 25.34
Sources: (Adema and Einerhand 1998: 25, Table 4; Ko and Kye 1998: 160, Table IV-10)
As the table shows, the percentage of GDP for private social spending at 1.12 per cent 
was the lowest among the selected countries. However, its proportional value to total social 
expenditure (25.34 per cent) was the second largest, next to the USA. This denotes that in 
contrast to other countries where the proportion of public social expenditure took an 
absolute majority of total social expenditure, public social expenditure in Korea was so 
minimal as to make the smallest private expenditure appear larger than in other countries.
8.2.2 Universality
The new social insurance programmes, introduced during this time, started as a 
categorical service, which covered at first only a limited number o f those who were in a 
relatively secure position in terms o f job and income, and then gradually extended to cover 
other sections of society. This top-down fashion of coverage extension limited the 
application o f the principle o f universality as well as the social solidarity achieved through 
risk pooling. On the other hand, the coverage expansion of previously implemented
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programmes, such as the MI, certainly contributed to a greater promotion of universality. 
This section discusses this phenomenon according to each programme.
National Pension
According to the National Pension Law of 1986, the NP programme was to proved 
coverage for those between the ages of 18 and 59, except those who were already a part of 
other pension programmes such as the Civil Servant Pension, the Military Pension and the 
Pension for Private School Employees (Article 6). The NP was divided into three categories 
according to the types of the insured: the Enterprise Pension, the Regional Pension, and the 
Voluntary and Continuous Pension. The Enterprise Pension was for workers and 
membership was either compulsory or voluntarily depending on the size of workplaces, as 
determined by the president (Article 8). Those who came under the voluntary scheme were 
able to join the NP if more than two thirds of those in the workplace agreed to join the 
programme and the minister of the MHSA permitted their participation (Article 8). Second, 
the Regional Pension was for the self-employed, farmers and maritime workers in rural as 
well as urban areas. For them, the NP was voluntary, and they were able to join the 
programme upon the approval of the minister of the MHSA (Article 10). The Voluntary 
and Continuous Pension was for those over 60 who were ineligible for the NP but wanted 
to make contributions to the programme. In this case, the insured could extend their 
participation up to the age of 65 with the permission of the minister of the MHSA (Article 
13). Thus, the NP in Korea was from the outset not just a categorical programme but also 
featured a mix of compulsory and voluntary participation.
The NP was implemented at first in workplaces with more than 10 employees in 1988. 
Then, it was extended to those with more than 5 employees in 1992, and further to the self- 
employed, farmers and maritime workers in rural areas in 199564. Thus, as of 1997, it did 
not cover the self-employed in urban areas and those working in workplaces with less than
64 For the background of the coverage expansion, see Shin 2000b: Ch 7.
264
5 employees65. Table 8-5 shows the trend in the composition o f the pension insurants until 
1997.
Table 8-5 The Trend in the Ratio of the Pension Insurants: 1987-1997
Total 
insurants 
as % of the 
population 
over 15
Insurants of 
the NP as % 
of the 
population 
over 15
Pension Programmes
NP CSP PPSE
1988 17.5 14.5 83.0 14.1 2.6
1989 17.6 14.5 82.5 14.8 2.7
1990 17.7 14.6 82.3 15.0 2.7
1991 17.9 14.7 82.0 15.2 2.8
1992 18.5 15.3 82.2 15.1 2.7
1993 18.7 15.4 82.3 15.0 2.7
1994 19.3 16.0 83.0 14.4 2.6
1995 24.3 21.0 86.4 11.4 2.2
1996 24.5 21.1 86.5 11.3 2.2
1997 24.5 20.6 86.1 11.5 2.4
Note: NP: National Pension
CSP: Civil Servant Pension 
PPSE: Pension for the Private School Employees 
Source: (MHW 1998b: 285, Table 7-1-1; KOSIS 2002a)
Since its implementation, the NP has emerged as the principal pension programme in 
Korea, covering around 84 per cent o f all pension insurants, while the CSP and the PPSE 
have been losing their relative popularity. In addition, the take-up rate o f all the pension 
schemes substantially increased. When the total number o f pension insurants was taken as a 
percentage o f the population over the age o f 15, it increased from 17.5 per cent in 1987 to
24.0 per cent in 1997. Similarly, the proportion of the NP insurants, increased from 14.5 in 
1988 to 20.6 in 1997. This was particularly noticeable from 1995 when the coverage was 
extended to rural areas. However, the table also reveals that the pension programme has
65 They came to be included in the programme from April 1999.
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failed to develop into a universal programme and that approximately three -quarters of the 
working populations did not have a public safety net protection from income loss.
The low take-up rates are perhaps due to the short history of the programme and to the 
lengthy minimum contribution period for the basic pension of 20 years, and 15 years for the 
reduced basic pension (Article 56). However, a more fundamental reason seems to reside in 
the implementation of the programme, namely the incremental manner of coverage 
expansion. Due to this, those working in workplaces with less than five employees and the 
self-employed in urban area were still excluded form the programme in 1997. Since they 
were the most economically vulnerable section of the population, they were most likely to 
experience circumstances of economic insecurity and hardship. At the same time, both the 
financing method of the NP, namely the provident fund system, and the requirement of the 
minimum contribution period, made those aged over 45 vulnerable to economic insecurity. 
Even though a special measure was introduced for them66, the programme still placed them 
outside the income protection as their participation was recommended as a voluntary one.
Accordingly, the pension programme in Korea did not promote an increase in social 
solidarity through risk pooling. Instead, it imposed a degree of social stratification or 
‘reversed discrimination’ between insurants and non-insurants. Generally, the participants 
in any pension scheme were already in a position of greater economic security than others 
in the community. For example, those entitled to the CSP and the PPSE had more secure as 
well as well-paid jobs, so that they were able to afford private measures such as insurance 
contributions. Similarly, the insurants of the NP were able to maintain more stable 
economic security than the non-insured, as they received a regular income. Thus, the 
pension programme in Korea could be argued as increasing levels of inequality among 
people.
66 The National Pension Law of 1986 provides that as of the commenced date of the 
programme, those who are over 45 and not be able to meet the contribution requirement can 
join a special scheme in which they can receive a reduced basic pension after five years 
contribution (Appendix 5, National Pension Law).
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Medical Insurance
As seen in the previous chapter, medical insurance came into operation in 1977, but 
only in larger companies. Starting from workplace with 500 or more employees in the year, 
the coverage gradually extended to cover more people. In January 1979, the MI law was 
revised so that the programme became compulsory for governmental officials and the 
employees of private schools. In July 1979, the compulsory coverage came to include firms 
with more than 300 workers, and in January 1981 to those with 100 or more workers. Two 
years later, the coverage extended to include workplaces with more than 16 workers (Kwon 
1999: 253-4).
Despite the gradual expansion of the coverage, however, the majority of Koreans were 
still ineligible for the MI. In 1983, when the latest expansion of the coverage occurred, the 
programme protected only 39 per cent of the population. Given that the coverage rate of the 
medical assistance was just 9.3 per cent, the majority of Koreans were still relying on 
private measures for financing medical treatment (KSO 1998b: 236-237). Until 1989 when 
the self-employed in urban areas were finally included in the medical protection, it has 
remained a feature of the MI that those excluded from the programme were those most 
socially vulnerable. This inequality of coverage distribution was rectified by the 
achievement of universal coverage in 1989. Table 8-6 shows the trend in the number of the 
MI beneficiaries over this time.
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Table 8-6 The Trend in the Number of the Medical Security Beneficiary
%
% of Total life .■ ■ ■ - Ml H H H H MAPopulation Type 1 Type II Type III
1987 61.6 70.4 9.0 20.5 10.5
1988 79.0 56.3 28.1 15.6 10.2
1989 100.4 41.4 47.4 11.2 10.0
1990 102.9 40.2 48.3 11.5 9.2
1991 100.8 39.8 48.9 11.3 6.6
1992 100.6 39.0 49.7 11.3 6.1
1993 100.9 38.3 50.5 11.2 5.4
1994 101.7 37.9 51.0 11.1 4.8
1995 102.0 38.0 51.1 10.9 4.4
1996 101.7 38.2 50.9 10.9 3.8
1997 100.8 38.1 50.9 11.0 3.1
Note: Type I: Enterprise MI
Type II: Regional MI
Type III: Civil Servants and Private School Employees MI 
* More than 100 % of coverage as a percentage of the total population from 1989 is due to a double 
registration in the MI as well as MA.
Source: (KSO 1998b: pp.236-7, Table 155 and 156 respectively; KOSIS 2002a; 2002d; 2002c).
As the table shows, the coverage o f the medical security programmes (the MI + the 
MA) was just 79.0 per cent of the total population until 1988. However, one year later, it 
had attained universal coverage owing to its extension to the self-employed in urban areas. 
Also the proportion o f the Type II in the entire MI programmes increased dramatically from
9.0 per cent in 1987 to 50.9 per cent in 1997, while that o f the Type III and I decreased 
from 20.5 to 11.0 per cent and 70.4 to 38.1 per cent respectively. This meant that the Type 
II MI became a principal pillar of the medical security programme in Korea. This universal 
coverage seemed to contribute to the achievement of social solidarity. However, inequality 
of Korean MI continues to be evident in the structure o f administration and the systems of 
finance within the programme, as will be discussed in the subsequent chapter.
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Employment Insurance
As the last major social security programme recent Korea had implemented, the EI 
started as a categorical programme like other programmes, with the UB commencing in 
workplace with more than 30 employees and both the ES and the WAD in workplaces with 
more than 70 employees. This coverage was narrowed in scope to exclude the following 
categories of individuals: 1) new employees aged over 60, 2) part-time workers who work 
less than 70 per cent of working hours per week than full-time workers, 3) casual workers, 
4) those employed in a seasonal and/or temporary business, and 5) civil servants and 
private school employees (Article 8). Along with the categorical implementation, this 
restriction made it even more difficult for workers to participate in the programme.
Not surprisingly, until 1997 only a small section of workers were under the protection 
of the EI programme. As of the 31st December 1997, those protected were just 4,280,430 
workers in 47,427 workplaces (MLA 2002: 101, Table 2-2-5). This number of workers, 
however, accounted for just 19.8 per cent of the economically active population of the year 
(KSO 1998a: 164, Table 4-2). Furthermore, considering the composition of workers 
according to the employment size of firms (Table 8-7), 21.73 per cent were ineligible for 
the EI programme.
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Table 8-7 Composition of Workers according to the Employment Size of Firms: 1996
As % of the Total Number of Workers
Total 100
Less than 10 6.55
10-15 5.51
16-29 9.67
30-49 8.56
50-99 12.07
100-199 12.67
200-299 7.30
300-499 7.43
500-999 8.83
More than 1,000 21.42
Source: (Korea Occupational Safety and Health Agency).
According to the ILO Convention concerning Employment Promotion and Protection 
against Unemployment (1991), a social security programme for the unemployed “shall 
comp rise.... not less than 85 per cent of all employees including public employees and 
apprentices” . And in circumstances such as those involving the introduction o f a new 
programme or an expansion of coverage, it “shall comprise.... not less than 50 per cent o f 
all employees” (Article 11). The coverage rate o f the Korean EI was far below the 
international agreement.
It could be argued that it is still too early to judge the effects of the EI programme by 
its coverage, given that it had only been running for two years by 1997. However, it must 
be pointed that the low coverage was largely a function o f its categorical approach. In 
particular, given the top-down manner o f coverage extension, the excluded at the beginning 
were usually those in a vulnerable condition in terms of job security as well as income 
stability. This not only was discriminatory but also hindered the effect o f social solidarity 
from taking place.
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8.23 Adequacy of Benefits
A third principle of citizenship, adequacy of benefits, can be measured by examining 
whether the level of benefits is enough to guarantee that citizens, or welfare beneficiaries, 
have a modicum of economic welfare and security, as well as possessing the means to 
pursue the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in society. At the 
same time, the examination of the adequacy of benefits also supports the view that one of 
the fundamental principles of social policy, redistribution, takes place through social 
insurance programmes.
National Pension
Under the National Pension Law of 1986, the pension benefits divided mainly into four 
categories. Firstly, for individuals who had made contributions for 20 or more years, there 
was the Old Age Pension reached the age 60 (Article 56). Secondly, there was the 
Disability Pension for those who developed a disability due to a disease and/or accident 
during the contribution period (Article 58). Thirdly, there was the Survivor Pension that 
paid for the survivors of the insured having more than one year of contribution record 
(Article 62). The final one was the ‘Rum Sum Refund’ for the insured who had 1) reached 
age 60 with less than 10 years of contribution record, 2) died, or 3) lost their citizenship due 
to emigration (Article 67). Among these various pension schemes, this section focuses on 
the Old Age pension, as it is regarded to be most important pillar of the entire pension 
programme.
According to the 1986 pension law, the full Old-Age Pension will commence from 
2008. The amount of pension received consists of two parts: the Basic Pension and the 
Additional Pension. The Basic Pension is decided according to the average monthly wages 
of all insured persons, and the average amount of the monthly standard wages of insured 
individuals. Thus, the former has the purpose of income redistribution, whilst the latter 
serves as a proportional distribution of income, both of which make the NP a combination
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of the earning-related system and redistributive benefit schedule. The contribution record of 
the insured decides the Additional Pension. That is, when an insured person remains as a 
contributor after fulfilling the contribution commitment of 20 years, she or he can receive 
an additional 5 per cent of the basic pension each year. The following formula shows that:
Yearly Pension Formula^ 2.4 X (A+B) X (l+0.05n)
Note: A: the average monthly wage of all insured in the NP during the last year
B: Average monthly income over the contribution period of a pensioner 
n: the number of contribution years after 20 years 
2.4: 20 years of contribution (24 months)
0.05: additional 5 per cent of basic pension each year after 20 years
Here, what makes the redistribution effect occur is A, and B makes the proportional 
distribution of income possible. However, the amount of the Additional Pension can be 
negligible. For instance, as of 1997, a spouse and other dependents received just 8,300 won 
and 5,000 won 67per month for the Additional Pension respectively. Thus, the income 
replacement rate can be calculated as a proportion o f the Basic Pension, as seen in Table 8- 
8 .
Table 8-8 The Income Replacement Rate of the NP
Income Level 20 Years 30 Years 40 Yeare
0.25A 0.95 1.00 1.00
0.5A 0.55 ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ I 1.00
1.0A 0.35 0.53 0.70
2.0 A 0.25 0.38 0.50
3.0A 0.22 0.33 0.44
Note: Income Replacement Rate= (Basic Pension/the average income over the contribution of a
pensioner) X 100
A: the average monthly wage of all insured in the NP during the last year
67 This amount is equivalent to £ 3 at year 2002 exchange rate.
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The table shows that the Korean pension programme provides a generous income 
replacement rate. As seen in Table 8-9, the replacement rate in other countries is relatively 
lower than in Korea.
Table 8-9 The Income Replacement Rate of Old-age Pension in Selected Countries
Male aged 65-69
Public Pension Private Pension
Sweden 87.8 25.8
Japan HHi 9HH flHH
Germany 79.3 4.6
United States IB 39.6 IBfB 27.8
United Kingdom 27.2 36.6
Source: (OECD 2001a: excerpted from p. 172, Table A10)
In the case of countries having low levels o f income replacement rate o f public 
pension, the private pension takes on a supplementary role. This provides a good 
comparison for the Korean pension programme. In addition to the high level o f personal 
livelihood protection measures, such as private savings and insurance68, the Korean public 
pension provides quite a generous replacement rate as well as redistributive effect (Table 8- 
8). Based on a 20-year contribution, average income earners have 35 per cent o f income 
replacement rate. While those who earns one fourth o f the average income will have 95 per 
cent of income replacement, those who earn three times more than the average income will 
gain 22 per cent o f the income replacement rate. Based on a 40-year contribution, average 
income earners can expect a 70 per cent replacement rate, which is comparable to that seen 
in some of the higher spending European countries. This offers the hope that, along with 
the high level o f private welfare measures, Koreans will in future be substantially protected 
by the state against income loss.
68 In 1997, for example, the domestic saving rate was 34.25 per cent and the private insurance 
premiums (both life and accident insurances) reached 15.69 per cent of GNP (KSO 1998b: 
pp. 121 and 131, Table 36 and 46 respectively)
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Despite such a generous replacement rate, however, the NP had some significant flaws 
to it. First, as of 1997, 84.4 per cent of the pension beneficiaries were those who received 
their refund benefit (MHW 1998b: 269-7, Table 7-2-5). However, the refund system is 
more akin to a personal saving offering a one-off payment. In strict terms, therefore, the 
refund system cannot be regarded as a part of the social security system that offers long­
term income protection for the aged: it rather weakens the basic principle of social 
insurance programmes by limiting or depriving the people’s rights to a pension. Second, 
due to the high replacement and low contribution rate69, the Korean NP is expected to face 
a financial deficit by 2047 (World Bank 2000). One feasible solution to this problem could 
be the adjustment of the pension formula either to reduce the income replacement rate or to 
increase the contribution rate, or both. In any scenario, it appears that there would be the 
contraction of people’s current rights to the pension.
Medical Insurance
Despite its universal coverage, the NI programme has been under constant criticism by 
many scholars for its inequity-generating features. This problem relates to various factors 
attributed to the institutional features of the programme, which can be categorised into the 
following three areas: the administration of insurance administration, the low benefit levels 
and high levels of private payment, and regional inequalities with respect to accessing 
medical services.
Regarding the insurance administration system, a first type of inequity occurs among 
the MI insured depending on the type of insurance entered into. This inequity stems from
69 As of 1997, the contribution rate for the NP was 6 per cent of real wages. This was quite low 
when compared to other countries which provided a similar level of the income replacement rate. 
For instance, in 1995, the Belgium pension system guaranteed 67.5 per cent of the replacement rate 
for pensioners, while requiring insurants to contribute 16.4 per cent of average earnings. At the 
same year, the Canadian pension system required insurants to contribute 5.4 per cent of average 
earnings but provided just 51.6 per cent of the income replacement rate (Blondal and Scarpetta 
1998: 62, 100).
274
the different contribution methods, as discussed previously, and can be referred to as 
‘inequity of contribution’. Table 8-10 shows how this takes place between the insurance 
types.
Table 8-10 Differences in Medical Contribution according to the Ml Types
Won
Type I
Type II
Type III
Urban Areas Rural Areas
1988 6,014 (100) 7,029(117) 5,466(91) 9,022 (150)
1989 6,832(100) 8,291 (123) 5,869(87) 10,019(149)
1990 7,592 (100) 9,699 (128) 7,772 (102) 11,393 (150)
1991 8,790(100) 12,727 (145) 10,591 (120) 2,586(134)
1992 9,949 (100) 13,693 (138) 11,783 (118) 13,866 (139)
1993 10,884(100) 14,255 (131) 12,693(117) 12,816(118)
1994 11,840(100) 14,838(131) 13,549(117) 13,834 (117)
1995 13,092(100) 15,603 (119) 15,018(115) 14,439(110)
1996 14,831 (100) 18,144(122) 16,606(112) 15,263 (103)
Sources: (Cho 1997b: 63; Kim 1998d: 154)
The table shows that when using the Enterprise MI as a base system (100), the 
contribution rate o f other Mis were always higher, except that of rural areas in 1988 and 
1989. For example, in 1995 the contribution rate of the insured in rural areas and Type III 
was 115 as compared to that o f Type I. This difference in contribution rate cannot be 
problematic to the insured of Type III, because they are usually higher wage earners than 
those in Type I. In contrast, in 1992, the ratio of farmers’ income to that of wage earners 
was 0.48 per cent (Cho 1997b: 63). Thus, despite lower income levels, the farmers and the 
self-employed in Type II MI have to pay a higher contribution.
A second type o f inequity caused by the administration system can be referred to as the
‘inequity between insurance societies’, which occurs not just among insurance societies o f
different MI types, but also markedly among those of the same Regional MI. Under the
current independent administration system, various states o f financial conditions take place
among insurance societies as they have different sizes o f  membership as well as different
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income level. For instance, in 1996, Type I MI had some 2.7 trillion won of insurance 
revenue and spent about 2.6 trillion won. In the case of Type III MI, revenue was about 
94.4 billion won and expenditure was around 89.2 billion won. At the same time, Type II 
MI had some 2.9 trillion won of revenue and approximately 3 trillion won of expenditure 
(MHW 1998b: 310, Table 7-3-7). Thus, the Regional MI performed poorly, while the other 
two Mis were financially healthy.
This financial inequity between insurance societies has been most evident in the divide 
between urban and rural areas, as those in rural areas have additional difficulties such as a 
declining population, a high proportion of elderly and sometimes the absence of an income 
earner in a household. Under the current system, the financial and administrative 
independence of operation enables each insurance society to set its own contribution rate. 
This system leads to a vicious cycle in poor areas in that the burden of the contribution as a 
proportion of the insured income grows disproportionately to that seen in wealthier regions, 
while the insurance societies are in continuous financial strain. As an example, by the end 
of 1996, seven out of the 227 regional insurers had no reserve funds, and they were all 
based in poorer regions. Similarly, 10 regional insurance societies delayed the payment of a 
deposit for medical services due to insufficient funds (Kang 1998).
Consequently, under the current administration system of the MI it was hardly possible 
to expect risk pooling or redistributive effects between insurance societies or within a 
society due to its size. Rather, this system has led to a “horizontal inequity in which people 
with same earnings could expect to pay different amounts of contribution depending on the 
insurance society they are enrolled in, whilst receiving similar benefits” (Kwon 2003b: 80). 
In addition, the exclusivity between insurance societies prevented people from making a 
free move from one job category to another. For instance, changes to occupational status 
from wage earner to self-employed status, would result in the contribution record for the 
previous occupation to be wiped out with commencement of the Type II MI, usually 
accompanied by an increase in contributions to be made.
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Regarding the low level of benefits and the high level o f  private payment, Korean MI 
has adopted a co-payment system in which patients have to pay a very high proportion o f 
medical service fee out of their pocket. Table 8-11 shows how much Korean people pay for 
medical services out of their pocket, as compared with other countries having a similar 
national health insurance system.
Table 8-11 Private Payment for Medical Services in Selected Countries: 1997
Outpatient Inpatient
Japan Insured: 10% Dependent: 30 %
Insured: 10% 
Dependent: 20%
Sweden 80 Kronor a day
Taiwan 30 to 50 %, depending on the type of hospital
10 to 30 % depending on the length of 
hospitalisation
Korea
30-55%, depending on the type of 
hospital.
If total cost is less than 12,000, a fixed 
fee of 3,200 won
20%
Note: the Japanese system is based on Employee Health Insurance 
Sources: (USSSA 1997; MHW 1998a)
In addition, even if they have adopted the co-payment system, those countries featured 
in the table have also set up a cap system so that private payment does not exceed a certain 
level. For instance, the Japanese system allows for a maximum o f 63,600 yen  a month 
payment by an individual for the same illness. In the Korean system, however, there is no 
such provision. The 30 to 55 per cent of outpatient fee means that the Koreans have to 
resort to the private health insurance, despite the universal coverage o f the MI. If we 
specify the number according to the type o f patient, the problem becomes more evident. For 
example, in 1998, patients’ total out-of-pocket payment accounted for as much as 43.2 per 
cent in the case of inpatients, and 63.7 per cent in the case of outpatients (MHW 1998a: 27), 
both of which saw an increase from the previous year (Kwon 2002a: 12).
Many related problems arise from the limited service coverage of the Korean MI. First, 
there was no sickness benefit provided through the Korean MI system in contrast with
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comparable nations70. Second, only the Koran medical insurance system places a limit on 
the service duration71. After the period, patients have to pay the full cost o f treatment, 
which restricts many citizen’s rights to medical services. Third, the Korean MI excludes 
many service items from its benefit package. It does not provide coverage for ultrasounds, 
MRI (Magnetic Resonance Imaging), preventive vaccinations, home care, and the use o f 
private hospital rooms, etc (Kang 1998; Kwon 2002a: 11).
All these factors combine to make Korean people pay for more medical costs than 
those in most other countries. Table 8-12 shows that among the five selected countries, 
Korean people pay the highest private medical costs.
Table 8-12 Health Expenditure of Selected Countries: 1990
Sweden UK Japan Germany Korea
Per Capita 
(US$) 2,343 1,039 1,538 1,511 377
% of GDP 8.8 6.1 6.5 8.0 6.6
Public (%) 
Private (%)
7.9 (89.8) 
0.9 (10.2)
5.2 (85.2) 
0.9 (14.8)
4.9 (75.4) 
1.6 (24.6)
5.8 (72.5) 
2.2 (27.5)
2.7 (40.9) 
3.9 (59.1)
Source: (KIHSA 1996: 417, Tab e 8-33)
The ratio of the private medical costs in Korea is even higher than that o f Japan and 
Germany, which have a similar health care system as Korea based on the social insurance 
principle, not to mention the UK and Sweden where the funds for health services come 
from general revenue.
In short, the Korean MI programme has not contributed to vertical equity, and raises 
questions as to whether it constitutes a social insurance programme. That is,
70 In the case of Japan, offering a cash benefit is not a statutory service, but provided by some 
insurers (USSSA 1997: 195).
71 As of 1997, the duration limit was 270 days a year per insured person (USSSA 1997: 208)
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notwithstanding its universal coverage, such features as risk pooling and redistributive 
effects do not occur with the MI.
The inequity in accessing to medical services is derived from the uneven distribution of 
medical facilities across the country as seen in Table 8-13.
Table 8-13 Distribution of Medical Facilities: 1997
No. of hospitals No. of beds No. of medical personnel’
Urban (A) 771 154,790 111,997
Rural (B) 115 14,998 5,322
B/A (%) 14.9 9.7 4.8
* The number of medical personnel includes not only medical doctors (both western and oriental) 
but also dentists, midwives, nurses, medical technicians, and pharmacists, etc.
Source: (MHW 1998b: excerpted from pp.138, 158 and 164, Table3-1-13, 3-2-2 and 3-2-5 
respectively)
The table shows a marked inequity between the urban and rural areas in terms of access 
to medical resources, given that rural areas only had 14.9 per cent of the hospitals found in 
urban areas. This was also evident in the shortage of beds and human resources, which 
placed severe restrictions on rural residents’ access to medical services.
It could also be argued that the uneven distribution o f medical resources was attributed 
to the imbalanced growth of private medical facilities following the inception o f nationhood 
(see Ch.5). In order to tackle the problem, the Korean government has arranged health 
clinics in rural areas. However, they could not compete with hospitals in urban areas in 
terms of the quality o f medical facilities, a situation which is similar to that seen in the UK 
prior to 1948.
Moreover, the Korean MI contributed to marked social stratification based on income 
occupation, and location of residence. However, the stratification was different to that seen 
in western countries because it is mainly based on social class (Esping-Andersen 1990: Ch 
3). Accordingly, the Korean MI produced a peculiar consequence o f social policy that was
not experienced in more advanced welfare systems.
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Em ployment Insurance
As seen above, the El has three different schemes under its umbrella. This section 
focuses on the UB as an essential form o f protection for workers from market-related risks.
Table 8-14 Unemployment Benefit Systems in Selected Countries
Conditions of Entitlement
Maximum
Benefit
Duration
Gross
Replacement
Ratio
Minimum Minimum 0 . , 
Employment Waiting Suspended 
Record Period ab d ica tio n
Germany
- One year in last 
3 years
- 180 days for 
seasonal workers
None Up to 12weeks
832
weekdays
- 67 % for 
unemployed with
children
- 60 % if no 
children
,  , , . 60-80% (higher
Japan la s t^  months^ 7 days 1-3 months 300 days percentage to
lower earners)
5 months in last
Sweden 12 months prior 
to unemployment
None 60 days 450 days 75%
To be dealt
One year of last 2 with by Flat rate: from
UK complete tax 3 days specialist 6 months £29.60 to £49.15
years adjudication depending on age
officers
One year in 18
Korea months prior to 
unemployment
14 days Disqualified 210 days 50%
Note: the base years are 1995 and 1997 for Korea and the other countries respectively.
Source: (USSSA 1997; Nahm and Cho 1998: 298, 302-307)
Table 8-14 shows the basic features of the UB in Korea as compared to those in 
selected countries, and reveals three major problems regarding the scheme. It is apparent 
from the table that there are relatively strict conditions o f entitlement across the nations
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examined. As seen in the table, all the selected countries determine eligibility for the 
unemployment benefit based on the employment record of the reference period prior to 
unemployment. The Korean system requires a relatively short reference period, while the 
employment record does not appear to be much different, for example as compared with 
Germany and the UK72. However, the short reference period means a relatively long period 
of contribution commitment by workers. Thus, the Korean system places a higher entry 
barrier for the UB than do other countries.
The problem of strict conditions of entitlement is made worse by the longer waiting 
period and the rigid ‘qualification suspension’ the Korean UB system has adopted. The 
waiting period of 14 days in Korean system is twice that of Japan’s and five times that of 
the UK. Alongside this, most countries apply certain conditions to the unemployment 
benefit in order to promote an active labour market policy. For instance, the unemployed in 
all the selected countries have to register at an employment office and show their 
willingness to look for a job, and place a restriction on the benefits of those “voluntarily” 
out of employment. However, only Korea totally disqualified beneficiaries for failing to 
meet such conditions.
The relatively low benefit levels found in Korea is another feature shown in the table. 
The 50 per cent income replacement rate is the lowest ratio among the selected countries 
except for the UK where the ratio reaches a third of any earnings despite supplemented by 
other kinds of benefits. However, maximum benefit duration in Korea is much shorter than 
that of other countries. This low level of benefit and short period of benefit duration 
seriously hampered the workers’ right to economic security arising from job loss.
Finally, like other social insurance programmes in Korea, the UB scheme has no 
connection with any public assistance programmes. In contrast with those countries that 
offer a public assistance programme, such as an income-tested Jobseeker’s Allowance in 
the UK and the Unemployment Assistance in Germany (USSSA 1997: 144, 371), those
72 The comparison with Japan and Sweden shows a significant difference.
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who are able-bodied unemployed in Korea cannot receive any benefits after the termination 
of their unemployment benefit period.
This high entry barrier and low benefit level of the Korean UB can be partly attributed 
to the relatively low level of contributions and the lack o f state commitment73. However, a 
more fundamental explanation comes from the fact that the El in Korea was principally 
designed as a part of active labour market policy, and hence the UB is more a 
supplementary rather than an essential component of the El. This can be illustrated by the 
following expenditure ratios: in 1996, the ratio of the expenditure of the UB to the total El 
revenue accounted for just 14.0 per cent, while those of Work Ability Development and 
Employment Stabilisation were 7.1 per cent and 30.0 per cent respectively (Yu 2000: 191, 
Table 5). Consequently, notwithstanding the El’s contribution in the establishment of all 
the major components of social security programmes, the institutional characteristics of the 
programme put a substantial limit on its primary function, namely, social protection for 
workers and their families.
8.3 Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the development of social rights in Korea during the 
transitional period (1987-1997). Driving forces of social policy development during this 
transitional period vary in each of the services. The expansion of the MI coverage in the 
late 1980s was driven by such political factors as campaigns by civil groups and other 
electoral pressures. Therefore, Korean social policy at this time was seen as a measure by 
which the ruling elites could mollify opposition movements and to mobilise electoral 
support from the general populace. The introduction of the El in 1995 was driven by 
economic necessity, that is, to promote the competitiveness of Korean firms in order to
73 As of 1997, the total contribution rate of the UB was 0.6 per cent of total wages, which was 
equally paid for by both employers and employees, while government paid only administrative 
costs (MLA 2002: 109). However, in the Japanese system, for example, the insured pay 0.4 per 
cent of their earnings and employers pay 0.75 per cent of payroll, while government pays 25 
per cent of benefit costs as well as administration costs (USSSA 1997:197).
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accommodate to changed international circumstances. Moreover, we must also take into 
account the overwhelming influence of the ideology of neo-liberalism on Korean social 
policy, particularly from the early 1990s onwards. Under the growing demand for social 
policy from various social sectors, the imported ideology helped the government not just to 
rationalise its minimal role in welfare provision but also relegate its welfare responsibility 
to employers and individuals.
A distinctive feature of social policymaking was the incremental expansion of 
insurance coverage in a ‘top-down’ fashion, and the low level of benefits. This is in 
contrast with the process of coverage expansion that occurred in many welfare leaders. For 
instance, the coverage of the German Sickness Insurance (1883) started initially with low- 
income manual industrial workers, and then was extended to higher income earners until 
1932, gradually bringing into the programme a wide range of occupations. At the same time, 
the German programme adopted a ‘cap system’ which in 1927, for example, those who 
were earning more than 3,600 marks per year were not eligible for programme entry even if 
they belonged to eligible job categories (Leichter 1979: 125; Gordon 1988: 198). Similarly 
in Britain, prior to 1948, the National Health Insurance in 1911 began covering all wage 
earners, 16 to 65 years old, earning less than £60 per year, and then came to cover higher 
income earners (Leichter 1979: 169). National pensions and unemployment insurance 
schemes in those countries also operated under the assumption that those earning above a 
certain level of income could afford to pay or purchase private insurance (Kaim-Caudle 
1973: 205-207, 217-219; Gordon 1988: 40, 228). Accordingly, this manner of coverage 
extension better served the purposes of risk pooling and income redistribution in the 
context of social insurance provision.
In contrast, the Korean path of social security development shows a similar pattern to 
that seen in Japan, China and Latin American countries, in which the economically 
advantaged were first brought under social insurance programmes and other socially, 
economically vulnerable groups were subsequently included (Mesa-Lago 1978; Hiraishi 
1987). Such a top-down manner of coverage extension, as Mesa-Lago (1978: 7) points, is 
not consistent with Marshallian principles of social policy. Rather, the application of
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selective insurance coverage according to different job sectors and geographic regions 
fortifies existing social inequality by making occupation a pivotal source of societal 
stratification in which the entitlement to social insurance benefit becomes a privilege. 
Consequently, as in the Latin American and/or Japanese cases, Korean social insurance 
system did not aim to conform to a set of social policy principles that advocates social 
solidarity through guaranteeing social rights for citizens.
This discussion shows that, like civil and political rights (see Chapter 7), social rights 
in Korea during this transitional period were also affected by the coexistence of 
components of democratic politics and the elements of authoritarian rule. In contrast to the 
previous military regimes, post-1987 Korean society did experience growth of the same 
driving forces that were found in the development of western welfare states, namely, the 
empowerment of trade unions and the growth of civil society. Indeed, Korea’s 
authoritarianism was breaking up. However, the major process of policy development was 
steered by the state’s different interests and relative power in different welfare policy areas. 
We cannot claim that such driving forces played a critical role in the context of social 
policy development in post-1987 Korea. Marshall failed to acknowledge this kind of social 
transition and its effects on the outcome of social rights, which can be characterised as ‘a 
variant’ that has the same appearance but different contents from his ideal This led to 
difficulty in applying Marshall’s historical account of social development to the Korean 
context. More generally, a society like Korea, which is going through a transitional phase, 
requires some modification of Marshall’s approach.
At the same time, the theory of power politics does not appear to be applicable to the 
development of Korean social policy during this time. The theory claims that trade unions 
play a critical role in social policy development. In Korea of this time, however, their 
power was enhanced but attention was not paid to enhancing social rights. Nonetheless, an 
approximation seems to be found between Pierson’s thesis of path dependence and the 
development of Korean social policy. As was the case during the two military regimes in 
Korea, the dynamics of policy-making changed little. At the same time, the underlying
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principles of Korean social policy, such as the minimalist state, categorical coverage, and 
low level of benefit, remained the same.
285
Chapter 9
Conclusion
This thesis has sought to trace the evolution of Korean social policy within the 
framework of T.H.Marshall’s citizenship theory. The following questions were raised: 1) 
does Korea have the historical and cultural foundations to secure citizenship rights? 2) has 
Korea followed Marshall’s developmental path of citizenship rights? 3) how far did 
Marshall’s sequence of emerging rights hold in Korea? 4) what obstacles have hindered the 
full development of citizenship rights in Korea?, and what kind of impacts have they had on 
social policy in Korea? 5) how far do the conditions necessary for full citizenship rights and 
responsibilities exist today in Korea?
As explained in chapter one (p.24) the detailed field work for this thesis stopped in 
1997. It has therefore not been possible to discuss in any detail the significant changes that 
have occurred since then. That must wait for another study. However, in this chapter I do 
reflect on the contrast between pre-and post-1997 social policy in Korea and what it may 
tell us about the argument of the thesis.
It has been argued that civil rights are not just concerned with the emancipation of 
human beings from feudal subjecthood but also constitute the mechanism that sustains the 
modem capitalist mode of production within a stable political environment. In Marshall’s 
model, the definition of political rights gradually expanded to include the comprehensive 
entity of democratic politics. This moved from the passive expression of negative rights to 
limit arbitrary state power, to the rights of individuals to participate in the political process. 
Social rights emerged from the dialectic development of those two rights, and the welfare 
state and its programmes were defined as harbouring such basic principles as the state’s 
commitment to secure a basic standard of living and universal access to services meeting 
basic human needs.
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The logic of citizenship suggests that both capitalism and democracy are critical 
preconditions for the emergence of modem social policy. Civil and political rights become 
the foundation of social rights. The extension enabled us to employ such ideas as ‘civil 
society’, ‘labour movement’ and ‘political openness’ as criteria to analyse the development 
of civil as well as political rights in Korea. At the same time, the principles of social rights 
were used as a barometer to measure the level of social policy development. Accordingly, 
this provides a useful tool for comparative study, as civil and political rights are commonly 
defined in western society as a principal driving force of the development of the welfare 
state, and as the principles of social rights are commonly used as a benchmark to measure 
the level of welfare programmes.
Based on this analytical framework, I have taken a historical approach to answer the 
above questions. This historical approach was particularly necessary to answer the first 
three questions. This thesis examined the development of each of the elements of 
citizenship at different stages of Korean history, spanning the period between 1945 and 
1997, but additionally including the pre-modem period as it sets the preconditions for the 
modem period.
This concluding chapter consists of five subsections. The first section will summarise 
findings regarding similar features shared by Korea and western societies in the 
development of citizenship rights. The next three sections will review my findings on the 
modem history of Korean citizenship, and I will conclude by discussing the future direction 
of social citizenship in Korea, especially in the context of globalisation.
1. Common Ground
The origins of citizenship in pre-modem Korea are not the same as in western societies. 
The differences were found in the political and economic foundations of the traditional 
society, while similar features were identified in some of the social foundations. One salient 
characteristic of traditional Korean politics, which was heavily supported by the Confucian
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ideology, was the ‘dual mechanism’ by which the power of the kings was weak but the 
state structure was centralised. What made this political structure possible was the well- 
developed bureaucracy by which the ruling yangban stratum effectively limited the scope 
of the kings’ power but also imposed Confucian teachings on the people to maintain the 
status quo of the society. This political structure of pre-modem Korea helped maintain the 
continuity of the Choson dynasty by putting a strong curb on the possible growth of popular 
movements. Thus, while western dynasties were sometimes overthrown and/or changed 
into a constitutional monarchy by a civil revolution, the Korean dynasty never experienced 
such a regime overthrow.
The economic foundations of citizenship growth in Korea were also weak. This was 
attributed mainly to three reasons. First, the strong power of the monarch curtailed the 
ownership of private property by individuals and also enabled a few state-endorsed 
merchants to virtually monopolise the commercial activities of the nation. Second, 
Confucian acknowledgement of the relative merits of occupations ranked the merchant 
class at the lowest level. Third, traditional Korea was principally based on agriculture, so 
that individuals were mostly confined within the boundary of their land rather than 
travelling for trading purposes. These three factors effectively blocked not just groups of 
private merchants but also autonomous cities from developing. Accordingly, there was, in 
old Korea, very little possibility of a bourgeois class or civil society emerging.
The social foundations of Korean citizenship, however, were more conducive to the 
ideas of modem social policy. Confucian teaching, a cornerstone of Korean culture, was 
interpreted as regulating various aspects of human life. First of all, it understood human 
beings not as individuals but in the realm of group identity, thus emphasising the notion of 
duty rather than rights. This helped fortify the king’s political grip on the society on the one 
hand, but also helped to define the king’s obligation for improving the people’s well-being, 
as exemplified by the wangdo chdngch 7 (politics of Kingly Way). Second, Confucianism 
greatly esteemed the ideas of humanitarianism and social solidarity as evidenced by the 
minbon sasang (people-oriented thoughts) and the taedong sahoe (society with great 
solidarity).
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These principles were well embedded in social institutions in pre-modem Korea. The 
emphasis on individuals’ duty contributed to the development of social protection based on 
the precept to serve family and community. Filial piety, one of the most valued virtues in 
Confucian teaching, functioned to provide primary protection to family members. Along 
with the people-oriented thought, the notion of a king’s obligation for his people’s well­
being contributed to the establishment of various state welfare measures, although some 
were short-lived, for poverty relief and health care. The principle of taedong sahoe was 
interpreted into the growth of such civil organisations as the kye and the turye that 
functioned as a mutual help system for community members to better cope with financial 
insecurity and labour shortages. Such organisations were all identified as harbouring such 
basic principles of citizenship as civil participation and social solidarity, the kye in 
particular having the additional function of banking or insurance with a horizontal 
redistributive effect, as well as containing the potential to develop into a trade union 
movement and friendly societies such as developed in western societies.
Accordingly, all these traits revealed that traditional Korea did have the potential to 
develop a civil society, which led to the provisional conclusion that the pre-modem Korea 
was a potential ‘seed-bed’ society for citizenship growth. This conclusion was supported by 
the fact that the absolute power of the Korean king began to be challenged at the end of the 
Choson dynasty with social reform movements, initiated by elites and the populace and 
sometimes imposed by foreign powers, pressing for a more equal society. The period also 
witnessed the growth of a free market, the emergence of a merchant class, and civil 
organisations.
The momentum of pre-modem Korea moving towards a modem society was held back, 
and those foundations of Korean citizenship were severely damaged by Japanese 
colonisation. Politically, the colonisation replaced the monarchy, but did not institute a 
constitution-backed government to lead the country. Instead, the Japanese Governor- 
General exercised wide-ranging authority for governing the colony. This prevented the 
Korean people from developing during this period basic civil rights such as freedom of the 
press, expression and association, equality before the law, and free movement.
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Economically, the land survey, which Japan conducted in Korea as its first colonial 
business, led to the fortification of the pre-modem land tenure system. This survey resulted 
in the appropriation of much of the natural resources for the colonial purposes of Japan. 
This first led to the dissolution of the landowner class in Korea. Along with the Company 
Law of 1910 that banned rights to native ownership of industrial company, the land survey 
rooted out the possibility of the growth of bourgeois class as a driving force of civil society 
development. At the same time, the exploitative economic policy downgraded most farmers 
to a tenant or vagabond status, and furthermore precluded the emergence of a new labour 
class and free commercial cities.
This economic destruction naturally accompanied the destruction of the social 
foundations of Korean citizenship. Economic hardship and the imperial war mobilisation by 
Japan during the 1930s and early 1940s created a large volume of forced-migration, both 
internally and on an international level. Along with the coercive oppression and the 
reorganisation of the administrative system, this led to a virtual dismantlement of the 
traditional systems of family and community on which the social foundation of Korean 
citizenship had built up. This first created the problem of labour shortages in rural areas and 
increasing social problems in urban areas. However, its more serious effect was the 
dissolution and/or the characteristic transformation of the indigenous mutual help system 
such as the kye and the turye. At the end of the colonial rule, the autonomous organisations 
had virtually lost their genuine functions. This means that Japanese colonisation hampered 
the traditional form of civil organisations in Korea from developing into modem forms 
such as trade union.
In sum, it could be argued that Japanese colonisation might have helped Korea move 
from a pre-modem to a modem society by introducing modernisation elements such as new 
technology for agriculture and transportation and modem education system, and by 
dissolving the indigenous landowner class. However, the colonisation did not bring about a 
structural break from pre-modem to modem society in Korea. Rather, it reinforced the 
conditions of the old society as evidenced by the increased number of tenants and the 
failure of the native landowners to develop into commercial capital. At the same time, the
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mass migration of Koreans did not bring in the same result as seen in western 
industrialisation process, as the majority of the migrants returned to their native villages 
after liberalisation, instead of remaining in urban areas and becoming industrial workers.
2. Civil Rights
The liberation and the subsequent American occupation of Korea seemed to herald 
bright prospects for Korean citizenship, and led to the introduction of liberal democracy 
and capitalism to Korea. The events granted Korean people at least two (civil and political) 
citizenship rights, and a foundation on which social rights could have grown. However, 
imported concepts of citizenship rights, which lacked any substantial history of 
development, did not take root in social institutions.
During the period of the nation building, the nation’s failure to assimilate citizenship 
rights was mainly due to the consequences of the American occupation. This first drove 
Korea to the centre of the international cold war confrontation and eventually led to the 
division of the peninsula into the two Koreas. Second, the occupation brought to the society 
both the idea of a liberal democracy and powerful anti-communism. Third, the occupation 
made the Korean economy heavily dependent on an international market, mainly American. 
Fourth, by enabling the legacy of Japanese colonialism to survive in post-liberation Korea, 
it helped a conservative authoritarian regime to take root in the society.
The combined effects of these four conditions were detrimental to citizenship growth in 
Korea. Economically, they caused land reform to fail. In combination with the uneven 
distribution of the former Japanese property, the failed land reform led to the concentration 
of economic resources in the hands of a few owners. Thus capitalism lacked the important 
component of competition from the outset. This prevented a bourgeois class from emerging 
as a driving force of economic development as well as of social change. Instead, what 
emerged was a mixed political and business class, which has dominated the political 
economy of Korea during the state-led economic development.
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Politically, these conditions gave birth to a form of an ‘imperial presidency’ in which 
the president was able to exercise enhanced power across the political spectrum. Along 
with the ideology of anti-communism, this helped the president to effectively oppress his 
political opponents as well as civil movements. Basic elements of democratic politics such 
as parliamentary democracy, party politics and a progressive political party were largely 
absent from the beginning of modem post-war history.
Socially, the combined effects wrecked havoc on the popular movements such as 
nationalist, civil organisations and trade unions that were on the verge of developing 
immediately after the nation’s liberation. All this made society develop along the lines of 
conservative authoritarianism, with little scope for the growth of civil society and 
democratic politics in Korea. Unfortunately, post-war reconstruction in Korea was a 
process that made the imported elements of welfare institutions develop in the context of 
authoritarian politics.
This authoritarian politics became consolidated in Korea by two military regimes 
between 1960s and 1980s. From the outset, the two regimes struggled to legitimise their 
illegal seizure of power by maximising the economic growth of the country. During the 
Park reign, this was expressed through a rapid industrialisation, and during the Chun 
regime through economic management. The economic policies of the regimes were 
successful in achieving their declared objectives, but at a heavy cost to socio-political 
institutions. The need for ‘a peaceful society’ was assumed as a precondition for them.
Both the state-led economic policy and concerns to foster a peaceful society generated 
two distinctive features in Korea. First of all, the previous coalition between the political 
community and industry was further reinforced. This led to the concentration of economic 
resources under the control of a few businessmen as agents of industrialisation and in turn 
to their subjugation to political interests of the state leadership. Meanwhile, this resulted in 
the restricted development of small and medium-sized businesses. Consequently, Korean 
society did not see the development of a bourgeois class who could effectively espouse an 
agenda of social reform. Rather, the state-led industrialisation finally destroyed the
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foundation for the bourgeois growth in Korea that had been waning since the colonial 
period. This meant that Korean society lost one of the driving forces for building a civil 
society. There was no possibility for a liberal revolution.
Second, the economic fluctuations and social disturbances during the two regimes 
resulted in the curtailing of imperial presidential power. This became particularly evident 
with the introduction of the Yusin Constitution in 1972. The new Constitution not only 
enabled the president to more actively utilise the traditional sources of the authoritarian 
politics such as anti-communism and national security, but also granted new fools of 
political control and repression as evidenced by the Presidential Emergency Measure 
(PEM) and the rights to incapacitate the NA and the Judiciary. While the republic was 
undergoing rapid economic growth, the political norm became one of authoritarianism. 
During the two regimes, Korean society was under a state of ‘national emergency’ or 
‘quasi-fascism’ that was engineered by the state leadership.
Both the demise of the possibility of a liberal revolution and the consolidation of 
authoritarian politics limited the civil rights of Korean citizens. During the 1960s and 1970s, 
authoritarian control was expressed mainly through the relentless campaign of anti­
communism and the issues of national security as represented by Anticommunist Act 
(ACA), National Security Law (NSL), Korea Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), and the 
PEM. During the 1980s, the control was practiced mainly through the more ubiquitously 
applied tool, Law Concerning Assembly and Demonstration (LCAD), in addition to 
ideological measures. The policy of maintaining a peaceful society deprived Korean people 
of access to basic rights such as the freedom of the press, association and publication. This 
naturally induced the growth of anti-regime, democratisation movements in the society, 
which would later contribute to the advancement of civil and political rights of citizens. 
However, the state power was too strong and the civil sectors were too weak during this 
period to allow for a transition to a participatory civil society.
Trade unions were an example of the specific targets most frequently identified by the 
‘peaceful society’ policies, though it applied to the society in general. From the outset of
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the state-led economic policy, the working class has been under almost constant control of 
the state. This was mainly due to the dependency of the Korean economy on foreign trade. 
Throughout all industrialisation policies from the ISI through to the HCI, the dependent 
economy required the local economy to maintain the comparative advantage in 
international trading, which is typified by low production costs such as cheap labour.
This led to the emergence of state corporatism in Korea, in which the state had the 
working class economically included but politically excluded, on behalf of the interests of 
capital. This political exclusion made the state employ various control measures, direct and 
indirect, running from the state-established central trade union to a great number of labour- 
related laws. At the same time, the conventional tools of social control such as the 
ideological assaults and the imperial power of presidents were frequently used as a method 
of labour oppression. Through the state-established FKTU, the government was able to 
effectively manage even the local branches of labour unions. Through a great variety of 
legal restrictions, it deprived the workers of basic labour rights, as well as relentlessly 
intimidating labour leaders and shutting down existing unions. These state-dominated 
industrial relations were universally found throughout the two regimes, but particularly 
evident during the Chun regime.
Consequently, Korean workers were not successful in establishing an independent 
organisation until the early 1990s. Throughout the period of the two military regimes, they 
mounted protests, which were conducted in an uncoordinated fashion, isolated from other 
workers as well as other sectors of the society and ultimately crushed by the state. This 
produced several symptoms in Korean industrial relations. First, it led to low rates of 
unionisation. Second, it generated a sharp dualisation of the labour movement between 
leaders and common members. Third, it led to the isolation of the working class from the 
general populace, resulting in a lack of popular support for their movements. In the short 
term, these resulted in the absence of bargaining power on the labour side. In the long run, 
they prevented the Korean working class from building up their own political power base. 
They were neither able to send representatives to the NA nor establish their own political 
party.
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1987 marked a turning point in Korea, leading to substantial changes in socio-politics. 
This turning point was made possible by the mass uprisings that eventually subjugated the 
authoritarian politics to the people’s demand for democratisation. The Constitution was 
amended to restrict the imperial power of the president and to give more autonomy to the 
society. Various legal restrictions on civil rights were also amended and/or abolished, so 
that people came to have basic legal rights as citizens. At the same time, along with the 
revisions of labour laws, the labour movement showed unprecedented growth by that time. 
In many respects, it was evident that the turning point in 1987 helped Korean people regain 
civil rights to a significant extent.
However, this change did not mean all constraints were swept away at once. There still 
remained the legacies of authoritarian politics in every comer of politics which hindered the 
society from achieving rapid social reform. Despite the substantial curtailment of imperial 
power, the president still stood at the centre of political processes. Although there was bold 
challenge from the social sectors, the tools of ideological control such the NSL and the 
KCIA still were in place. ‘Boss politics’ that have long dominated the modem history of 
Korean politics made the political processes revolve around a few charismatic political 
leaders. This led to the break down of a previously cohesive social movement, into 
scattered interest groups.
The effects of this breakdown were detrimental on the society. The labour movement, 
which experienced record growth after the 6.29 declaration in 1987, went into decline, 
losing probably one of the best opportunities to grow into a political force. They were still 
not able to either send a representative to the NA or establish a political party, of their own. 
The increasing power of the working class did, however, lead to the establishment of an 
independent central organisation, the KCTU. But, the democratic organisation was never 
legalised or allowed to participate in the political processes. The basic structure of state 
corporatism remained virtually intact. The Korean working class remained divided.
Civil organisations did develop rapidly to promote various socio-politico-economic 
issues in the wake of the unfrozen civil rights. But, their growth was mainly based on a
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small section of the middle class, rather than on broad grass-roots support. This helped a 
few leaders of civil organisations successfully advance into institutional politics. But, it also 
predisposed these organisations to develop conservative characteristics in pursuing social 
reforms, which made it unlikely for them to become a unified social force or to demand 
radical reforms. Instead, they were driven to the edge of politics, leaving them peripheral to 
the main in the political processes. While civil organisations were weak, some powerful 
interest groups did emerge as exemplified by the National Association of Physicians and 
the Korean Association of Medicine. More seriously, the divided labour unions began to 
pursue their own sectional interests, rather than being united over the issues of social 
reform in general. This was typified by the conflicts between the Regional MI unions and 
the Enterprise MI unions over the issue of medical insurance reform.
The discussion on civil rights in Korea reveals that they had been in fact under constant 
state oppression since 1945 until 1987. The democratic transition of the society from 1987 
certainly helped the reinstatement of basic rights. But, this process took place within a very 
short span of time, thus lacking a substantial history of civil institutions, and was not 
embedded in a long history of social struggle as in the West. There was growth in some 
civil and interest groups. But it was not the growth of a rich civil society in which a 
common good is pursued by the general citizens’ consensus and/or support. This was a 
limitation not just of the Korean expression of civil rights but also of the civil society in 
Korea.
3. Political Rights
The development of political rights, or democracy, in Korea progressed on quite a 
similar track as civil rights. Along with the inception of nationhood, the Korean people 
were granted the right to vote and thus to participate in political process. But it did not 
mean that democratic politics had been substantially established in the society.
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Parliamentary democracy was hardly seen in Korean politics until 1987. Like civil rights, 
politics was under the constant control and oppression by the authoritarian leaders.
The modem history of Korean politics began with conservative politicians occupying 
the central stage of politics. President Rhee is considered to be a prototype of authoritarian 
conservative. The NA was dominated by the reactive pro-Japanists and other such vested 
interests. Under the vortex of political instability of that time, the emergence of the 
authoritarian conservative regime meant that Korean democracy was in a very fragile state. 
The institutions of democratic politics such as the NA and political parties were brought 
under the control of the state leadership as a tool of sustaining their political bases. The NA 
was sometimes utilised to extend the Rhee’s presidency. Politicians in opposition parties 
were made a frequent target of ideological assault.
This fragile foundation o f democratic politics further deteriorated under the two 
military regimes. The military coups, which brought them to power, began by dissolving 
the NA and restricting political rights of politicians and other social figures. The 
culmination of this autocratic politics came with the introduction of the Yusin Constitution. 
The Constitution did not just deprive the Korean people of the right to elect their leader 
through the democratic ballot. It also granted the president substantial control over the 
Assembly and free way to engineer the political process. The Constitution empowered the 
president to nominate a third of the entire lawmakers as well as to dissolve the Assembly. 
Furthermore, under the Constitution, the Assembly could not conduct its genuine role of 
auditing the government offices.
The institutional characteristics of the autocratic rule changed little in the 1980 
Constitution. Although it was amended to reinstate the balance of power within the 
government, the people were still not able to choose the president. Instead of abolishing the 
lawmaker nomination system, it introduced the proportional representation system in which 
the president was privileged to nominate a large number of assemblymen as the chairperson 
of the ruling party. The Assembly was still under the firm control of the president. All these 
arrangements effectively prohibited democratic politics from growing in Korea.
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Substantial changes came in 1987. The revised Constitution enabled the people to elect 
the president through a universal, equal, secret and direct vote. The power of the NA was 
enhanced, so that it is now protected from dissolution by the president. In addition, it was 
again bestowed with the right to audit the government offices and to check any arbitrary 
use of power by the president. Prima facie, this series of institutional changes was finalised 
in 1988 when the general election enabled three former opposition parties to occupy the 
majority of NA seats for the first time in Korean political history
However, the changes failed to sweep away the old convention of authoritarian politics. 
Korean politics had been monopolised virtually by one ruling party for some 35 years since 
the Park regime till 1997. This generated situation whereby a handful of leaders dominated 
political parties and the resulting practice of bossism governed the parliamentary processes. 
One consequence of this characteristic was the re-emergence of the conservative regime 
even after the electoral victory of the opposition. This destroyed the structure in which the 
opposition parties dominated the NA and enabled those politicians who subscribed to such 
old-style politics to regain power. Party politics were still far away from maturity. Despite 
its growing power, the Assembly hardly reflected public opinions on various social issues. 
Neither did it properly perform the role of policy maker.
4. Social Rights
The modem development of social rights, or social policy, in Korea began with the 
dissolution of the traditional forms of welfare provision and the introduction of the poor 
relief programmes by the colonial Japan. Introduced under the colonial regime, the 
programmes served as an instrument to control the society, to Japanise Koreans and to 
conduct war mobilisation. Instead of harbouring the general principles of social policy such 
as redistribution and social solidarity, modem social policy in Korea began with traits such 
as instrumentalism, paternalism and authoritarianism. Some of these characteristics, 
instrumentalism in particular, persisted as a major principle of social policy making,
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especially from the Park regime, though interpreted in a different context74. Thus, the 
colonial period was the first stage of the modem formation of Korean social policy.
The period of American occupation and the authoritarian Rhee regime was a second 
stage in which new principles were added to Korean social policy. Unlike their systematic 
structuring of Japanese social policy in the post-war period, the American military 
government in Korea took poverty relief and the maintenance of public health as the basic 
limited purposes of social policy. This enabled the Japanese policies on the poverty relief 
measures play principal role in the state’s welfare efforts. In these circumstances, the basic 
principles of social policy such as redistribution and social solidarity were not imbedded in 
the welfare programmes. On the other hand, the American military government introduced 
the American system of welfare administration in which the role of private and voluntary 
organisations claimed priority, with the state maintaining a minimalist stance. This new 
trend was essentially an off-shoot of the Japanese style of poverty policy, the operation of 
which was mainly under the government control.
Under the Rhee regime, this trend was taken further. The government did not show any 
interest in a broader set of social policies. Welfare policy was still grounded on poverty 
relief. With the exception of the Japanese introduced Korea Relief Order, no new anti­
poverty programmes were introduced by the government. It still relied heavily on the role 
of the private, voluntary sector as provider of social services. This lack of state commitment 
to welfare was evidenced in the case of Retirement Benefit Scheme for the workers, in 
which the state was not required to contribute to the scheme. Indeed, during the American 
military government and the Rhee regime, another principle of Korean social policy was 
added to those inherited from the Japanese period, the minimalist state -  one that still 
appears with respect to social policy making in Korea.
From the economic point of view, this minimalist state can be attributed to the fact that 
the government did not have enough resources to implement welfare programmes. By that
74 During the colonial period, social policy was an instrument to control the society. Since 
industrialisation began, it was often used to sustain economic policy as seen in the cases of 
National Pension and Employment Insurance. This will be discussed later in this chapter.
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time, the Korean economy was suffering from the destruction of the Korean War. Virtually 
no welfare demands were expressed by the civil and political groups. Scholars of the 
development of the western welfare sates, however, do see social crisis such as war and/or 
an outbreak of a mass social contingency as a springboard for the expansion of the welfare 
state. This was particularly true during the early post-World War II period (Titmuss 1976; 
Castles 2001). In Korea of that time, the same conditions failed to provide such an impetus.
The two military regimes were critical to the development of Korean social policy. In 
many aspects, the period can be regarded as the formative period for modem Korean social 
policy. State welfare programmes were introduced and laid an institutional foundation for 
future programmes. As widely recognised, however, the period was also the time when the 
authoritarian politics, represented by the imperial power of the president, reached its apex. 
The intermingling of these two conditions not just consolidated the principle of the 
minimalist state but also created a idiosyncratic pattern in Korean social policy.
The political system during that period was authoritarian characterised by the imperial 
power of the president. This system generated exclusiveness of policy making in which 
major state policies were initiated and determined, under the guidance of the president’s 
policy direction, by the leader and a few officials around him; ideas from the civil and 
political groups were neither considered for discussion nor were they ever reflected in 
policy decisions. As the primary attention of the two presidents was paid to success in 
economic policy and national security, social policy was placed on the periphery of the 
policy agenda. At the same time, this policy orientation led to an imbalance of 
organisational power between the economic ministries and the welfare ministries: while the 
former, working close to the president, enjoyed an significant power in the administration, 
the latter were always placed at the periphery.
This exclusive policy network dominated social policy making in Korea during that 
period. In this circumstance, there had to be a strong supporter in the government or 
president’s directive, if welfare programmes were to be successfully introduced to the 
society. In the early 1960s, this appeared in the way that a small number of social policy
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experts, or the SSC, initiated the introduction of social security programmes. But due to 
their weak organisational power and the lack of political openness, they had to make use of 
informal channels, that is, to contact high-ranking officials whom they knew in the political 
inner circle and to persuade them to influence the president. The early 1960s’ programmes 
such as the Basic Law Concerning Social Security (BLCSS), the Industrial Accident 
Insurance (IAI), and the Medical Insurance (MI) came about in this manner. In a similar 
vein, the decision to introduce National Welfare Pension (NWP) was made by the director 
of the KDI persuading President Park in the early 1970s. The formal launch of the MI in 
1977 was made possible because there was the president’s directive and his unusual interest 
in the programme. The first reform movement to transform the societies-based MI to a 
unified system was frustrated by one simple fact, that is, the president’s wilL Thus, the 
policy making through the exclusive policy network had become a dominant rule in Korea 
social policy by the end of two military regimes.
In this context, what emerged was an idiosyncratic ‘Korean pattern’ of social policy. 
Owing to the lack of public interest in social policy as well as of a substantial commitment 
on the part of the state leadership, Korean social policy developed on the bases of three 
more principles, in addition to the two inherited principles of the minimalist state and 
instrumentalism: economic-centred state policy, administrative convenience, and 
gradualism in coverage expansion. Accordingly, these five principles became a guide 
directing the development of Korean social policy since the 1960s.
From the outset of the Park regime, the economic-centred policy determined the 
direction of the government attitude on social security programmes, fortifying the principle 
of the minimalist state. This was evidenced by the modification and the elimination of the 
original bill of the BLCSS, which eventually released the state from any financial 
commitment to the social security programmes. The 1973 NWP also supports this case, as 
it was initiated in order to mobilise domestic capital for industrialisation and was 
terminated due to the economic recession in the early 1970s. Administrative convenience 
meant that the new programmes were basically modelled on Japanese ones. The adaptation 
of the societies-based administration system in the MI was a typical example. The same
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reasoning led to the segmentation and gradualism in expanding coverage to take root in all 
the programmes during this period. The state adopted the top-down manner of coverage 
expansion, by arguing that it would be difficult to assess the incomes of non-wage earners. 
Finally, the instrumentalism was found in the cases of the NWP and the MI: the one as a 
tool to mobilise domestic capital and the other partially as a means to achieve a 
‘demonstration effect’ amidst the regime competition with North Korea. It would not be an 
exaggeration to state that these principles were the main determinants of Korean social 
policy at this time.
The combined effects of all the principles, however, were detrimental to the 
advancement of Korean social policy, and in particular for the principles of social rights. Of 
all the programmes discussed in the Park regime, the only one implemented within the 
planned time was the IAI. The MI was put in operation 14 years after its legislation and the 
NWP not during the military regimes. This low rate of programme implementation clearly 
failed to provide a national minimum of social protection for Korean citizens. Furthermore, 
even successfully implemented, the categorical coverage, especially in top-down manner, 
prevented the idea of social solidarity from coming true through redistribution. In a more 
strict sense, being insured and receiving the benefits of social security was a privilege 
among Koreans. This hampered the idea of solidarity taking root. It was indeed a ‘reverse 
discrimination’, the insured population being the one in established wage earning sectors, 
not the poor.
The mass democratisation movement in the second half of the 1980s provided a great 
momentum forward for Korean social policy. In 1988, the dormant programmes, such as 
the NP, were finally put in operation, and the categorical programmes like the MI grew to 
have more comprehensive coverage. Along with this, in 1995, the El was finally 
implemented as the last component of Korean social security system, giving a semblance of 
a welfare state to Korea. This series of actions and the expansion of welfare programmes in 
post-1987 Korea were attributed to the growing civil and political power of citizens and 
their enhanced interest in social policy, as well as the cornered situation of the state 
leadership. For example, when President Chun proclaimed ‘the Measures for Improving
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National Welfare’, he was conscious of elections, general as well as presidential, being 
around the comer.
However, the post-1987 period was also the time when the new ideology of new 
conservatism, or neo-liberalism was introduced to the society. Despite the growing interests 
in social policy from various sectors of the society, the ideology helped the state further 
justify its basic stance of the minimal state in social policy. At the same time, the ideology 
also justified the state to delegate a substantial part of its welfare responsibility to private 
sectors such as employers under the name of ‘welfare pluralism’. Without a proper 
foundation laid for the state welfare, the ideology made the society follow the western path 
of welfare state retrenchment.
This meant that the basic traits of the exclusive social policy making had not yet 
changed. This was partly because the civil sectors failed to maintain their unity, and partly 
because the NA was still occupied with the issue of democratisation. A more fundamental 
reason, however, was derived from the fact that Korean politics still operated in the old 
framework of ‘bossism’ that eventually led to the advent of conservative regime in post- 
1987 Korea. Compared with the previous military regimes, there appeared to be more room 
for labour unions and employer organisations to express their opinions on the policy­
making processes. But, their opinions were hardly reflected in the final decisions. As seen 
in the case of the NP, the decision-making was principally led by the EPB. In the 
deliberation of the El, the MLA, the MCR and the EPB took the initiatives. In the 
meantime, the MHSA was staying on the peripheral edge of policy discussions in both 
cases. This point is further supported by the fact that it was President Chun’s proclamation 
of the Measures that led to the implementation and expansion of several welfare 
programmes, and that the second reform movement of the MI was frustrated by President 
Roh’s veto, despite the fact that the reform bill was unanimously passed in the NA.
Both the survival of the exclusive policy network and the intrusion of the new ideology 
helped the five principles of Korean social policy persist until 1997. Administrative 
convenience helped the old structures of the welfare programmes, the original designs of
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which had been drawn in the Park regime, to survive during this period as well. The 
original form of the NP in 1988 was basically based on the NWP in 1973, with the same 
structure and object preserved. The coverage expansion of the MI to the whole population 
between the late 1980s and the early 1990s was carried out without structural change to the 
programmes. Therefore, Marshall’s idea of full social rights did not pertain to the welfare 
programmes of that time.
The principle of the minimalist state persisted throughout this period. Despite the 
expansion and implementation of new welfare programmes, the state stuck to the principle 
of the bipartite system in social security contribution. The Korean government’s social 
security budget never exceeded 1 per cent of GDP till 1997. The amount of the 
government’s contribution to social security funds was always below that of employers. An 
international comparison with the selected OECD countries provided a clearer image of this 
Korean phenomenon. Throughout the post-1987 period till 1997, Korea spent an average 
2.54 per cent of GDP on social policy. However, this does not mean that Korea was weaker 
than other countries in terms of economic power. As stated in Chapter 8, Korea spent much 
less on social policy than those countries at a similar stage of economic development. It 
indicates that the Korean government neglected its welfare responsibility. Sen’s dictum that 
economic development should be assessed with reference to the level o f the state 
commitment to social protection did not apply in the Korean case (Sen 1999).
The principle of universality was never achieved by any social security programmes 
except the MI. Due to the gradual expansionism in service coverage; most Koreans were 
outside the social protections and heavily reliant on private or company welfare. In the case 
of the NP, the total proportion of the insurants to the population over age 15 was only 24 
per cent in 1997, leaving the most vulnerable sector of the population in income insecurity. 
In the same year, the El covered only 19.8 per cent of the economically active population. 
With this low take-up rate of the programmes, it can hardly be expected that social 
solidarity via redistribution will occur. Instead, the phenomenon of a ‘reverse 
discrimination’ still applied.
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The principle of adequacy reveals a similar story as that of universality. 
Notwithstanding the relatively high rate of income replacement, the rum sum refund system 
of the NP was more likely to take pension rights from the elderly, than guaranteeing the 
aged of long-term protection against income loss. Despite its universal coverage, the MI 
generated problems with inequality on many levels. Firstly, the society-based system 
generated ‘an inequity of contribution’ as well as ‘an inequity between insurance societies’. 
Secondly, the co-payment system led to the problem of low levels of benefit and high levels 
of private payment. Finally, the limited access to medical services in rural areas generated 
‘regional inequity’ between the urban and rural areas. These inequity problems were made 
worse by other factors such as the lack of sickness benefit and the limits on service duration 
and service items. All these traits of the MI not only limited the possibility of risk pooling 
and redistribution, but also restricted the people’s rights to health. Instead, what the 
programme generated was a Korean type of social stratification that is based on different 
income groups, job categories and geographical regions, but not on social class. The El, 
examined through the Unemployment Benefit Scheme, revealed such problems as a high 
entry barrier, low benefit levels, a short period of maximum benefit duration, and no 
connection with the public assistance programme. 50 per cent of the income replacement 
rate and 210 days of benefit duration was the lowest (except the UK which uses a flat-rate 
system) and the shortest in the compared countries. In conclusion, up until 1997 no benefits 
of social security programmes were considered to be sufficient to sustain Korean citizens in 
the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society; this drove 
many to become largely reliant on private welfare measures.
The principles of instrumentalism and economic-centred policy were typically found in 
the motive of introducing the EL The programme was introduced as a part of a labour 
market policy, that is, to increase labour flexibility. But, one noteworthy point is that 
developmentalism, the traditional tenet of Korean social policy, seemed to fade away in the 
policy making process of the EI. Instead, what took over was the idea of segyehwa 
(globalisation). This fear of global competition justified keeping down the costs of the 
welfare sectors.
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Nonetheless, there is one critical point to be made regarding the policy making process 
of the EI. The El came about in a rather different fashion of policy making, compared to the 
other programmes implemented ahead of it. First of all, there was ‘a national consensus’ on 
introducing the programme notwithstanding the different interests expressed by the groups 
involved in it. More importantly, the policy interests of both trade union and employers ’ 
organisations began to be reflected in the deliberation courses, which had not been seen 
before at all Accordingly, both the coverage and the benefit levels of the UB were 
determined as a result of the agreement between labour and the employer. The issue over 
whether employers could utilise the severance reserve fund could not be decided due to the 
bold reaction from the labour. This different style of policy making does not mean that the 
exclusive nature of policy network had disappeared. But, it denotes that possibilities for 
participation were gradually opening up, so that traditionally excluded groups could more 
freely express their interests in the policy making.
To answer the abovementioned research questions, this study on the development of 
citizenship in Korea has argued that traditional Korea possessed, to some extent, the 
foundations of citizenship rights: social foundations were relatively well established, while 
political and economic ones began to burgeon by the end of the Choson dynasty. But the 
study also revealed that Korean citizenship did not follow Marshall’s developmental 
trajectory. The foundations of citizenship were destroyed while the society was in grip of 
colonial control, and thus did not take root in modem Korean society. In this situation, all 
three rights of citizenship in Korea were imported at once by foreign powers at the same 
time as nationhood commenced, which presents a contrasting image to the European or 
British experience of citizenship development.
Focusing on social rights, this study identified five major driving forces of Korean 
social policy: the economy-centred state policy, the minimalist state, administrative 
conveniences, gradualism in coverage expansion, and instrumentalism. At the same time, 
the five principles helped Korea create a semblance of a welfare state. However, they also 
made Korean social policy inconsistent with Marshall’s notion of social rights as expressed 
by such principles as the state commitment to welfare, universalism and adequate benefits.
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The salient features of Korean social policy are the lack of the state responsibility for 
welfare, the exclusion of the socially weak from the service protection, and inadequate 
level of benefits.
This discussion of the development of citizenship in Korea suggests several features 
that are new to existing studies of Korean social policy. Firstly, it suggests that previous 
studies have ignored many important factors in understanding the development of Korean 
social policy. They ignored the deep traditions of the pre-modem Korea in which Korean’s 
social relations were strongly based on mutuality and co-operation through civil 
organisations. They failed to take into account the importance of Japanese colonialism and 
its consequence on the trajectory of the development of Korean social policy. Finally they 
ignored the consequences of military dictatorship on the trajectory, in which the oppressed 
civil and political rights led to the underdevelopment of social rights. All these factors are 
of great importance in understanding the current outcomes of social citizenship in Korea.
Secondly, this study reveals that the existing approaches to the study of comparative 
social policy do not explain the development of Korean social policy. It seems that neither 
the modernisation approach nor the class stmggle theory is appropriate frameworks to 
analyse the development. Korea has not followed the path of citizenship growth as 
described by Marshall, and social policy programmes were introduced at lower level of 
modernisation than the European countries (Abbott and DeViney 1992; Hort and Kuhnle 
2000). It has also never experienced a democratic struggle for the expansion of social 
protection. However, the framework of path dependence does appear to be partially 
acceptable, but, only if the modem period of social policy development in Korea is taken 
into account, because it has been basically guided by the five principles. But, it does not 
hold, if the pre-modem time is included in our consideration. There was a structural break 
produced by the Japanese colonisation.
Third, the study confirms the widely accepted proposition that welfare states differ and 
reflect their origins in the history of each country. Nevertheless, it challenges the 
conventional ‘welfare regime’ approach that is widely used in the recent comparative study
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of social policy. Korea seems to belong to none of the three welfare regimes distinguished 
by Esping-Andersen (1990). It is certain that Korea cannot be categorised as a social 
democratic welfare state. But, it also cannot be argued that the country belongs exclusively 
to either liberal regime or conservative corporatist one.
Korea might be said to come under the category of a liberal welfare regime. It has a 
modest level of benefits, strict entitlement rules, and stigma attached to its welfare services, 
but many of the countries in this category do achieve at least the goal of universal minimal 
poor relief. Korea fails in this respect. The corporatist regime, defined by Glennerster 
(2001: 173) as being the same as Titmuss’s industrial-achievement model, also shows some 
similarities with the Korean case, in that it “attaches rights to class and status” and 
emphasises “the preservation of traditional familyhood” (Esping-Andersen 1990: 27). The 
‘reverse discrimination’ identified in the Korean case seems to conform to the notion of 
preserving class and status through welfare programmes. In addition, the accentuation of 
familialism has been the well-established tradition in the Korean case. However, if the 
point is to be considered that in the countries of this regime, “private insurance and 
occupational fringe benefits play a truly marginal role” (Esping-Andersen 1990: 327), the 
Korean case does not show any similarity with them Due to the neglected welfare 
responsibility of the state, a great part of Korean welfare provisions were made through 
individual or corporate participation. In a nutshell, the Korean version of the welfare state 
does not fit really into any one of the three regimes.
This kind of discussion appears to support the argument that the comparative study of 
social policy based on the regime categorisation may be “illusive”, though it still provides a 
useful tool (Davis 2001; Kasza 2002). In this context, Holliday (2000) proposes that 
Korean social policy is a part of a fourth regime of ‘productivity welfare regime’ in which 
social policy is subordinated to economic policy. But, this new categorisation seems to 
support only one principle out of the five defined in the development of Korean social 
policy: economy-centred state policy. Jones’s classification of a Korean welfare state as a 
part o f ‘oikonomic’ or ‘Confucian’ welfare regime (Jones 1990, 1993) also does not seem 
to be wholly acceptable, since the traditional Confucian values are currently experiencing a
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gradual decline in Korea. For instance, a sample survey on 1,010 Koreans in October 1998 
shows that 83 per cent answered that the state should take welfare responsibility for citizens 
(Shin and Rose 1998: 35). The majority of Korean people now put the state first, before 
their families and/or individual responsibility, as the bearer of primary responsibility for 
welfare provision.
More importantly, this study alerts to a potential risk associated with comparative 
studies of social policy. As testified by the Korean welfare state, the regime approach in 
comparative study could lead to the over-generalisation of specific cases. Such an over­
generalisation could cause a ‘blindness’ on the part of social policy analysts to the details of 
welfare programmes in a specific country. For instance, despite possessing such 
praiseworthy features of the welfare state having all the social security programmes well 
implemented, leading to favourable assessments form overseas commentators (Goodman, 
White, and Kwon 1998a; Jacobs 2000), the Korean welfare state, as we have found, has 
never been successful in planting the idea of social citizenship. More seriously, it has been 
reported that welfare service institutions in Korea, which had the support of foreign aid and 
are currently subsidised by the government for their operation, violate human rights, not to 
mention social rights, of residents, including the forced sterilisation of women with 
disabilities (Oh 1999a; Im 2001). Marshall’s broad principles of citizenship rights do 
provide critical reference points for comparative social policy scholars to keep vigilant for 
the detailed differences in various welfare states.
5. Whither Korean Social Policy?
The year 1997 in Korea commenced with two unprecedented events in its history: 
financial crisis and the advent of Kim Dae Jung government. The financial crisis and the 
subsequent intervention of international organisations such as the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank means that Korean economy was not just fully absorbed 
into global economy, but also driven on the verge of collapse with a great deal of resultant
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social problems. The advent of the Kim government denotes that democratic politics were 
gaining an unusual momentum towards consolidation. It was the first power change from a 
ruling party to an opposition party in modem Korean history. At the same time, President 
Kim had a reputation as the most progressive, reform-minded political leader in the country. 
This combination of two events made Korea enter an era of globalisation as well as 
democratic consolidation. Under this circumstance, Korean social policy has experienced 
an overhaul, but in a way that social policy scholars do not usually expect.
It is generally argued that economic hardship and globalisation armed with neo­
liberalism bring the existing welfare programmes into a substantial retrenchment. The state 
has to attract foreign investments and prevent domestic capital from exercising the “exit 
threat”; national governments have to adopt fiscal austerity measures, reducing social 
spending and avoiding budget deficit. Accordingly, in the era of globalisation, the 
conventional Keynesian macroeconomic management that sustained the Golden Age of the 
welfare state comes to lose its rationale, or at least is considerably constrained (Scharpf 
1997; Mishra 1998; Stryker 1998). In the meantime, neo-liberalism grows to claim a 
dominant stance in national policy making, putting a great emphasis on the free functioning 
of the market force. Sizable retrenchment of the generous and redistributive social 
protection system becomes necessary. At the same time, organised labour becomes situated 
in the dissolution of traditional class structure in the wake of changing institutional context 
and is unable to exercise much influence or command as they used to do in social policy 
making, or at least unable to resist the residualisation of welfare, (Taylor-Gooby 1997; 
Giddens 1998: 31; Mishra 1999). These internal as well as external erosions of the existing 
foundations of the welfare state eventually lead to a marked attenuation o f social 
citizenship rights, whereas civil and political rights become consolidated (Mishra 1998; 
Falk 2000). Korean social policy in post-1997 might be expected to fit perfectly into this 
scenario.
The reality of Korean social policy since then, however, has run in the opposite 
direction. Along with the outbreak of the economic hardship, the Korean welfare system
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has undergone an unprecedented expansion and restructuring in its form. Table 9-1 presents 
a cross-sectional view on this change.
Table 9-1 Changes in W elfare System after Financial Crisis
%
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
SSB as % of GDP 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.6 2.0
24.5 21.8 33.2 ■ ■ ■ ■ 35.4
PP* Yearly Pension Formula changed from 2.4(A+B)(l+0.05n) to
1.8(A+B)(l+0.05n)
Ml Changed into National Health Insurance
El ** 19.8 24.6 28.0 30.8 31.1
IAI** 38.0 35.3 34.4 42.8 N/A
PA Changed into Minimum Living Standard Guarantee
Note: SSB: Social Security Budget
PP: Public Pensions (National Pension + Civil Servant Pension + Pension for the Private 
School Employees)
MI: Medical Insurance 
El: Employment Insurance 
IAI: Industrial Accident Insurance 
PA: Public Assistance
* Coverage as % of the total population over age 15 
** Coverage as % of the total number of the economically active population 
Sources: (MHW 2002; MLA 2002; KOSIS 2003a)
Distinctive changes can be seen in the post-1997 welfare programmes. The government 
budget for social security has doubled within just four years, reaching a ‘historic’ 2 per cent 
o f GDP in 2001. As seen in the previous chapter, the welfare budget had constantly been 
less than 1 per cent over some 50 years o f the modem history of Korean social policy, 
reflecting the lack of the state commitment to social policy.
The take-up rate of all the programmes showed rapid and marked expansion. Within 
five years, the PP expanded its coverage by nearly 11 per cent; the El by 11.3 per cent; and 
the IAI by 4.8 per cent. Among them, the El, the Unemployment Benefit (UB) in particular 
can be taken as a most distinctive example of the coverage expansion since the expansion
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took place at the highest speed, despite the shortest history of operation among the social 
security programmes. As seen in the previous chapter, the UB covered those in workplaces 
with more than 30 employees by the end of 1997. As of January 1998, the coverage 
expanded to workplaces with more than 10 employees, and two months later to those with 
more than 5. In October of the same year, it was finally expanded to all workplaces 
including temporary and part-time workers75 (MLA 2002: 37, 93-96).
The entry barriers for the UB were also markedly lowered, and benefits became more 
generous. In March 1998, the requirement of 12-month contribution was reduced to 6 
months and later to 1 month from October. The duration of benefits was extended from 30 
to 90 days as a minimum period and from 210 to 240 days as a maximum period, and a 
‘special extended unemployment benefit* was newly introduced to cover additional 60 days 
as long as an unemployed shows willingness to find a job. Thus, the minimum duration of 
benefits can be 150 days. The level of benefits increased from 50 per cent to 70 per cent of 
the minimum wage from March 1998. From 2000 the level was further expanded up to 90 
per cent of the minimum wage for the low-income unemployed (MLA 2002: 53-63). These 
changes in the El present just one facet of the comprehensive overhaul in Korean social 
policy during that period.
Structural changes were made in the cases of the NP, the NI and the PA. The basic 
object of the NP’s formula change was to decrease the replacement rate from 70 per cent to 
60 per cent for 40-year contributors, as the pension funds were expected to run out by 
(World Bank 2000; Kim 2001). Thus, the change can be superficially understood as 
reducing the level of benefit to tackle institutional defects. But, the simple change of the 
benefit formula should be understood in the context of the Kim Dae Jung government’s 
decision to maintain the single pillar system instead of transforming the NP into a multi­
pillar system which was widely prescribed by the World Bank for Latin American and East 
European countries’ pension system as a solution for the problem of fund deficit (Kim 
1998e). In fact, around the end of 1997 a task force team for pension reform under the
75 Daily workers in less than one-month contract are to come under the protection of the UB 
from 2003 (MLA 2002: 100).
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previous Kim Young Sam government proposed to transform the existing NP into a two- 
pillar system consisting of basic pension and earning-related pension (Kim 2001: 107-110). 
At the same time, the World Bank strongly supported this type of transformation as a 
precondition for the Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL) during the financial crisis (Kim 
1998e).
This proposal was, however, rejected by Kim Dae Jung government in its final decision 
taken in 1998, with the current one-pillar system maintained. Furthermore, the NP was 
expanded to cover the self-employed in urban areas, those working in firms with less than 5 
employees and temporary workers, thus eventually all workers have come under the 
protection of the NP. The management of the pension funds also changed into more 
democratic system; the Management Committee of National Pension Funds (Yon’gum 
kigum unyong wiwonhoe) was established with chairmanship taken over from the minister 
of Finance and Economy to the minister of Health and Welfare, as well as a broader 
participation by the representatives of insured members. Along with the revision of the 
Public Fund Management Act (Kongjok chagum kwalli-bop), the establishment of the 
committee opened the way to manage the pension fund in more democratic way.
The structural change of the NI was another aspect of the overhaul of Korean social 
policy during the economic hardship. The main characteristic of the new National Health 
Insurance was the transformation of the existing insurance-society-based system into a 
unified one. As seen in the previous chapters, the society-based system had been a ‘political 
football’ in the politics of Korean MI, despite bold requests for reform from various social 
sectors. Under the new system, the possibility of social solidarity through risk-pooling and 
income redistribution was increased. Due to the negative backlash against this new system 
from conservative groups such as FKTU and the opposition Grand National Party 
(Hannaradang), the unification was only half successful. While the administration system 
was unified by incorporating the existing 420 individual societies into one organisation 
National Health Insurance Corporation, the unification of the financial system was 
postponed (Kim 2002: 42-45). However, the integration, even though partial, brought an
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end to the struggles associated with the MI. At the same time, it was the sign that Korean 
social policy was beginning to break away from the Japanese welfare model.
Finally, the restructuring of the public assistance programme was also a path-breaking 
event. Based on the poor relief programme imported by the colonial Japan, the Livelihood 
Protection System (Saenghwalpoho chedo) had remained unchanged since the Park regime. 
With the basic idea of the state’s benevolence remaining intact, the programme, as a social 
safety net, had never been successful in providing a national minimum for the poor, 
triggering much criticism and moves for reform from various social sectors (for more 
details, see Park 1995; Yi 1998; Ho 1999b). However, no previous government had paid 
any attention to such criticism until the Kim Dae Jung government came into power. In this 
respect, the introduction of a new public assistance programme, Kungmin kich'o saenghwal 
pojang chedo (the Minimum Guarantee of Living Standard: MGLS), in 199976 can be 
regarded as no less than a radical turn of the state’s attitude on social policy since the 
programme was designed to recognise the social rights of all citizens to ensure a decent 
standard of living (H6 1999a: 29; MHW 2001).
The major features of the MGLS are as follows. First, the entitlement conditions for 
public assistance were relaxed. In the old system, the distinction between the able bodied 
and the disabled bodied was clear, and a ‘demographic criterion’ barred those between 18 
and 65 old from becoming recipients, as they were assumed to have the ability to work. But, 
the new programme abolished such criteria and introduced the notion of relative poverty 
calculated on the basis of minimum living expense of the society. Thus, in the new 
programme, anyone who is under the official poverty line becomes eligible for benefits 
regardless of his/her age and ability to work. At the same time, by introducing a ‘temporary 
assistance scheme’, the new programme came to protect those who cannot afford a decent 
standard of living due to unemployment and decreased income caused by the economic 
hardship. Second, the benefit structure began to provide a living allowance to all recipients, 
which used to be only for those living in residential care (Ho 1999a: 29; MHW 2001).
76 This has been in operation from October 2000.
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Finally, the criterion of the means test was moderated by increasing the maximum assets 
threshold from 29 million to 44 million won (Shin 2000a: 94).
This series of reforms brought a substantial change to every aspect of the Korean public 
assistance programme. The government budget for public assistance rose by 124 per cent 
between 1999 and 2000 and again by 136 per cent between 2000 and 2001 (MHW 2002). 
The number of beneficiaries did not change much. In 1996 before the financial crisis, it 
accounted for 2.3 per cent of the total population and rose to 3.2 per cent in 1999 just 
before the operation of the MGLS, reflecting the aftermath of the socio-economic crisis. In 
2001, one year after the commencement of the programme, however, the number slightly 
decreased to 3.15 per cent. But, this decrease is attributed to the underdevelopment of 
infrastructure such as the IT system capable of assessing applicants’ incomes and the 
stricter application of the entitlement criteria in the course of beneficiary selection (MGLS 
Evaluation Team 2001: 11). In the meantime, the level of benefits increased substantially. 
In 1997, the amount of benefits for a household with three members was 267,540 won. In 
2001, it increased about 2.5 times reaching 667,000 won (MGLS Evaluation Team 2001: 
67). These improvements in all areas of the public assistance programme may not mean 
that the programme becomes enough to guarantee a national minimum for Korean citizens. 
For instance, the minimum living expense in 2001 set for household with three members 
was 760,218 won (MGLS Evaluation Team 2001: 13). But, it has certainly meant that the 
basic attitude of the state towards social policy has changed in post-1997 Korea.
What made this sweeping overhaul take place in Korean social policy during this time? 
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the overhaul has been driven by two critical 
factors: the economic crisis and the arrival of the democratic Kim government. The 
devastating impacts of the financial crisis were widespread and profound both 
economically and socially. The crisis first brought down the GDP growth rate to -6.7 per 
cent in 1998 from +5.0 per cent in 1997 (at 1995 constant prices). All industries 
experienced negative annual growth. Accordingly, the per capita gross national income was 
almost halved fromUS$ 10,315 in 1997 to USS 6,774 in 1998 (KSO 2002).
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More seriously, problems in economic arena were rapidly transferred to social arena. 
With the deteriorated economic performance, the unemployment rate rose from 2.6 per cent 
in the last quarter of 1997 to 8.5 per cent in that of 1999 (KOSIS 2003b), causing a rise in 
homelessness, suicide, family break-up, and increasing income inequality. Along with this, 
the middle class, which is regarded as an important pillar to support the modem welfare 
state, diminished in size relative to the total population (Yu and Kim 2002). This economic 
and social crisis meant the collapse of the traditional welfare system in Korea which was 
principally based on high economic growth, low rate of unemployment and lifetime 
employment, as well as the reliance on established informal welfare networks such as 
family and company.
New welfare efforts were made to address the social turmoil first by international 
organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank. As the IMF’s initial prescription on the 
economic crisis, which can be epitomised by the maintenance of high interest rates and a 
bold cut in government expenditures, turned out to be a failure (Shin 2000b: 253-255), the 
World Bank came to propose the setting of a social safety net as well as a more flexible 
labour market. The two were seen to be interdependent. They were made a precondition for 
SAL I and II. This gave a momentum to overhaul all the major social security programmes. 
The major programmes considered for this were public assistance system and the El, but 
other programmes such as the NP and the NI were also brought into a thorough scrutiny77. 
The implementation of the preconditions helped to improve the existing social policy 
programmes in Korea.
Why did the international organisations request such an expansionary overhaul of 
Korean social policy, despite their reputation as a ‘messenger’ of neo-liberalism? It can be 
claimed that from their point of view, the seemingly well-equipped Korean social 
protection system was too immature to tackle the new social turmoil, or even to reduce 
poverty. The nation, in their view, needed a more appropriate welfare system before 
embarking on economic reconstruction. This line of argument had been addressed in
77 For the details of the preconditions, see Kim et al. 1998.
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relation to the post-Communist countries in a World Bank report (Barr 1994). As the IMF 
director of that time Camdessus (1999) acknowledged, the Korean, Asian in general, crisis 
had to be dealt with through not just “strong monetary and macroeconomic management” 
but also “sound social policy”. From the viewpoint of Korean government, it was expedient 
and necessary to accept such a precondition because the crippling economy desperately 
needed foreign loans for recuperation. Seeing from the stance of Korean social policy, it 
was an unexpected opportunity to make changes towards a more generous and 
comprehensive system.
This story disputes the conventional understanding of the relationship between 
globalisation and the welfare state. It is often claimed that it leads to retrenchment of state 
welfare (Pierson 2000b) or ‘retreating to core programmes’ (Glennerster 1999: 10) in 
advanced economies. But, in Korea a contrary phenomenon happened. From the Korean 
experience, it can be thus argued that welfare laggards like Korea can benefit from 
globalisation to a certain extent. In this context, it is possible to argue that what 
globalisation brings to welfare laggards is expansion, even if symbolic, and a progressive 
modification of the traditional forms of social protection (Strang and Chang 1993; Holliday 
2000; Rudra 2002). In a similar vein, it seems more plausible to agree with the assertion 
that globalisation brings about not a retrenchment but a diversification of national, 
especially first world, welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1996; Gough 1996; Scharpf 1997: 
26-27).
International organisations were not the only actor driving welfare reform in post-1997 
Korea. As mentioned above, the installation of the Kim Dae Jung government was also 
critical in setting up the direction of the welfare reform. As seen in the case of the new NP, 
the direction of the reform did not follow the prescription of the World Bank; the more 
distributive one-pillar scheme being preserved instead. Despite continuous calls for reform 
from various social sectors, former Korean governments had not attempted to reform the NI 
and the public assistance system. But, the Kim government managed to achieve this. More 
importantly, if the government followed the principle of ‘administrative convenience’ 
typically found in Korean social policy making, the reform would have ended up simply
317
expanding their coverage and/or increasing benefits, instead of giving a sweeping overhaul 
to their structures. But, the Kim government sometimes broke away from the prescription 
of the global governance and sometimes put bolder reform in welfare programmes than 
widely expected. What made this possible?
The first salient feature of the new government was the arrival of a new politics of 
Korean social policy in which the hitherto exclusive policy network changed to an inclusive 
one. The Kim’s accession to power meant not just the electoral success of a progressive 
party in Korean politics, but also the empowerment of the progressive politicians in policy 
making, giving a great momentum for the reinstatement of party politics and parliamentary 
democracy. This opened political windows so that the formerly excluded progressive civil 
organisations such as the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy could actively 
participate in policy-making processes. Up until the previous government, the policy 
agenda on welfare programmes was usually initiated and processed within the 
administration, that is, between the president (or the Presidential Office) and government 
ministries such as the EPB, the MLA and the MHW, while the political parties and the NA 
were decidedly on the outer. But, in the era of more open style of politics, a symbiotic 
relationship between president, the ruling party and civil organisations was created in 
which a progressive policy agenda set forth by the organisations was principally discussed 
in the ruling party and sent to the Presidential Office, while the government ministries 
mainly conducting practical affairs to put the new agenda in operation. This kind of new 
policy network was applied to acts of all major social policy reform during the Kim 
administration (An 2000; Kwon 2003a). This shows that the legacy of the authoritarian 
state still remained with the president still occupying the centre of the policy process on the 
one hand. On the other hand, it also reveals the extent to which the exclusive policy 
network had undergone rapid change.
The second salient feature was found in the establishment of NosajSng wiwSnhoe (the 
Korean Tripartite Commission; KTC) on 15 January 1998, which engaged participants 
from unions, employers and the government. Superficially, the establishment was an 
attempt of the government to raise a social consensus amidst the financial and social crisis
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(KTC 1998a). In reality, it was an official end of the exclusive state corporatism that 
dominated the Korean industrial relations for about 50 years, as the democratic trade union, 
the KCTU, was finally legalised and its representatives entitled to membership of the KTC. 
At the same time, it opened up the possibility for the emergence of the democratic power 
politics. During the financial crisis, the Commission dealt with virtually all the major 
reform agendas, running from social policy to industrial relations including the reform of 
the Korean conglomerate, cheabol (for more details, see KTC 1998b).
In conclusion, it can be said that while the economic and social crisis after 1997 
triggered the series of welfare reforms, it was the new open style of politics that has steered 
their directions. The blend of two events has helped Korean social policy gradually moving 
from exclusive to inclusive system. In one sense, it was the second structural break of 
Korean social policy after Japanese colonisation, once again contradicting the Pierson’s 
path dependence theory, even if such a judgement may be too hasty given the short history 
of the reform. More fundamentally, such changes seem to suggest important implications 
for the future development of social citizenship in Korea. Given the fact that the direction 
of the welfare reform was determined by changed politics more than by economic turmoil 
or global governance, what still matters above all in Korean social policy seems to be 
domestic politics. Since 1997, the democratic progress has made the power of the state 
gradually contract. In this context, the future direction of social citizenship development in 
Korea is likely to be determined by the conflicts between different interest groups including 
trade unions. In the meantime, if the working class are successful in unifying the currently 
split representation system, the future direction would be dependent on democratic power 
politics. In Marshallian terms, political rights are still vitally important as a condition for 
the development of social rights in Korea.
This led to several questions that a further research on Korean citizenship needs to 
address. First of all, it needs to test whether the new policy process in post-1997 Korea 
continues to help civil and political rights consolidate as the precondition for social rights. 
Further, it needs to test how far the principles of social rights are embodied in Korea’s 
implemented welfare programmes. In other words, future research needs to test how far
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civil sectors such as trade unions are able to participate in particular policy developments, 
and how far welfare politics are open and reflective of different pressures and interests. 
This will help us see whether such a new policy tradition complies with the Marshallian 
understanding of social development, or whether it retreats to the old Korean tradition of 
authoritarian politics. In the context of comparative study, this will help us test whether a 
half-century-old theory of citizenship still provides an important reference point of social 
policy study in the era of globalisation.
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Appendixl Chronology of Social Policy Legislation in M odern Korea
Year Legislation
1944 Korea Relief Order
Act of Children’s Well-being
Act of Rehabilitation Relief
1961 Veterans Compensation Act
Prostitution Prevention Act
Public Assistance Act
1962 Disaster Relief Act Civil Servants Pension Act
1963
Soldiers Pension Act 
Medical Insurance Act 
Industrial Accident Insurance Act 
Basic Law Concerning Social Security
1969 Enforcement Ordinance of Public Assistance Act
1970 Social Welfare Services Act Revision of Medical Insurance Act
1973
Act for Mother and Children’s Health 
National Welfare Pension Act 
Pension Act for Private School Teachers
1976 Amendment of Medical Insurance Act
1g77 Medical Assistance Act
Medical Insurance Act for Civil Servants and Private School Teachers
1981
Welfare Act for Children
Welfare Act for the Elderly
Welfare Act for the Mental and Physical Disorders
1982 Amendment of Public Assistance Act
1983 Amendment of Social Welfare Service Act
1986 Amendment of National Welfare Pension Act of 1973 into National Pension Act. 
Minimum Wage Act.
1989 Maternity Welfare Act.Law for the Promotion of the Employment of the Disabled.
1991 Child Care Act
1992 Amendment of Social Welfare Services Act
1993 Amendment of the Welfare Act of the Elderly Employment Insurance Act
1995 Basic Act of Social Security
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Appendix 2 Structure of Korean Social Policy (1997)
Programmes ResponsibleInstitution(s) Source(s) of Fund
Civil Servants MGAHA(CSPC)
Civil Servant and 
Government
Soldiers MND Soldiers andGovernment
Public Private School
Pension Private School 
Employees
ME
(PSEPC)
Employees, 
Government, and 
School
Social
National
Pension
MHW
(NPC)
Employees and 
Employers
Enterprise MHW(NFMIS)
Employees and 
Employers
Social
Insurance Regional MHW(NFMIS)
The Insured and 
Government
Health Civil Servants andCivil Servants Government;
Security and Private
School
Employees
MHW
(NHIC)
Private School 
Employees, 
Government, and 
Schools
Industria Accident MLA Employers
Employment Insurance MLA(EIC)
Employees and 
Employers
Livelihood Assistance
Medical Assistance MHW
Public Funeral Assistance
Educational Assistance ME Government
Assistance Vocational Training MLA
Public Loan MHW
Public Work MGAHA
The Elderly
Social Children MHW Government and 
Non-profits FundsWelfare The Disabled
Services Women in Need
Correctional Services MJ
CSPC: Civil Servant Pension Corporation 
ELC: Employment Insurance Corporation 
ME: Ministry of Education
MGAHA: Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs
MHW: Ministry of Health and Welfare
MJ: Ministry of Justice
MLA: Ministry of Labour Affairs
322
MND: Ministry of National Defence
NFMIS: National Federation of Medical Insurance Societies
NHIC: National Health Insurance Corporation
NPC: National Pension Corporation
PSEPC: Private School Employee Pension Corporation
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